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## ART. I.—TRADITION AND PAPAL INFALLIBILITY.

*Papal Infallibility.* By a ROMAN CATHOLIC LAYMAN. London: Rivingtons.

*J. B. Franzelin de Traditione et Scripturâ.* Romæ.

IT is a trite remark, that at one period of her history the Church is led to reflect on one part of the Deposit committed to her, at another to another; to her doctrine on the Incarnation, or on Justification, or on the Auxilia of Grace, as circumstances may prompt. Nor indeed can it be said, that her stream of thought is always determined for her by the heresies which may happen to arise in any particular age. On the contrary, as F. Newman has profoundly remarked, those heresies are themselves often occasioned by her existing state of thought and the movement of her theology; insomuch that they may be taken as indications, "in what way the current is setting and the rate at which it flows." \*

Now we have more than once expressed an opinion, that the particular class of doctrine with which the Church is just now especially engaged—which especially and as it were spontaneously presents itself to the analysis of her theologians—is that which concerns her own teaching authority. And in this case indeed the movement of theology does seem moulded by the pressure of the time; because, in these days of intellectual anarchy, the principle of doctrinal authority is the one most salient point of contrast between the Church and the world. It was a matter then in some sense of necessity—even apart from the Döllingerite movement—that the precise location of her supreme magisterium should be more sharply and peremptorily defined, and moreover that the sphere and range of that magisterium should be more exactly and methodically considered. Many an incidental mistake of expression or even of thought—as has been so frequently

\* "Essay on Development," p. 349.

pointed out—was comparatively harmless in the earliest centuries, which might tend to fatal results if continued after the rise of the Arian pestilence. And in like manner many an inaccurate expression, tending as far as words go to limit unduly the doctrinal authority of the *Ecclesia Docens* or the Holy See, may receive in such times as these a noxious and subversive application, of which its originators never dreamed.

The trumpety pamphlet, which we have named at the head of our article,—as on the one hand it abounds throughout with almost incredible misapprehension of the most orthodox and undeniably Catholic propositions,—so on the other hand endeavours to make capital out of one or two such inaccurate statements as we have just mentioned. It is so weak and puzzle-headed, that one might well doubt whether Catholics of even the most ordinary intelligence might not be safely left to see through its fallacies for themselves. But before we had heard of it, we had been intending to place before our readers some brief account of Cardinal Franzelin's masterly treatise on Tradition, with special view to the exigencies of the moment. The "layman's" pamphlet then has in no other way influenced our plans, than as determining us to do at once what we had resolved to do very soon. It seems to us that certain writers, far abler than our "Layman," fall into serious error, from not sufficiently apprehending the true nature of Catholic Tradition. On the other hand, when this theological foundation has once been securely laid, one can most readily show how simply irrelevant are the arguments commonly adduced from Tradition against the dogma of Papal Infallibility. In the first part of our article therefore, we shall entirely ignore the anonymous pamphlet before us: we shall exclusively occupy ourselves, under Card. Franzelin's guidance, with stating a few of the more elementary and rudimentary truths concerning Catholic Tradition. We have more than once expressed our humble opinion, that he is the greatest of living Catholic theologians; and we feel it especially opportune that our article should appear at a moment, when his very numerous pupils and admirers are jubilant at his recent elevation.

When Döllingerites and Anglicans allege that Tradition is opposed to the dogma of Papal Infallibility, they must use the former term as signifying "the body of divinely revealed doctrine committed by the Apostles to the Church's custody." Tradition, so understood, includes the doctrine, that certain given books are divinely inspired; and also the doctrine, that the term "divine inspiration" has such or such a meaning: but it does not (we suppose) include the mere letter of Scrip-



ture. We are merely saying this for the sake of precision, and not at all as though any part of our argument turned upon the remark. But there are various statements, which are in no other way testified by the Church, except only by her authentication of Scripture. Such are e.g. in very large measure the details of our Lord's Life and Passion; the details of S. Paul's Conversion; and a thousand other particulars. In regard to these, every one (we suppose) would say, that they are contained immediately in Scripture, and not otherwise than indirectly in Tradition.

Card. Franzelin (p. 13) divides Tradition into "Dominical" and "Divino-Apostolic": the former consisting of those doctrines with which the Apostles were imbued by Christ Himself; the latter those which were taught them by God after Christ's Ascension. In whatever degree doctrines of either class may happen to have been expressed in Scripture,—they have an authority quite independent of that fact, and we are here regarding them as *unwritten* traditions. And thus arises a very fundamental question, on which it is vitally important that true notions should be entertained. What is *meant*, we ask, by this phrase "unwritten Tradition"?

When a Catholic controversialist dwells upon "unwritten Tradition," he is sometimes challenged by shallow Protestants to exhibit once for all a *list* of these "unwritten traditions." F. Newman, even in the most anti-Roman period of his life, saw the utter absurdity of such a challenge. As well, he said, you might go up to a man in the street, and challenge him to tell you his whole mind.\* The Church's Tradition is what may be called her doctrinal mind. It is impossible ever by analysis to exhaust the fulness of that mind. The questions are indefinitely numerous, to each one of which but one answer can be given, consistently with the genuine doctrine entrusted to her keeping. "The conception of Divine Tradition," says Card. Franzelin (p. 254), "is not realized (*absolvitur*) by the fact, that a certain summary is preserved of doctrinal formulæ; but the essential character of Tradition consists in the perpetual and infallible conservation of the *true sense* and *true apprehension* [*intelligentiæ*] of the Deposit of Faith and Revealed Doctrine." So in p. 182, having recited various patristic testimonies, he thus proceeds: "When we are taught [by the Fathers] that 'into the Church, as into a rich treasure-house, are brought together all those things which belong to the Truth, insomuch that whosoever will

\* We are referring from memory to his work on "Romanism and Popular Protestantism."

may thence draw the draught of life;—that ‘in the Church, as in a good vessel, there exists through the Holy Ghost the Deposit of Faith, always youthful and always preserving in youth the vessel itself’;—‘that accordingly the Holy Ghost is the principle of this ever-youthful life of faith’;—truly by such words is not understood only a conservation materially considered of certain words, formulæ, and theorems, but the conservation and propagation of the pure apprehension of revealed truths.” Or to express in other words the bearing of such patristic passages,—the Church has been from the first put in trust with a treasure, on the one hand unspeakably precious: yet on the other hand of so comprehensive, delicate, spiritual, supernatural a quality, that it is exposed to indefinite danger of unconscious corruption; and that not otherwise than through the very agency of the Holy Ghost, can it be preserved in its genuine and pristine purity.

This treasure—this body of dogma—may be regarded in a twofold aspect. Firstly it may be considered in itself and objectively; and in this sense the Fathers call Tradition “the Ecclesiastical Announcement [prædicatio]”; “the Rule of [Catholic] understanding”; “the Rule of Apostolic Truth.” Secondly and correlatively we may consider the mind of the Church subjectively, as enlightened by and moulded on this doctrine: and this enlightenment is called by the Fathers “the common consciousness of faith [conscientia fidei communis]”; “the Catholic intellect”; “the ecclesiastical sense”; “the faith written in the hearts” of Christians; “unwritten wisdom” (p. 87).\* So S. John himself says that Christians have “the mind of Christ”; and S. Ignatius, his disciple, declares that “Bishops throughout the world are in the mind of Christ [in sententiâ Christi],” even as “Christ Himself is the very Mind of His Father.” And Card. Franzelin proceeds with such citations to the end of the Thesis.

Such was the principle, universally recognized in the Church from the earliest times: often distinctly expressed, and invariably the foundation of her practice. The criterion of genuine Tradition (p. 62) was the consent of the various Churches with each other, and especially with the Roman Church. The *Ecclesia Docens* in every age was to be the Catholic’s one infallible guide: the formal cause of her infallibility being her union with her visible Head, and its efficient cause the assistance of the Holy Ghost.

\* Our references in this part of our article, unless it be otherwise mentioned, are all to Card. Franzelin’s work. Nor do we hesitate on occasion to abridge his language, and even to alter a word or two with that end in view.

And thus we are able to understand that constant appeal to Antiquity, which has been so grievously misapprehended by Dollingerites and Anglicans. Whenever (p. 251) some dogma has been defined, or otherwise taught as revealed, by the body of the *Ecclesia Docens* united with her Head,—the fact of its divine revelation must be regarded as infallibly certain; and those who refuse to accept it with divine faith, become thereby heretics. But from time to time it may happen in the case of some given doctrine, that this consent of the living *Ecclesia Docens* is not so manifest; inasmuch as some not inconsiderable number of Bishops may have lapsed into heresy. In such a case, the orthodox often appealed to Antiquity. In doing this, their design was not what Anglicans suppose; viz. (p. 70) “to demonstrate *historically* the Apostolic derivation of such doctrine.” Their purpose was to adduce a *theological* argument. “It was an established and universally received truth, that in no age could the Fathers of *that* age have unanimously laid down some doctrine as of faith, except one which they had themselves received; nor taught anything, except what they had learned from their predecessors. Therefore, in appealing to their predecessors, the unanimous consent of their *immediate* predecessors was thought sufficient. Thus in the Fifth Century the Ephesine Fathers appeal, as to irrefragable witnesses of Apostolic Doctrine, to ten preceding Fathers; among whom, two only belonged to the Third Century, and all the rest to the Fourth or even the Fifth. Among twenty-five Fathers cited by S. Augustine against Julian, two only are antecedent to the Fourth Century. In the Lateran Council under Martin I., among twenty Fathers cited, only two or three were considered anterior to the Fourth century. In the Sixth Council, fifteen Fathers are cited, not one of whom flourished before the Fifth Century” (pp. 70, 71).

This important remark, on the patristic meaning of the word “Antiquity,” was earnestly pressed by Rev. W. Penny, now a Catholic priest, in the exposition of Vincent’s Canon, which he published at the time of his conversion. Card. Franzelin’s statement however, on the identity of doctrine in every age, must of course be taken subject to that view of gradual development, which he sets forth in a later part of his treatise, and to which we shall presently refer.

The direct cause of the infallibility of the *Ecclesia Docens* was the “*charisma veritatis*,” promised and conferred by Christ. But every human means was also taken, in order that the possibility of error might be excluded (pp. 72–78). Thus (1) no one was appointed Bishop, until careful investiga-

tion had been instituted concerning the soundness of his faith. Then (2) in every Church a list of the preceding orthodox Bishops was preserved, whence were sedulously excluded the names of any suspected concerning error or heresy. Moreover (3) it was a recognized rule, that in whatever part of the Church any doctrinal novelty might display itself, it was the Bishop's business at once to announce the fact to other Bishops, especially to the Roman Pontiff. And lastly, when special danger threatened the Faith, resource was had to the assemblage of Councils, Provincial or Ecumenical. And all this took place under the influence of a universally admitted principle: viz. that the Faith once given is most religiously to be retained, and that every novelty is known by that very fact to be subversive of faith and salvation.

Our purpose does not lead us to follow Card. Franzelin in his very interesting disquisition, on the authority justly claimed for the unanimous teaching, whether of the Fathers or the Theological School: we will but briefly indicate his conclusions. In regard to the former, he does not admit (p.142) a distinction, sometimes drawn, between the authority of the Fathers as *witnesses* to Tradition on one hand, and as *doctors* on the other. Rather, he says, the distinction should be, between an individual Father on one hand, and the unanimous patristic voice of any given period on the other. "When the Fathers, in their capacity of *doctors*, unanimously, consistently, and expressly" at any given period "declare some sense as the true one of a dogma which had been obscure, or explicate what had been implicit, or define more strictly what had appeared ambiguous—the sense thus delivered and explicated must be no less accounted the true and genuine sense of revealed dogma, than when in their capacity as *guardians* of the Faith they have handed down to posterity what they had received clear and explicated from their predecessors." For "their unanimous apprehension of doctrine" in any given age is nothing else than "the Catholic intellect, formed and moulded under the infallible assistance and direction of the Holy Ghost" (p. 142).

A similar authority is ascribed to consent of the *theological schools* of the post-patristic period; but on grounds somewhat different. "Although the schools and their theologians are not (as the Bishops are) the organ instituted by Christ for the purpose of conserving religious doctrine under assistance of the Spirit of Truth—nevertheless by their unanimous and consistent judgment on matters of faith, when they teach something not only as true but also as to be believed with Catholic faith, we are led to the knowledge of that Catholic intelligence and doctrine, which the Apostolic Succession itself, as the authentic

interpreter and guardian of Revelation, conserves and lays down." (p. 171). It may well happen indeed (p. 177), that the theologians of some one age may teach *opinatively*, with approximate or even complete unanimity, some mistaken tenet; but theologians will never unanimously and for a series of years teach any doctrine as certainly revealed, which is not really so.

These remarks are followed by a very interesting examination of two or three theological instances, which have before now been alleged, as inconsistent with the above statements. Card. Franzelin shows that they are by no means inconsistent therewith.

Card. Franzelin however is careful to point out (p. 176) that the authority, justly claimed for the scholastics, concerns only "doctrines truly theological, appertaining to matters of faith and morals"; and by no means extends to "tenets which are merely philosophical." And he explains his meaning more clearly, in a note of very great importance. "It is easily seen," he says, "that many truths, in themselves philosophical and metaphysical, are in the strictest relation with verities of faith; insomuch that without them the latter cannot be rightly understood and explicated. When this happens, those metaphysical truths, not indeed regarded universally but in their formal relation to the verities of faith with which they are bound up, should be accounted truly theological. Of this kind are the notions of 'nature' and 'hypostasis,' in relation to the Mystery of One Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, and of Two Natures in the One Hypostasis of Christ. Of this kind again, is the doctrine concerning the accidents of bodies, in reference to their being conserved in the Holy Eucharist without substance as their subject of inhesion. Also concerning the essential relations of bodies to space (in reference to the same Mystery of the Eucharist) at least *negatively*; viz. what relations are *not* necessary. Again, the doctrine concerning accedent and inherent substances and qualities, in reference to the dogmata on Grace and the Sacramental Character; or concerning 'the substantial form,' in reference to the true unity of human nature. Lastly, there are several other truths, which in themselves are common to philosophy and theology; because on the one hand they are within the sphere of Reason, while on the other hand they are also comprehended in Revelation."

It is of most vital importance, that philosophy be thus subject to theology in every point of their mutual contact. And there cannot be a better illustration of the motives which have led the Church so peremptorily to insist on this subjection,

than the account given by Card. Franzelin (p. 261) of Günther's theological method: a method distinctly contemplated and anathematized by the Vatican Council. "Günther distinguished between the historical facts mentioned in Scripture, and the intelligence of those facts. This intelligence he called 'doctrinal tradition' and 'the Church's consciousness.' He then laid down, that this intelligence receives continual increments by help of philosophical science; insomuch that it was more imperfect in the Apostles than in the Fathers, and yet even in the latter very inadequate because of their ignorance of true philosophy: until at length in our own age the new philosophy (Günther's own) has opened the road, whereby we may arrive at the supreme intelligence of all revealed doctrine. While science is thus growing, it is the Church's part, among the various modes of understanding some doctrine which prevail at any given period, to define that which for the said period is *fittest*: and in defining *this*, the Church is infallible. But (according to Günther) as psychology and other branches of philosophy advance, the definition of a doctrine before given by the Church will show itself to be defective; and a more perfect one will become necessary."

Against this monstrous view of things, Card. Franzelin lays down of course the Catholic truth (p. 263), that "the Church's Definitions, under that form of words and under those conceptions under which they are proposed, are to be believed with irreformable and immovable faith. For this is the very thing done through the Holy Ghost's assistance, that nothing be contained in definitions of faith which is not objectively revealed and immutably true." And as regards Günther's doctrine on the growth of philosophy, Card. Franzelin thus draws out the antagonistic verity. "After a definition, it is forbidden that human science conform the sense of a dogma to its own preconceived ideas: on the contrary the sense [of terms] contained in the Definition must be the norm of [philosophical] science and intelligence. Science e.g. must explain its notion of 'person' and 'nature,' according to the sense of defined dogma concerning the Trinity and Incarnation; science must explain its notion of 'generation,' according to the sense of defined dogma concerning the Procession of the Holy Ghost"; and so in the various other instances already specified.

Our readers may remember, that Card. Franzelin's view on the authority of the scholastic philosophy is that on which we have ourselves always insisted; though the writer whom we have chiefly followed in the matter has not been Card. Franzelin



but F. Klentgen. Of those propositions which are unanimously affirmed by the scholastics, by no means a small proportion—including perhaps all which may be truly called the most essential and fundamental principles of scholastic philosophy—are of absolute authority; as being indissolubly bound up with authoritative theology. But in regard to those which are not so bound up, a Catholic philosopher, who conforms himself with due docility to the Church's mind, will attach to them just that amount of weight, neither more nor less, which he considers due to the reasoning adducible in their defence. Nothing can be more opposed—we will not merely say to the spirit—but to the express teaching of the Church, than to bring authority to bear on matters of mere philosophy.\* Accordingly (as we mentioned last October, p. 514) F. Palmieri, S.J., warns his readers to be on their guard in such matters, not to rest on the authority even of the greatest men. And similarly speaks Gonzalez, the distinguished Dominican philosopher, whom we cited in our last number (p. 242). "It is neither reasonable," he says, "nor useful, nor conformable with truth, to cry up the scholastic philosophy, as though it contained nothing false or erroneous; or as though it knew and contained everything, in such sense that it may not learn and appropriate new and useful truth from modern philosophy." Philosophy in itself is a purely rational science; and no one can gravely maintain, that in a series of centuries, during which it has been assiduously cultivated, it is likely to have been entirely barren of important discoveries. The philosophers of one age may have held unanimously many a tenet, which the researches of the subsequent period have gravely disparaged or even conclusively disproved. On this whole matter however, we would refer to an article in our number for April, 1878.†

\* We may add two statements however, which do not indeed modify, but which explain more clearly what we intend in the text. (1) As a matter of terminology, the Catholic philosopher, if well advised, will generally (though not quite universally) employ the scholastic term to express some given thought, rather than another term which on its own ground might seem to him preferable. (2) In regard to any philosophical tenet held universally by the scholastics, we may be quite certain that it is not *theologically* objectionable. The Catholic philosopher then should not reject it, until he has carefully assured himself that its rejection has no unfavourable bearing on Catholic truth.

It is somewhat difficult on the surface to understand, how authority can reasonably be allowed any weight, on questions which are within the domain of reason. On this we would refer our readers to pp. 43, 4 of our number for July, 1869.

† There can now be no impropriety in saying that this article was contributed by the late F. Dalgairns. By F. Dalgairns's most melancholy illness, and now by his death, the Catholic cause in England (as we need hardly



Reverting to the course of our argument—having considered consent of the Fathers and consent of Theologians as notes of Catholic truth, we must not omit to consider consent of the faithful in that light. “The consciousness and profession of faith,” says Card. Franzelin (p. 94), “in the whole assemblage of the faithful is always preserved free from error by the Spirit of Truth, through the authentic magisterium of the Apostolic Succession.” This is the doctrine, so well known under the name of the Church’s “passive infallibility.” “The very end,” says Card. Franzelin (p. 95), “for which the authentic magisterium of the Ecclesia Docens was instituted, is the conservation and integrity of the Faith in the minds of the faithful.” “The Spirit of Truth is present to the whole body of the faithful, not suffering the various churches to be otherwise minded, to believe otherwise, than as He had preached through the Apostles” (p. 97). At the same time, when S. John says to his disciples “you have an unction from the Holy Spirit and know all things”; or when God says in Jeremias, concerning Christians, “I will write My Law in their hearts”; or when similar passages elsewhere occur;—the very context commonly shows, that the divine knowledge possessed by the faithful is in no other way given and conserved, except through the divinely protected teaching of their Pastors (pp. 97–100). And in connection with this statement, Card. Franzelin (pp. 103, 4) carefully considers S. Hilary’s well-known complaint, uttered in the days of Arianism, that “the ears of the people are more holy than the hearts of the priests.”

At the same time we would ask, under correction, whether a certain more independent authority may not be conceded to

say) has lost one of its most intelligent and one of its most effective champions. Among his more special characteristics was, that he performed with thorough conscientiousness a task, peculiarly necessary in these days for solid controversy: we mean, that he carefully studied the chief irreligious writers, with an earnest desire to avoid all misapprehension of their meaning, and to catch accurately in each case their precise point. In truth, we hardly know any Catholic who (to our mind) had so accurate an apprehension, whether of the infidel stand-point, or of the appropriate Catholic reply; but he was prevented from doing anything like justice to his own powers, on the one hand by constant pressure of ill-health, and on the other hand by the great amount of practical work in which his sacerdotal zeal involved him. He possessed extraordinary many-sidedness and versatility: theology, philosophy, history,—all were so much in his line, that it is difficult to say which was most so of the three. And all the world knows the charm and brilliancy of his style, with whatever theme he might be engaged. If we may speak for a moment of ourselves—we feel keenly that in him we have lost one of the most hearty co-operators and sympathizers with the special work to which this REVIEW is devoted. Requiescat in pace.

the *cœtus fidelium*, than Card. Franzelin admits. Let it be supposed, that certain fundamental verities have been taught to the Church as divinely revealed; and let it be further supposed, that individual Christians—in proportion as they more constantly and profoundly meditate on these verities, in proportion as they lead more devout lives, in proportion as they are more widely removed from the corrupting infection of worldliness,—in that very proportion are found unanimously to develop these verities into certain given corollaries. We would inquire, whether such a fact as this should not reasonably weigh with the *Ecclesia Docens*, as an extremely strong presumption that these corollaries are true. It seems to us, that the affirmative answer to this question was implied by more than one theologian, who advocated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception before it had been defined, and who alleged the *sensus fidelium* as telling in behalf of that dogma.

What we have said in the preceding pages, makes clear the ground of a statement, universally made by Catholic theologians. The infallibility of the *Ecclesia Docens*,—of the Episcopate acting in union with its visible Head—was not merely from the first an integral portion of the Catholic Faith, but was in some sense the very foundation on which all the rest reposed. The dogmata of the Catholic Faith are the dogmata which the Apostles taught as revealed verities: but in no other way did the Apostles give to each individual Christian means of *knowing* them to be revealed, except by committing them to the guardianship of the *Ecclesia Docens*.\* If then the *Ecclesia Docens* were not *infallible* in such guardianship, there would have been no certain knowledge whatever of revealed truth.

It is most carefully to be observed however, that the *Ecclesia Docens* in every age teaches a large body of doctrines, in some way entirely different from that of definition. So Card. Franzelin (p. 105) ascribes to her infallibility, not only "in her solemn judgments or definitions of doctrine," but also "in her universal and consistent preaching" thereof. This truth was emphatically inculcated by Pius IX. in his Munich Brief, and was afterwards declared at the Vatican Council. When Arius's tenet on the Son's Nature was first understood, or Nestorius's or Eutyches's on the Incarnation, or Pelagius's on Original Sin and Grace, or Luther's on Justification, or in other similar cases,—the contemporary faithful felt at once

\* We are not here arguing against those strange thinkers, who consider that the individual can arrive by personal inquiry at full knowledge, (1) that certain given books are divinely inspired, and (2) that they contain this and that definite dogma.

that they had been taught and trained in a doctrine, which these respective tenets denied and subverted. Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians, Pelagians, Lutherans were heretics, not merely after their condemnation, but before it; because they denied what was contained in the Church's universal teaching as an integral part of Revealed Truth. On the other hand, this antagonistic teaching had not been effected by means of *definitions*; because it was not till these heretics arose, that each antagonistic dogma was defined.

Here a question is opened of much interest and importance, which we cannot find that Card. Franzelin has directly contemplated: viz. *how* can verities be taught, in some different way from that of completely accurate and scientific statement. There are various suggestions in F. Newman's writings, which throw great light on the question; though we do not remember that he has exactly proposed it to himself, in the shape in which we have here raised it.\* The question is far too large a one to be entered on episodically; but we may give one illustration of what we would say on it. Let it be supposed, that for one reason or other I wish to indoctrinate my children with a thoroughly true idea of some dear friend now deceased. For that purpose, I tell them so large a number of vivid and illustrative anecdotes concerning him, that his true image quite possesses their mind. They go into the world, and find various persons filled with a perfectly mistaken notion of his character; and they labour accordingly to put into shape that true impression, which they have received from me. It is they who first *define*, what it was I nevertheless who originally taught them.

We now arrive in natural course at a theme, which we have already somewhat anticipated; viz. Card. Franzelin's view (p. 239) of doctrinal development. The various verities, which were delivered by the Apostles to the Church, are divided by him (after S. Thomas) into two classes. Firstly there are those, which "are explicitly to be known and believed by all" the adult faithful: "because their knowledge is either absolutely necessary of itself for directing man to his supernatural end, or at least in such sense constitute the foundation of the Christian religion that it is every Christian's duty to know them. For which reason at every period they

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\* His "Essay on Development" is that which, more than any other, would contain his thoughts on the matter. We may perhaps be permitted to express our earnest hope that he will give the world a new edition of that most powerful treatise; with such changes of course as would be necessitated by the circumstance, that he is not now, as he was when he wrote it, in a state of theological transition.

were contained in the public profession of Christians." Of such doctrines we have been just now speaking. But there is also a second class, which "appertain to a knowledge of Christian Truths both intensively and extensively more perfect: which said deeper and wider knowledge, neither by itself and absolutely, nor by reason of any precept, is necessary to all Christians or even morally possible." So S. Paul spoke "wisdom among them that were *perfect*" (1 Cor. ii. 6); and exhorted his disciples that, after having laid a dogmatic foundation, they proceed diligently to build thereupon (Heb. vi. 1). See also 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2, 10; 1 Thes. iii. 10. These are Card. Franzelin's references. Now (p. 240) "those truths, which were explicitly to be known and believed by all the faithful, were doubtless from the first contained in Apostolic Tradition, explicitly, clearly, and emphatically. But among the other class of verities there may be some, which are contained in Apostolic preaching *implicitly*, and were only handed down in this implicit shape"; which in fact are but obscurely and unemphatically contained in Tradition, "until circumstances require, and the Holy Ghost through the Church's authentic magisterium effects, the explication of what had been implicit, the elucidation of what had been obscure, the express and constant preaching or the definition of what had been unemphatically handed down."

This however is by no means all. Even those truths, which were from the first most emphatically and unremittingly taught, were in the earlier centuries (as we have seen) inculcated by some method different from that of completely scientific and accurate definition; while nevertheless—as time went on, and heresies arose, and the original Apostolic impulse (if we may so speak) grew fainter—such more accurate definition became a matter of absolute necessity. We see then how undeniable is Card. Franzelin's statement (p. 254), that "a true understanding of doctrine and the integrity of the Deposit cannot be infallibly preserved and rightly proposed," unless the *witnesses* of the Faith are also its *infallible expositors*. The Ecclesia Docens has not merely to preserve Tradition in the shape in which she received it, but to perform a work immeasurably more anxious and delicate. In regard to those dogmata which have been explicitly taught from the first, she has to determine what is their bearing on this or that question which successively emerges, and in what language also (as necessity arises) they shall be appropriately clothed: while in regard to those contents of Revelation which had *not* been from the first explicitly taught to all, she has to discriminate them on occasion from counterfeits; to authenticate

them as revealed ; and to express them in precise and accurate formulæ. All this moreover, without mentioning the *further* duty incumbent on her, of defining doctrines, which are not contained in the Deposit at all, but which nevertheless need to be imposed on the Catholic's assent, in order that a due apprehension of the Deposit itself may be rightly secured in his mind. Unless she were enabled then to perform with infallible accuracy a task of extreme delicacy and difficulty, she would not be able to protect infallibly the Deposit committed to her charge.

It is certain then, that the Church can define a dogma as revealed,—as part of the Catholic Faith,—which is but “*implicitly*” contained in the Apostolic Deposit. But now here, what is the precise meaning of this word “*implicitly*”? Let us suppose e.g. that some given proposition had been in no sense whatever communicated by the Apostles to any portion of the Church ; but that nevertheless it is logically discoverable, by combining this or that revealed verity with premisses known by Reason. No one doubts, that such a proposition can be infallibly defined as a *Catholic Truth* : but can it be defined as a *revealed truth* ? as part of the *Faith* ? in such sense that its denial is a *heresy* ? Theologians differ on this question ; and we think that Card. Franzelin himself (see p. 239, note) does not express himself unmistakably on the subject. Speaking however entirely under correction, we submit that a *negative* answer should be given to the question. According to the view which we are ourselves disposed to hold—when the Church defines some dogma as *revealed*, she defines that it has *in itself* been communicated to the Church by the Apostles ; that to deny it, would be in some degree to impair the full picture of Truth which was exhibited by the Apostles. Exhibited by them—observe—by no means necessarily to the multitude of the faithful, but to those more “*perfect*” keen and docile disciples, whom we have above mentioned. Certainly Card. Franzelin's instances seem chiefly of this kind. “*In the Apostolic preaching*” he says (p. 242) “*there might be proposed universals, of which the Church in due time defined particular instances : as the revealed dogma of the necessity of grace for every salutific work, was applied by her to that particular salutific work, the ‘initium fidei.’ Or there might be contained in that preaching complex statements, which she successively explicated : as the revealed truth, that Peter is the visible foundation of the Church and the centre of unity, enabled her in due time to apprehend many of his rights and offices in particular. Again there might be contained in that preaching the simple announcement of verities, which she*

afterwards scientifically analyzed. Lastly the Apostles often inculcated this or that dogma, not so much by means of express language, as by means of originating usages and customs which implied it." And such dogma of course may in later centuries be expressly defined by the Church as *de fide*.

Card. Franzelin is very careful to guard the doctrine of development against any inference, injurious to the fulness of *Apostolic knowledge*. To say that the Church in later ages has largely developed and will continue largely to develop what the Apostles taught, is widely different from saying "that the Apostles—notwithstanding their infused knowledge—understood less perfectly than subsequent doctors the dogmata of the Faith, as contemplated in their whole intrinsic character. This latter opinion is commonly censured by Catholic theologians as temerarious, and by some even as erroneous" (p. 248).

The whole course of our remarks will have shown the fundamental mistake involved in a certain impression, which no one (we suppose) would quite deliberately and consciously entertain, but which seems in some sense to possess the mind of not so very few. Several Catholics, we fancy, think vaguely about Revelation, as though dogma had sprung up at once full-grown; nay, like Minerva, clothed in full armour: as though in the very first century Catholics had been taught the phrases "Three Persons in One Nature," "One Person in Two Natures"; as though the distinction between actual and habitual grace had from the first *eo nomine* been distinctly placed before them; as though the dogma of Original Sin, and the effect of Baptism in remitting such sin, had been explicitly announced in terms to the whole flock. When persons were more or less possessed with such a notion as this, we cannot be surprised that the Definition of the Immaculate Conception or of Papal Infallibility should have plunged them into some perplexity. In the same spirit the Döllingerites used to say in 1869-70, that the whole office of Bishops assembled in Council is to testify each one the tradition of his own diocese; and that an Ecumenical Council has no other authority, than is involved in such testification. This from persons, who boasted forsooth of their "scientific history"! As though Catholic Tradition could be reported, textually as it were, to Nicæa or Chalcedon from the *orbis terrarum*, in the way in which statistical facts are reported: the population, e.g., of some city, or the number of Catholics included in that population.

And such persons, by another kindred mistake, attach an



unreal and untenable sense to the Church's attribute of doctrinal unity. They picture to themselves Christian faith, as having always consisted in the acceptance of a certain fixed phraseology; though of course they do not forget that the said phraseology receives additions as time advances. He who accepts this authorized phraseology,—such is their unconscious thought—is a Catholic: he who does not accept it, is not a Catholic: and every question, external to this phraseology, is simply an open one; on which every Catholic may think just as he pleases. But Catholic faith has never consisted in this passive and otiose acceptance of a phraseology; and during the very earliest centuries in fact, there was extremely little fixed Catholic phraseology for any one to accept. In *those* centuries at all events, in order to apprehend Christian dogma, it was necessary to study the Church's mind; and such study would be of course much more effectively performed by one Catholic than by another. In *the earliest* centuries at all events, to say that A was a more docile Catholic than B, might or might not be a *true* affirmation; but it was as simply *intelligible*, as to say that he was more charitable to the poor, or more veracious, or more austere in life: it meant that he was more earnest than B, in giving due weight to the Church's authoritative intimations. In S. Paul's own time (as we just now reminded our readers) some Christians were more "spiritual" in their apprehension of dogma, and others more "carnal"; some were content with the elements of Christian knowledge, while others went on to perfection. This distinction between Catholic and Catholic did not cease, merely because definitions increased and multiplied: at least if any one alleges that it did cease, the burden of proof emphatically rests on *him*. Nay in one sense the increase of definitions has placed in even stronger light the circumstance on which we are insisting. During many centuries the Church has been in the habit of censuring given propositions, not as heretical, but as meriting some lower censure. Those Catholics who deliberately deny the justice of such censures, are grievous offenders against faith, while yet they do not become thereby external to the Church: they are still Catholics, but they are extremely bad Catholics. And how urgent the Holy See is in inculcating the importance of certain doctrines doubted by some Catholics, is plain from a fact to which we have recently more than once drawn attention. Only the other day Pius IX. enounced in the most practical of ways, that there are certain Catholics who, "through obstinacy in their own opinions, cherish sentiments at variance with the Holy See";



and that they thus close their ears to "what is the very voice of God." Nay so desirous was he of this fact being duly pressed on the attention of the whole Church, that he indulgenced a prayer, to be recited on one day by every Catholic throughout the world, which contained a supplication that these bad Catholics might be brought to repentance.\*

This inaccurate language, concerning the Church's doctrinal unity, is largely due (we fancy) to controversial motives. It is so telling and indeed so very important a matter of controversy, to contrast Protestant divisions with Catholic unity,—that the latter not unnaturally is somewhat too brilliantly coloured, and with too little attention to light and shade. But the true view is surely quite as effective in controversy, as is the delusive one; while it has this inestimable advantage in addition, that it *is* true and cannot therefore be gainsaid. F. Newman, in his volume on Anglicanism, has admirably expressed the controversial issue involved; though his drift is not precisely the same as our own. He is arguing against those Protestants, who "allege" the existent "differences in the Catholic Church, as a reason for not submitting to her authority." He thus proceeds:—

I am speaking to those who desire both in their creed and conduct to approve themselves to their Maker and save their souls. This being taken or granted, it immediately follows to ask "What must I *do* to be saved?" and "who is to *teach* us?" And next "Can Protestantism, can the National Church teach me?" No, is the answer of common sense; for this simple reason, because of the variations and discordances in the teaching both of one and the other. The National Church is no guide into the truth, because no one knows what it holds and what it commands: one party says this, and a second party says that, and a third party neither this nor that. I must seek the truth then elsewhere; and then the question follows, "Shall I seek it in the Communion of Rome?" In answer, the objection is instantly made, "You cannot find the truth in Rome, for there are as many divisions there as in the National Communion." Who would not suppose the objection to mean, that these divisions were such as to make it difficult or impossible to ascertain what it was that the Roman Communion taught?†

In other words, so long as there is no difficulty in understanding what the Roman Catholic Church teaches, the Protestant objection is senseless. That most precious blessing, to which Protestants (remaining such) have no access and which the Church offers them, is simply this: authoritative, intel-

\* The prayer may be seen in our number for last July, pp. 37, 38. We would also refer our readers to a collection of Pius IX.'s official utterances, which we have translated in our present number.

† "Difficulties felt by Anglicans, &c.," pp. 271, 272.

ligible, consistent teaching and guidance on religious truth. But how can it be said that the teaching and guidance of the Holy See is in any respect less authoritative, intelligible, consistent, merely because certain Catholics refuse to follow it in its integrity? because (where there is no question of heresy), "through obstinacy in their own opinions, they refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See and cherish sentiments at variance with her teaching"? Nay or even because, through no fault of their own, they may be unacquainted with an important part of that teaching? Such deficiency as exists in Catholic doctrinal unity\* does not in the slightest degree arise from the fact, that any rival teaching is proposed within the Church as authoritative. No: it arises exclusively from the fact, that that teaching, which alone is proposed as authoritative, is by certain Catholics imperfectly accepted.

We cannot better bring to a close our general remarks on Tradition, than by quoting part of Card. Franzelin's statement, on the three stages through which many a dogma has passed; and which he illustrates especially from S. Augustine's language, concerning S. Cyprian's error on Baptism:—"The first stage is, when (while no controversy presses and the question has not as yet been diligently explored) some head of doctrine is retained in the Church, either implicitly in her explicit profession of some more universal proposition which contains it, or by means of her recognized usage and practice rather than of her theoretical and distinct enunciation. The second stage ensues, when this head of doctrine begins to come into controversy, and therefore to be more diligently examined and investigated. During this period doubtless a certain fluctuation of opinion arises; and in some minds greater obscurity clouds the doctrine, than had anywhere existed before the controversy: until at length, by means of investigation and under the Holy Ghost's assistance and direction, the whole point is made clear. Then follows the third stage; when, either by the solemn judgment of the Church's authentic magisterium, or otherwise by her general consent, a sure conviction arises, that the dogma was revealed; and such dogma passes into the explicit Catholic intellect and the explicit ecclesiastical preaching" (p. 245).

These remarks land us naturally in that particular application, which is to our present purpose, of the general doctrine concerning Tradition with which we have hitherto been

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\* In our number for last October (p. 286), we quoted some of Pius IX.'s strong language, on the deplorable evils which result from this deficiency.

engaged: for the dogma of Papal Infallibility—we would maintain—is emphatically one, which has passed through the three stages commemorated by Card. Franzelin. If we were asked then in what sense this verity can be called—what it has been defined by the Vatican Council to be,—viz. “a revealed dogma,”—we should answer somewhat as follows.

The Apostles taught the Church explicitly and most emphatically, that, until the Lord's return, the Episcopate, acting in union with and in subordination to S. Peter's Successor,\* were to be the secure and indefectible guardians of Revealed Truth. Had any one denied this, he would at once have as simply been accounted a heretic, as Arius, Pelagius, Nestorius were successively so accounted. Now it was of course involved in this—and would be seen to be so involved by any one who might be led to consider the matter—that the Roman Church herself (and so her Bishop) was ever to be the secure and indefectible guardian of Revealed Truth. But it by no means follows from this affirmation, that a denial of this *latter* verity would at once have shocked the Church's “*communis fidei conscientia*”; because this latter verity was an *inference*, and was not *in itself* explicitly taught to all Catholics. Again. The notion of protecting Revealed Truth by means of obligatory verbal definitions thereof, was—we may probably suppose—alien to the mind of every Catholic in those earliest centuries. But suppose the idea had been suggested, that at some future period the Roman Pontiff *would* impose such definitions on the interior acceptance of Catholics, for the purpose of protecting religious truth; and yet that any one of such definitions could possibly be mistaken: such an idea would have readily been discerned to be at variance with that picture of the prerogatives of the Holy See, which the Apostles had exhibited. We do not say that it would have been so discerned by the general body of Catholics; but certainly by those more keen and perfectly instructed disciples, whom S. Paul commemorates.

If this general view be accepted as true, it follows (according to the principles we have laid down) that the dogma of Papal Infallibility is on one hand not one of those, which were of the Catholic Faith even before their definition; but on the other hand that it is one of those, which the Church might at any moment have infallibly defined as a revealed verity. We need hardly say, that it is no part of our present undertaking to establish any part of this thesis; because our only business

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\* On the Apostolic teaching in regard to Bishops, see our number for Oct. 1873, pp. 368, 369.

is to consider, how far anything urged by our "Layman" has the remotest tendency to disparage it. Still we may in passing refer our readers to the third part of Cardinal Manning's "*Petri Privilegium*," in which he distinctly traces the dogma through Card. Franzelin's "three stages." And we may also refer to two papers, published in this REVIEW, on S. Ignatius of Antioch and S. Irenæus respectively; in which the strong language of those Fathers on the Pope's doctrinal authority is distinctly pointed out. Oct. 1873, pp. 372, 373; Jan. 1875, pp. 101-111.

But now for our "Roman Catholic Layman." And as we shall so often have to mention him, for brevity's sake we will call him "L."

At starting, L. quotes the statement made to him by some priest, "that many Catholics at this time [apparently in 1870-1] are under a special trial"; and he explains that this special trial consisted in their "uncertainty as to whether the Church has now added to the Faith once delivered, or has hitherto failed in her mission of declaring the whole counsel of God." Such a remark is to our mind a perfect enigma. Surely it was rather in 1854 than in 1870—rather when the Immaculate Conception than when Papal Infallibility was defined—that an ill-instructed Catholic might have felt this uncertainty; and we are quite unable to understand how L., having weathered the earlier storm, should now have made shipwreck. However, it is at this time and not at the earlier, that he, a convert of twenty years' standing, is in a state of "utter dismay at finding that what he had supposed solid rock is melting away under his feet" (p. 8). He states successively (p. 10) four reasons, "which to his mind absolutely forbid a Roman Catholic to accept" the Vatican Decrees (p. 8). And without further preface, we will begin with setting down the first of these in his own words:

I have been taught that, as a Catholic, I am obliged by Jesus Christ Himself to believe what the Pastors of the Church teach, under pain of damnation. Now the Pastors of the Church have taught me that the Pope is not infallible apart from the Church; therefore I am bound to believe under pain of damnation, that he is not."

We are encouraged in good hopes of L.'s future, by observing the hearty confidence with which he enunciates the very important major of his syllogism. We would only, as regards this premiss, supply one explanation, which he evidently intends, but which he has accidentally omitted to express. He was taught that "as a Catholic he was obliged, under pain of

damnation, to believe what the Pastors of the Church teach" as a doctrine of their religion; as obligatory on the Catholic's acceptance; but not otherwise. We shall not scruple therefore to add this qualification, in our future citations of his argument.

But his minor is as baseless, as his major is indisputable. In order to establish it, he considers (1) the explicit, and (2) the implicit teaching of the Church's Pastors. We will follow him into both.

Under the former head (pp. 13-21) he quotes seven writers: and not one of the seven ever so remotely hints at any opinion, that the Church's Pastors teach, as a doctrine of the Church, the fallibility of Papal *ex cathedrâ* definitions. There is but one of them, whose words present the faintest *primâ facie* appearance of any such opinion; and that one is Gother. According to Gother (p. 17), "the Papist truly represented" "believes that there is no one pastor or prelate of his Church, but may fall into errors and heresies." But the extremest advocates of the Vatican Decrees do not maintain, that the Pope is exempt by divine promise from the liability to error or heresy; and still less of course, that any such exemption is a revealed dogma. What is defined is, not that the Pope can never fall into heresy or error, but that he can never inculcate heresy or error on the Universal Church. And Gother gives no hint whatever, that "the Papist truly represented" considers himself bound by his religion to think otherwise.

What the authorities cited do say is (as every one might have known beforehand), that no Catholic is required to hold the dogma of Papal Infallibility as an article of the Faith; as a condition of communion. This was indisputably true, when they wrote; and (we need hardly add) it is as obviously irrelevant, as it was obviously true.

Further, these very writers, in other parts of their works, expressly declare that many Catholics do hold as an opinion, and that without incurring any kind of censure, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.

But more can be said even than this. In the very passages which L. quotes, the writers cited by him repeatedly say, that many Catholics believe the doctrine in question. He has been able to write down page after page of theological extracts, and afterwards correct them for press, without seeing that they directly contradict the very thesis for which he adduces them. Thus Rev. R. Manning (p. 14): "many Catholic divines place the infallibility in the Pope:"\* "we believe

\* Certainly Manning adds: "But no Catholic divine ever placed it in the Pope alone; because the word 'alone' excludes both General Councils and the diffusive body of the Church, to which no Catholic divine ever denied infallibility in matters of faith." Every Catholic at this day speaks exactly thus.

the Pope is head of the Church, *jure divino*; but how far this prerogative reaches, *is not agreed upon*" (p. 15). Rev. D. Gallitzin: "the infallibility of the Pope is *an opinion of some divines*" (p. 16). Dr. French: "I know there are some divines who think that the Pope is infallible" (p. 18). Rev. Alban Butler: "Some private divines think that the Pope cannot err in the decisions of faith solemnly published by him, &c." (pp. 18, 19).

We should have thought that nothing could possibly be more unmistakable, than the language of all L.'s witnesses. Many Catholics, they say, hold the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, but no one Catholic holds that it is an article of faith or condition of communion. For our own part, we think that one and all they greatly underrate the certainty which even then existed, of the dogma defined in 1870; but this is widely different from their saying (as L. understands them to say), that the Pastors of the Church unanimously teach as an obligatory doctrine the fallibility of Pontifical definitions.

We now arrive at the citations (pp. 21-44) adduced by L. in order to exhibit "the *implicit* teaching of the Pastors of the Church on Papal Infallibility." Here the difficulty lies in understanding what connection he imagines them to have with his subject. He gravely cites various theologians, who lay down two indubitable truths: viz. (1) that the Church is the Congregation of the faithful; and (2) that this Congregation possesses the prerogative of Passive Infallibility.\* He cites other or the same theologians, who lay down the equally indubitable truth, that the *Ecclesia Docens*, whether dispersed or assembled in Council,—that is the Episcopate teaching in union with the Holy See—has received the promise of active infallibility. But his thesis is, that "the Church's Pastors have taught him, that the Pope is not infallible apart from the Church." How does it follow,—because the Pope teaches infallibly when united with the Episcopate,—that he does *not* teach infallibly by his own prerogative? In the mind of an ordinary person, the very opposite conclusion follows. Those who hold that the Pope is by his own prerogative infallible in teaching, necessarily *hold*—and do not (as L. thinks) necessarily *deny*—that the Pope is *also* infallible in teaching when the Bishops teach in his company.

We proceed to L.'s second and third objections; which are in fact mutually identical. According to his apprehension

\* "It is clear then," he pronounces (p. 22), "that the Pope alone does not constitute the Catholic Church." One would have fancied, from the solemnity of his enunciation, that the Vatican Council had defined that the Pope alone does constitute the Catholic Church.



of facts, the Bishops have always unanimously taught as a doctrine of the Church, that Catholics can never be required to accept any dogma, except one "which has been believed everywhere, at all times, and by all"; and that no tenet, which has once been a matter of opinion, can ever be infallibly defined.

We will put the same proposition into other words. According to L., the Bishops have from the first unanimously taught, that the Church is not infallible in her judgment on those theological controversies, which may arise within her bosom. If he does not mean this, he means nothing whatever. A dogma, which has been actively controverted within the Church, has certainly not "been believed everywhere at all times and by all":\* and if no Catholic therefore can ever be required to accept any dogma which has not been so believed, he can never be required to accept as true the Church's judgment on a domestic theological controversy. F. Newman's apprehension of facts is somewhat different from this. "It is no *change*" of doctrine, he says, when the Church "decides between two prevalent opinions: but if it is to be so regarded, then *change has been the characteristic of the Church from the earliest times.*"† Indeed was there ever heard a greater paradox than L.'s? The Church, it appears, has from the first emphatically disclaimed the power, of judging infallibly on theological controversies which arise within her bosom! So far from emphatically disclaiming this power, it is obvious on the very surface of history that she has from the first emphatically claimed it.

One would have thought that L. would at least remember, what happened so recently as twenty years ago, when the Immaculate Conception was so carefully discussed. And since his theological studies have extended to so voluminous and comparatively little-known a writer as S. Antoninus,—one would have thought he must be well acquainted with so familiar and compendious a little volume, as Perrone's on the definableness of that dogma. We will not occupy space by detailed references to this well-known treatise: suffice it to say, that F. Perrone makes unhesitatingly such statements as these. The italics throughout are our own.

There are other truths which are only contained implicitly in the divinely Revealed Word; and this may happen in very many ways. For either they lie hid in it implicitly and obscurely, from whence they can be brought to

\* F. Franzelin (pp. 248—253) discusses the true meaning of Vincent's canon with admirable completeness.

† "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," p. 156 or 140.



light through a distinct and fuller explication of concepts ; or they are involved in verities expressly revealed, *as conclusions are involved in a premiss* ; or by some other intimate and necessary connection they are so bound up with other truths of the Faith, as to be *thence deducible by easy ratiocination and evident inference*. . . . In regard to which explication or deduction,—if it be effected by a private doctor it by no means constitutes a dogma of the Faith ; . . . but if it be effected by the Church in a *dogmatic decree* (as has often happened in the progress of time)—seeing that the Church is not only the *Guardian* of doctrine but also its *infallible Interpreter and Guide and Judge of controversies*—all are bound by the obligation of assent to such truths.

Even on so fundamental a dogma as the Divinity of the Holy Ghost :—

S. Gregory Nazianzen says :—“ The New Testament did but obscurely indicate the Divinity of the Holy Ghost. . . . For it was not safe . . . when the Son's Divinity was not yet [clearly] admitted, that the Holy Ghost should be imposed on us as a sort of heavy burden, so to speak.” Petavius quotes to the same effect S. Epiphanius, S. Augustine, S. Chrysostom, and other Fathers.

Not without a special Providence must we regard it as having happened, that very many truths [plurima] do but *lie hid* implexly and adumbratively in the Revealed Word ; viz. in order that the faithful might thence more feel the necessity of the Church's living and *infallible* magisterium (Part ii. c. 1).

As to the dogma finally defined on the validity of the Baptism ministered by heretics, Perrone says (c. 3) that “ *the contrary*” of that truth seems rather derivable from earlier patristic writings. As to the dogma defined by Benedict XII. concerning the Beatific vision, Perrone affirms (ib.) that “ the divine utterances are not clear on the matter ; the Fathers were of different opinions ; the very liturgies present no small difficulty ” against the reception of that dogma. And so F. Perrone proceeds indefinitely, adducing a large number of other instances. We are far from denying, that in some cases he considerably overstates the patristic divergence on this or that dogma afterwards defined ; though substantially we altogether follow his teaching. But our point is this. The very fact that a distinguished theologian can so have expressed himself in the face of the Church and the Episcopate, at a most critical period of ecclesiastical history, when every word was sure to be carefully weighed,—this fact is about the most peremptory disproof that can be imagined of L.'s amazing statement. We refer of course to his statement, that, according to the unanimous teaching of Catholic Pastors, no doctrine can ever be defined as of faith, “ which has not been believed everywhere, at all times, and by all ” ; and that no doctrine,

which was once an opinion, can ever become a dogma of the Church.

No doubt he has accumulated several citations from individual Catholic writers, in support of his statement. In dealing with these citations, we are the last to deny that exaggerated propositions have from time to time been uttered by Catholic writers—mainly for a controversial purpose—on the absolute identity of form preserved by Catholic dogma through successive ages. In fact our very principle of doctrinal development gives us important help in understanding what led to such utterances. For what is this principle of doctrinal development? There is many a dogma, we say, in regard to which various Catholics spoke and even thought more or less inaccurately—sometimes very inaccurately—until the time arrived, when such dogma was expressly and maturely contemplated in itself and in its various bearings. And what happened in the case of other dogmata, has happened inclusively in the case of those dogmata which concern the Church's teaching authority. The full doctrine of doctrinal development has itself been but gradually developed. But L.'s quotations are simply and utterly irrelevant to his thesis, unless they show that the Episcopate has from the first unanimously taught the strict stationariness of dogma as itself a dogma. Now assuredly his warmest admirers will not allege, that their effect approaches this ever so distantly. Indeed some, who (we suppose) would advocate a general conclusion not unlike his own, are in the very opposite pole of error to his on this particular subject of doctrinal development. We are thinking especially of Mr. Oxenham; who advertised himself as translator of "*Janus*," and who has not (so far as we happen to know) as yet publicly expressed his acceptance of the Vatican Definition. Mr. Oxenham some years ago expressed an opinion, that "the fulness of truth was wrapped up in the Apostolic Tradition, . . . as the results of mathematical science are involved in its axioms, or the oak is contained in the acorn." Nay Mr. Oxenham quoted Dr. Döllinger himself as maintaining, that what the Apostles knew concerning dogma was hardly more than certain "facts, principles, dogmatic germs and intimations." Dr. Döllinger and Mr. Oxenham will not thank L. for the line of reasoning which he has adopted against the Vatican Definition.

In regard to the other arguments miscellaneously introduced by L., the arguments themselves, together with the current Catholic replies, are so trite and familiar, that the mere recounting of them would generate tedium. We will only say

therefore, that if we pass over any to which he attaches special weight, we promise beforehand that, on receiving an intimation from him to such effect, we will expressly consider them. At present we will confine ourselves to two in particular, which are perhaps less threadbare than the rest.

In p. 60 he says, that "to suppose the doctrines of Christianity were not of equal force before and after a Council" may have defined them, "*is a most unheard of novelty.*" Yet only five pages earlier (p. 55) he quotes with cordial approval S. Augustine's statement, that the very doctrine on Baptism, which S. Cyprian refused to admit, was afterwards "cleared up and decided" by a General Council; and that S. Cyprian would doubtless have submitted to that decision, had it taken place in his time. That which S. Augustine enunciated in the Fifth Century, is forsooth a "most unheard of novelty" in the Nineteenth.

The argument, which L. intends in p. 60, is thus more expressly stated in p. 58. "If, in reference to Papal Infallibility and the Immaculate Conception, it was permitted to doubt and even deny doctrines without heresy before they were formally defined to be *de fide*,—then it must have been so in the case of *every other doctrine.*" And he proceeds gravely to argue that, on this assumption, an ante-Nicene Catholic "might have described belief in the Trinity as a Pagan invention"; or "declared the Divinity of Christ to be a forgery of the Jews"; or regarded "belief in God as no part of the Catholic Creed." In the mind of this consummate logician, to deny a universal affirmative is to affirm the universal negative. If I deny that all animals are bipeds, I affirm forsooth that *no* animals are bipeds. If I deny that *all* defined dogmata were obligatory before their definition,—I affirm that *no* defined dogmata were obligatory before their definition. As we explained in the earlier part of our article, the truth lies between these two opposite errors. The more fundamental Christian dogmata were inculcated as revealed verities from the first; and could not therefore from the first have been denied without heresy. But in regard to various authoritative *expressions* of these dogmata—and in regard to the substance itself of certain dogmata less emphatically taught by the Apostles—the obligation of belief commenced with their Definition. No Christian of the third century e.g. would have been heretical, for denying that heretics can validly baptize.

The second argument of L.'s which we shall cite, refers to the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem. In p. 5 he quotes Barrow's anti-Catholic argument, based on this Council; and

in p. 94 he reinforces the same with a supplement of his own. In this supplement he says, that "infallibilists affirm" "what any one who has read the Acts of the Apostles is aware" to be false. But this imputation of dishonesty, we gladly admit, is out of harmony with his general tone; and we shall say no more therefore about it. We proceed to his argument itself. And since he has shown himself to be a diligent reader of the "DUBLIN REVIEW," we wish he had drawn his readers' attention to what we said on the subject some years ago.\* What we suggested was this.

It is plain from S. Luke's language in Acts xv. that two different meetings were held in Jerusalem. Firstly (v. 6) "the Apostles and" Jerusalem "Elders assembled to consider on this matter." But afterwards there was a general meeting of the faithful: for in v. 12 S. Luke speaks of "the whole multitude"; and the final assent (v. 22) was given by "the Apostles, Elders, and *whole Church*." At the former of these two meetings doubtless, the Apostles delivered their concurrent testimony on the Christian dogma; all the facts and bearings of the question were carefully investigated; and a practical conclusion arrived at. At this meeting also it must have been resolved, that the public Assembly should be summoned. In such Assembly two pronouncements were to be publicly made; a doctrinal decision and a disciplinary enactment: though the latter was to include indeed the emphatic inculcation of an admitted and most prominent principle in Christian morality. The doctrinal decision was to be suitably pronounced by S. Peter;† and with this the public proceedings were to commence. The multitude of Jerusalem Christians having then come together—and the lively interchange of opinion having continued to the last moment—S. Peter at last rose up among them. When he had finished speaking (as Catholic writers constantly point out) the voice of controversy was no longer heard (v. 12); and the whole multitude gave attentive ear to the recital of SS. Paul and Barnabas. S. James then rose to speak; and his address consisted of two parts. Firstly he conciliated the Hebrews, who were his especial flock, by pointing out how clearly the heathens' vocation had been prophesied in the Old Testament itself. Secondly he officially announced those regulations, which it had been resolved to

\* In our number for July 1867, pp. 20, 21; and in an article on S. Peter and S. Paul contained in our previous number.

† Dean Alford is more candid than L.; for he frankly admits in his commentary, that S. Peter took the more prominent part on this occasion. He explains this (1) by "*the universal deference paid to him*"; and (2) by his past history in the matter of Cornelius.

impose on the Gentile converts. We do not for a moment deny, that the "ego judico" implied the existence of an Apostolic decision; but (as the words which follow conclusively prove) that decision was disciplinary, and not (except incidentally) doctrinal. If we may indulge in conjecture, it would seem far more probable that it was S. James himself, who had proposed this measure at the earlier meeting. At all events his position, as specially representing the Jewish element in the Church, made it obviously suitable that *he* should pronounce what had been decreed in *protection* of the Jewish Christians. But so far from promulgating a declaration of doctrine, he begins his address with a reference to S. Peter as having already done so.

Under pain then of undergoing L.'s severe censure (p. 94), we nevertheless "have the hardihood to affirm," that in the Jerusalem Assembly "S. Peter presided, and delivered" the Apostolic doctrinal "judgment on the question in dispute."

The last of the four points raised by L. concerns, not the authority in teaching, but the power of governing, ascribed to the Pope by the Vatican Council. And he "has the hardihood to affirm," that "the Vatican Decree makes the Pope *infallible in a legislative*, as well as judicial capacity" (!) (p. 82). Why not at once say, that the Vatican Decree "makes" the Pope impeccable, nay, omnipotent?

L. (as might have been expected) is incapable of understanding clearly what he means to maintain, on the Pope's legislative authority; but we rather imagine, that what he has confusedly in his mind is the following notion. A theory is imaginable, that the Pope has no power of imposing laws on the Church, except with the concurrence of the Episcopate; and that, as he cannot enact them, so neither can he *repeal* them, without such concurrence. Nothing is more intelligible than this theory. When L. finds himself able to state it definitely;—and also to give reasons for his opinion, that such theory was unanimously taught by the Episcopate from the first, as a doctrine of the Church;—Catholics no doubt will confront his allegation.

We can honestly say, that there is only one argument of the slightest weight, which we can find between cover and cover of this pamphlet. And very characteristically, L. thinks so little of this argument, that he mentions it only in passing and never reverts thereto. We refer to the question asked in his first page, "whether the Church," by defining the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility, "has now added to the Faith once delivered"; or on the other hand had in the

preceding centuries "failed in her mission of declaring the whole counsel of God." Of course this difficulty presses against the Fourth Century, no less than against the Nineteenth: though it does not on that account the less require an answer. Take e.g. the declaration of S. Augustine, which L. mentions with agreement in p. 55; viz. that the validity of Baptism ministered by a heretic had been decided by the Church since S. Cyprian's day. L. might have said that S. Augustine is here in a dilemma: for either that Father must admit, that the Church of the Fourth Century had added to the Faith once delivered; or else he must allege, that the Church of the Third Century had failed to declare the whole counsel of God.

The answer to this difficulty is at last not very hard of discovery. The Apostles did declare the whole counsel of God; for they inculcated the momentous verities committed to their charge, with the greatest fulness and "perfection," with which the faithful were able and willing to receive those verities. On the other hand the Church of succeeding centuries did not *add* to the Faith once delivered; but only developed and exhibited it more fully, as circumstances might permit or even require.

In the mean time what is L.'s own theological position? Firstly he describes himself (p. 8) "as a convert to the Church of more than twenty years' standing." For more than fourteen years then before 1870, he had considered all those and only those to be Catholics, who were united in dogma and communion with the Holy See; he had accounted the Anglicans, the Dutch Jansenists, the Photians, Nestorians, Monophysites of the East, to be all outside the Catholic Church. Now nothing which took place in 1870 can have affected *their* position; and he must still therefore account them exterior to the Church. Secondly he considers, that all who accept the Vatican Definitions, with Pius IX. at their head, have fallen from Catholic faith and communion. Thirdly, as has been seen, he considers that every one who holds the principle of doctrinal development, denies what the Bishops of every age have unanimously taught as a dogma of the Catholic religion, and has accordingly fallen into heresy. In his view therefore, no one is a member of the Church which Christ founded, except those who unite these three qualifications: who (1) were in communion with the Holy See before 1870; who (2) have now left that communion, by refusing to accept the Vatican Definitions; and who (3) repudiate the principle of



doctrinal development. There cannot be five persons in the world who unite these three qualifications: probably there is only one, viz. L. himself. \*

All things considered, the pamphlet leaves us in a certain perplexity. We cannot doubt that there is much ability among those unhappy apostates, who are openly or secretly Döllingerites; nor can we doubt that they must wish to create a favourable intellectual impression on English-speaking Catholics. Yet more than five years have elapsed since the Vatican Council; and we cannot understand therefore how it is, that during this period they have not lighted on some more competent English spokesman, than our "Roman Catholic Layman."

Since the preceding article went to press, Card. Franzelin has brought out a new edition of his work "On Tradition and Scripture," containing considerable additions. Among other things, he has entered at much greater length than before (pp. 128-157) on the firm interior assent due to certain Papal utterances, which are not strictly infallible. We have on former occasions dwelt with some emphasis on this doctrine; and we hope in an early number to treat it once more, under Card. Franzelin's guidance.

\* He seems prepared for this contingency: for he arms himself at starting with a quotation from S. Antoninus, to the effect that "it is possible for the entire Faith to be preserved in one single individual"; as at this moment indeed it is probably preserved in L. alone. Even if the holy and orthodox S. Antoninus had in an unwary moment been betrayed into such a statement as L. ascribes to him,—the fact would have been in no other way important, than as a very valuable psychological datum in its bearing on the theory of momentary hallucinations. But L. is evidently unacquainted with a series of articles, which appeared in the "*Civiltà*" of 1868-9, examining the whole doctrine of S. Antoninus, and maintaining with great strength of argument that he was a consistent advocate of Papal Infallibility. In the last of these articles (Jan., 1869) the writer considers the passage cited by L., and shows it to have been interpolated: evidently by some contemporary heretic. The paper of the sheet, containing this and a few contiguous paragraphs, is different from that containing the rest; the character is different; the sheets do not follow in order; &c. &c. &c.

L. proceeds to quote, as based on "a similar principle," an opinion once expressed in our excellent contemporary the "*Tablet*": viz. that perhaps in the last days the state of things may become so disastrous, that Catholics—i. e. persons in communion with the Holy See—shall not outnumber five hundred. Dr. Murray (de Ecclesiâ, c. ix. n. 18) mentions an opinion, apparently expressed by Bellarmine and a few others, to the same effect; but he adds that the great majority of theologians speak differently, and that he himself regards the opinion as certainly mistaken. We fear that if it were ever so true, it is not calculated to afford L. any great sanction or consolation. He hardly displays that exceptional loyalty to the Holy See, which would warrant the anticipation that, under such circumstances of discouragement as the "*Tablet*" supposes, he would be firm and unshaken in his allegiance.



## ART. II.—PROFESSOR MIVART'S LESSONS FROM NATURE.

*Lessons from Nature, as manifested in Mind and Matter.* By ST. GEORGE MIVART, Ph. D., F.R.S., Sec. L.S., F.Z.S., &c. London : John Murray. 1876.

IN this volume (which is brought out in a manner worthy of its publisher) Professor Mivart has collected together various essays written by him, and published during the last few years in the Quarterly, DUBLIN, Contemporary, and Fortnightly Reviews, and has filled up the lacunæ between them by additional papers which form them into a correlated whole. His aim is on the one hand to show what are the conclusions which legitimately follow from an evenly-balanced as distinguished from a merely one-sided study of "Nature," "in the broad sense of that word, as a great whole of which the mind of man forms a part"; and on the other hand to insist on the "narrowing and misleading effects" of following the opposite and obviously fallacious method of taking nature as denoting the assemblage of phenomena external to and apart from the human mind, and then making use of it to explain this mind, which has already been tacitly excluded from it.

In order more fully to understand what is the nature of the position here taken up, it will be necessary to go back to the Scholasticism by which it is developed.

The Scholastics were primarily theologians; but, whatever a modern physicist may think of their physics, they must be admitted by any "Natural Realist" to have been the coryphæi of a sound and reasonable philosophy. At a time when physical science was as yet scarcely in its infancy, they accurately distinguished between two fundamentally different regions of scientific investigation,—the sciences which are founded on the material world and the feelings (and, we may add, the consequent movements) which it excites in us, and those which are based on knowledge of thinking and morally energizing intelligence. Under the first head they ranged physics, meteorology, astronomy, natural history, and the other sciences of matter so far as known to them; while under the second they classed part of what we now call psychology, ethics, and the other natural sciences dependent on psychology. Psychology was, however, included under physics, or the study of nature, in the large sense of the word.

But mind, that is, thinking and morally energizing intelligence, and matter, meet in man; and in man they had consequently to distinguish several orders of phenomena:—phenomena, such as those of extension, which he possesses in common with the whole of the material universe; vital phenomena, such as those of nutrition, development, and reproduction, which are not *per se* attended by consciousness, and belong to him in common with all other living material objects, even plants; phenomena of feeling and consequent movement, which imply consciousness, are shared by other animals, and were called phenomena of animal, as those last mentioned were called phenomena of vegetative life; and, finally, phenomena of thinking and morally energizing intelligence, proper to man, and raising him to an elevation in the scale of being indefinitely higher than that of the other inhabitants of the phenomenal world. This last order of phenomena was consequently grouped apart as giving a point of departure to a new series of sciences inferior in dignity only to the sciences which treat of the supernatural—of *ens supernaturale*, the order of grace as made known by the Divine Revelation,—while the three other classes were ranked as belonging to a lower level.

Of these, however, two—the phenomena common to the inorganic universe and the phenomena of vegetal life—do not involve consciousness, and are, therefore, in no sense phenomena of mind; while the other two imply consciousness in the being who is the subject of them. Now if we take mind no longer in the strict sense in which it has been taken above, but in a larger denotation as co-extensive with consciousness, not only the phenomena of intelligence and moral activity, but also those of feeling, may be called phenomena of mind; and thus we have a classification of mental phenomena into two great divisions—the higher and the lower. These two kinds of mental phenomena were carefully distinguished by the Scholastics.

Under the lower they ranked sensations, as of colour or warmth and chill; and, since sensations are extended, what is now called the sense-percept of extension; animal appetites, or cravings, such as hunger and thirst, excited by the recurring wants of the system; sensible or sensual pleasure and pain; the sensual part of emotional feelings, as distinguished from the manifestations of the higher nature which may accompany them; phantasmata, i.e. the faint reproductions of these vivid states in imagination and “sensible memory”; and the agglutination of the various kinds of lower phenomena together by what we now call association. They

denied that these phenomena have any properly intellectual, or, in themselves, any moral character, and consequently denied that the "motus primo-primi" of concupiscence in man are sinful, and that the actions of the lower animals are either morally good or morally evil; declared that they are common to man and brutes; and asserted that they are inseparably correlated with given states of the organism, and are, indeed, themselves states of it—not, however, of the organism, considered as a mere portion of the common matter of the universe, but of the organism *quā* animated or informed by a sentient principle. The majority of them also believed that the phenomena of vegetal life—nutrition, development, and reproduction—could not be adequately accounted for by the operation of merely mechanical causes such as are found in inorganic nature, and that it was therefore necessary to assume the existence in plants of some additional principle in order to explain them. To this additional principle they gave the name of the "vegetative soul," using the word soul in a wide sense, and not meaning to imply by it that this principle is spiritual or immaterial. All were agreed that the phenomena of feeling could not be accounted for by merely mechanical causes; and, therefore, in order that sensations and the other lower phenomena of mind as manifested in animals other than man, might not be left as without a cause, they postulated, in order to account for them, what they called an animal soul, which they also termed an *anima organica* or *anima materialis*. They did not, therefore, attempt to draw any proof of the immortality and immateriality of the human soul from the phenomena of sensation and the other lower phenomena of mind; and when they spoke of the so-called soul of animals being material or organic, while they doubtless had in their minds the close correlation of sensations and the like with organic changes, they do not seem to have pretended to any positive knowledge of what this principle was. Their position was rather:—"Sensations exist; they must therefore proceed from some cause. This cause is not mechanical; they must proceed from some non-mechanical active principle; but there is nothing to lead us to conclude that this principle is immaterial." And, finally, *ne entia multiplicarentur sine necessitate*, and also for other reasons into which it is unnecessary here to enter, they believed that in animals the "animal soul" performs the functions of the "vegetative soul" as well; and similarly that in man the soul, which is now the soul in the ordinary sense of the word, performs the functions both of a vegetative and of an animal principle. These functions they consequently called *operationes conjuncti* or *compositi*,—operations not of the

body alone, nor of the soul alone, but of the *compositum* of body and soul together.

On the other hand, as functions of the soul *quâ* rational, as operations of a thinking and morally energizing intelligence, rising above the sphere of mere feeling and movement and sensuous pleasure and pain, the Scholastics counted the following kinds of activity:—The intellectual recognition and contemplation of the lower phenomena; judgment, as distinguished from mere difference or agreement of sensations; the recognition of the fact that certain things not only are such and such, but must be so, and cannot be otherwise;\*

\* That is, necessary truths, e.g.  $1+1=2$ . A being possessed of feeling alone might, *datâ occasione*, see two objects, and the resulting impression on its consciousness would not be the same as that produced by a single object or by three objects. In this way, for instance, crows and other animals are said to be able to *count*. A being having feeling, but not intellect, in visually perceiving one and another object, would moreover see what is in fact an instance of a necessary truth; but, not having intellect, while one and one made the same impression on its brain and sense-organs as two, it would not perceive that this must needs be so. In other words, it would see the *subject-matter* of the necessary truth, but not its *form* or essence, *i.e.* the distinctive character of necessity which makes it a necessary truth; which the Scholastics would have expressed by saying that sense, as distinguished from reason, perceives such truths *materially*, but not *formally*. And they would have made analogous distinctions in other cases,—distinctions which are of extreme importance in illustrating the difference between the lower and the higher faculties of the mind. Thus, as to judgment, they would have declared that the lower animals judge, not formally, indeed, but nevertheless materially; that, for instance, blackness is not the same to them, and is not associated with the same things, as whiteness, but that they are incapable of pronouncing that peculiar intellectual decision which makes a judgment a judgment. (Cf. Scotus, in 4 lib. "Sent." d. 47, q. 1; and on "De Anima," q. 9, ad 5.)

But now let a being possessed of intelligence have an instance of  $1+1=2$  brought before him by his organs of sense. The same phenomena take place in him as occurred in the animal, but there is the additional phenomenon that he can perceive that one and one do not merely happen to be two in this particular case, in the same way as a particular line may happen to be straight, but that they must necessarily be two, and cannot possibly be anything else. Here we have the formal recognition of a necessary truth. The Scholastics, again, would have said that he *abstracted* the necessary truth, which they would have called a *species intelligibilis* or intellectual idea, from the sense-presentation of one and one, which on being brought together were two; it is obvious, therefore, that they employed the word abstraction in a sense very different from that in which it is employed at the present day, and that their abstract and general ideas were by no means the same kind of things as the abstract ideas *v.g.* of Locke. In the signification given to the word by many modern writers on these subjects (Hamilton must be honourably excepted) an abstract idea is part of an imagination, or part of a complexus of sensations: I endeavour to form an abstract idea of colour, for instance, when I try to imagine colour without extension. But the abstract idea of the Scholastics *was never part of* a complexus of sensations or of a *phantasma* or imagination, and could not be represented in

intellectual memory ; the formation of general ideas ; the recognition of certain intellectual ideas which are not sensuous feelings either vivid or faint, as of the predicate of moral goodness as attaching to certain actions ; inference, as distinguished from the mere suggestion of one idea by another, as when deer suggests ruminant, and ruminant horned animal ; free, and therefore intelligent, as distinguished from blind and automatic activity ; consequent moral action ; and voluntary as distinguished from spontaneous and automatic attention.\* These they called *operationes separate*, operations of the soul alone, in which the material organism does not immediately co-operate. At the same time, however, they admitted an indirect co-operation of the organism even in those higher activities. We cannot, they observed, form a volition with respect to that of which we are ignorant, in so far as we are ignorant of it : *ignoti, quâ ignoti, nulla voluntas*. Thus will depends on intellect, and intellect, at least in our present state, and prescinding from supernatural interposition, is accompanied in its operation by the activity of the lower powers. Whenever we apply our intellect to any object, we have, at the same time, according to the Scholastics, a phantasma or mental picture referring to that object, even though it be only the phantasma of its name ; and without such a phantasma it is *de lege ordinariâ* impossible for the intellect

imagination. For, to revert to the illustration just given, the characteristic mark of necessity, the presence of which in certain judgments justifies us in calling the things judged necessary truths, was never, according to the Scholastics, apprehended by mere sense or feeling, and could not be abstracted from the sum of the feelings in the modern sense of the word to abstract. The necessity was not itself felt. But it was hidden—hidden to sense—in what was felt ; the light of the intelligence, the *lumen intellectûs agentis*, disclosed it, as it were, and brought it out, set it apart, and made it a separate object of contemplation, and in this sense abstracted it. Yet even after it has been thus abstracted, the necessity refuses to be made an object of imagination. Every one *knows* what necessity is ; every one can mentally picture or imagine instances which involve it ; no one can mentally picture the necessity itself. Nor would the mental picture be altered in the least if the necessity were eliminated and everything else remained the same. My mental picture of  $1+1=2$  would be exactly what it is now if  $1+1$  only happened to be equal to 2, but were not so necessarily, just as all organized living beings contain carbon, although it is not, in so far as we know, impossible that there should be such beings containing no carbon. The necessity is a superadded intellectual predicate.

\* Spontaneous attention is merely the fact that a sensation, &c., occupies a large portion of consciousness, whether because it is intense in itself, or because it is associated with other things which bring it into the foreground. Thus, independently of any action of our will, a loud cry at once arrests our attention ; and a faint groan will do the same, because of the mental picture of some one in distress which it automatically suggests, and the emotional feelings which are associated with that picture.

to operate. Thus, expressed in their own phraseology, the Scholastic theory of knowledge was *intellectus intelligit, phantasiâ convertendo se ad phantasmata, intellectû vero abstrahendo ab eis species intelligibiles.\**

\* Phantasmata, the Schoolmen rightly taught, are of individual objects exclusively. We cannot, as Berkeley has amusingly shown in an often-quoted passage, form a mental picture of man in general; our phantasma must be a representation of some one whom we have met, who has been described to us, whose portrait we have seen, &c., or of a more or less fictitious man or series of men conjured up for the occasion.

Now the number of mental pictures which we can keep before the mind at one time, whether these mental pictures are of more or less imaginary objects, or of objects which we remember have occurred in our experience, is limited in the extreme. It depends, of course, partly on the simplicity of the object, and partly on the imaginative power of the individual. But the reader will probably find it impossible to picture at once, *e.g.*, sixteen black dots on a white ground. Simple though these objects are, some of them will slip out of consciousness while he is trying to make the others distinct, and this will happen, even though he arranges them in some regular order, for instance, in four rows of four, in order to make their conjoint representation less difficult.

The words "all," "each," "every," "any," and the like, would therefore be without meaning to a being possessed only of phantasmata, if they were used of a larger number of things than it could comprehend in a single act. Such a being, on tasting the sweetness of two kinds of sugar, or on phantasmata of resembling objects being produced in its consciousness, would experience the feeling of *continuity*, if it may be so called, which we feel when the things of which we are conscious are like each other, so that there is no sensuous shock in passing from one to another. The resembling sensuous phenomena would also become associated together, and, by the law of contiguity, emotions and movements which had become automatically associated with the one would also become associated with the other. We may even suppose that, if such a being possessed the power of partially understanding and using language, yet without the power of forming general ideas, it would be able to say, "These two things are sweet," "These two phantasmata resemble each other in such and such respects,"—although, of course, it would enunciate statements even so simple as these with a most inadequate apprehension of the signification they convey to beings of a higher order. But it would not be able to say, "These pieces of sugar are sweet, and other pieces of sugar were also sweet." The word "other" would have a denotation to it only on recalling more or less distinct phantasmata of the other pieces of sugar in question; and while it was doing this, the phantasmata of the two pieces which it had just tasted would fade away out of consciousness. Much less, consequently, would it be able to say, "All the sugar I ever tasted was sweet." Genera and species would have no meaning to it, and science would be impossible.

When, on the other hand, we form a general idea, we have a phantasma of an individual object—a man, a horse, a circle,—or of a series of individual objects, of the same kind as those of which the general idea is. We then say in our own minds "All men, all horses, resemble this man, horse, or circle in certain assignable respects"; "A particular and uniform curvature at the circumference, and the maintaining of a uniform distance from a fixed point within it, are in every case conjoined together"; "Any other circle which I chose to draw or mentally to represent, would exhibit similar characteristics."



Such, in necessarily brief but sufficiently comprehensive outline, was the Scholastic Psychology. A severe blow was dealt to it by the Reformation. The Reformers, in the interest of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, greatly weakened the force of the distinction between man's higher and lower powers, by attributing a moral character to the involuntary movements of concupiscence, and magnifying the intellectual ruin wrought in the nature of man by original sin. Man was assimilated to the brutes in almost everything but the possession of an immortal soul, which was certainly very much out of place in a being such as he was now supposed to be. The distinction between the higher and lower faculties tended to fade away, especially in England. It was assented to little more than traditionally, the word *instinct* being applied to brutes, and reason to man, but without any definite idea what is the exact distinction between them. The will being denied to be free, it was impossible to establish any well-grounded distinction between will and the spontaneous automatic conscious activity which is common to man and the lower animals. The lower phenomena of mind are, moreover, much more obvious on casual and superficial inspection. Every one knows what a sensation, an emotion, a movement, or an imagination is, though he may not be able to perceive so clearly what is an abstract or a general idea. The progress of biological speculation directed attention to the lower mental phenomena especially, and they were ascertained to be, as the Scholastics had long before\* declared them to be, closely correlated with

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The intelligent use of these words "all," "every," "any," as distinguished from the use which might be made of them by a talking machine, involves the existence of a general idea which is not a *phantasma*, which cannot be represented in imagination, although it may be regarded as abstracted from the *phantasma* in the Scholastic, not in the modern sense of the word abstraction. Who can form a mental picture of "any"? Yet every one knows what is meant by any. Thus we try to form an idea of a figure in which the diameters are not equal, but the circumference has a circular curvature; we fail to do so; we make the same effort in another case, and similarly fail; and after a greater or less number of unsuccessful endeavours, we say, "Any circle will be found to have all its diameters equal." It is obvious that we can do this only because we are able to form a general idea of circles which are not present in *phantasma*. Had we not the power of doing this, our "any circle" would be merely equivalent to "ABC, DEF, GHI, KLM, which I am at this instant mentally beholding." The word circle, used of any other circles than those, would be absolutely meaningless; for, if a meaning to words exist only in *phantasma*, where there is no *phantasma*, there is no meaning.

\* Thus S. Thomas, "*Summa*," p. 1, q. 77, a. 5, "*Potentia sensitiva est in conjuncto*." Paul Venetus and Pisanus alone asserted that the *species sensibiles* are immaterial, unextended, and indivisible; their opinion is consequently briefly controverted by Suarez ("*De Anima*," i. 3, c. 2, n. 16).

corresponding states of the organism. A school of what is not unfrequently called Philosophy naturally arose which made it its business to analyze the higher phenomena into the lower—to show that the higher are only the lower in disguise. According to this school, the powers which man possesses in common with the brutes are the only powers which he possesses at all. The human mind is a machine of very considerable complexity, composed of an enormous number of interacting levers and wheels; the animal mind is a machine of the same kind, and its levers and wheels are fundamentally of the same character; but they are relatively so few that it is not adequate to the production of all the phenomena manifested by the more complex structure.

Now, what Professor Mivart chiefly sets himself to oppose in the present volume is this theory of the essentially bestial character of the mind of man, and the idea that the doctrine of biological evolution involves such a theory. He also, however, discusses some other topics,—the efficaciousness of natural and sexual selection as the cause of the transmutation of species, the theological aspects of evolutionism, and the like,—which are more or less closely connected with the double subject of which he principally treats. In biology, he is an evolutionist, but not an extreme evolutionist; in philosophy, he follows the Scholastics, but not, of course, necessarily in the physical speculations in which they merely took up the science of their time, which has since been both emended on the one hand, and supplemented on the other. His work shows on almost every page the condensed result of large and varied reading, and mature and acute thought and reflection; and we cannot but regard its appearance, proceeding as it does from a Catholic, and from one in the scientific position which Professor Mivart occupies, written from the point of view which is taken in it, and treating of a subject which is at present so deeply occupying the minds of thinking men, as an event of very considerable importance.

"Lessons from Nature" may be divided into three principal parts, of which the first is primarily psychological, the second primarily biological, while the third contains supple-

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Following Galen in preference to Aristotle, the Scholastics also declared the organ of the lower powers to be primarily the brain and secondarily the nerves. Various curious speculations may be found in the work last cited (l. 3, *in fine*) as to the cerebral localization of the lower faculties. Descartes (who is much praised by Mr. Huxley in the "Fortnightly Review" of November, 1875, for psycho-physiological speculations) added little—we are not sure that he added anything—*de suo*. The opinion which denies sensations, &c., to the lower animals was proposed by Gomez Pereira, a Spanish physician of the sixteenth century, in his "*Margarita Antoniana*."

mentary matter and conclusions drawn from the other two. Under the first head we have chapters entitled "The Brute" (pp. 192—243), in which the author deals with the consciousness of the lower animals, and especially with instinct; "Language" (pp. 82—94), in which he treats of the sensuous and the intellectual elements in language, and what belongs to the one, what to the other component; "Duty and Pleasure" (pp. 95—127); "Man" (pp. 128—191), which is, however, partly biological; "First Truths" (pp. 29—54); "The External World" (pp. 55—81), *i.e.*, the philosophical question whether an extramental material world exists or not; and "The Starting Point" (pp. 1—28), that is to say, the absurdity of philosophical scepticism. Under the second head fall the chapters on likenesses in plants and animals, natural selection, sexual selection, and a reply to Mr. Chauncey Wright's animadversions on the author's opinions (pp. 244—355). And, finally, the third part consists of three chapters, on "Causes" (pp. 356—376), which is chiefly a criticism on Mr. Spencer's and Professor Huxley's statements as to the "Unknowable" and the existence of God; "Consequences" (pp. 277—421), on the consequences of the acceptance on the one hand of the views of the so-called modern school whose pronouncements have already been briefly indicated, and on the other hand, of the philosophy maintained in the present volume; and "A Postscript" (pp. 422—449), "called for by an unamended republication by Professor Huxley of his criticism on the 'Genesis of Species,' " and defending the position that "the Christian revelation asserts creation, but at the same time lays down principles which so harmonize with evolution that no contradiction can arise in this respect between its doctrines and those of physical [*i.e.* biological] science. This harmony must be preordained."

This brief summary will probably have given our readers a fair idea of the subjects of which Mr. Mivart treats, and the manner in which he discusses them. We now, therefore, proceed to details.

The examination of the conscious phenomena of brutes is, after some preliminary explanations, opened with the following suggestive observations:—

The whole process of reasoning being a progression to the unknown by means of the known, we can, of course, only define the former in terms of the latter. All our knowledge having human sensible experience as its necessary condition, scientific language can only make use of terms which primarily denote such human experiences. Thus, when men speak of God and of His attributes, they are, of course, necessarily limited to terms primarily denoting human sensible experiences; and hence arises the danger

of theological anthropomorphism. In the temporary philosophical decline which has accompanied the rise of physical science, very many modern (non-Catholic) theologians, neglecting the old rational conception of a *Deus analogus*, have been asserting a *Deus univocus* with the natural result of producing the modern opposite error of a *Deus equivocus*. In other words, the absurdity of asserting that the terms which denote powers and qualities in man have the very same meaning when also applied to God, has naturally led to the opposite absurdity of denying that there is any relation whatever between certain terms as applied to God, and the same terms as applied to man. It has become necessary to return to the old, safe *via media* of an older school, and maintain with them that though no term can be used in precisely the same sense of man and of God, yet that none the less there is a certain relation of analogy between these two uses of the same term.

An exactly parallel but opposite error has taken place in biological science. Descartes, that fruitful author of philosophical error, deserted the old moderate view which affirmed that between the highest psychical powers of man and brutes there is a certain natural likeness and analogy, and gave rise to the notion that animals are nothing but wonderfully complex machines—an error naturally resulting in the opposite one now so prevalent—the error, namely, that there is a substantial identity between the brute soul and the soul of man. ("Biological Anthropomorphism.")

Statements and misrepresentations of the kind follow naturally from that tendency which exists on the part of so many to be interested in and attracted by anecdotes in praise of the mental powers of brutes. We see this tendency in the many fables about animals—fables of all ages and of all climes—such as now serve to amuse our childhood or to call out the skill of artists such as Kaulbach.

It is this biological, or inverted, anthropomorphism, which has led to that exaggerated interpretation of animal activities, of which Mr. Darwin, in his "Descent of Man," has given us, as we shall shortly see, such an ever-memorable example. ("Lessons from Nature," pp. 199-200.)

The lower animals, as every one sees, possess those conscious faculties which have been previously enumerated as constituting the lower powers of mind.\* They feel sensations

\* According to the Scholastics, that they possess sensations is a matter of course; they also have the *appetitus sensibilis*, which comprehends emotions (S. Th. "Summa," i., 80 and 81). They likewise imagine, and memory cannot be denied to them (cf. however Scotus in 4, 45, 3), but they know past time as past only *materialiter* (Suar. "De Anima," l. 4, c. 10, n. 4). Besides "*avis colligit paleam, non quia delectat sensum, sed quia utilis est ad edificandum*" (S. Th. "Summa," l. 78, 4); for they have also a *sensus estimativus*, which feels, without reasoning, desirableness and undesirableness (convenientias et inconvenientias) which are not apprehended by the external senses. The Scholastic *sensus estimativus*, which was one of the internal senses, was almost (Tongiorgi, Inst. Phil. III., p. 34), identical with what is now called instinct; but the Scholastics did not, as far as the present writer is aware, analyze it into association, although they were, as their commentaries on Aristotle's "De Memoria et Reminiscentia," and their treatment of reminiscence, sufficiently prove, acquainted with the laws of association.

and emotions, perform associated actions, cling to pleasure, shrink from pain, are susceptible of anger and fear, tenderness and affection. This, it is almost unnecessary to say, gives rise to no difficulty whatever. The mere existence of a sensuous feeling, whether of anger on the one hand, or of affection on the other, is neither good nor evil. Good and evil enter in only when such feelings are accepted or rejected by the will; and if the life of animals is merely sensuous and automatic, it has as little a moral as an intellectual character. But the difficulty is that animals occasionally seem to perform actions which indicate intelligence and purpose. Bees store up honey in preparation for a season when there are no flowers. Swallows fly to warmer climates at the end of autumn, and thus avoid the inclemency of winter. A dog on seeing his master acts in a manner very different from his conduct towards an indifferent person. Do these actions, then, and others like them, proceed in the lower animals from the same principles from which similar actions would proceed in us? A human being who insures his life for the benefit of his wife and family, or denies himself present satisfaction for the sake of making a provision for his old age in order that he may not be a burden on others, calculates far-distant consequences, and acts, probably from a belief that it is morally right and just that he should so do, and that to act otherwise would be wrong and unjust to others. Does anything of the same kind pass through the "mind" of a bee, as it returns, burdened with honey, to its hive? When a swallow flies away, does it leave us because it knows that winter is at hand, and that southern countries are warmer than the north? Does a dog intellectually recognize its master when it manifests its delight at his presence? Or do these and the like actions, although often in their external manifestations agreeing with those which would be performed under similar circumstances by human beings, nevertheless proceed from other principles, which *merely imitate* what intellect, will, and the action of moral cognitions would accomplish? We are accustomed to say that such actions proceed from instinct. Well, then, what is instinct?

Now it appears to the present writer that the labours of the Association-Philosophers, although they have in many cases failed to give a satisfactory account of human mental phenomena, have rendered possible a full and scientifically adequate account of Instinct—i.e. automatic impulse to act—and have finally disposed of the difficulty respecting the "minds" of the lower animals. Instinct is simply association; and to explain its general character we have only to refer to the phenomena

of association as they are manifested in ourselves. In us, sensations and sense-percepts are associated with phantasmata, as when the odour of a hayfield automatically recalls its mental picture; phantasmata are associated with one another, as when the phantasma of St. Paul's recalls that of the London smoke; either sensations, sense-percepts, or phantasmata, may be associated with emotions; \* emotions may be associated together, that of power, for instance, with that of hope; any of the preceding kinds of phenomena may be associated with movements, as when we shrink from a blow, rise, automatically and from habit, in the presence of a superior, or gesticulate, without any distinct intention of doing so, under the influence of strong emotion; and finally movements, e.g., the movements of the muscles which must co-operate to produce a frequently performed action, become associated together.

The above associations are due to our personal experience, and, with regard to it, are therefore *postformed*; others are not due to it, and are *preformed* with respect to it. The association of the emotions with great part of the movements, &c., by which they are expressed, is obviously of this character; and the same may be said of the association, for instance, between the movements of swallowing and sensations produced by the contact of food with the back of the mouth. When a child for the first time performs the complicated movements involved in sucking, they must occur in virtue of a preformed association, and not because it has any knowledge that they will result in the presentation of a supply of agreeable nourishment. These are what we call instincts; a Darwinian would declare that they are due, not indeed, to the experience of the individual, but to ancestral experience, the results of which have been as it were branded into the organism, and communicated by inheritance; while one who is not an Evolutionist would probably regard them as produced by a more immediate action of the Creator. If so produced, and intended to supply, to a certain extent, the place of reason, they might be expected to imitate the results of reasoning; and if produced by experience they would obviously do the

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\* A little while ago, on turning up a walk (which was merely a path between two stone walls), the present writer suddenly felt a rush of partly pleasurable and partly painful feeling, which had certainly nothing whatever to do with his previous cogitations, and for which he was consequently entirely at a loss to account. Presently, however, it occurred to him that, some months before, he had walked along the same pathway with a friend who had there complained of a pain which, he apprehended, might grow into something worse. The mixed emotional feelings thus produced had become blindly associated with the sensations produced by the walls and the pathway.



same thing. They would in the main run parallel with the actual facts of experience, although they would do so automatically, and without any perception of that exclusive consistency which is the characteristic of inference. It might also be anticipated that they would be stronger and more numerous in the lower animals than in man. The "mental range" of brutes is more limited than that of human beings. The conscious phenomena to which they automatically attend are fewer and simpler, and less distracted by attendant phenomena. They are consequently, *cæteris paribus*, more vivid, and their simpler and more regularly recurring resemblances and contingencies more easily laid hold of by association.

The so-called instincts of the lower animals are merely pre-formed associations:—

Chickens newly hatched will so correctly adjust their movements as at once to pick up various objects. Some young puppies, M. Gratiolet tells us, that had never seen a wolf, were thrown into convulsions by the smell of a small portion of wolf-skin.\* Birds of the first year migrate readily to avoid a cold, of which they can have no knowledge. The young female wasp (*Sphæx*), without maternal experience, will seize caterpillars or spiders, and, stinging them in a certain definite spot, paralyze and deprive them of all power of motion (and probably also of sensation), without depriving them of life. She places them thus paralyzed in her nest with her eggs, so that the grubs, when hatched, may be able to subsist on a living prey, unable to escape from or resist their defenceless and all but powerless destroyers. Now, it is absolutely impossible that the consequences of its actions can have been intellectually apprehended by the parent wasp. Had she Reason without her natural Instinct, she could only learn to perform such actions through experience, and the teaching (by precept or example) of older wasps. Now, if such complex actions can be performed in this unconscious manner by insects, why may not the most seemingly rational actions of higher animals be performed in a similar manner? . . . . Mr. Herbert Spencer . . . . makes some noteworthy admissions. He remarks, e.g., as to "birds that fly from inland to the seaside to feed when the tide is out, and cattle that return to the farmyard at milking time. . . . Even here there is not a purely intelligent adjustment of inner to outer sequences, for creatures accustomed to eat or be milked at regular intervals come to have recurrences of constitutional states, and the sensations accompanying these states form the proximate stimuli to their acts." ("Psychology," i. 323, 324.)

And again, he says: "It is anatomically demonstrable that the pairing and nidification of birds in the spring is preceded by constitutional changes which are probably produced by more food and higher temperature. And it is a rational inference that the whole series of processes in the rearing of a

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\* So S. Thomas:—"Ovis videns lupum venientem, fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris, vel figure, sed quasi [fugiens] inimicum nature." ("Summa," 1, 78, 4.)

brood are severally gone through, not with any recognition of remote ends, but solely made under the stimulus of conditions continuously present."

. . . . He also makes a very important admission when he says: "It might fairly be said that the Indian fish, which catches insects flying over the surface by hitting them with jets of water, exhibits an adjustment of inner relations to outer relations as special as that shown by the archer (who shoots high according to the distance of an object aimed at); but considering that in the fish nothing more is implied than an automatic connection between certain visual impressions and certain muscular contractions, it cannot be held that there is anything like the complexity of correspondence." (Op. cit., p. 353.)

The explanation of the phenomena of instinct by the association theory gives us the key to that of the remaining division of animal actions, in which the impulse to act is not already implanted at birth, but generated by the experience of the individual. The joint result of the whole of the past conscious states of an animal is the establishment of post-formed associations, which together constitute what the Scholastics called sensitive memory. When *we* remember anything we have a phantasma representing the thing remembered, together with an accompanying belief that the thing which that phantasma represents formed part of our past experience; and this belief, which is an intellectual act, makes the memory more than sensuous. It is *intellectual* memory. But we should commit the common and not unnatural mistake of reading into the consciousness of the lower animals what we find not there but in our own, if from the performance of actions which, if done by us, would indicate intellectual memory, we inferred that intellectual memory exists in them. Mere automatic association is quite competent to explain all that in them occurs. A horse, to use Reid's example, is terrified at a particular spot in a journey, and on afterwards passing the same place he again exhibits symptoms of fear. But it does not follow that he remembers (in the sense in which we speak of intellectual memory) that there was something terrible in that place the last time he went by it, and anticipates that it may perhaps be there now. All that can be justly concluded is, that the sensations produced by that part of the road have become associated with an emotion of fear, which consequently recurs, when the sensations recur, on the same point being passed again. Any one who is at all familiar with the workings of the laws of association will find no difficulty in applying them to the explanation of hundreds of other phenomena constantly witnessed in the lower animals. The fawning of a dog on its master; the affection of a cat or a cow for its offspring; the actions which it will perform in

their defence ; its distress when they are taken from it ; the phenomena of animal suspense ;\* these and other phenomena of which an almost endless list might be made, are easily and naturally explained by automatic association, without intellect or will.

Thus far, then, of the lower phenomena of consciousness ; we now turn to the higher.

Closely following the Scholastics, Professor Mivart gives in substance the following enumeration of the higher phenomena of mind :—Reflection or “ reflex ” consciousness ; intellectual memory ; abstraction and generalization ; inference ; the power of perceiving necessary truth without ratiocination ; the cognition of moral goodness as a predicate of certain actions ; will ; and intellectual as distinguished from merely sensuous language such as the words uttered by a parrot, cries of pain, and the instinctive expression of the emotions by gesture or otherwise. The faculty of rational language, however, is the consequence of the possession of intelligence rather than a new and superadded faculty ; and the power of the mind to perceive necessary truth has already been so fully treated of in this REVIEW that we shall only quote the following passage, as an example of the careful thought which the author has given to the subject :—

The nature of [the] process of inference is expressed by the word *therefore*, and a little introspection shows us that it is something widely different from the association of different things together in the imagination, so that the recurrence of one induces the recurrence of a group of others, as when the recurrence of a smell occasions the revival in imagination of places, persons, and circumstances of various kinds. Moreover, in this conclusion there is no freedom of choice. We are compelled to admit any conclusion logically contained in admitted premisses, just as we are compelled to admit the truth of the self-evident proposition, “ What thinks, exists.” But it should be noted that though our reason is necessitated, and acts fatally as regards the explicit evolution of implicit truth, and as regards the immediate apprehension of self-evident truth, yet it is not *blind* ; it sees both the objective truths, and their necessity. Our intellectual perception of self-evident truth is not a passive impotence of imagining two things apart (such as our inability to imagine uncoloured extension), but is an active power of perceiving what is positively and necessarily true (pp. 49, 50).†

Reflection, the bending back, as it were, of the mind on

\* That is, incitation to act, not immediately followed by the excitation of an association automatically determining the course of action.

† In the context it is acutely remarked, *inter alia*, that “ it is impossible really to deny the principle of contradiction, for if it is not true, we cannot be certain that in denying it we are not actually affirming it, or that a doubt respecting it is not the same as an absolute certainty that it is true.”

itself and its own operations, may be either consciousness of self, as in saying *I exist, I feel, I know and will*, or reflective consciousness of the affections of self, which is expressed, for instance, in saying *I know that I feel this sensation, that I entertain this belief*. Self-consciousness in the first of these two senses—the consciousness of an enduring identical *ego*, which is the subject of the various modifications experienced by it—is treated of by Professor Mivart in the first chapter of his book. It is well known that Hume sceptically declared that what we call mind is merely a bundle of feelings accreted together without any being which is conscious of them, and that the idea that there is such a being is merely an artificial product of association to which no credence is to be attached. This opinion, like that which denies the existence of material substance, has, oddly enough, been praised as getting rid of supposititious entities, without its being noticed that, according to it, all our sensations, thoughts, emotions, phantasmata, &c., must be as many distinct entities, subsisting of themselves, and having the attributes of being useful, painful, intense, and many more, belonging to them. The Scholastics have often been censured by modern philosophers for having supposed that attributes (or at least some attributes, tastes, colours, sounds, and extension, for instance) are entities, “stuck into the substance,” says Mr. Mill, “like plums into a pudding,” and it has been urged that *v.g.* the extension of a substance or thing is not an entity superadded to the thing, but simply the thing itself considered as having its parts arranged or disposed after a certain manner. The denial of mental substance obviously revives the theory of absolute accidents, as it was called, in a most extreme form. Not only are attributes entities, but they are the only entities which exist.

This opinion is intrinsically so preposterous that it is impossible, perhaps, to find any premisses more obvious than that which it denies, from which to infer its falsehood. “Every man,” as Reid observes with his usual good sense, “has an immediate and irresistible conviction, *not only* of his present existence, but of his continued existence and identity, as far back as he can remember. If any man should think fit to demand a proof that the thoughts he is successively conscious of belong to one and the same thinking principle,—if he should demand a proof that he is the same person to-day as he was yesterday, or a year ago—I know no proof that can be given him.” This conviction “needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it, and no philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity.” And as the opinion which

denies the existence of self is chiefly supported by the exceedingly curious argument that all our knowledge is of states of consciousness—which is what logicians call an *ignoratio elenchi*, one of these states being knowledge of self,—and by another argument as curious, that because we always know self in some state, we do not know it *per se*,\*—those who hold it might, it would seem, properly be left to abound in their own wisdom. And if they were consistent, this would necessarily have to be done. But consistent they of course are not; and it is therefore possible to meet them by appeal to truths which are not, perhaps, even as obvious as that which they deny, but which it may nevertheless be anticipated that they may be brought to admit. Two arguments† of this descrip-

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\* The argument here appears to consist in a peculiar use of the word *know*; according to which, if I had always seen a thing in conjunction with other things, I should never know what it was itself, however often I had seen it, and however accurately I had observed it. It is in the ordinary sense of the word “know” that we are said to know self.

It may further be observed that we never know anything apart from other things, so that in the above sense of know we know nothing whatever, about either self or anything else. Thus, when one sees a horse or a man, one sees at the same time surrounding objects or the surrounding darkness. In the same way we never see colour, without at the same time perceiving extension; and we never see an extended object, without seeing either its limits or the limits of the field of view. In the above sense, therefore, we do not know them; but this does not affect our knowledge in the usual sense of the word.

Such things (using the word “thing” in a wide sense) as whiteness, extension, limit, sweetness, moral good, &c., are the simple elements of our knowledge; and because they are simple there is very little to be said about them. I can only say of whiteness, that it is white; of extension, that it is a being spread out; and of the Ego, that it is myself, as distinguished from the sensations, and the like, which I experience; that it is persistent, indivisible, unextended, and so on. These things are the bricks out of which our other knowledge is made; and if there were no knowledge-bricks, there would be no knowledge-buildings. It is from several of them (e.g., line, straight, extremities, distant, shortest way) being brought together, that our more complex knowledge results. When we try to think of straightness, without taking into account its causes, or its effects, or the things in which it is found, or the other properties which are correlated in any way with it, we find that there is nothing to be said about it, except that it is what it is,—it is straightness. But we do not the less know what straightness is; for otherwise we should be unable to discriminate it from crookedness. It is an atom of knowledge; no more; and equally no less. But because in all acts of at all complex knowledge a number of these atoms are conjoined, we are sometimes said to know, not the atoms themselves, but the relations between them. This would make the relations entities, whereas a relation, according to the now common opinion, is simply the things related. And besides, each relation would be a new atom; the same difficulty would recur; and we should never know anything at all.

† By arguments is not here meant explanations of what is meant by self, and what by knowledge of self, but reasons presupposing that the person to

tion are here available,—a negative argument, that there is no evidence that Inseparable Association can produce new positive ideas, and a positive argument, drawn from the absurdities which emerge when what is involved in the idea of a series of feelings conscious of itself as a series is explicated. The gist of this argument is stated by Reid (*Essay* 6, ch. 5); it is noticed by Mr. Mill (*"Examination of Hamilton,"* ch. xii.), who admits that it renders impossible the explanation of our belief in self by the Association-Theory (p. 260 of 4th ed.), and is that on which Professor Mivart relies.

With reference to Professor Huxley's declaration that self and not-self are "hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved or known with the highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate consciousness," our author brings forward another point which is worthy of notice. He shows that even if we suppose that immediate consciousness alone gives the highest degree of certainty, the theory of a series of states is a hypothetical assumption not warranted by it, while it does, on the other hand, testify, in the "self + state" of reflection, to the present existence of self. A series of states must extend into the past; consciousness is only of the present. Whoever asserts a series of states goes far beyond consciousness, and is obliged either to postulate, or to prove the validity of memory. To postulate it, is to demand that more than present consciousness be conceded; to prove it from present consciousness is impossible.\*

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whom they are addressed knows what is meant, and intended to convince him of its truth. At the same time we are far from asserting that explanations and examples of what is intended are unnecessary. It might not, for instance, be useless in the controversy as to our own existence, as distinguished from that of the various feelings, &c., which we experience when we are not asleep, to explain that by the *Ego* is not meant an unknowable something which is fancied to lie hidden *behind* consciousness, but self as manifested *in* consciousness. It often happens that denials of our knowledge of self or of moral goodness, or assertions that the lower animals reflect or reason, proceed from ignorance of what is meant by self, moral goodness, reflection, or reasoning. In cases of this kind, it is obvious that such explanations are in the highest degree necessary.

\* Cf. DUBLIN REVIEW, July, 1873, "Mr. Mill's Reply to the DUBLIN REVIEW." As we are on the subject of memory, we may take the opportunity of making a remark on the distinction between sensitive and intellectual memory. By sensitive memory we mean the excitation by an object which has been previously experienced of its own phantasma through the law of resemblance, and the consequent resuscitation of associated phantasmas, emotions, and movements, through the law of contiguity, without any reflection on these phenomena, or belief that the object has been previously experienced. This is obviously sufficient to explain the facts of animal memory. When a kitten has repeatedly drunk milk out of a certain saucer, and runs to the saucer on its being placed on the ground, it is not necessary



Our reflective knowledge of other kinds is a use of the same faculty as is employed in cognizing self. We may, of course, be overmastered with pain, or, *sub tegmine fagi*, may give ourselves away to a grateful stream of sensuous pleasure caused by the warmth of the sun, the freshness of the leaves, the odour of the flowers; and when we do this, our consciousness so far resembles, no doubt, that of the lower animals. But we can also bring ourselves to a stand; we can examine, not only external objects, but also, what is of far greater importance in view of both our intelligence and our moral accountability, our own state—our thoughts and motives and feelings. Not only may a phantasma, with its associated emotions and automatic impulses to action, move across our consciousness as it may across the consciousness of the brute, but we can also ask ourselves, Is the indulgence of those emotions, of those impulses, right? Does this phantasma represent what is true? This is reflection, as distinguished from self-consciousness; it is the inbending of the mind to observe its own affections as such; and as the brute cannot do this, it is neither an intellectual nor a moral being. It is not an intellectual being, for the intellect is the faculty of truth, and truth is an *adæquatio mentis et rei*, which cannot be apprehended without comparing the two together. An animal may be conscious of what is *de facto* true, but, if its conscious phenomena are merely associated feelings, it cannot apprehend the truth of it—cannot say to itself, My representation of this is true. It is not a moral being; for no being

to suppose more than that the visual sensations due to the saucer have become associated with the phantasma of an agreeable taste, which instinctively excites muscular movements which carry the animal in the direction of the saucer. To suppose that it forms intellectual acts of belief about milk, saucer, &c., is mere gratuitous assertion. By intellectual memory we mean, as has been already indicated, that in which there is a superadded act of *belief*,—belief that the thing represented in consciousness formed part of past experience. This belief is specially important, since as, e.g., Mr. Mill has shown in his notes to his father's "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," it cannot be accounted for by association, and is therefore one of the phenomena of the human mind which feelings and their association are incompetent to explain. Mr. Mivart's observations on the subject we do not, we confess, entirely understand. He gives as an example of intellectual memory "that most remarkable fact that we may search our minds for something . . . which at present we cannot imagine, but which we intellectually remember, and immediately recognize . . . as soon as its image presents itself to our imagination" (p. 197). It appears to us that during this intermediate period the thing is not remembered at all.

Intellectual may of course differ from sensuous memory not only *ex parte modi quo res cognoscitur*, but also *ex parte rei quæ cognoscitur*. Moral goodness, for instance, as it cannot be apprehended by the lower powers, cannot be an object of sensuous memory.

which is incapable of asking itself, "Is this action, which I am about to do, right?" can possibly be such. It is, therefore, almost impossible to overrate the importance of reflection, although the simplest exercises of the faculty may not fully show its dignity. But, to take the simplest example possible, is to feel the same thing as to know that one feels? Can we say with any additional meaning, "I know that I feel"? or do we, when we say this, mean no more than we do when we say simply "I feel"? If we mean more, then we have, at least in rudiment, the power of reflection; if we mean no more, then reflection, and all that depends on it, is mere appearance.

Those who assert that the human mind is essentially similar to that of the lower animals, consequently deny that we mean any more. "To have a sensation," says James Mill ("Analysis of Human Mind," ch. 11), "and to believe that we have it, are not distinguishable things. When I say, 'I have a sensation,' and say 'I believe that I have it,' I do not express two states of consciousness, but one and the same state. A sensation is a feeling; but a feeling, and the belief of it, are the same thing." The error is obvious. The sensation is in both cases the same; the mental attitude toward it is different, and separated by the whole of the interval which separates feeling and knowledge. So long as I merely feel the sensation, there is only one mental state, the sensation or feeling itself; as soon as I apply my intellectual power to that humble object, there are two:—the sensation, and a distinct act of cognition with respect to that sensation. Every one recognizes in himself that these two states, that of mere feeling, and that of reflection on the feeling, are different *toto cælo*. No amount of automatic attention, no increase, that is to say, in the vividness of the sensation itself, would ever make it the act, "I know that I have this sensation"; and this act, lowly as it is, is obviously of the same general character as those which we perform when we answer to ourselves such questions as "Is what I am thinking true?" "Is what I am doing right?" Without the possibility of such acts as these we should be neither rational nor accountable beings.\*

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\* The dependence of human freedom, another condition of moral action, on the existence of Self, ought not to be let pass without notice. It is well brought out in some observations of Herbert Spencer's ("Psychology," i. 500), quoted by Professor Mivart in p. 124 of his book. We here reproduce part of the quotation, which must, of course, be read between the lines:—"Considered as an internal perception, the illusion [of human freedom] consists in supposing that at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas actual and nascent, which then exists. . . . This composite psychical state which excites the action, is at the same time the ego which wills the action. Naturally enough, then, the subject of

We must here, with many regrets, take our leave of Professor Mivart's book, commending it most cordially to the attention of our readers. Into the biological questions which are treated of in the later portion of it, and into the ulterior consequences, both of the opinions which he defends and of those which he attacks, it is impossible for us here to enter. But we have at least given an idea of its general character, and a pretty full account of that part of its subject-matter which bears more directly on philosophy and so on the philosophical interpretation of the scientific speculations discussed in subsequent pages.

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such psychical changes says that he wills the action; since, psychically considered, he is at that moment nothing more than the composite state of consciousness by which the action is excited. But to say that the performance of the action is, therefore, the result of his free will, is to say that he determines the cohesions of the psychical states which arouse the action; and as these psychical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd. Their cohesions have been determined by experience." But every one who has an ordinary amount of intelligence sees that there is an unfathomable difference between those acts which are the mere results of previous states—as when he cries out because of sudden and violent pain—and those which he himself deliberately wills; and from this, if other evidence were wanting, he might conclude that besides the bundle of feelings, there is a being, active on occasion, who has them. Professor Mivart excellently remarks:—"Assertors of free will do not, of course, maintain that they are conscious of what is external to their consciousness, as if they could see, as a spectator, that external and internal influences do not in all cases determine their actions; but what they do assert is, that they are conscious that they themselves, in the very act of deciding, exercise occasionally a free power of choice, for which choice they are justly responsible. Just as a blind man, pushing his way through a thicket in one direction, but suddenly taking another, because on reconsidering his past footsteps he is convinced he was wrong, knows that his change of path was due to his own thoughts, and not to any rocks, pits, or other external impediments, though he cannot affirm that such were not close to him when he turned."

ART. III.—CATHOLIC INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION.  
—ST. MARY'S ORPHANAGE, BLACKHEATH.

*Protestantism and Catholicism in their bearing upon the Liberty and Prosperity of Nations.* By M. E. DE LAVELEYE. (English Translation.) London: John Murray.

**M.** DE LAVELEYE'S pamphlet on "Protestantism and Catholicism in their bearing upon the Liberty and Prosperity of Nations" contains the following passage:—

It is admitted that the Scotch and Irish are of the same origin. Both have become subject to the English yoke. Until the sixteenth century Ireland was much more civilized than Scotland. During the first part of the Middle Ages the Emerald Isle was a focus of civilization while Scotland was still a den of barbarians. Since the Scotch have embraced the Reformed religion they have outrun even the English. Ireland, on the other hand, devoted to Ultramontaniam, is poor, miserable, agitated by the spirit of rebellion, and seems incapable of raising herself by her own strength.

What a contrast even in Ireland between the exclusively Catholic Connaught and Ulster, where Protestantism prevails.

The English translation of this work was made at Mr. Gladstone's request, though the preface he prefixes to it says that this request did not imply adoption of the precise view of the author, or of each of his opinions in detail. It is passing strange that Mr. Gladstone, with whatever reservations, should have allowed his name to be identified with a work containing an accusation at once unjust and ignorant against some millions of his fellow-countrymen, until recently his firmest and most trusted supporters.

Common justice should have constrained him to point out to M. de Laveleye that less than a hundred years ago the penal laws were in full operation; that they have done their work; that Catholics were more entirely excluded from the State under which they lived than the Christians are now in Bosnia or Herzegovina; that they could not fill any position, however humble, civil or military; that there was not, and could not be, a Catholic barrister or attorney, or officer or civil servant; that to render them, as Mr. Burke said, 'patient under a deprivation of all the rights of human nature, everything which could give them a knowledge or feeling of those rights was rationally forbidden. To render humanity fit to be insulted, it was fit that it should be degraded. To make them contented without property or power, to prevent them from feeling this a grievance, to be shut out from every civil and military occupation, education was denied to them. To

expect the Irish to be as advanced in material progress as three centuries of education have made the Scotch would be as absurd as to expect the muscles of printers and painters to be as much developed as the muscles of prizefighters; and if M. de Laveleye had urged that these penal laws were now abrogated, Mr. Gladstone might have quoted the words of his late ultra-Protestant colleague, Dr. Lyon Playfair, in his address to the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh in 1870:—

The chief difficulty for the development of Ireland consists in the fact that England has impressed a character upon the people by centuries of misrule, and that time is requisite for the change of character, because a State responsible for the upbringing of a people cannot escape the judgment which says that the sins of the fathers shall be visited on the children even to the third and fourth generation.

We have cited M. de Laveleye, not for the purpose of entering into controversy with him, or of teaching Mr. Gladstone consideration for his former friends: the latter task is beyond our powers; the former, as to facts, has been completely and exhaustively done by the Baron de Haulleville in some remarkable articles published in the "*Revue Générale*" at Brussels; and the fallacy of taking temporal prosperity as a test of religious truth has been exposed by F. Newman in his unanswered and unanswerable sermon on the Church Visible for the sake of the Elect, and in others of his writings.

Our object is to draw from those remaining effects of the legislation of past times, which M. de Laveleye has exaggerated and left unexplained, some lessons for our present conduct. Now, at all events, we have conquered our political and social liberties; we stand before the law on the same footing as the rest of Her Majesty's subjects; almost every office under the Crown, civil as well as military, has been thrown open to public competition; but still, though equal before the law, we are not equal in fact to our Protestant fellow-countrymen.

Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, who has been prime minister of Victoria, thus wrote in a letter addressed to Lord Emly, and cited by him in his address delivered in November, 1874, to the Irish Statistical Society:—

MY DEAR LORD EMLY,

I have just been reading the pamphlet containing your speech in the House of Lords on the state of primary education in Ireland. The state of primary education, I dare say, is bad enough; but, trust me, it is not so deplorable and disastrous as the state of middle-class education. For nearly twenty years my position in Australia brought under my notice a constant stream of immigrants from Ireland. To aid them in finding a career in the

new country was a duty and a pleasure ; and they possessed, as a rule, nearly all the necessary qualifications for success but one. They had natural intelligence, good conduct, and integrity ; but, in the great majority of cases, they had been taught nothing systematically or thoroughly. They had not got that sort of practical discipline, either at school or at home, without which success in life is hard to win. This deficiency was most notable in the middle class. When I asked a young man, tenderly reared, as we say, and bringing the best testimonials of personal character, what he had been taught, his answer, in the majority of cases, disclosed the fact that he had been taught nothing beyond the instrumental parts of learning. If I asked him how he had been employed, the probability was that he had been idling about his father's house for a year or two before leaving home ; of the practical business of life he had not learned a jot. In a country where men will pay liberally for skilled labour, or disciplined intelligence, where, if you have learned any profession or pursuit thoroughly, you may confidently count upon living by it, a flood of young men, often singularly bright and genial creatures, come to offer themselves to a market that had no place or opening for them. At an age when young Scotchmen are earning a good income, and when young Americans have made a position in life, they were still in search of some short cut to that success, which is only reached by the road of useful training and steady industry. It is true that against all these difficulties some of these young men made their way, slowly and painfully, to an honourable independence. But many of them sank down into the labouring mass and disappeared ; and a more tragical fate befell others, who became dissipated and hopeless idlers. I could not hope to realize to you the painful struggles I have seen ; but once, when a dangerous illness brought me to death's door, I traced it to the distress and discomfort I had endured, day after day, in the labour to place a multitude of young Irishmen, who brought me letters of introduction from friends at home, and thought a letter of introduction was a substitute for training.

In Australia, and, indeed, in nearly every civilized country in the world, Irishmen of natural brightness and intelligence are sweating under the heaviest tasks, whilst their overseers or employers are Scotchmen of the same class. I have never been able to discover any cause for this painful contrast, except the difference in education. Scotch boys are adequately and skilfully trained in the school and on the farm. Irish boys, as a rule, are not. The reformed land system of Australia has enabled thousands of Irishmen to become proprietors of small estates, from 200 to 2,000 acres, where they are prosperous in a pursuit which they understood. But most of these were tenant-farmers or farm-labourers in Ireland ; a very small proportion of them belonged to the middle class. Scotchmen of both classes have made a much more conspicuous success. They become squatters or Crown tenants, and have obtained estates as large, in many cases, as the estates of the greatest proprietors in Europe. The main cause of this difference was simply a better and more practical education. No one acquainted with the iniquitous laws which regulated education in Ireland will be surprised that it should be in a backward condition, for you cannot undo the work of generations at a stroke. But we have not done all that we



might, and I cordially sympathize with your desire that we may do better. I beg you to be assured, however, that the most urgent need of amendment is in the training of the children of the middle class.

Believe me, my dear Lord Emly,

Very sincerely yours,

C. GAVAN DUFFY.

Two notable instances of the result of this inferiority have come before the writer of this article.

In an office where the superior officers have been chosen by open competition, with this limitation, that Catholics only should compete for Catholic, and Protestants for Protestant vacancies, it was proposed to cancel this proviso. This intention was abandoned, because it was found that, on account of the superiority of Protestant to Catholic higher education, without the proviso almost every successful candidate would have been a Protestant.

In another instance, a schoolmaster, with high classical and scientific acquirements, was to be appointed to an endowed school. An advertisement calling for tenders was issued. A Catholic was in the chair when the tenders were opened. It was desirable that the officer to be appointed should be a Catholic, but the five obviously and unmistakably best candidates were Protestants. There is no necessity for multiplying proofs. Our education, as Lord Emly stated in the address to which we have already referred, is scandalously and lamentably inferior to the education of our Protestant fellow-countrymen.

We must not turn away our eyes from this most painful fact. The first step towards removing our inferiority is to realize it, and to bear to contemplate it. If it could not be accounted for by the history of the past, if our comparative want of education and culture did not follow necessarily from past legislation, we might shut our eyes and fold our hands, and adore the mysterious Providence that had doomed us to inferiority; but we can touch with our fingers the causes of every bad and dangerous symptom, and we know that, although the effects remain, those causes have been removed. Surely, then, the path of duty for us is clearly and sharply marked. It was not by sitting still and trusting in Providence that we broke down the barriers raised by past ages against our progress; it was by long, steady, persevering, organized energy. Energy no less steady, persevering, and organized can alone avail us now; and without this energy our last state will be worse than our first; for education of secularists and Protestants is making from year to year gigantic progress. If they, starting from a higher level, are reaping the fruits of

steady and concentrated exertion, what will be our position in relation to theirs if we, starting from a lower level, are less active than they are? When we use the epithet gigantic we in no way exaggerate. The ideal aimed at in England and Scotland is well described in the last of the series of admirable speeches, full of thought and of matter, which Mr. Grant Duff delivers annually to his constituents. "It is," he said, "the view, the unanimous view of the Scotch Education Royal Commissioners, the things most wanted in Scotland are better secondary schools, technical schools, and a means by which deserving boys of the very poorest class can rise step by step, so as to have, if their abilities, application, and good conduct make them worthy of it, the very best education their country affords. To provide that appears to me the truest charity, and if the least fortunate classes of this country knew their own interests, they would never rest till they were able to say Scotland is a land in which there is a self-acting machinery by which the child of the poorest labourer is certain, if he is remarkably gifted, to have as good an opportunity of obtaining a first-rate education, so far as that can be got within the bounds of Scotland, as the son of the greatest nobleman." To realize this ideal, commissions have sat, on which were placed such men as Lord Derby, Mr. Forster, the Duke of Argyll, and the Duke of Devonshire. Effect was given to the reports of the English and Scotch commissions by the late Government; so the scheme moves with the steady, even flow of water seeking its own level, and it will, we may safely predict, be realized probably in England, certainly in Scotland, before this generation passes away. Men now living will see the day when every young Scotchman, gifted with remarkable ability, however low his social position, however poor his parents, will have the opportunity of passing from the primary to the intermediate school, from the intermediate school to the university, and will be helped on by bourses or scholarships in his progress.

Our success in improving and developing primary education has been satisfactory, but elementary schools only put the tools of education into the hands of their pupils. How can even men of real ability, whose education has ended with a primary school, wrestle in the battle of life with men of equal, or even inferior ability, whose education has been such as Mr. Grant Duff aspires after. He insists, and we have a right to insist, on having a fair share of endowments to assist us in this object. In England, with its 700 endowed intermediate schools, and in Scotland with its 71, there are no Catholic endowments for intermediate education;

but even in Ireland no such endowments exist. There are only 108 Catholics in Irish endowed schools; so that if it were not for unassisted voluntary efforts 108 would be the whole number of Catholics receiving intermediate education out of more than four millions—the Catholic population of Ireland.

The following table, which we extract from Lord Emly's address, is full of painful interest:—

Country.	Population.	Attending Endowed Intermediate Schools.	No. in each 100,000 of the Population.
In Scotland .....	3,360,018	12,500	375
England .....	27,712,266	40,000	144
Prussia (in 1863).....	18,476,500	66,136	358
Ireland :—			
For the Protestant portion of the population.....	1,260,588	2,518	199
For the Catholic portion of the population.....	4,141,933	108	2

The Irish Census Commissioners, in their report just published, lament the deficiencies of superior instruction in Ireland :—

The genius (they say) of the Irish people is admittedly not adverse to the pursuit of liberal studies, nor is there wanting a class in Ireland from which aspirants to higher culture in its various degrees might be largely recruited. . . . Taking in the whole field of view, we are unable to repel the inference that the cause of this miserable backwardness in higher culture lies outside the national character, outside the distribution of wealth, outside variety of station, and outside every ordinary influence that should determine a certain element of the population to the acquirement of liberal culture in various degrees from the lowest to the highest. We must be only permitted to hope that the causes of the failure we record may be more intelligently inquired into than heretofore, and that the remedy, when discovered, may be seriously and courageously applied.

The Commissioners then proceed to analyze the figures before them with reference to the religious elements of the population, and show that as regards intermediate education the Roman Catholics are absolutely destitute of State provision.

The report from which we have made the above extract is drawn up with remarkable ability, and should be in the hands of every one who desires to be informed as to the state of education amongst us. We hope to refer to it more at length on a future occasion. As to our position there can then be no controversy. There is open competition for public as well

as for private establishments: the lists are open to all, but armour and lances are provided for Protestants. We must procure as best we can the weapons with which we are to fight. Evidently our political power is in this respect lower than it has been at any time for the last quarter of a century. The constituencies, which often, at the price of heroic sacrifices, returned members to defend or to conquer religious liberty, now have fixed their aspirations on an object which, be it for good or evil, alienates from them the sympathies of every party in the State. So long as Catholic influence is concentrated on this object Catholics must fight their battles alone. Until educational equality takes as prominent a place as Home Rule in the aspirations of Catholic electors, little progress will be made towards the participation of Catholics in educational grants or endowments.

It is, at all events, clear that at present we have little to hope from the State. Governments never were and never will be guided by abstract justice. No Government will come into collision with the No Popery cry while we remain powerless. In Elizabeth's times churches were provided to supply our spiritual wants which our consciences forbade us to enter. Now, the only schools higher than primary offered to us are conducted on principles to which we conscientiously object. Even in a purely material point of view this is hard to bear. The mere money value of education, such as is given to Scotch Protestants, would be an addition of hundreds of thousands of pounds to the annual income of Catholic families of the humbler classes. Are we then to fold our hands? Are no efforts to be made to redress an inequality which prevents the Catholic middle class, miserably weak as it now is, from being recruited, as the Protestant middle class is being recruited from day to day? Higher than mere material interests are involved in the answer to this question. The influence of a Labré or of a S. Francis of Assisi no doubt was independent of their social position; but with ordinary men it is otherwise. As the stream flows down from the mountains to fertilize the plains, so social influence descends from above and does not rise from beneath.

Dr. Carew, the late Archbishop of Calcutta, when he asked to have a Catholic judge appointed there, said, "All I shall ask him to do will be to walk up the High Street to mass on Sundays. What we want there is respectability." Until Catholics in the various stations of life can be placed on a level with Protestants, Catholic truth will be discredited in public opinion by our social and intellectual inferiority. But there is another danger. The spread of doctrines subversive

alike of faith and morals is confined unfortunately to no class—not a few artisans and shopkeepers are possessed with that fanaticism of unbelief which has made such astounding progress in polite and educated society. What could be more dangerous to our people than to find themselves in intelligence and culture below these apostles of evil?

This want then must be supplied; not merely material objects are at stake, but the highest interests of religion. The galling fetters of penal laws have not been struck off from our arms in order that they should fall nerveless and powerless by our sides. There is a bank always open on which Catholics may confidently draw at every emergency. There are spiritual forces—faith, self-denial, quiet energy—which exist in their perfection only under the shadow of the Church. What has been done may be done again—what has been accomplished in one district may be accomplished in other districts similar to it. Those of our readers who live in the neighbourhood of London may see for themselves how the difficulties we have described have in a limited sphere been successfully overcome by the quiet energy of a single man.

Just nineteen years ago a priest in charge of a small parish a few miles from London was painfully impressed with the contrast between the educational opportunities accessible to his people and to the population among which they lived. There were no means to enable them to rise from the low social level in which they were born. If any, by the death of parents or guardians, were removed from the protecting influences of family life, he saw them frequently permeated by the Protestant atmosphere around them—first ashamed of their faith—then too often falling off from their religious duties. Even those who resisted the temptations that swarmed in their path were a difficulty to him. He had no way of giving them that training which Protestants around them received, and of fitting them to supply the demand for intellectual work which abounds in London.

Under the influence of these feelings he went to his Bishop, the late Dr. Grant, and with his concurrence and blessing resolved to withdraw from parochial labour and to dedicate himself exclusively to the work of training children.

He established an orphanage at Chislehurst. When it expanded beyond the proportions of the small house he had there hired, he moved it to Greenwich, and ultimately established it in a convenient house, which he purchased chiefly on credit, at Blackheath.

The site is a convenient one overhanging the town, and within two minutes' walk from the railway station. From

first to last this orphanage has had no endowment. Its founder had nothing to give it but his own devotion and energy. It lives from year to year on casual charity, and it is, and always has been, in debt.

A contrast certainly to the hundreds of similar institutions around us, which smoothly flourish on endowments either wrested rudely from Catholics or bequeathed at times when Catholic education was proscribed by law; and yet out of its poverty it has made many rich—it has largely recruited the scanty numbers of the Catholic middle class in London—it has rescued hundreds of children from contamination or apostasy.

The results of its working so far are as follows:—

It has produced—Priests secular and regular, 5. (One young religious, professed, and preparing for Holy Orders, died at the age of 23 years.) Preparing for Holy Orders in secular and regular colleges, 8. Clerks and such-like occupations, as distinct from trades, 65. In various trades, such as opticians, linendrapers, plumbers, carpenters, &c., 74. In the army and navy, 12. In the house now, 116. Most of these are doing well, are respectable, and practise their religion.

Many of those who are established in London frequently come on Sunday to spend the day in the atmosphere where they received their training; so well conducted and satisfactory have the pupils been found, that the demand for boys trained in the Orphanage, by many first-rate establishments in the city, Protestant as well as Catholic, exceeds the supply. Dr. Todd never finds any difficulty in placing well a boy whose training he has completed.

We have stated the number of the present inmates to be 116—with sufficient funds that number might without difficulty be doubled,—and we are convinced that the funds necessary for this increase would not be wanting, if only a small proportion of the Catholics who visit London during the season could be induced to visit the Orphanage themselves: a very slight inspection would convince them of its importance. Unfortunately, however, its support is thrown now upon a few contributors. The debt on the establishment increases from year to year, and we can hardly see how, without increased resources, even the present number of inmates can be maintained.

Let our readers see for themselves—if they see they will give. And now in conclusion, let us ask what would be the effect on Catholic interests if institutions such as this were established in Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow, and the other great centres of our population?



The penal laws left us a few great families, who, living in obscurity, had kept together some portion of their properties. Almost all the remainder of our population belonged to the lower class. That description happily would not now apply to us. Industry and good conduct have raised many to a higher position. The excellence of the primary education given by the Irish National Board has been shown by the success of the Irish competitors for the lower appointments in the Civil Service. In the examinations held during the two years ending the 30th of June, 1874, while Ireland, according to her population, would have been entitled to only one-sixth of the places competed for, out of 600 excise appointments, they gained 324. But the proof we have given of their inferiority to the rest of the population of the United Kingdom, in intermediate and higher education are conclusive—they might be multiplied indefinitely. We find, for instance, in the last report of the President of the Queen's College, Cork, that the small number of scholarships awarded at entrance is due to the very imperfect preparation of the candidates. Indeed, one of the chief difficulties, he goes on to say, which the College has to contend with is the want of good intermediate schools, in which boys would be well grounded. This want is greater in England and Scotland than it is in Ireland; until it is supplied, we cannot compete on equal terms with Protestants for employment in mercantile houses, in the higher posts of factories, in banks, in our colonies; and our influence in that powerful middle class, which is the backbone of English society, cannot be increased. Until it is increased, the supernatural weapons we wield must often be blunted by the seven-fold armour of contempt which our social and intellectual inferiority presents to resist them. Every motive, natural and supernatural—charity, justice, honour—summons us to this work. Our business has been to destroy, to pull down the fabric of persecuting laws which crushed us. Now we have to build up, to fit our people for that struggle of life into which they are, so far as legislation goes, admitted on equal terms with their fellow-countrymen. When this necessity is realized—when the same amount of energy is roused for this object that now wastes itself on the realization of impossible dreams, a pressure will be put on governments for the amount of assistance our numbers entitle us to, which they will not be able to resist.

In the meantime, very little effort, if it be general, will enable us to double the numbers in S. Mary's Orphanage at Blackheath, and to rear up similar institutions in other parts of the metropolis, and in our great manufacturing towns.

## ART. IV.—RANKE'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

*A History of England, principally in the Seventeenth Century.* By LEOPOLD VON RANKE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875.

IN a former article we pointed out that Ranke, in his narrative of the earlier period of English history, has been betrayed by religious prejudice and political motives into gross falsifications of facts. We will now pass on to the later period, and especially to the seventeenth century, to which he has principally devoted his studies. His subject being here more purely secular, has not afforded the same temptations for the indulgence of religious bigotry. Notwithstanding, he has availed himself of the opportunities that have incidentally offered to follow out his political purpose, and misrepresent the Catholic Church, sometimes as the natural ally of despotism, and then again, as the enemy of the State. We shall first direct attention to the most important of these misstatements, and afterwards we shall turn with pleasure to the better side of the work, which, in spite of these blots, is a valuable contribution to English history.

We begin with the Grand Alliance of 1689 against France. After telling us that it was formed to balance the overwhelming power of Louis XIV., Ranke goes on to treat it as if it were a struggle between Catholic monarchical principles and Protestant free institutions; \* notwithstanding that Catholic Spain and Germany stood by the side of Protestant England and Holland, that "at the Court of Rome," as we learn from his "History of the Popes," "were combined the threads of that alliance," and that the Pope's "resistance to the appointment of a candidate favoured by France to the Archbishopric of Cologne, . . . contributed largely to the breaking out of the war." † So far was Louis from being identified with Catholic principles, that, as Bossuet said, "From the time that" he "had taken the government into his own hands, and especially under Colbert, his policy had been to humble Rome and strengthen himself in opposition to her." ‡ His ambassador at Rome was at this time excommunicated, and Ranke tells us elsewhere that "it was the opinion of contemporaries, that

\* Vol. v. l. 20, Introd.; c. 1, p. 9; l. 21, c. 6, p. 229.

† "Hist. Popes," l. 8, sec. 16, p. 24, ed. Bohn.

‡ "Journal de Leduc," t. i. p. 8.

although France might remain within the pale of the Catholic Church, it yet stood on the threshold, in readiness for stepping beyond it." \* In closing the subject Ranke sets in striking antagonism "the old original hostility between Catholicism, strong monarchical forms, and all that is involved in them on the one side, and Protestant Parliamentary tendencies on the other," † forgetful alike of his own admission that "in the great crises of European history theological sympathies have generally but little weight if they are opposed to interests," ‡ and of the broad fact that at the present moment the Catholic Church is nowhere more flourishing and vigorous than in the great Republic of the West, while quite recently the Republic of Ecuador has been the very model of a Catholic State. §

Speaking of the martyrs in Elizabeth's reign, he says:—

Assuredly there were not so many executed as the Catholic world wished to reckon, but yet probably more than the statesmen of England admitted. They persisted that it was not a persecution for religion: and in fact the controverted questions lay mainly in the region of the conflict between Papacy and Monarchy: those executed were not so much martyrs of Catholicism as of the idea of the Papal supremacy over monarchs. But how closely connected are these ideas with each other! The priests for their part believed that they were dying for God and the Church. ||

This remark has a singular connection with the present persecution in Germany. But it is an absurdity, worthy only of Exeter Hall, to suppose that the heroic men who braved unsurpassed hardships, torture, imprisonment, and death, in order to keep alive the faith and courage of their brethren through the ministration of the Sacraments, ever bestowed a thought upon "the idea of the Papal supremacy over monarchs," except when it was forced on their notice by Elizabeth's judges and magistrates; or that they gave their lives for ought less than the love of "God and the Church." The Protestant Hallam has taken pains to show that it was for "the most clandestine exercise" of their religion that they suffered, "since," as he says, "so false a colour has been often employed to disguise the ecclesiastical tyranny of this reign." His remarks are so unanswerable that we quote them.

That which renders these condemnations of Popish priests so iniquitous is, that the belief in, or rather the refusal to disclaim a speculative tenet, dangerous indeed, and incompatible with loyalty, but not coupled with any overt act, was construed into treason.

\* "Hist. Popes," l. 8, sec 16, p. 421.

† Vol. v. l. 22, c. 2, p. 349.

‡ Vol. v. l. 20, c. 1, p. 5.

§ I consider too F. Lambert's article in the "Month" of March, on the Republic of S. Marino.

|| Vol. i. l. 3, c. 4, p. 295.

In a note he adds:—

A man is punished for religion when he incurs a penalty for its profession or exercise to which he was not liable on any other account. This is applicable to the great majority of capital convictions on this score under Elizabeth. The persons convicted could not be traitors in any fair sense of the word, because they were not charged with anything properly denominated treason. . . . The only evidence, so far as we know or have reason to suspect, that could be brought against them, was their own admission, at least by refusing to abjure it, of the Pope's power to depose heretical princes. I suppose it is unnecessary to prove that, without some overt act to show a design of acting upon the principle, it could not fall within the statute.\*

As to the number of the martyrs, our own impression is that it far exceeds what "the Catholic world wished to reckon." But the true state of the case will come out more plainly when the example of the Jesuits, who have begun to publish the memoirs of their own martyrs, shall have been followed on behalf of the other religious orders and of the secular clergy.

Ranke's account of the Popish Plot, however, outdoes all his other falsifications of history. For though he tells us that Oates "had been from his youth up notorious for the most shameless untruthfulness," and gives us the details of the political intrigue based upon the supposed plot, yet he hesitates not to assert, that "it cannot be affirmed that all that they alleged was mere invention. 'There was some truth in it,' as Dryden says, 'but mixed with lies.'"<sup>†</sup>

He also heads his pages, "Denunciation of the Jesuit Conspiracy," and states in the index, "They [the Jesuits] form a conspiracy against Charles." He does not, however, give us the grounds on which he rests this bold assertion, in opposition to the threefold judgment of the Courts, which in 1684 and 1685 found Oates guilty of libel and perjury, and the House of Lords, which after the Revolution refused to reverse the sentence; <sup>‡</sup> and also to the verdict of posterity, which has made the very names of Oates and the Popish Plot a byword for a malicious political imposture.<sup>§</sup> As to the "very offensive letters," by which Ranke implies that Oates supported his first statement, the fact is that his startling narrative was unauthenticated by a single document; for the five letters to which he directed attention were so evidently forgeries, that they were not even brought forward at the trials, and Coleman's correspondence bore on a totally different

\* "Constit. Hist.," vol. i. c. 3, pp. 141, 164, 165.

† Vol. iv. l. 16, c. 5, p. 60.

‡ Cobbett's "State Trials," vol. x. pp. 126, 1079, 1318.

§ Serjeant Ballantyne used them in this sense in his speech last year in defence of the Gackwar.

subject; while the circumstantial evidence broke down completely, often with ludicrous mistakes. This studious attempt to create the false impression that the Jesuits were actually guilty of this crime, is rendered the more disgraceful by the fact that Ranke's book was published in Germany, where his readers were less likely to be familiar with the true state of the case and the opinion of respectable Protestant writers.

A similar spirit betrays itself in the frequent mention in the reign of James II. of the Jesuits and "the Jesuitical party," who, in opposition to the Queen and even to the Pope, encouraged James in his violent measures. But when, in order to ascertain the names of this knot of Jesuits, we turn to James's Autobiographical Memoirs, of which Ranke says, "no one has ever doubted their authenticity,"\* we are surprised to find that it contained only one Jesuit, F. Petre, the rest being the Catholic lords Arundel, Powis, Bellasis, Dover, and Castlemaine, and the Protestant Sunderland; to whom may be added Mr. Jermyn and Lord Tyrconnel, who had been James's devoted followers under all changes of fortune.† The Annual Letters of the Jesuits of the English province show that they did not approve of James's proceedings.‡ The General of the Society, by the Pope's desire, rebuked F. Petre for ambition.§ The Queen opposed his being made a Privy Councillor, because it would give scandal to the Society, as being against their rule.|| And Ranke himself tells us, that Sunderland was a man "without any preference for one religion or the other," and "destitute . . . of all political morality"; that he was "the man of business," who first gave the party any real importance, and that it was he who brought forward F. Petre to be used as the scapegoat on whom the odium of all unpopular acts was to be thrown.¶ As to F. Petre, he "was made a Privy Councillor against his own judgment";\*\* and when it was insinuated that he had too much influence with the King, and a difference with the Pope had arisen on his account, he frequently, but in vain, besought the King on his knees to dismiss him.†† As to his advice, we know that he urged James not to proceed against the bishops, nor to leave London on William's landing; but

\* Vol. vi. Appendix, sect. 2, p. 35.

† Macpherson: "Original Papers," extract 1, A.D. 1686, p. 148.

‡ Oliver: "Collections," p. 164. § Ranke, vol. iv. l. 18, c. 1, p. 375.

|| Clarke, "Life of James II., from the Stuart MSS., vol. ii. p. 77.

¶ Vol. iv. l. 17, c. 4, p. 283; c. 7, p. 344; vol. vi. Appendix 2, p. 43. Clarke, vol. ii. p. 76.

\*\* Macpherson: "Original Papers," extract 1, A.D. 1686, p. 148.

†† Oliver: "Collections," p. 164.

on both occasions without effect.\* Thus, this "Jesuitical party," which is responsible for all James's acts, on closer approach melts like a phantom of the night into thin air. But Ranke's constantly-repeated assertion unavoidably creates the impression that it actually existed; and it is impossible not to impute to him the deliberate intention to circulate a falsehood.

One more misstatement we cannot refrain from noticing. Ranke says :

Among Catholic princes and kings, not one has ever attempted to establish the ecclesiastical independence of his realm in a more comprehensive sense than Louis XIV. While he thrust out the Protestants from it, he at the same time systematically opposed the influences of the Roman See. He made common cause with the Gallican clergy against the Protestants, and the Gallican clergy made common cause with him against the Pope.

After giving a garbled version of the affair of the *régale* and that of the franchises, he continues :

The Pope pronounced his Interdict on the ambassador, and on the special French church in Rome, that of S. Louis. The Great Chamber of the Parliament of Paris replied by a lengthy declaration that the Interdict, and the Bull which preceded it, were null and void; they required their king, on the basis of the Four Articles, to summon a national council, which might, when it assembled, make orders with regard to the vacant bishoprics. The clergy and the Sorbonne assented to this suggestion; the affair began to assume the aspect of a schism.†

Here there are no less than four misstatements. First, it was not the independence, but the ecclesiastical enslavement of the realm, which Louis sought to establish. Even the Gallican Fleury says :

If some foreigner, zealous for the rights of the Church, and little disposed to flatter the temporal power, wished to write a treatise on the "Servitudes of the Gallican Church," he would not want for matter, and it would not be difficult for him to describe as such the appeals *comme d'abus*, the jurisdiction of lay judges over ecclesiastical property, the *régale*, the tithes, the rarity of councils, the trial of the clergy in lay courts, the succession of relatives to ecclesiastical goods, mortmain, &c.; and he would ridicule our court writers who, notwithstanding, so loudly proclaim this name of liberty, and make it even consist in part of these very things.‡

Secondly, the Gallican clergy did not make common cause with Louis against the Pope, for it was only by extraordinary coercion that the small, packed Assembly of 1682 could be collected; and even its members would, had they been permitted, have reversed the Four Articles the day after they had

\* Lingard, vol. xiii. pp. 143, 180; ed. Dolman, 1845.

† Vol. iv. l. 18, c. 1, p. 375.

‡ "Nouveaux Opuscules," p. 108, ed. 1807.



passed them;\* while the Sorbonne absolutely refused to register them, and the Gallican doctrine, Fleury says, was rejected by all the religious orders and the great majority of the priesthood, and accepted only by doctors who were neither pious nor exemplary for morality, by lawyers and by free-thinking politicians.†

Thirdly, the Parliament did not require the king to summon a national council, but merely accepted and endorsed an appeal to a future council, of which the heads had been drawn up by the Procureur-Général by order of the king, and in his presence.‡

Fourthly, the clergy and the Sorbonne did not assent to this suggestion; for so well aware was Louis of their sentiments, that *he did not even ask for their approval or signature.*§

To these four misstatements may be added the important omission that Louis retracted all the measures that he had taken against the Pope, and compelled all the members of the Assembly of 1682 to apologize to him, and withdraw the Gallican Articles.||

We have now done with controversy, and turn to more congenial subjects.

Ranke's account of the development of the English constitution till it assumed its present form in the seventeenth century, is lucid and valuable. It has a peculiar interest for us, because it illustrates our article on "The Sovereignty in Modern States," in October, 1874.

No one, we suppose, will deny that originally the sovereign power in England was in the hands of the king, the nation retaining only the rights of personal freedom and security of property. The contests between the Norman-Plantagenet kings and their subjects turned exclusively on the violation of these personal rights. At Runnymede in 1215, and at Oxford in 1258, the barons attempted to usurp the sovereign power by placing the king under the control of a committee. But on both occasions the Pope stood up in defence of the existing constitution; and his judgment was confirmed, in the first case by the treaty of Merton, to which Prince Louis of France was a party, and in the second by S. Louis, who was called in as arbiter. Ranke points out that at Merton it was agreed to give Magna Charta a form compatible with the monarchy, so

\* "Mémoire du Procureur-Général à Colbert," Bibl. Nat. MSS. Fr. 17,417, ap. Gérin, p. 387. † "Nouveaux Opusculs," p. 77.

‡ MS. Harlay. S. G. 168, ap. Gérin, p. 447.

§ Bibl. Nat. MS. Ital. 690, ap. Gérin, p. 447.

|| "Mémoire du Cardinal d'Estrées," Bibl. Nat. MSS. Fr. 15,727, ap. Gérin, p. 613.

that while personal freedom was secured, everything was "left out that could imply a power of control to be exercised against the king," and even the right of approving taxes by a vote was not granted. This charter was "renewed in the ninth year of Henry III. as *Magna Charta*, and was afterwards repeatedly confirmed" by both the king and the Pope's legate.\*

Edward I., in 1297, agreed not to levy money without the consent of the clergy, nobles, and commons, and "for the interests of all," whereas the crown "hitherto had alone exercised the right of estimating what the State needed, and of fixing the payments by this standard." But Ranke observes that the barons did not hereby secure their own direct supremacy, nor did Edward's concessions abase the royal authority. They only "brought into clearer view the unity of interests between the crown and the nation."†

Richard II. was compelled in 1386 to place the government in the hands of eleven barons. But the judges solemnly affirmed, "that the appointment of that commission against the king's will, contravened his legal prerogative," and those who had forced it on him were guilty of high treason.

Under the Lancasters the parliamentary encroachments on the King's sovereignty were temporarily secured. For the kings of this family allowed the Parliament to exercise control over money voted by them, and over the royal officers, and

The prerogative hitherto exercised by the kings, of softening the severity of the statutes by proclamations contravening their purpose, was expressly abolished.‡

But Edward IV. ignored the acts of the Lancasters, whom he regarded as usurpers, restored "the royal prerogative as understood by the old kings," and by various arbitrary exactions and enactments managed to administer the supreme power quite independently of Parliament. §

Such was the sovereignty handed down to the Tudors, and exercised by them. For though in the reign of Elizabeth we find the Commons claiming the privilege of freedom of speech, discussing questions of peace and war, and attacking abuses, yet the Queen constantly asserted her prerogative, imprisoned members who said what did not please her, warned the House not to interfere in affairs of Church or State, and bent them completely to her will. ||

With the seventeenth century and the accession of the Stuarts a new era opens. The struggle between royal and

\* Vol. i., l. 1, c. 3, p. 56; c. 4, pp. 60, 62.

† Ibid., c. 4, pp. 66, 67.

‡ Ibid., p. 83.

§ Ibid., l. 2, c. 1, p. 93.

|| Ibid., l. 3, c. 7, p. 334.

popular rights, which at this time disturbed the whole of Europe, was the natural result of the substitution of private judgment for authority. Peculiar circumstances in England brought about a contrary issue to what befell in other countries. For during the religious struggle of the preceding century the Crown, while getting rid of the Church which was the only barrier to its absolute rule, had unwittingly fostered the Parliamentary power, and thus given it an advantage at the opening of the subsequent contest. The union of the crowns of England and Scotland in the person of James I. also imparted courage and strength to the English democratic party and the anti-episcopal sects, whose representatives in Scotland had already triumphed over royalty and episcopacy. Ranke gives the following summary of the struggle:—

Towards the middle of the seventeenth century we see them (the Crown and the Parliament) first come into collision over ecclesiastical regulations, and then engage in a war for life and death respecting the constitution of the realm. Elements originally separate unite in attacking the monarchy; meanwhile the old system breaks up, and energetic efforts are made to found a new one on its ruins. But none of them succeed; the deeply-felt need of a life regulated by law and able to trust its own future is not satisfied; after long storms men seek safety in a return to the old and approved historic forms so characteristic of the German, and especially of the English race. But in this there is clearly no solution of the original controversies, no reconciliation of the conflicting elements: within narrower limits new discords break out, which once more threaten a complete overthrow: until, . . . European emergencies coinciding with the troubles at home bring about a new change of the old forms in the Revolution of 1688, the main result of which is, that the centre of gravity of public authority in England shifts decisively to the Parliamentary side.\*

In drawing out the details of the contest Ranke shows clearly that it was in truth a transition from one constitution to another, and not a mere series of violent acts on either side. He points out how both parties strove to place themselves on the foundation of law. The Scotch were not satisfied with the simple withdrawal of the offensive liturgy. They insisted on its being declared in distinct and final terms that theirs was the true legal mode of procedure, that the popular movements were justified by their aim, which was the restoration of the laws, and that the acts of the spiritual tribunals were illegal.† Of Charles I., Corroero the Venetian says, "With the key of the laws he seeks to open the entrance to absolute power." But he also says of the persons who refused to pay ship-money, "They stick to their laws, and allow

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\* Vol. i. Preface, p. 8.

† Vol. ii. l. 6, c. 6, p. 96.

legal proceedings to be taken, solely to make it known that the laws are violated, and that they are compelled to pay by force."\* "The King held his conduct to be valid and lawful: Parliament declared it in the highest degree unlawful, both the scheme itself and every separate step."† "Thus was one legality opposed to the other, one obedience to the other, one conception of the supreme power to the other: and the great question now was which of the two would gain the upper hand in England."‡

Arbitrary as many of Charles's and James's acts appear to us, they were no more than the ordinary prerogatives commonly exercised by their predecessors. Ship-money had been levied as late as by Elizabeth at the time of the Spanish Armada. The dispensing in favour of individuals with the execution of Parliamentary statutes, was the constant practice of early English kings, as is proved by the express stipulation for its suspension in the time of the Lancasters. It

had been formally exercised by the Tudors, especially by Henry VII., to a great extent, and that with the sanction of the judges; even under the Stuarts it had been recognized by the greatest jurists, although with the necessary limitations. It was agreed that this prerogative did not apply to the common law, nor to questions of property and possession, nor to things wrong in themselves, but only to the provisions of statutes: there was a difference, however, on the question how wide its scope was when thus applied, and whether it extended to absolute or only to limited ordinances. Coke had defined the frontiers of the prerogative and of statutes as follows:—That Parliament had not the right of depriving the King of the services of his subjects, which every one was bound to render—a point which came in question more strongly than ever after the profession of Protestantism had been made by Act of Parliament a condition for admission to the civil and military service. There were still lawyers who held that the King had a right to dispense with the statutes which imposed this restriction.§

On the other side, members of Parliament, as early as 1604,

Were heard to assert that the legislative power lay in their hands; and that if the King refused to approve the laws for which they demanded his sanction, they would refuse him the subsidies which he needed.||

In 1610,

The question was raised how Samson's hands could be bound; that is to say, how the King's prerogative could be so far restricted as to prevent him from breaking or overstepping the agreement.¶

\* A. Corroero, "Relazione di 1637"; ap. Ranke, vol. ii. l. 6, c. 3, pp. 35, 38.

† Vol. ii. l. 8, c. 10, p. 324.

‡ Ibid., l. 9, c. 1, p. 350.

§ Vol. iv. l. 17, c. 4, p. 288.

|| Vol. i. l. 4, c. 2, p. 401.

¶ Vol. i. l. 4, c. 5, p. 441.

In 1642,

The zealous adherents of Parliament did not repel the charge of transgressing the laws; they accepted it. Their doctrine was . . . that Parliament could not be bound by written laws, for that the legislative power in the fullest extent belonged to it.\*

Some years later Milton argued that

The King governs through the laws; the Parliament, even in the absence (as then) of any king's assent, makes and repeals them, so that Parliament is above all positive law. Thus a power, if not literally absolute, yet exalted above the law, such as the King claimed, was ascribed to Parliament.†

It is evident that any compromise between these two parties must involve the transfer of the sovereignty. That contemporaries thus understood the matter, appears from Mazarin's instructions to M. de Sabran in April, 1644. He was directed

To support the just pretensions of the King of Great Britain, and to favour him in every way for the re-establishment of his legitimate authority, without however appearing to wish to raise his power so high that he would become lord and monarch (*seigneur et monarque*) of England, where the laws which counterpoise the excessive power of kings, must be upheld in their entirety, in order to appease the public mind, and calm down disturbances.‡

It is beyond our purpose and our limits to enter into the details of the transfer of the sovereignty from the Crown alone to the existing Parliamentary constitution. But the broad fact can scarcely be denied, if we remember that the objects for which supplies were refused, ministers were impeached, civil war was waged, one king was beheaded, and another dethroned, were, the absolute control of taxation and expenditure, of religious establishments, of the exclusion or admission of individuals to civil rights, of the army, of the judicature, of the choice of ministers and officers of state, all of which, with every other possible branch of legislative and executive power, are now vested in the new sovereignty of King, Lords, and Commons.

In a copious appendix, Ranke gives us a number of valuable original documents. In the first section we have letters from the Venetian and French ambassadors, the Papal Nuncio, Queen Henrietta Maria, and others, which throw much light on the secret history of foreign relations in the reigns of James I. and Charles I. Among them is a report to Pope Urban VIII. of the state of the Catholic religion in England in 1632. § It says that the King was looked upon as neutral,

\* Vol. ii. l. 9, c. i. p. 353.

† Ibid.

‡ Vol. v. Appendix, 1st section, p. 472.

§ Appendix, sect. 1, p. 444.

but the principal persons at court, especially among the nobility, were Catholics, though often secretly. Those who could afford it kept a priest in their houses to say Mass, and so great was their piety and respect for the priesthood, that he exercised absolute authority in the household. Others heard Mass in the Queen's chapel, or in those of the Catholic ambassadors, or in the church of the Capuchin fathers, who, in accordance with the marriage treaty, had a convent adjoining the palace. Sometimes persons coming out from the Queen's chapel were taken up; but they easily got off, either by paying a sum of money, or by the Queen's intervention. The writer says that the number of Catholics would have been much greater, had there not been a dispute about who was to be the Queen's confessor, the King of France and Cardinal Richelieu wishing to force on her F. Leonard, a Capuchin, to whom she objected.

There is also an interesting report to Cardinal Barberino from Cuneo, the Papal Nuncio from 1636 to 1639, who used to be on intimate terms with the King and Queen, of a conversation that he had with the former in the Queen's closet one Sunday in September, 1636.\*

Cuneo having assured the King of the Pope's great affection for his royal house and realm, and of his desire that all his Catholic subjects should be most faithful to him, without any other dependence on himself than what was due to him as their spiritual Father and Pastor, Charles answered, that to this he would never have objected; but certain Frenchmen and Spaniards tried to create dissensions, and thus obliged him to assure himself with greater certainty of their loyalty. Cuneo replied that such conduct was very displeasing also to his Holiness, and to all the other Catholic princes; for they knew that were Great Britain in union with the Apostolic See, the forces of Christendom would suffice to recover for Christ His lost heritage of the East. Charles assented, saying with great emotion, "God forgive the authors of this disunion." Whereupon Cuneo seized the opportunity to represent to him how great would be the glory of healing the schism. But Charles made no answer, and turned the conversation to another subject. He complained that the Pope should have sent a message to the Emperor through the Nuncio, that he could not restore the Palatinate without going to hell. But Cuneo assured him from his personal knowledge of what the Nuncio had said, that this was a malicious lie invented by the enemies to union. He explained how the Pope must consider

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\* Appendix, sect. 1, p. 451.



the interests of the Catholic Church, how ardently he desired the Palatine's conversion, and how the position of the latter would be changed were he a Catholic. The King was satisfied with this, but said nothing. He however pointed out that his Holiness could easily promote good feeling by ordering Catholics to take the oath required of them, the object of which, he declared, was only to bind them to loyal obedience, and thus to distinguish them from the Anabaptists and other heretics who were enemies to royalty. But Cuneo answered, that no Catholic could take the oath without shipwreck of conscience, because it condemned as heretical the opinion that the Pope could depose princes; and no private person could pronounce a thing to be heresy unless the Church had already done so. He added, that theological opinions were proved by reasoning, and not by oaths; that this oath had been framed by those who wished to perpetuate discord; and that if the King would think of some other pledge of temporal loyalty, without touching upon theology, he would find the Catholics ready to shed their blood in his defence. Charles spoke of the difficulty as well as the danger to Catholics there would be in summoning a Parliament to alter the oath. But Cuneo answered, "We consider your Majesty above the Parliament." "That is true," replied Charles; adding, that considering the great difficulties, it would be easier for the Pope to oblige Catholics to take the existing oath. Cuneo rejoined that the Pope could not conceal his opinion without being wanting to himself. At this Charles became angry, and said that if the Pope were to pronounce it of faith that he could depose princes, every one would be against him. Cuneo answered, that the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit could never fail the Pope, but with us the case was different. Later in the conversation Cuneo complained of the pursuivants, who molested Catholics at their own caprice, without any authority from a judge. Charles retorted by laying the blame on the Catholics, who took advantage of his clemency, and congregated in the palace and the houses of the ambassadors, and thus gave scandal to his other subjects. He referred him, however, to Lord Stirling and Secretary Windebank for redress.

On the 7th of January, 1637, Cuneo adds a short report of a conversation he had had with the King and Windebank about the new oath, which he proposed that the King, by virtue of his dispensing power, should substitute for the former one. But they objected that as no penalty could be attached to the refusal of this oath, the Puritans and others would refuse it with impunity. Cuneo concluded by saying

that as the King, for fear of the Puritans, left the Parliamentary laws in full force, it was impossible to introduce the new oath till the difficulty about Parliament was got over.

On the 6th of March he had a long conversation with Charles on theological questions. After discussing various Catholic doctrines, Cuneo besought him, for the love of Christ, to consider the great evils that resulted to Christendom from the schism. Charles confessed it was so; but said, Cuneo knew not what, about the happiness and peace of one's own kingdom. Cuneo represented to him, on the contrary, the dangers he incurred in his foreign relations, the great sin of schism, and the loss of glory to himself; and in answer to his objections that at the Council of Trent the Roman Church had been too haughty and exacting, he urged him to send some well-disposed person to Rome to discuss the canons of the Council of Trent to which he objected, when he would discover how benignant was the Catholic Church. But Charles, placing his hand on Cuneo's shoulder, replied, "It is not the time yet; things are not yet ready; we must look further forward, and say nothing." Cuneo reverted to the conduct of the pursuivants, and Charles gave his word that the Catholics should be delivered from their tyranny; which, Cuneo says, he at once notified to the Queen and Windebank, in order to pledge the King more completely.

It is evident from the tone of these conversations that Charles regarded Catholic questions only on the side of political expediency, and never on that of conscience and the pursuit of truth. Still, they form a curious commentary on his declaration to the Scotch in the following December, "That he loathed the superstition of the Papacy from his very soul,"\* and on the increased severity with which he had allowed Catholics to be treated. When Cuneo reminded him of the conditions of his marriage contract, by which he had assured the Catholics of protection and care, he answered, "I shall never break these conditions, but with your permission I will show that I really belong to the religion which I profess. I know that the Pope wishes me to be other than I am."†

In the second, fourth, and fifth sections of the Appendix there is a valuable collection of documents, which lay bare the motives of the political career of William III. They begin with the meeting of his confidential friend Bentinck with Fuchs, Privy-Councillor of Brandenburg, at Celle, where the co-operation and neutrality of the Protestant German princes were secured for his plans for the invasion of England; and

\* Ranke, vol. ii. l. 6, c. 6, p. 95.

† Ibid., l. 7, c. 1, p. 125.

through the despatches of Friedrich Bonnet to the court of Brandenburg, and William's correspondence with the Grand Pensionary Heinsius, they carry on his history down to the close of his life. They make it clear that his motive for coming to England was not the religious one, for his views as to the toleration of Catholics and Nonconformists were the same as those of James, but James's close alliance with Louis XIV., whose humiliation was the great object of William's life. To a similar motive may be referred the termination of the constitutional struggle in favour of the Parliament. For William, a foreigner and childless, took little interest in England except so far as it could be brought to bear on his foreign policy; and as his influence abroad depended on his having a good understanding with the English Parliament, and obtaining from it liberal support in men and money, he gave way on questions of royal prerogative more readily than a native sovereign, who had a permanent interest in the kingdom, would have done.

But the portion of the Appendix which is the most interesting to Catholics, is the third section, in which are the reports of Lauzun, general of the French troops in Ireland in 1690, and extracts from the diary of a Jacobite, relating to the war in Ireland in 1689 and 1690.

The Jacobite, evidently an Englishman, was employed in Wales collecting the revenue when the Revolution broke out. In January, 1688, he followed his royal master to France, and early in the following year he embarked for Ireland at Brest with fifteen hundred other exiles, together with whom he was set ashore on the rocks in Bantry Bay. He made his way on foot and in sorry plight to Dublin, where he arrived in May, 1689, and soon obtained a commission as lieutenant. He describes the whole nation as being in arms. Every poor country fellow who could get hold of a "skeine," or dagger, or a "ropery," like a half-pike, called himself a soldier, though he often used his arms only to plunder his neighbours, under pretence of putting down the rebellious Protestants. By people of this sort, "commonly called roperies" (*raparees*), millions of cattle were destroyed, being killed only for their tallow and hides, and the carcasses left to rot in the fields. Each officer being posted near his own home, collected all the rabble around him; but when he came to march, half of them would desert. The writer's own regiment numbered seven hundred, but no more than four hundred entered Dublin or took the field. The Irish would obey no one but their own gentry, and therefore men who were taken from the plough, or following cows, or digging potatoes, were placed in command, because they had a few men to follow them, or bore the

name of a good family ; while experienced English and French officers had to be put under them as "seconds and reformades," to give them instruction and advice, which they were often too proud to accept. Thus in his own regiment there were no less than ninety-five officers to thirteen companies. Arms were so scarce that the men had to be drilled with sticks alone, and often went into action without having fired a shot ; when it was hard to guess whether their own or their neighbours' fire was most terrible to them. He says that at the siege of Derry the besiegers were not the fourth of the number of the besieged ; and for siege battery they had but two or three pieces, which, through scarcity of ammunition, played only upon great days. The Lough, instead of being choked by sunken vessels or by a strong boom, had only a chain, tied with some old ropes, laid across it, which gave way to the first small vessel that attempted the passage ; and though she stranded close to the shore, the "blind gunners could not or would not hit her, though they aimed several shots at her."\* He deprecates the summoning of a Parliament, because it drew to Dublin all the principal nobility and gentry, who ought to have been at their posts collecting and exercising their soldiers ; and still more the repeal of the Act of Settlement, because every one quitted his command to enter upon his estate, while the Protestants "were in a manner necessitated to espouse the rebellion, which alone could restore them to their, though unjustly, yet long-enjoyed fortunes." Thus "the army was much damaged and weakened, the King lost the assistance of many of his friends, and gained a vast number of irreconcilable enemies."† Exaggerated reports of the numbers of men and millions of money sent from France, and fables about French victories and English defeats, inspired a general feeling of security and confidence in the troops ; and when later in the year they shut up Schomberg in his camp, they did not doubt, much to the amusement of the Protestants in the army and apparently of the writer, that during the next season they would drive back the enemy to Londonderry and Enniskilling, if not to England and Scotland. But though the aid of the French was so much "extolled, yet the persons of some few Frenchmen were not acceptable to some of the Irish ; and the English, though never so loyal, were suspected and hated. . . . Notwithstanding there were but a few of both nations in the kingdom, especially near his Majesty, the clamour against English and French advise was no less, than it was once in England against Popish Councillors and French Pensioners."‡

\* Vol. vi. p. 136.

† P. 135.

‡ Pp. 140, 135.

Lauzun, who arrived in Ireland about April, 1690, confirms the Jacobite's account. The army was composed of imperfect regiments, and the infantry was totally unarmed. His first care was to appoint experienced officers, taking the precaution to place under them seconds from the districts where the soldiers had been enlisted, and to form magazines on the frontiers, with garrisons to defend them. The troops could not take the field till the season was advanced and the pasture-lands were well covered, because the Treasury officials had neglected to collect hay, straw, and oats; contenting themselves with pillaging the country, each for his own benefit, without the least regard for the service of the King, who was robbed to an extent that could not be told. At Cork, while a general scarcity of everything prevailed, and free trade alone could avert a famine, the traders were repulsed by exorbitant duties and rough usage; and Lauzun had difficulty in persuading Lord Dover to remit the duties, not one penny of which, he was certain, ever found its way into the King's purse. All authority was practically in the hands of the Treasury and Custom-house officers, who regulated every military detail. The King really worked hard; but whenever he issued an order, the Treasury began by delaying its execution, and ended by not executing it. Lauzun wore himself out trying to impress on them the urgent necessity for forming an army, whether to defend themselves or perish honourably. But the King and Tyrconnel alone listened to him, the rest regarding him as a troublesome fellow, who looked only to French interests, for which they cared not. So strong was the feeling against the French, that Lauzun declined to attend the meetings of the Council; but he and Tyrconnel, with whom he was in perfect accord, saw the King daily in his closet. Lord Dover went so far as openly to accuse Louis of wishing to deceive James and ruin England by sending such inefficient aid; and he even advised that James should come to terms with William, and join him and the Allies in their attack on France. At last, when James was on the point of taking the field, he had the assurance to ask for a passport to Schomberg's camp in order to make his peace with the Prince of Orange. This James naturally refused, but he gave him leave to retire to Ostend; and while waiting at Waterford for a vessel to convey him thither, he did his best to have the French massacred in their retreat after the battle of the Boyne.

Lauzun perceived that in the desperate condition of James's affairs after William's arrival in Ireland, only two lines of action were open to him. The one was to resist William in

the field, which appeared to him impossible; the other to burn Dublin and retreat to Connaught, laying waste the country as he passed.\* Ranke considers the last proposal as outrageous as that which Avaux, Lauzun's predecessor, had made to massacre all the Protestants,† the very thought of which James had repelled with horror. But it strikes us rather as a heroic act of self-sacrifice in defence of religion and personal liberty, like that of the Russians in 1812, which could have been carried into execution only by a grand national burst of enthusiasm, which James, whose heart was devoted to England to which Ireland was merely his stepping-stone, was equally incapable of feeling or inspiring. It was, then, only natural that he should have rejected the proposal as "*cruel*," and preferred trusting to his army posted behind the Boyne.

Both writers give the details of the battle of the Boyne from their personal experience, each account supplementing the other. Ranke corrects the popular opinion that it was a great battle. He says:

This action can hardly be called a battle; it was the passage of a river, with some skirmishes on the other bank, against an enemy who was just then engaged in shifting his position, and was thinking of retreat more than of serious resistance.‡

This is fully confirmed by Lauzun's letters, in all of which he speaks of his firm resolution, on account of the state of affairs in England and elsewhere, to avoid an engagement and gain time, and of his fear that William would desire the contrary and not be long without meeting them. As soon as it was believed that William had landed, the retreat began. Lauzun wished to hurry on to Dublin, fearing that they might be cut off either by a flank movement of William's superior forces, or by a detachment from the English ships, no less than forty of which he had seen pass the coast in a single day. But James loitered, hoping by eating up the country in his retreat to starve the advancing enemy, forgetting that William could have had an ample supply of food from his ships. Thus he came to be overtaken at Drogheda.

We all know that the two fords were at Oldbridge and Slane; that Meinhard Schomberg having forced the passage at Slane, Lauzun was compelled to spread out his line to avoid his flank being turned, and detachments had to be sent from the right wing to reinforce the centre; and that thus there remained at Oldbridge only the newly-levied Irish regiments,

\* P. 117.

† Vol. iv. l. 19, c. 10, p. 601.

‡ Ibid., p. 609.



some of which, the Jacobite tells us, had been taught only four or five days before to fire their muskets for the first time. These raw soldiers made a splendid stand, and again and again repulsed the enemy, till at length, overpowered by numbers, and by fresh troops led by William himself, a panic seized them, and taking to flight they carried the whole of the right wing away with them. The Jacobite thus graphically describes the catastrophe:

The Grand-Prior's (regiment) wherein I served, was in Dulik Lane, enclosed with high banks, marching ten in rank. The horse came on so unexpected, and with such speed, some firing their pistols, that we had no time to receive or shun them, but all the men supposing them to be ennemys (as indeed they were no better to us) took to their heels, no officers being able to stop them, even after they were broke, and the horse passed, though at the same time no ennemy was near us, or them that fled in such haste to our destruction. This I can affirme, having stayed in the rear till all the horses were passed, and looking about, I wondered what madnes possessed our men to run so violently, nobody pursuing them. What their men I could see (*sic*), I called to—to—no commands being of force, begging them to stand together, and repair to their colors, the danger being in dispersing; but all in vain, some throwing away their arms, others even their coats and shoes, to run the lighter. The first cause I had to suspect the route at the ford, was, that the Duke of Berwick, whose command was with the horse, came to us, and discovering a party of horse at the distance, thinking they were the ennemy, commanded our musquetiers to line the side of the bank over which they appeared, till, finding they were our own, we continued our marche. . . . I thought the calamity hade not been so general, till, viewing the hills about us, I perceived them covered with soldiers of several regiments, or scattered like sheep flying before the wolf, but so quick that they seemed to cover the sides and tops of the hills. The shame of our regiment only afflicted me before, but now all the horror of a routed army, just before so vigorous and desirous of battle, and broke without scarce a stroke of the ennemy, so perplexed my soul that I envied the few dead.\*

Meanwhile Lauzun had been ordered by James to attack Schomberg at Slane, but it was impossible to do so, because a bog lay between them; and the only course open to him was to march opposite to him, approaching nearer and nearer as the bog became narrower. After the rout at the ford, Tyroconnel collected many of the fugitives and joined him, while William's victorious left wing formed itself on his other side. Thus the French and the remnant of the defeated army, marched along steadily with all their cannon between two columns of the enemy, answering their fire, and doing,

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 142.

as they afterwards heard, much more damage than they received. Perceiving the extreme peril of their position, Lauzun insisted on James's flying to Dublin with eight squadrons of horse as his escort, notwithstanding that some of his officers remonstrated at this diminution of their forces. Lauzun's great object was to gain the defile of Duleek, where a bog on either side would effectually protect them from attack; whereas, if the enemy anticipated them, their retreat would be barred. But when they had gone three miles and the defile was only one mile further, the four last battalions of the rear-guard were so completely done up, that they were obliged to make a halt behind some huts, where they were nearly surrounded. After dark, however, they discovered a defile which had been left unguarded, and through it they made their escape and reached Dublin. Here all was in utter confusion in consequence of James's departure. Lauzun therefore continued his retreat to Limerick, where he arrived with all his cannon and the military chest, with the loss of only seven or eight men of the French troops, and but one officer of any note. From Limerick he wrote in absolute despair. There were neither ramparts nor forts on which to mount cannon, nor tools to construct fortifications; ammunition and food were scarce; there were but two mills, which worked only as the tide ebbed; and he and Tyrconnel had doubts whether the Irish would defend themselves. The position of Maréchal de Créquy at Trèves was nothing to what he beheld around him. Notwithstanding, after he had retreated with the French troops into Galway, and finally returned to France, in this utter destitution of all ordinary means of defence, Ireland's forlorn hope made a last heroic stand during two successive sieges, and won honourable terms from the conqueror. Then crossing to France, they formed themselves into the Irish Brigade, which, during a century on the battle-fields of Europe paid their debt of gratitude to the French, and avenged on the English poor Ireland's wrongs. So terrible was the fame of their prowess, that on the restoration of the Bourbons England made an express stipulation that there should never again be an Irish Brigade.

In concluding our article we must once more express our regret that the great writer, who has just completed his fifty years of historical authorship and renown, should have cast a shade upon his own fair fame, and robbed his interesting and valuable work of its full claims on our confidence, by degrading the noble science of history to the furtherance of unworthy political aims and the gratification of religious bigotry.

## ART. V.—CHURCH AND STATE.

*Catholic Church and Christian State.* By Dr. JOSEPH HERGENRÖTHER ; translated by permission of the author. London : Burns & Oates.

*Burning Questions.* By WILLIAM MOLITOR. London : Burns & Oates.

*Concordantia Sacerdotii atque Imperii.* By Sir G. BOWYER, Bart., M.P. ("Contemporary Review," Feb., 1876). London : Strahan.

ENGLISH Catholics owe a very large debt of gratitude to the translators of Hergenröther's work. It is the very thing that was wanted. There is no more favourite resource with an adverse controversialist, than to fling at the head of Catholics some isolated dictum or historical fact of the past, as showing how unscrupulous and tyrannical the Church ever becomes, in proportion as she can have things her own way. But no one such dictum or fact can be understood even approximately in its true colours, except by being viewed in connection with other parallel facts, and with the whole assemblage of then existing social phenomena. The thing peremptorily needed was, that Catholics should have before them, in a systematic and connected view, the whole body of facts and received principles concerning the relation of Church and State, as these have exhibited themselves in every successive age of Christianity. What are needed are not facts only nor abstract principles only, but principles, at once theoretically stated, and illustrated by facts. This is what Hergenröther has done with such singular completeness and success; and his work is as it were a richly stored armoury, in which every Catholic, when controversially assailed on this class of questions, will readily find the very weapon he needs for the Church's defence. The translators have taken extreme pains in the execution of their task, which was one of no ordinary difficulty; the notes in particular must have needed quite exceptional patience and care; and the value of the volumes is still further enhanced, by a very complete and elaborately compiled index. The only adverse comment we are tempted to make on the work, is one which we expressed in January when first noticing it. It is almost too complete for its size. Theories and facts of gravest importance succeed each other so rapidly, that space is not left for their due evolution or for stimulating the reader to due reflection on them. But considering the evils which have befallen the Church through

ignorant and baseless theorizing, such a fault as this may almost be called an excellence. We hope on a future occasion to deal in some detail with the admirable series of disquisitions here placed before the English reader. At present we shall only make use of Hergenröther, in company with the other two writers whom we have named at the head of our article, for the purpose of submitting some brief general remarks on the relation between Church and State.

Dr. Molitor's work is in some sense supplementary of Hergenröther's. The latter writer has no doubt carefully thought out his own doctrine; but his main purpose is not so much to press this doctrine on the acceptance of Catholics, but rather to exhibit data helping each man to judge for himself. Molitor on the contrary—while more than once appealing to Hergenröther for his facts—is directly occupied with the exposition of doctrine. He sets forth with singular brilliancy and power that theory of the Church's indirect temporal power, which for centuries had undisputed possession of the Catholic schools. His little volume is to our taste one of the most fascinating we ever read; and we found difficulty in laying it down, before we had finished its perusal. Its ethical and doctrinal tone are most purely Catholic; and any one especially who is ignorant of German, owes an especial acknowledgment to its translator.

Sir G. Bowyer's paper is written throughout, as we need hardly say, in a spirit of hearty attachment and loyalty to the Church; and his ecclesiastical learning is a well-known fact. But we trust he will not think us deficient in the great respect due to his high character and attainments, if we venture to express dissent from the doctrine which he has formulated on the "*concordantia sacerdotii atque imperii*."

We say advisedly the doctrine which he has "formulated," as distinct from the doctrine which he practically holds; for our own conviction is, that the differences between Catholic and Catholic, on the due relation between Church and State, are far less fundamentally significant than they appear on the surface. We think in the first place, that, when Catholics come to a mutual understanding on the true office of the State, their mutual divergences on its due relation with the Church—though by no means evanescent—will nevertheless considerably dwindle down. And we think in the second place, that there is no kind of insurmountable difficulty, against their coming to a mutual understanding on the true office of the State. We think that their apparent discrepancies on this head do not generally arise from any different judgments which they practically form, on each separate case

as it arises; but rather from the mode they respectively adopt, of generalizing their judgments and formulating a speculative theory. But if this be so, we shall certainly do good service by setting forth the fact; for in these days of anxious conflict against the irreligious movement, few results are more precious, than increased unity of religious opinion among children of the Church. We shall attempt then to lay down a certain statement of principles in regard to the State's office: a statement, we think, on which all Catholics are really and practically in mutual accordance, while antitheists and revolutionists are no less mutually united in its repudiation. We shall not adduce any argument in defence of what we shall say: because we address ourselves exclusively to Catholics; and we persuade ourselves that they will unanimously accept each successive part of our statement, as harmonizing with their already existent view.

"The natural and primary\* end of the State," says Her-genröther (vol. i. p. 23), "is the protection of rights." "The civil government has no competitor in its office of protecting the whole society and its members both from internal and external attacks." Among the foremost (we need hardly say) of those rights which it is the State's primary end to conserve,—stands protection of person and property. Such protection could not possibly be afforded—and mankind would therefore be condemned to a permanent condition of barbarism and savage conflict—unless there were some one authority, having so much physical power at its command as to render permanent resistance hopeless. If in any given place there be no one authority thus transcendent in physical power, the peace and tranquillity of society will there be disturbed to the very foundation, by each man's conflict with his neighbours. This one authority is of course the civil government. It may be vested absolutely in one prince, or a number of persons may have an integral share in the sovereignty: but civil government itself is the same institution,—the same in end, in scope, in rights—whether it reside with one or with many. Its primary end, we have said, is to conserve rights; the protection of *person and property* being among the most prominent of these rights. Next we may name the rights of *family*; for these rights again cannot be conserved, unless there be some physically irresistible secular arm, which shall interpose to protect the family against forcible separation of husband from wife, of non-adult children from parents. Another right we may mention, is that possessed by each man to his

\* The translators here use the word "immediate." We change it into "primary," for a reason which will presently appear.

*reputation* ; and this again cannot be conserved, unless there be a secular arm to punish slander and calumny. Then there is the right again to reciprocal observance of *contracts* ; and other rights also which we need not further detail.

In order then to constitute legitimate civil government in actual exercise, two conditions at all events must combine. On the one hand, that which purports to be such government must have at its command a physical force practically irresistible ; while on the other hand it must exercise that force, for the purpose of conserving such rights as those we have mentioned. Let it be supposed for a moment, that the secular arm were utterly reckless in permitting invasions of person and property ; that it permitted indiscriminately the separation of wives from husbands, and children from parents ; and so on with the rest. Such secular arm would be no civil government at all, but ruffianly brigandage ; nor would any greater deference be due to it by God's Law, than is due from a harmless traveller to the highwayman who points a pistol at his head. It is most remarkable however, how difficult it is to allege any so-called government, which has been in this extreme sense tyrannical. It was under the very reign of Nero that, according to S. Paul's testimony, the civil ruler (speaking on the whole and generally) was a minister of good to the good, and a terror only to evil-doers.

Here we are already brought into direct conflict, with what is among the most fundamental tenets of revolutionism. Christians say, that God has conferred on mankind certain rights, and that He has instituted civil government for the conservation of those rights ; but revolutionists say, that all rights flow from the omnipotent State. This is the 39th error condemned in the Syllabus.\* There is hardly one in that melancholy and dreary catalogue, more full of subtle peril ; or the result of which would in fact be more subversive of human morality and happiness.

Now on the above-named Christian foundation, two important conclusions may at once be built. And that our remarks may be more immediately practical, we will suppose a Catholic exercising his share of civil sovereignty, in a country so circumstanced as England, by the votes which he gives in his capacity of Member of Parliament. First, he will not unfrequently have to ask himself, what *in particular* are those rights of family or of property, which it is the civil ruler's primary office to conserve ? Is it consistent e.g. with the rights of family, that such a measure as the Factory Bill be

\* "The State, as being the origin and fountain of all rights, possesses a certain right of its own, which is circumscribed by no limits."



enacted, which prevents parents from devoting their children prematurely to labour? or again that children shall be compelled to attend school, against their parents' wish? or again that conjugal separation and divorce be permitted in certain cases? Is it consistent with the rights of property, that men are not permitted to transfer their property except by complying with certain legal formulæ? that restrictions be imposed on their liberty of *endowing* public institutions with which they may have sympathy? that restrictions be imposed on their power of bequeathing property by will? It will be seen at once, that we ourselves are not answering these questions either in the negative or in the affirmative. Our point is quite different: for we are only pointing out, that an indefinite number of such questions may be asked by the legislator, and that they require an answer. All Catholics will agree, that each legislator must answer them according to his religious creed; and that the Catholic legislator in particular must answer them according to the Church's doctrine. Here then is the first of our two conclusions. It is the Church's business to declare what are those rights, which it is the State's primary business to conserve.

Our second conclusion is of much greater importance. The State cannot possibly conserve these various rights, without instituting a very complex machinery; and this machinery in many cases cannot but exercise a very important influence for good or evil, on the individual's moral character and generally on the interests of religion. We could easily enough go into considerable detail on this head; but there is really no reason for doing so, because the most elementary function of civil government affords amply sufficient illustration of our statement. It is plain that person and property cannot be protected, unless there are *prisons* on one hand and *armies* on the other; unless there be a carefully devised system of criminal procedure and of jurisprudence at home, and again of foreign policy abroad. Further it is equally plain, that neither of these requisites can be supplied without producing results of grave moment in regard to the interests of religion. Now take any Catholic legislator of the most ordinary piety and conscientiousness; and let us suppose him to arrive at a conviction, that some proposed measure—proposed as a means to the due conservation of rights—would be beneficial indeed to the nation's temporal welfare, but injurious to religion. This conviction once arrived at—would he entertain so much as a moment's doubt on his appropriate course? Would the notion even cross his mind, that he is bound indeed in his private capacity to do what he can towards neutralizing the

evil effects of this measure, but that he is *also* bound to give his legislative vote in its favour? Our Catholic readers will unhesitatingly answer in the negative.

We would ask Sir G. Bowyer then with great respect, what he precisely means when he says (p. 360) that the State "looks only to the outward peace of society"? that the State (ib.) in enacting its marriage-laws "disregards the question" whether the children born from a certain class of marriages would suffer religious detriment? that "the State may educate children *solely* with a view to making them useful citizens," without considering at all whether they will thus become "good Christians"? (p. 361) that the State should "confine itself within the limits of its own duties and functions"; those duties and functions being "the *temporal and material* government of its subjects, and all those things which conduce to the good order and prosperity of the State, the administration of justice, and the welfare of the country in *all things material*"? (p. 368). Let us take these expressions one by one. Let us suppose Sir George Bowyer himself convinced that some given measure would promote the outward peace of society, but inflict a heavy blow on religion; or that a certain proposed marriage law, while promoting outward peace, would grievously increase nevertheless the number of those children who grow up without God in the world; or that a certain educational measure would train Englishmen of the next generation to be more useful citizens indeed, but worse Christians; or that some suggested line of policy would advance the country's welfare in things material, but damage it in things spiritual. We are very confident, not only that he would not feel himself *bound* to support these respective measures, but that he would feel it his sacred duty to *oppose* them. Surely then—so we would earnestly submit to him—he is mistaken in his method of theoretically formulating his own practical theory, and does grievous injustice to his own convictions.

It may be objected, that we have been supposing a divergence which cannot exist; that no such opposition is possible, between a nation's religious and temporal interests. We are entirely disposed to concur with this statement. As we have more than once urged on former occasions (see e.g. July, 1863, pp. 83, 4), there may frequently enough be a wide gulf, between what conduces to a nation's spiritual welfare, and what conduces to its temporal *greatness*; but its *permanent* temporal *well-being* is (as a fact almost or quite universal) indissolubly bound up with its spiritual interests. But if this truth be urged as an objection to our preceding argument, we

make three replies. Firstly, Sir G. Bowyer at all events cannot avail himself of any such objection. The central point of his whole paper is, that the ends of Church and State are fundamentally distinct; and that it is only by this doctrine being most carefully acted on, that the sacerdotium and imperium can be prevented from mutual conflict and dissension. Secondly, it is generally a far easier and readier task for a Catholic to discern the bearing of some measure on men's religious welfare, than its bearing on their permanent temporal good. It is far easier e.g. to see unmistakably that the present English divorce law is religiously disastrous, than that it is opposed to England's permanent temporal interests: though the latter conclusion no doubt is also daily becoming more obvious, to devout and thoughtful minds. Thirdly, it is at all events no *contradiction in terms* to affirm, that some given measure may be religiously injurious, while temporally beneficial; and we may put the case therefore as an hypothesis. But this is absolutely all which our argument requires. Let the case be put as an hypothesis, and every Catholic will exclaim that it is the legislator's duty to oppose such a measure. It is the unanimous doctrine therefore of Catholics (whatever may be their speculative and theoretical expressions) that the promotion of spiritual good is very far from being external to the office of the civil ruler.

We have been referring to that vast number of instances, in which the State cannot fulfil its very primary office—the conservation of rights,—without incidentally and (as it were) episodically affecting most seriously the interests of religion, for good or for evil. And we have pointed out that, according to the unanimous judgment of Catholics, in every such case these interests should predominate over all that is antagonistic to them, in influencing the legislator's action. But it may be worth while (though it is not essential for our purpose) to carry the inquiry a little further. There are certain functions, everywhere performed by the civil government and serviceably performed, which are *not* required by its primary office. Take as one instance, the regular forwarding of letters. Every one sees that this in itself must be beneficial to society; and that by no other agency can it be performed at all so effectively, as by the State. Nor again does any one complain, if taxes are imposed for the fulfilment of such service. Such functions as these we may call “spontaneous”; to distinguish them from those which are “necessary,” for fulfilment of the State's primary duty. Here then a further question arises. Can the civil ruler, without transgressing his province, exercise “spontaneous” functions,

for the advancement of religion? May he e.g. tax his subjects for the support of churches and schools? or may he coerce parents into securing for their children a good religious education?

On the surface it appears, that Catholics would differ from each other in the answer they would give to these two questions. But at all events as regards the former, we do not think such difference really exists. In such circumstances as those of England, doubtless many Catholics would look with extreme misgiving on any such arrangement; because they would with entire reason profoundly distrust the impartiality of those, who would have to administer such a measure. But their demur, we think, would arise from this circumstance; and not from any opinion, that such an application of the public money is a transgression of the State's province. Let a country be in question where both government and population are sincerely Catholic, and their objection would surely altogether disappear. Nay, even as regards the second of the two questions—we think that Catholics would be pretty well of one mind in a purely Catholic country; they would entirely applaud any legislation, which made it incumbent on parents to place their children under the Church's control for educational purposes. At the same time we may add, that this little discussion on the State's "spontaneous" functions has no great practical bearing on our theme.

Another question may be raised, on which Catholics would be much more promptly energetic in their response; and that in a sense *opposed* to State interference. Those misbelievers who now worship the State as a kind of idol, have more than once broached a very ominous suggestion. The State, they say, should take into its own hand the whole control of education, in order to imbue its citizens with a truly national spirit, and mould them into that mental type which shall best subserve the nation's special character and purposes. There should be an elaborate system of training, in order that Germans be thoroughly Germanized, or in order that Frenchmen may grow up in due sympathy with what a disciple of the Revolution calls "the ideas of modern civilization." There is no one matter in which pious Catholics feel more intensely, than in their abhorrence of any such State claim over the sphere of education. And in this particular case it may be worth while to add a few words, on the reasonable *ground* of their abhorrence.

The first reason they would give for it would probably be, that God has instituted the Church for the very purpose of educating and moulding the youthful mind; and that any

such State claim as we are supposing is an intolerable usurpation of the Church's rights. But this answer is very far indeed from going to the bottom of what Catholics instinctively feel. If God had not founded a Church at all—as He was of course entirely free not to found one—still the claim we are considering would be felt as no less intolerable by all who are at once religiously-minded and intelligent. There is in essentials but one type of character, really conformable with natural reason; viz. the Christian type: the type set forth in the Sermon on the Mount, and practically realized in saintly persons as far as they are such. By the agency of the Holy Ghost, the Church remains ever faithful to this type of character; it is this only which she impresses on those submitted to her influence, and she impresses the more efficaciously in proportion as their submission is more complete. On the other hand in any given country what is the characteristically *national* type, except one or other form of worldliness? Englishmen canonize one form of worldliness, French another, Germans a third; but neither of the three is appreciably nearer than the rest to that Christian standard, which alone is conformable with the true dictates of reason. It would be preposterous then to say, that God has given the State a right to train the individual on its own mould; for that would be to say, that He has given the State a right to detach men from their true end, and to divert them from His fear and love.

At the same time, as is most manifest, the restriction on which we have been insisting by no means implies, that promotion of spiritual welfare is external to the civil ruler's province. The very contrary. He would effect, not the promotion, but the grievous detriment of his people's spiritual welfare, if he were permitted any despotic control over the machinery of education.

We think then on the whole that we have made good the promise we made at starting. We think we have shown, how large an amount of union exists among Catholics as to the State's true end, so long as they confine their attention to definite practical instances, and make no attempt at generalization and formulation. We will now express, under correction, what seems to us substantially the true speculative formulation of what Catholics practically hold.

We divide the State's end into its "primary" and "secondary" ends; and we subdivide its primary end into "immediate" and "absolute." \* Its immediate primary end is the

\* We avoid the phrase "ultimate primary end," because the phrase may present a delusive appearance of self-contradiction.

conservation of those rights—prominently the protection of person and property—which on the one hand God has conferred on mankind, while on the other hand they cannot be secured to men except by some authority having irresistible physical force at its command. This, we say, is the State's "immediate" primary end; while its "absolute" primary end is of course the attainment of those inestimable blessings, supernatural and natural, religious and secular, eternal and temporal, which spontaneously and necessarily accrue to mankind from the conservation of these rights. Such in its integrity is the State's primary end. It was for the attainment of this end, that God instituted civil government, and imposed on mankind the obligation of submitting to its authority. Nor do we see any kind of reason for supposing that, had it not been for this end, He would have instituted it at all.

But *having* been instituted, there are various secondary ends, which it may pursue with great advantage, and with God's full approval; nay in great degree even as a matter of obligation. These secondary ends may be summed up as in fact constituting *one* secondary end; viz. the civil ruler's general promotion of his people's highest welfare, so far as he is cognisant of its existence. This is in great degree (as we have said) even of obligation: because it is sinful in him knowingly to achieve any lower purpose by the sacrifice of any higher; to promote secular good e.g. at the expense of religious, or natural at the expense of supernatural. Nor can his secondary end ever clash with his primary; because in no other way can he so effectively advance the supernatural welfare of his subjects, as by using the physical force, which is at his disposal, for the conservation of those rights which God has given them. The advancement of their temporal felicity is (we need not say) entirely included in the secondary end assigned to him, and should be to him a matter of sedulous consideration. But all will admit that the promotion of supernatural good—if it fall within his province at all—must indisputably be his highest and noblest function. Accordingly, S. Thomas does not hesitate to say,—and that with some variety of expression—that the advancement of supernatural good is that at which he should principally aim.\*

\* "Agendum est de cultu divino: ad quem reges et principes studere debent  *toto conatu et sollicitudine tanquam ad finem debitum.*" ("De Regimine Principum," l. 2, c. 16.)

"Quia igitur vite quâ in præsenti vivimus finis est beatitudo celestis, ad regis officium pertinet eâ ratione vitam multitudinis bonam procurare, secundum quod congruit ad celestem beatitudinem consequendam. Quæ



On the precise sense however of this word "principally," a few words shall presently be said.

It will at once be objected to this theory, that the State belongs to the natural order; and that civil government would have been instituted by God, even though He had not seen fit to elevate mankind supernaturally: how, therefore, it will be asked, can the promotion of man's supernatural end be included within the office assigned by Him to civil government? But we reply with great ease. Taking the State as a natural institution,—or in other words, considering the Natural Law alone—it is within the civil ruler's province, and in large measure his actual duty, to promote the highest welfare of his subjects, so far as he may be cognizant of such welfare. So soon therefore as he knows that they have been raised to the supernatural order, the promotion of their supernatural interests becomes included in what was his natural function, and is approved or prescribed by the Natural Law. Just so all theologians say that, if the reception of a Christian Sacrament be once known as a necessary means against sin, the Natural Law itself enjoins the reception of such Sacrament. And in a thousand similar instances, supernatural acts fall under the Natural Law.

But there is a second objection to our theory, which requires far more careful notice. If it be indeed true that the highest and noblest end of the State is identical with the end of the Church, it would seem to follow, that the principles, which should guide a Member of Parliament in his votes, are the very same with those which should guide Pope and Bishops in their legislation for the Church: and this seems a difficult doctrine to receive. We reply that at all events, as regards the *application* of those principles, there is a vast gulf between the two cases. We will begin with the smallest among the points of difference, and end with the largest of all.

1. We have just now pointed out, that to train and mould the character of youth,—while it is one of the Church's most characteristic functions,—is an office which the State is entirely forbidden by God to attempt. And this statement—as will be evident to any one who will consider the reasons we gave for it—applies not only to the education of youth, but to every attempt which the civil ruler may make to mould the character of his adult subjects on some national type.

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*autem sit ad veram beatitudinem via, ex lege divinâ cognoscitur, cujus doctrina pertinet ad sacerdotium."* (Ib. l. 1, c. 15.)

"Finis ad quem *principaliter* rex intendere debet . . est æterna beatitudo quæ in visione Dei consistit." (Ib. l. 3, c. 3.) See also 1a 2æ q. xcvi. a. 2 and 3.

2. But further, the State has no authority given it by God, for what may be called directly moral and religious legislation. Suppose the civil ruler issued a precept, requiring his subjects to recite periodically certain prayers, or practise certain religious austerities. Such a precept would of course be utterly *ultra vires*, and would impose no obligation whatever. And here let it be observed, that this distinction does not bear at all on any difference of *ends* between Church and State. Let us suppose that the end for which such prayers are enjoined is as purely temporal as any human end can possibly be. It does not ever so remotely follow—because the end is temporal—that such legislation is within the State's authority.\*

3. But there is another distinction between the State's and Church's respective action as to things spiritual, on which we would lay far greater stress than on either of the two preceding. Every Englishman, whatever his belief or unbelief, is by absolute compulsion a subject of the State: but (as Sir G. Bowyer importantly urges, pp. 350, 351) no one accounts himself a subject of the Church, unless he firmly believe that she is God's authorized minister for his sanctification and salvation. Consider on one hand the kind of legislation which Pope and Bishops may serviceably issue, for the spiritual benefit of those who thus believe; and consider on the other hand the kind of legislation which a Member of Parliament could serviceably promote, for the religious benefit of that heterogeneous and miscellaneous multitude which he takes part in governing. If the holiest and most devout of Catholics (supposing him to be sagacious and intelligent) were able to influence every detail of Parliamentary enactment—and if his own predominant end were (as it would of course be) to confer on the whole population the greatest religious benefit in his power,—how indirect and circuitous would be his means of conferring such benefit! How innumerable are the measures, the thought of which might flit across his mind as tending to their religious benefit,—but in regard to which he would promptly see, that their effect on the nation at large and in the long run would be incomparably more for harm than for good! It would require a long essay to set forth this consideration in its full integrity; but enough has been here suggested for our present purpose.

It may be rejoined, that at all events if a nation were purely

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\* In July 1863 we expressed this by saying, that the civil ruler has no power of commanding interior acts, either directly or indirectly; nor yet of commanding such external acts, as do not conduce to his end, except in virtue of the interior acts which should accompany them.

and heartily Catholic, on our own showing the respective provinces of Church and State would far more nearly approximate. But in truth this is our very point: for it merely comes to saying that, in a nation purely and exclusively Catholic, the State's attitude should be one of indefinitely larger and more pervasive subordination to the Church, than it can be or ought to be in those non-Catholic or imperfectly Catholic nations which now exist.

But at last—we may be asked—do we really deny the proposition, that the State's appropriate end consists rather in the promotion of temporal felicity than of spiritual well-being? On the contrary we admit and indeed strongly maintain, that in a certain very true sense this proposition holds good. The State possesses indefinitely greater intrinsic aptitude for the promotion of temporal than of spiritual good; and the civil ruler, so far as he acts by his own light and with his own proper instruments, has indefinitely more power towards the lower end than towards the higher. A good Catholic, who has any share in civil government, feels this most keenly. On questions e.g. of currency, or military organization, or legal codification, he proceeds in the last resort on his own discretion and responsibility; but where moral and spiritual interests are mainly concerned, he feels deeply that his one true attitude is that of subordination to the Church's guidance and authority. Nor is this statement (we think) in any way at variance with S. Thomas's "*principaliter*"; or with the "*maximè*" and "*potissimùm*" in that teaching of Gregory XVI. which we are about to cite. When Catholic doctors say that the State should aim "*principally*," "*predominantly*," "*chiefly*" at the people's religious welfare—we do not understand them to mean (very far from it) that plans for the direct promotion of such welfare should occupy the principal and predominant part of the civil ruler's deliberation and reflection; for on the contrary—as regards Catholics at least—it is the Church's especial business to occupy herself with such plans. But we do understand these writers to mean, that whenever a *conflict* may seem to threaten between spiritual and temporal good, the civil ruler shall feel it his most sacred duty to give the former his preference.

And this lesson is indubitably inculcated, by Gregory XVI.'s authoritative teaching in the "*Mirari vos.*" We italicise a word or two.

But in regard to those good wishes which we put forth for the common safety both of Church and State, may the princes, our most dear children in Christ, forward those wishes by their power and authority; which power and

authority let them regard as conferred on them, not only for the world's government, but *most of all for the Church's protection*. Let them carefully consider that whatever labour is expended for the Church's welfare tends really to their own power and tranquillity; and let them esteem it a great privilege (we say with Pope St. Leo) if to their diadem there be also added from the Lord's hand the crown of faith. *Placed as they are in the position of parents and guardians to their peoples*, they will procure for those peoples true, permanent, and profitable rest and tranquillity, if they apply themselves chiefly to this care; viz., that religion and piety towards God may be securely preserved.

We cannot but think then (as we have more than once said) that there is a large and profound practical agreement among Catholics—both in the practical teaching of authority and in the practical belief of individuals—as to the extent and limits of the State's office. On the other hand we have admitted throughout, that there is considerable mutual difference in the theological statements which have been formulated, for the purpose of expressing this practical judgment. In particular, it has been said by many great Catholic writers, that the proper end of the State is the promotion of "temporal felicity" as distinct from "eternal." But then these very writers, when they come to explain themselves in detail, show plainly that they do not put forth this statement in (what we must admit to be) its more obvious sense. And we will here add a few words to explain what (as we understand the matter) they have intended to express by it.

Now firstly let it be remembered that, when they thus speak, they are commonly regarding the State, not in itself, but as to its position in face of the Church. And secondly let it be also remembered, that they have commonly had in their thoughts what Hergenröther calls "the Christian State": viz., a State unanimously and profoundly Catholic, existing in active relations with the Holy See. Under these circumstances it may be said with great truth and even with great verbal propriety that, of the two great elements which integrate (as we may say) this complex society, each has its appropriate function: the State planning and consulting for the people's temporal felicity, the Church for the people's sanctification and salvation. Now of course principles do not change by change of circumstances; but it often happens, that a particular way of *expressing* those principles is indefinitely more apt under one set of circumstances than under another. Still under all circumstances it may be said in a very true (though not in the most obvious) sense, that the State—viewed in contrast with the Church—has temporal and not eternal felicity for its end.

Thus its immediate primary end is exclusively temporal:

being the conservation of certain rights, which constitute an absolutely indispensable part of earthly felicity, while they have no existence beyond the grave. The Church on the contrary is exclusively spiritual in her proper end. And it is quite intelligible that a distinction should be drawn in language between these two divinely constituted authorities, based on the distinction of those respective ends for which God immediately instituted them.

But now as regards the State's secondary end. Assuredly we maintain that, according to the unanimous conviction of Catholics, the promotion of religious and supernatural good is an integral and in some sense the predominating portion of that end. Nevertheless (as we have already pointed out) there is an important contrast between the State's power in the spiritual and temporal orders respectively. In aiming at his people's temporal felicity, the civil ruler is proceeding by his own light and on his own ground; and the legislative plans with which he is engaged both are and ought to be principally for the promotion of such felicity. In spiritual matters, the State (so to speak) is not *at home*. So far from God having endowed it with any special aptitude on such matters, it is exclusively *the Church* which He has so endowed. So far from its being the State's proper business to devise plans for man's spiritual advancement, it is precisely the Church's proper business to devise such plans: and what the State should do, if it knew its duty, is simply to accept and forward them. And we will venture to say that not one of the great Catholic writers, who have laid down that temporal felicity is the State's proper end, has either affirmed or implied what may not unnaturally be understood by his statement. None of them, we say, have either affirmed or implied, that the civil ruler can without sin knowingly promote the nation's temporal welfare at the expense of its spiritual; or again that he transgresses his divinely assigned province, by giving his strenuous temporal support to the Church's spiritual labours.\*

Let us now see, how Hergenröther and Molitor express themselves on the State's true province. We quoted at starting the half of a sentence from the former, which sentence as a whole runs as follows: "The natural and immediate end of the State is the protection of rights; its remoter end the temporal

\* Some theologians here and there use language which might seem to imply, that the State cannot *by its own authority* take a supernatural end into account, but only by commission and delegation from the Church. In July, 1863 (pp. 107-110) we maintained with fullest confidence, that such is not the true interpretation of their language.

felicity of its members" (i., 23). But elsewhere he speaks more distinctly. "The State is an ordinance of God for the maintenance of peace and justice, a figure of the moral government of the universe in this lower world. The majesty and power of rulers is based upon their receiving a charge from God and being His representatives; and *it is their calling to do all in their power for the increase of God's kingdom, and the training of man for his supernatural destiny*" (ii. 190, 1). "*Earthly power has for its end the well-being and furtherance of the Kingdom of Christ*" (ii. 179). See also ii. 355. On the other hand we do not deny that here and there Hergenröther uses expressions, which to us seem inaccurate; but they all admit of being interpreted in accordance with the most unmistakable statements which we have just quoted.

Molitor's language on the State's office is even more emphatic:

[The work set before man on earth is] to strive in a well-ordered way for the possession of the Infinite Good. And so in purely human society, the notion of the true social good necessarily follows from the idea of the last end of man. All other ends, which are usually put forward as the highest and last of the State, must be looked upon as insufficient (p. 16).

In laying down the *last end of man* and the *great end of the State* as the same even according to the order of nature, we are making head against specious and widespread errors and prejudices. But we must not be persuaded from becoming witness to the truth against godlessness by this nineteenth century (ib.).

It is the endeavour of the State, so far as it is possible and so far as its means permit, to realize the moral order of the world (p. 23).

It is the end of the State . . . to make the paths of virtue easier to its citizens; . . . and by these means to co-operate for the attainment of their highest and final end (p. 25).

Molitor nowhere uses language which can possibly be understood to imply, that the State's end is the promotion of temporal felicity, as distinct from the promotion of religious and moral good. But in two places (pp. 89, 105) he does undoubtedly speak, as though man's *supernatural* interests were external to the State's office, and were the Church's exclusive province. Yet the following sentence—the last (we think) which refers to the subject—is very unmistakably expressed:—

A harmonious working of Church and State is effected, because *both finally pursue one and the same and that the highest supernatural end*: the Church directly, but indirectly also the Christian State (p. 141).

Now if it be admitted that Catholics practically agree in holding that view of the State's office which we have been setting forth,—it will follow that there is also a large amount



of practical agreement among them, as to the true relation of Church and State. We say that, before coming to the alternative between the Church's "indirect temporal" or "directive" power—antedecently to, and independently of, any such discussion—there will be found a large amount of common ground among Catholics on the subject; there will be found to be many and those the most important truths, which are practically accepted by disciples of Fénelon and Gosselin, no less than by disciples of Suarez and Bellarmine.

Let us consider then a few particulars, on which every Catholic will admit (when the matter is put before him) that the Catholic civil ruler should be subordinate to the Church in the exercise of his appropriate functions. Even as regards the State's immediate primary end—the conservation of rights—the Church (as we have seen) has her word to say; for it is she who pronounces, what is the extent and what the limit of those rights as conferred by God. But there is of course a far more prominent intervention of her magisterium, when the civil ruler contemplates that general promotion of the people's spiritual good, which is his highest and noblest end, and in which nevertheless he should act from first to last under subordination to the Church's guidance. On this momentous matter we cannot do better, than quote from Cardinal Antonelli's well-known official letter to Count Daras. It will be observed indeed, that the Cardinal uses that language on which we have commented, as to "temporal felicity" being the State's proper end. But it will assuredly be also found on careful consideration, that we have his entire sanction for the doctrine we advocate concerning the State's office, no less than on the matter for which we directly cite him. These are his Eminence's words:—

And in truth the Church has never intended, nor now intends, to exercise any direct and absolute power over the political rights of the State. Having received from God the lofty mission of guiding men, whether individually or as congregated in society, to a supernatural end, she has by that very fact the authority and the duty to judge concerning the morality and justice of all acts, internal and external, in relation to their conformity with the natural and divine law. And as no action, whether it be ordained by a supreme power or be freely elicited by an individual, can be exempt from this character of morality and justice,—so it happens that the judgment of the Church, though falling directly on the morality of the acts, indirectly reaches over everything with which that morality is conjoined. But this is not the same thing as to interfere directly in political affairs, which by the order established by God and by the teaching of the Church herself, appertains to the temporal power without dependence on any other authority. The subordination also of the civil to the religious power is in the sense of

the pre-eminence of the sacerdotium over the imperium, because of the superiority of the end of the one over that of the other. Hence the authority of the imperium depends on that of the sacerdotium, as human things on divine, temporal on spiritual. And if temporal happiness, which is the end of the civil power, is subordinate to eternal beatitude, which is the spiritual end of the sacerdotium,—it follows that in order to reach the end to which it has pleased God to direct them, the one power is subordinate to the other. Their powers (I say) are respectively subordinate, in the same way as the ends to which they are directed.

Here surely is a large, fruitful, most practical doctrine, on which all Catholics are necessarily in accordance. We will not at this moment consider their points of difference. We will not attempt to balance against each other the two rival theories: viz. (1) that which ascribes to the Church an "indirect temporal" power; and (2) that which ascribes to her no more than a "directive" power over the State, in things primarily temporal considered on their moral and spiritual side. Hergenröther treats this question with characteristic impartiality and completeness (ii. pp. 204—234). He evidently indeed inclines, or more than inclines, to the more moderate theory; though he thinks (p. 230) that the two "do not in all points differ widely" from each other. Molitor on the contrary (p. 116) speaks with great severity against the opinion of a merely directive power. He accounts this opinion directly inconsistent with the Church's teaching; and he "altogether doubts" whether Fénelon would have "maintained his theory" had he lived to see the Syllabus. We cannot here enter on a question, which would require a long article for its satisfactory consideration. But we have more than once expressed our own humble judgment, that no theory short of the "indirect temporal power" is reconcilable with the Church's authoritative teaching, or with the infallible utterances of the "Unam sanctam." No doubt under existing circumstances the question is devoid of immediate practical bearing; still in April 1872 (pp. 288—294) we gave reasons for thinking it to be of real moment, that Catholics should apprehend the Church's teaching on the subject. And we may mention it as a most honourable mark of Hergenröther's fairness and judicialness, that we think they would nowhere find the data for a judgment more effectively brought together, than in his pages. We shall not be understood then as being at all insensible to the importance of this particular controversy. Yet after all—reverting to the point at which we began—though the controversy is important, it is by no means *all-important*. Cardinal Antonelli's words just quoted erect a large platform of sound doctrine, on which the whole body of devout Catholics

will heartily agree, and which is amply sufficient for the practical exigencies of the time.

Here then we should naturally bring our remarks to a close. But Sir G. Bowyer's name reasonably carries with it much weight; and, writing as he does in a non-Catholic periodical, he may probably be considered by many externs, as representing the whole Catholic body in his doctrinal propositions. It will be more satisfactory then, if we mention one or two other points, over and above that already mentioned, on which for our own part we cannot sympathize with the tone or even the substance of what he has said.

Thus in p. 352 we find this sentence: "We condemn and abhor the persecutors of former days, whether Catholic or Protestant." Here non-Catholic readers will certainly understand Sir G. Bowyer to denote, by the term "persecutors," those who have co-operated in inflicting punishment—at all events, in inflicting capital punishment—on heretics as such. Yet we do not think he can have really meant this. He cannot have forgotten what excited much attention at the time; viz. Pius IX.'s canonization of S. Peter Arbues, who in his time exercised the office of Inquisitor, and doubtless condemned more than one heretic to capital punishment. Hergenröther refers to this Saint in vol. ii. pp. 331, 2. The Saint's case certainly proceeded with sufficient maturity: for his process began in 1490; was resumed in 1537, 1614, and 1622; issued in his Beatification on April 17th, 1662, and finally in his Canonization in 1867. Sir G. Bowyer most certainly never intended to express "abhorrence" of a canonized Saint. But in truth (as every one knows) there is a considerable number of canonized Saints, who have one way or other taken an active part in the capital punishment of heretics. Moreover, as Hergenröther mentions (ii. 309), "it follows from Leo X.'s condemnation of Luther's 33rd thesis, that it is not contrary to the spirit of Christianity to punish heretics with death by fire." Sir G. Bowyer assuredly does not "abhor" persons, unless they act contrariwise to the spirit of Christianity.

We may take for granted then, that those "persecutors," whom Sir G. Bowyer "abhors," are those who have acted with circumstances of undue severity and in a cruel temper of mind, when carrying out the Christian legislation against heretics. Yet even so we would remind him, that heresy is a more grievous sin, than is cruelty in punishing heretics; and we wish he had expressly stated this. He may reply indeed that, under certain circumstances, there is often invincible ignorance concerning the sin of heresy; but we rejoin that it

is at least equally possible, there may be invincible ignorance concerning the sin of cruelty. In those times to which Sir George Bowyer refers, we think the latter was far more probable than the former.

We proceed to another particular. In p. 353 he says that "history furnishes cases, where the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church have overstepped the legitimate boundaries of spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction." No Catholic need quarrel with this statement;\* but we would nevertheless add a supplement. Often enough there is found in history a series of acts—similar in character—done by successive Popes, of such a kind in themselves and in their attendant circumstances, as to show that the doctrine which sanctions them is the recognized and traditional doctrine of the Holy See. Such a doctrine, we would maintain, should be regarded by every Catholic as infallibly true. Hergenröther implies this principle, throughout the historical part of his volumes. Molitor (p. 122) on the same principle infers, from the series of depositions pronounced by Popes against secular princes, that the power of deposition was at that time really possessed by the Holy See.†

But that part of Sir G. Bowyer's language which most surprises us, has reference to the Syllabus. There are certainly some few theologians, who do not consider it certain that the Syllabus was issued *ex cathedra*; though their opinion much surprises us. But Sir G. Bowyer says (p. 363) that it is a "figment and absurdity" to regard the Syllabus as *ex cathedra*. His words imply, that the ascription to Catholics of such a doctrine is a wanton and injurious charge, unscrupulously brought against the Church by her opponents. And elsewhere (p. 350) he says right out, that "Catholics do not hold" the Syllabus "to be infallible." It is rather hard on his brother Catholics—especially on those who take pride in the Syllabus as being among the noblest and most beneficent utterances ever put forth by the Holy See—that such a representation of Catholic opinion should be placed before the non-Catholic world. F. Dumas, in the "Etudes" for March, affirms that "no recent work in theology of any value has come into his hands, without his finding the Syllabus there

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\* As regards the 23rd proposition of the Syllabus, we would refer to F. Newman's explanation of the sense in which it was condemned; for in this case we prefer his exposition to Hergenröther's. See our number for last April, p. 328.

† Hergenröther does not differ on this; but is disposed to explain that power by the public law of the period, not by any prerogative bestowed immediately by Christ.

invoked against many a thesis, just as the condemnation of Baius or Quesnel is invoked" (p. 402). Hergenröther takes for granted, in a tone which implies there can be no doubt on the matter, that the Syllabus-condemnations are *ex cathedrâ*; and only points out (i. 206-8) the indubitable and universally admitted truth, that the propositions are by no means all condemned as precisely heretical, though "each one is censured one way or other." Molitor says (p. 73) that the Syllabus is "a piece of Apostolic teaching," which "stands like a light-house in the stormy night of our times, so that poor seafarers may steer their boats by it, and that stately vessels may not founder on the rocks." Canon Neville says (on "Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation," p. 54) that "the teachings of the Syllabus are the cordially accepted creed of every son and daughter of the Church, in the sense in which they emanate from the Pope." Even Mgr. Fessler, who may be taken as chief representative of the opposite opinion, does not venture to say more, than that "*many* theologians think it may be assumed to be *doubtful*" whether the Syllabus be *ex cathedrâ*, "*until* a fresh declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See." This is somewhat different from affirming, that to account it *ex cathedrâ* would be a "figment and absurdity."

But we do not see how Sir G. Bowyer's argument against Protestants would gain, if Mgr. Fessler's view of the Syllabus were admitted. As we showed last April (pp. 330-2), the Bishop accounts it part of the "true obedience," which "the faithful owe to the Pope," that they regard every proposition contained in the Syllabus as having been justly censured. If every Catholic be required interiorly to reject all the propositions cited in the Syllabus,—it is a matter of very small practical importance, whether he be required to reject them as *infallibly* condemned, or as condemned by some authority, which is not infallible indeed, but which has a *de jure* claim on his interior assent.

But Pius IX. has put forth the very declaration which Mgr. Fessler desiderated; and indeed, he has put forth several such declarations. We cited last October (p. 280, note) a Brief, bearing date July 22, 1875. In that Brief the Holy Father expresses his gratification, that those whom he addresses "follow faithfully, and in all obedience, the teachings of this Chair of Truth"; including the Syllabus by name among those teachings. What is the difference, between saying that the Syllabus is "a teaching of the Cathedra Veritatis," and saying that its teaching is "*ex cathedrâ*"? For it must not be forgotten, that the phrase "*ex cathedrâ*" had

been fixed in its technical sense by the Vatican Council, long before this Brief was issued.\*

If anything could astonish us more than Sir G. Bowyer's direct expressions about the Syllabus, it would be that interpretation of the Vatican Definition on which he bases them. Indeed the latter (as we understand it) is so startling, that

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\* In a note at p. 363, Sir G. Bowyer refers to Cardinal Manning's "*Petri Privilegium*," for the text of the Vatican Definition. Others however may possibly understand the note, as we did, to claim the Cardinal's authority for Sir George's own doctrine. We may as well therefore point out that in that volume (i. pp. 33, 4), the Cardinal mentions the Syllabus as being accounted *ex cathedrâ* by the whole Episcopate.

Last April (p. 346) we "retracted an opinion which we had once expressed," concerning the obligation incumbent on Catholics of accepting the Syllabus-teaching as infallible. We must now retract that retraction. It was mainly based on the credence which we then gave, to the story about Mgr. Fessler's treatise having been approved by a theological "commission of different nationalities," to which the Pope was supposed to have referred it. As we pointed out however in July (p. 219), there can now be no doubt that this whole story is the purest fable. Canon Erdinger, who wrote "*The Life of Bishop Fessler*," admits expressly that the treatise received "no official approbation" whatever. As to the Brief received by the Bishop, F. Dumas, S.J., to whom we are indebted for the fact concerning Canon Erdinger, puts the matter in a very clear light ("*Etudes*," for March, pp. 404, 5). The Bishop had addressed a memorial to the Pope on various matters. In the course of this memorial, he mentioned the excitement caused in Germany by Schulte's work; and he added that he had written a volume in reply, of which he therewith sent the Pope a copy. The Holy Father, in responding, referred to the memorial point by point successively. We quoted last April (p. 329) that part of his Brief which referred to Mgr. Fessler's treatise; and, as our readers will have seen, it does not imply that the Pope had either read one syllable thereof, or received any kind of official report on its contents.

We think however, that in one or two particulars, F. Dumas does the treatise injustice. Thus (as we showed last July), it is most certainly a mistake to suppose, that Mgr. Fessler denies the Pope's infallibility in pronouncing minor doctrinal censures; or (correlatively) that he confines Papal infallibility to the definition of truths integrally contained in Revelation. Then as to the notes of an *ex cathedrâ* Act: it does not seem to us that the Bishop held definitely a mistaken theory on that subject; but rather that he failed to think out and keep before his mind, concerning it, any one definite and consistent doctrine. Indeed, a certain extraordinary puzzle-headedness on one or two particular points seems to us the great drawback from the merits of a treatise, which is otherwise of great value.

Since this article went to press, we have observed that a theologian, whose judgment (to our mind) carries with it far greater weight than Mgr. Fessler's, may be cited with some plausibility as doubting the Syllabus's *ex cathedrâ* character. F. O'Reilly, in his February paper on "*The Church in its relations to Society*," somewhat pointedly abstains from pronouncing, that the Syllabus was certainly issued *ex cathedrâ*; though he by no means expressly states that this fact is *not* certain. We willingly admit that F. O'Reilly's judgment on such a question is entitled to grave and respectful consideration, and may not lightly be put aside; for he pre-eminently excels in those very theological qualities, in which Mgr. Fessler is somewhat deficient. We wish he had expressed his full mind on the matter.



we must express our comments entirely under correction, and as intended only on the uncertain hypothesis that we rightly understand him. But we understand him to say, that the Syllabus cannot be *ex cathedrâ*, because it is a mere *condemnation of error*; for that the Vatican Definition confines infallibility to "a distinct affirmation and declaration of a doctrine of faith or morals" (p. 363). At one time a notion was not so very uncommonly expressed, that the Pope never speaks *ex cathedrâ*, *except* when pronouncing an anathema. But Sir G. Bowyer has surely been the first writer who ever said (if indeed he does say it) that, whenever a Pontifical Act *confines* itself to the anathematization of some given tenet, this circumstance suffices to prove that the Act is *not ex cathedrâ*. Can it be necessary to answer his argument? Surely, if the Pope defines that some given tenet, bearing on faith or morals, is an "error,"—he thereby "defines" a certain "doctrine, concerning faith or morals."

While we are on the theme of *ex cathedrâ* Acts, we would remind our readers of what we said in our last number (p. 240), concerning an incidental expression of Hergenröther's on the subject. And we will add one further remark. He considers Popes to be infallible in doctrine (i. 43), even when they do not *express* any doctrine at all; when they merely *imply* doctrine, by this or that "moral precept" imposed on the Universal Church. If there could be any doubt on the meaning of Hergenröther's words taken by themselves (though we do not see how there can be), his citation of Suarez in corroboration is perfectly conclusive as to what he intends.

We must not conclude, without again expressing our sense of the great benefit which has been conferred on English Catholics, by the translators of Hergenröther and Molitor. As to the former translation especially, we think its publication will mark an era in Catholic controversial discussion, on all those particulars—now so numerous and momentous,—which refer to the relation of Church and State. What we have said on this occasion very inadequately represents our great admiration of Hergenröther's work. But (as we mentioned at starting) we hope to compensate for this deficiency, by devoting an article in an early number to its exclusive consideration.

ART. VI.—ART IN THE PROVINCES.—“KERAMIC  
ART OF JAPAN.”

1. *Report for 1874 of the Liverpool Art Club.* Privately printed.
2. *Catalogue Raisonné of the Oriental Exhibition of the Liverpool Art Club, &c.* Edited by GEORGE ASHDOWN AUDSLEY, Architect. Published by the Liverpool Art Club. 1872.
3. *Catalogue of the Exhibition of Goldsmith's Art.* With Introduction, by EDWARD QUAILE. Liverpool. 1874.
4. *Notes on Japanese Art.* By GEORGE ASHDOWN AUDSLEY. Paper read before the Architectural Association, London. Illustrated by Specimens from the Collection of James L. Bowes, Esq. Liverpool: printed for private circulation. 1874.
5. *Catalogue of Collection illustrative of the History and Practice of Etching.* With Preface by JAMES ROSE ANDERSON, Esq. Liverpool. 1874.
6. *Ancient and Mediæval Ivories.* A Paper read before the Liverpool Art Club by HENRY CLARK, Esq. 1875.
7. *Catalogue of the Exhibition of Ancient and Modern Embroidery.* With Paper read before the Liverpool Art Club by Rev. ROBERT E. GUY, O.S.B. 1875.
8. *The Political Value of Art to the Municipal Life of a Nation.* A Lecture delivered at the Free Library, Liverpool, by PHILIP H. RATHBONE, Esq., Honorary Secretary of the Liverpool Art Club. 1875.
9. *Catalogue of the Objects illustrative of Dutch, Flemish, and Belgian Art,* exhibited at the Liverpool Art Club in May, 1875.
10. *Catalogue of Japanese Lacquer-work* exhibited by Mr. James L. Bowes at the Liverpool Art Club, June, 1875. By GEORGE ASHDOWN AUDSLEY. Printed for Private Circulation at the Chiswick Press. 1875.
11. *The Art of Sculpture, its History and Practice.* A Paper read before the Members of the Liverpool Art Club, October 25th, 1875, by HENRY CLARK. Liverpool. 1875.
12. *Catalogue of the Loan Collection of the Works of the late David Cox.* With Preface by WILLIAM HALL. Liverpool: published by the Liverpool Art Club. 1875.
13. *Keramic Art of Japan.* By GEORGE ASHDOWN AUDSLEY and JAMES LORD BOWES. Published for the Subscribers by the Authors. Liverpool: 1875. Parts I. and II.

THIS long list of publications we owe to the members of the recently formed Liverpool Art Club. It is by no means a complete record of their labours in the cause of Art.

It is but a summary of the work done in little more than one year. And heartily do we wish the club a continuance of the success it has already achieved; and that for many years to come it may put forth as abundant a supply of literary fruit as it has yielded during the year just brought to a close. Of the treatises before us there are two characteristic traits in each. There is the modest, inquiring tone of the humble beginner, which makes each writer address his fellow-members as though all were on an equality as mere students, and none sufficiently old in the study of Art to assume the air of a teacher. And there is that keen grasp of the subject under treatment, which must be the offspring of brains well worked into the habit of powerful exertion by the unceasing demands of active commercial life.

It is not our purpose to dwell at any length upon the general utility of such associations. They are already beyond the stage at which an apologist for their existence can have much difficulty in making short work of opponents. The benefit derivable from them indeed hardly admits of question. They are invariably of some service wherever formed; but in a community devoted to commercial pursuits they supply a great and palpable want. Men born and reared amid the beauties of rural scenery, surrounded in youth with the joys, and blessed with the ruddy health that country life affords, and in manhood and old age occupied with those duties of an agricultural and landlord life, which so far possess the character of amusement as to be the holiday resort of the busy denizens of our cities and the blissful goal of their rest-requiring old age; men so favoured have less of that craving for the elevating and refining influence of Art, which the overtaxed brain of the merchant recognizes as his nobler nature's rebellion against the soul's complete absorption in the pursuit of mere wealth. To one it is but the desire of another species of pastime; to the other it is a yearning for something more important as well as more pleasurable. To him it even assumes the warning voice of Religion, and certainly clears the way in many for the free and unfettered action of religious instincts and aspirations. This is the case with all Art tendencies and inspirations, although perhaps more especially so with Music of the higher kinds. But, whether as cause or effect we need not delay to inquire, a love of Art is certainly almost incompatible with that complete absorption of the soul's best powers in mere "business." Hence it is undoubtedly one of Religion's most efficient handmaids in her work with the souls of men surrounded so unceasingly by temptation to amass wealth and to love it for its own sake.

It helps her to draw off their minds a little from that which no one can gaze upon too intently or too persistently without dimming the brightness of the mental vision which gives unto man his glimpse here below of the One True, the One Good, and the One Beautiful. It joins her in the war against Mammon :—

Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell  
From Heaven ; for e'en in Heaven his looks and thoughts  
Were always downward bent, admiring more  
The riches of Heaven's pavement, trodden gold,  
Than aught divine or holy, else enjoyed  
In vision beatific.\*

And Mammon needs a deal of fighting in this nineteenth century, and in this wealthy country ; but the fight must ever be hottest in the great marts where colossal fortunes are reared, and among those whose days are occupied in rearing them. Hence it is indeed cheering to be able to report that amongst these very men a movement has already advanced beyond the stage of initiation towards studies from which they look to derive something more needful than mere recreation. From several expressions scattered *passim* in the several works before us, it is clear that the highest purposes of Art have been in contemplation from the very first amongst the members of this association. Indeed, they frankly acknowledge Art as almost a necessity for them amid their peculiar temptations as commercial men ; and plainly welcome and cherish it as having a special mission for them. They see in it a kindly preventive to the pursuit of material riches becoming their souls' second nature. And in this they show that practical common sense which is the foundation of commercial sagacity. For if,

Our torments also may, in length of time,  
Become our elements, †

what must the man end in, whose forty or fifty years of activity have had but one aim, one occupation, one goal, and that Money, the love of which is proverbially the most powerful and the most persistent of the passions?

We speak of the natural order mainly, and do not for one moment lose sight of the far more powerful agency of prayer and meditation, of devotion to the Church and love of the poor, and of many other concomitants of what Catholics term the Spiritual life. In enumerating Art as one of the handmaids of Religion we endeavoured to guard against the folly

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\* "Paradise Lost," I.

† *Ib.*, II.

of those who would raise it above its legitimate sphere, and even worship it with a *cultus* due to Religion alone. It has no power, no message, save in the natural order, and men must love it and cultivate it only as a means towards an end far more important than itself. Much less must they hail it, with a Freemason kind of sympathy, as the grand instrument of the regeneration of the human race after the failure of the mission inaugurated by the Son of God and continued by His one, living and teaching Church. Such an absurd and exaggerated estimate of the proper sphere and value of Art must defeat its own object. And hence it must be jealously withstood not only in the high interests of Religion, but in the interest of true Art itself. Else, at one time vainly crying,—

I take possession of man's mind and deed,  
I care not what the sects may brawl;  
I sit as God holding no form of creed,  
But contemplating all,—

she relapse, after the reaction inevitable upon any departure from the golden mean, into

A spot of dull stagnation, without light  
Or power of movement.\*

With this proviso, we throw ourselves cheerfully into the ranks of those who are banded together for the purpose of pursuing Art studies, and of rendering the engrossing cares of daily life harmless to the higher powers of the soul by means of their benign influence.

Yet one more observation in reference to Art in the hands of commercial men seems to us to demand attention. It is one which must have struck most readers of the several treatises placed at the head of this paper. It is the earnest, thorough manner in which they appear to set to work, and to persevere in it. There is nothing of the mere connoisseur, not a shadow of the dilettante, about one of them. The results of their studies seem to tell us that they and their fellow-members have entered upon the prolonged and devoted cultivation of Art which distinguishes the genuine lovers of it from those who follow it merely as a refining kind of fashion. And we might go on to ask, if, after all, such a zest for it among such men is not a species of necessity to them? Granted that it constitutes their recreation. It is a mistake to suppose, as many, nevertheless, foolishly do suppose, that sheer idleness is relaxation. The man who has nothing to do, and who does it, does nothing,—

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\* "The Palace of Art."

nothing of any value, at any rate—even by way of change. *Ennui* may cause him to fancy that he is tired, and so to alternate nothing to do with doing nothing—

A life of nothing, nothing worth,  
From that first nothing ere his birth  
To that last nothing under earth.\*

The man who is by nature or habit thoroughly lazy, and whose means enable him to live in utter laziness, can seldom, if ever, arouse himself to the degree of exertion requisite for the prosecution of any study. And, on the other hand, the man whose days are occupied with many transactions, most of which demand intelligent and unremitting attention, cannot be idle even in his moments of leisure. To him, at least, if not to every one save the inveterate drones of society, cessation from action is not rest or recreation. He must have occupation, and his pleasure and refreshment of soul consist in that occupation being of a different and usually higher nature than the one which constitutes his life-work. The *dolce far niente* of the sunny South must transport us in spirit to its own native languid clime before it can have much charm for our active northern breeds. Take amongst us the physician whose mental and bodily faculties are continuously upon the strain in one direction, or the barrister engaged many months in a series of forensic struggles which tax both body and mind most severely. These seek not repose upon the couch of luxury, nor beguile a Long Vacation's wanton hours with pleasures attainable without effort or exertion. "Nil cupientium nudus castra peto" is no motto for either of them. It is amid Alpine glaciers, upon the dancing waves, in the excitement of the chase or the pursuit of sport, that they seek and most effectually find the relief which renews life and vigour, and is in the deepest sense to them *re-creation*. The very men to whom sport is a business must perforce in their off-times make some kind of business their sport. The huntsman turns saddler, farrier, or gardener when the day's hunt is done: the gamekeeper is by turns his own tailor, shoemaker, gunsmith, and carpenter. And all this with far greater pleasure than any mere abstention from occupation could possibly impart. And do not the heroes of our college days for the most part stand out in the past as champions with the bat, the football, and the oar, the selfsame whose supremacy in studies was best assured? Our own age bears remarkable testimony as to "boys of a larger growth," that the

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\* "The Two Voices."



hardest workers are they whose acquirements and accomplishments in subjects unconnected with their daily labour give proof that all their leisure time has had its allotted share of wholesome labour, and that their bodily and mental vigour has been kept unimpaired under heavy pressure by variation in what they did rather than by cessation from doing. Truly,

Absence of occupation is not rest ;

A mind quite vacant is a mind distressed.\*

And it is a cheerful sign of the times that our steamboats and railway trains with their increasing summer traffic afford. For they indicate the fact that no sooner has the nation acquired by its industry means to exchange idleness for the active recreation of travel, than it has answered to the call of its higher nature, and year by year returned to its labour refreshed, but not relaxed.

This beneficial law of our mental constitution is the *raison d'être* of such associations as that to which we are indebted for the able treatises before us. And to these we will now turn, although to all save one we can devote but a few lines. For our special object in this paper is to introduce to our readers the first two instalments of a work which promises to take its rank as one of the most complete and elaborate specimens of Art literature ever issued. We, of course, refer to Messrs. Audsley and Bowes's "Keramic Art of Japan." Otherwise, to begin with the Report (No. 1), we should be tempted to quote from it at considerable length for the benefit of the Art-loving inhabitants of other provincial towns, who might be incited to imitation of Liverpool by the perusal of this modest record of a year's good work in the cause of Art. Suffice it to say, that if the year that has just elapsed be but a fair specimen, as we have every reason to believe it to be, of those that have preceded and those that are to follow it, the members of this remarkable club may be justly congratulated upon a success hardly paralleled in the history of such undertakings. The two "Objects" of the club are thus expressed :—

The amount of wealth expended in Liverpool upon different forms of Art is out of all proportion to any influence exerted upon its progress, or upon the general diffusion of intelligent love for it. This may not unfairly be ascribed to the isolation to which Art-collectors and Art-lovers have found themselves condemned, through the want of one general centre of communication and reunion. . . . .

The Liverpool Art Club is intended to form such a centre. Among the

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\* Cowper.

methods by which it is proposed to attain the desired ends are :—*Social Evening Meetings*, at which specimens of all forms of Art may be exhibited and discussed. Moreover, it is intended to make the club a medium of bringing the art-loving public into closer and more direct connection, not only with local, but also with Metropolitan and other artists, a step which cannot but be serviceable to all parties, and to the interests of Art (p. 11).

In Mr. Quaile's paper a brief description is given of the several processes, or rather branches, of the goldsmith's art, and then a well-compressed history of its several phases and styles. As to the art itself, he explains it thus :—

The goldsmith's art includes what the old masters knew, and what they hand down all worthy of the craft ought to know : how to design, to chisel, or engrave, to inlay, to do all the work of enamelling, and not to be ignorant of filigree-work. A worker whose knowledge and practice are confined to a single process is merely a mechanic, while the goldsmith who understands all is an artist in the truest sense. Gold and silver in his hands are like clay to the potter, capable of being wrought into an infinite variety of works of utility and ornament, in accordance with his powers of design and manipulation, while from the extrinsic worth of the material employed these productions are not impaired, but increased in value by time. Even where the progress of science has increased the facilities for the rapid production of elaborate designs, and dispensed to some extent with manual labour, the older works, wrought by that most cunning, delicate, and patient of all instruments, the human hand, are still most highly prized by all lovers of Art (p. 5).

The writer here touches upon a question, upon each side of which there is much to be said. When does the artist lapse into the mere mechanic, who is but a fraction of another entity, the manufacturer? It seems to us that the first idea of an artist is that of one whose work possesses the unity which proceeds from one hand as well as from one head. Hence, we should hardly regard Architecture so much in the light of an art as a combination of the works of one art—that of the sculptor, or of two or more arts—those of the sculptor and the painter. Indeed, it approaches nigh unto the idea of a manufacture, inasmuch as it is indebted to one man for the idea to be worked up to, and to others for the structure of the component parts. But it seems to us that the essence of the idea of an artist is this, that he should himself be the possessor and wielder of a power, of which no mechanical appliance and no multitude of assistants can supply the place. And, consequently, his work must show forth as its primary claim to value and appreciation that it is an individual work like unto nothing else; that it is unique as well as excellent, and indebted for both its excellence and its one-

ness to the last touch of the master's gifted hand; and that, if lost or destroyed, it can never be exactly replaced, even during the artist's lifetime, much less after his death. On the other hand, the mechanic, *quâ* mechanic, aims less and less at one perfect individual whole. His energy is directed to some one part of the whole work, and often to a very insignificant part; for most of the parts, even of a design which, *as a design*, may be an elaborate work of art, are in manufacture trivial and insignificant. And most commonly his work is of such a character that practice alone is necessary to make a thoroughly brainless man a proficient at it. Mind is essential to artistic work, it is absolutely more often than not an impediment to mechanical work. For the moment the mechanic permits any natural tendency towards taking in with his mind's eye the one whole of which his labour is to furnish but a small part to gain the slightest hold upon him, this small part allotted to him becomes endangered so far as its true and simple structure is concerned.

Moreover, the artist must not be weighed down by the heavier and more vulgar portion of what may in some sense be regarded as pertaining to the department of Art. In this way, unfortunately, the goldsmith, as an artist, has now become almost lost in the mere mechanic, while the artist *par excellence* is the painter, who has luckily handed over the rougher part of what even several great masters held to belong to their craft—that is, of the decorative art—to the men who add plumbing and glazing to the labours of the brush.

Nos. 3, 4, and 10 are by the same writer. They are brief but extremely interesting accounts of Oriental, and specially Japanese Art, and should be studied as an introduction to the large work (No. 13), of which Mr. Audsley is the joint author with Mr. Bowes. To the exhibition of Oriental Art which gave rise to the production of these instructive treatises, both the "Times" newspaper (December 26, 1872) and the "Art Journal" (January, 1873) devoted long and able articles. Mr. Bowes's collection is held by the writer in the "Times" to have "probably no rival in the world." And in the "Art Journal" Professor T. C. Archer, himself, if we mistake not, a Liverpool man by length of residence if not by birth, ventured to prophesy that "the prices (of such specimens) will rise as soon as the real rarity of the objects becomes more known." He must, indeed, be astonished at the rapidity with which his prophecy has been fulfilled. For it is well known *now* that the first, and in fact only extensive, importation of Japanese works of art into Europe at the Paris Exhibition of 1867, was not only superior in character to any subsequent supply, but seems to have

almost exhausted the art treasures of Japan. And, contrary to the belief current certainly in 1867, we find modern Japanese artists far behind their predecessors, in fact hardly skilful enough as copyists to supply the European market with wares capable of escaping detection from originals by the most untutored eye.

In No. 4 Mr. Rose Anderson introduces the catalogue of his famous and almost unique collection with a very practical lesson in the art of etching, followed by a brief account of some of the leading English and foreign etchers. This collection, recently lent to Birmingham as well as to Liverpool, has its present, and—the Liverpool Art Club must pardon us the wish—its permanent home, we trust, in the Metropolis.

Mr. Clark, in his "Ancient and Mediæval Ivories," as well as in his "Art of Sculpture," falls in suitably with the other members who have written papers, by introducing, rather than attempting to exhaust, his subjects. Indeed, nothing is more pleasing throughout these valuable contributions to the literature of Art than the modest tone, as befitting students addressing each other, which pervades them all. The portion of the second paper devoted to the *practice* of sculpture proves that its author has left no stone unturned, if one may say so without the semblance of appearing jocose, to master his subject in its various details and to make his account of it, though brief, yet most comprehensive. Yet there is no lack of boldness when occasion serves, as, for instance, in Father Guy's Introduction to the Catalogue of the Collection of Embroidery (No. 7). He there ventures to doubt the accuracy of so accepted an authority as Dr. Rock upon an important point in the terminology of the art. At the same time he does not fail to put the matter so clearly that any person of fair eyesight can judge for himself as to which of the two accounts of the "Opus Anglicum" is correct, by one inspection of the Sion cope at the South Kensington Museum.

Mr. P. H. Rathbone, however, though keeping to the subdued and student-like manner of his predecessors, rises beyond their simple didactic and familiar styles, and aims at an original essay upon high Art. And in justice we must own that he has succeeded in his line as well as they have done in theirs. It is one of the most interesting and well-written lectures we have met with. It is replete with information, and strongly marked with the originality which springs from great opportunities having been made the best use of by a mind gifted by nature and cultivated by study. It proves its author to be not only a lover of Art, but a persevering plodder amid the dry details of its history. And it bears testimony to an amount

of enthusiasm most refreshing, not for Art and its literature as mere ideas or fashions, but as one day to permeate the vast population of his native town and upraise it to the level of the old mediæval marts. From the two subjoined extracts our readers cannot fail to see that the whole subject of Art is treated by a most proficient student, as student he will call himself, whom many other students might readily and with profit look up to as a master ; while the vein of quiet humour discernible in the first may be taken as a fair specimen of what will be found throughout the whole lecture.

Thus does Mr. Rathbone bring to an end some pregnant comments upon the causes of the perfection of Greek Art :—

Contrast this (the conduct of the Greek sculptor who acted upon the suggestion by a cobbler as to one of the feet of his statue) with the correspondence which has taken place in our daily papers concerning a picture lately exhibited in this town—the "Shadow of the Cross." Whether the artist has succeeded or not in his aim I will not now stop to inquire, but the aim itself was unquestionably an artistic one ; viz., to bring vividly before the spectator's mind the reality of a passage in the life of the Being who forms the central figure of Christianity. A critic, professing to be an operative carpenter, pointed out certain details which, to the mind of an educated carpenter, would seriously interfere with his feelings of the reality of the scene, and the answer\* to his criticism was, to my mind, unsatisfactory and inartistic. It was to the effect that though these details were, as far as we knew, inaccurate, yet, by a considerable stretch of the imagination, they might have been conceived to be accurate. The aim of a painter ought to be, not to tax the imagination of the spectator, but to assist it, and to make every man feel that the more he knows about that particular part of the picture of which his previous education has enabled him to judge, the more he is struck with the painter's mastery of the subject. One of the criticisms was, that the saw was left in the board, which would not have been done by any careful joiner. And we may presume that He who was said to have been perfect in all vocations of life would have been perfect in the work which He was then undertaking. No Greek would have made that mistake. Whatever he undertook to do he undertook to do in the best possible way, and nothing unnecessary to complete the impression was left to the imagination of the spectator which the painter's imagination and knowledge could supply (p. 6).

Our second extract is from the concluding pages of the lecture. And with the one suggestion that "thought" in the second line should, to avoid an approach at least to a contradiction in terms, be "feeling," we commit it to the reader's attention.

I have tried, however imperfectly, to explain how Art is the permanent

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\* Given, if we mistake not, by Mr. Holman Hunt himself.  
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expression of a nation's thought ; how what literature is to the individual mind Art is to the common mind of the community ; how where philosophy, politics, theology, and, even as we have found in these latter days, physics, tend to bring out the divisions of mankind, Art develops all that is common to our nature in each of these, and expresses that essential truth which underlies them all. What literature and discussion divide, Art and poetry unite ; the former are the expression of thought, the latter of feeling. All alike are necessary ; but whereas the latter makes us realize we are one community, the former reminds us that we are individuals differently constituted, and often apparently with antagonistic principles.

Therefore Athens, whose philosophy and politics produced jealousies and ill-feeling, developed to an extent to which we are happily strangers, comes down to us through her Art as a great and united community, to whose lessons the world, even now, gladly listens. It is for us, with our vast population, our enormous wealth (as a town), but without either politics or philosophy that the world will care to preserve, to decide whether we will take advantage of our almost unequalled opportunities for the cultivation of Art, or whether we shall be content to rot away, as Carthage, Antioch, and Tyre have rotted away, leaving not a trace to show where a population of more than half a million souls once lived, loved, felt, and thought. Surely the home of Roscoe is worthy of a better fate (p. 44).

We cannot leave these smaller treatises for the large one (No. 13) without expressing the belief that there are sure indications of a spirit amongst our merchant princes, which must in process of time work good not only directly, but indirectly by its influence upon our nobility and landed gentry. Considering the vast wealth for centuries at the disposal of the aristocracy of this country, how remiss have its members been in the cause of Art ! They have certainly withheld their support since the days when the finest specimens of architectural art in the world ceased to be living temples of the One True, the One Good, and the One Beautiful, and at the same time to be the nation's treasures of the choicest products of the goldsmith's, the painter's, the embroiderer's, and the sculptor's art. Undoubtedly, since the Reformation our great landed proprietors have neither encouraged artists nor understood Art. With rare exceptions, the English people who possessed the means to become patrons of Art, have persistently kept themselves aloof from it. The patronage bestowed upon eminent scholars has been scanty enough, but the scholars have fared daintily in comparison with artists of almost every date and description. And if it be, as Mr. Rathbone insists, and, as it seems to us, without any hazard of being refuted by appeals to history, that when a race has become extinct and its habitation a ruin, it lives or dies amid other races in other lands according as it had lived or not lived in its day a life



adorned by the cultivation of Art, pray what will the fate be with the men and women of some two thousand years to come of the great cities of this land? London is certainly the richest, it is probably the most populous city the world has ever beheld. Had it been levelled to the ground fifty years ago, what would have been the value of the most gigantic fragment or most extensive area of its ruins compared to that of a few square yards in the Forum of Rome or the Acropolis of Athens? After three centuries of decadence, we have much ground indeed to make up ere we can hope to rival even the art-teeming cities of old.

"Keramic Art of Japan," by Messrs. Audsley and Bowes, is a work of vaster extent and far higher aim than any of these Essays. Indeed it is being brought out upon such a splendid scale and with so much erudition that it must eventually bring into European notice the society with which its origin is associated by the authors. So elaborate a series of plates are evidently the result of most costly and rare workmanship. The collection, when completed, will certainly form a *chef-d'œuvre* in the art of printing, not surpassed, if even equalled, by the splendid specimens that the almost fabulous wealth of the Arundell Society enables it to present to its subscribers. The mechanical labour and skill, together with artistic delicacy and talent requisite for such a task as this, can hardly be imagined by those to whom the process of printing in colours is unknown. And hence, previously to noticing Messrs. Audsley and Bowes's explanatory descriptions of the plates, and their useful Introduction to the study of Japanese Art, we will give a brief account of the several kinds of printing, which find their acme and perfection in the perfectly modern process of chromolithography. We speak, of course, of printing as the art which gives us prints, and not of it in its younger and ordinary acceptation. For to this earlier kind does ordinary letterpress undoubtedly owe its origin. Yet the marvel is that what we call the *invention of printing* does not antedate the Christian era by as many centuries as intervened between these two events. For we have Scriptural and classical evidence in abundance that prints something akin to our plate-engravings were extensively used in the very earliest ages. In the beginning these were probably impressions taken from seals of the rudest structure. Indeed such impressions have in recent times been taken from several of these remnants of even Etruscan art. Yet, strange to say, the application of larger and more elaborate gravings to the production of pictorial representations, was, like the process of ordinary printing, not attempted. The art owes its invention or origin to

the lucky accident by which, according to Vasari, some melted sulphur was dropped by Maso Finiguerra upon a silver plate he had just engraved.\* This, on its removal, brought with it the black mixture of charcoal and oil with which artists were wont to fill up the interstices of each plate, that they might better judge of the character of their work before filling it in with the peculiar mixture of silver and lead (*nigellum*) much in vogue, gold, or even copper, of which the design was to be composed. What coagulated sulphur could do, he at once thought that paper could do more effectually. And the art of plate-engraving was the result. It must, however, be borne in mind that, although we are using the term *print* in the signification of a *pictorial impression*, yet one main difference does exist between it in this sense, and our ordinary letterpress and engraving, a difference which likewise distinguishes woodcuts and lithographs from engravings. In engravings, etchings, &c., the ink or marking material is sunk into the plate, permeating the many minute channels or grooves cleaned out for it by the graver's instrument, or, as in etching, by the action of the acid upon channels left upon the plate by the plough-like passage of the needle through the coating of wax, with which the whole surface of the plate was originally smeared. In woodcuts, on the other hand, and lithographs, the design is allowed to *stand out*, by its surroundings being actually or virtually† removed; and the ink placed upon these upright portions left remaining readily gives the type upon paper. They thus yield their impression from a plate prepared *in relief*; or, to use Mr. Rose Anderson's description, they are "works in cameo, while line engraving and etching are works in intaglio" (p. 4). As will appear also, the early lithograph bore much the same relation to a woodcut that etching bears to an engraving. In engravings the plate is cut *mechanically*, in etching it is effected *chemically*, being bitten into by an applied corrosive, which runs throughout the several channels prepared for it *upon*, not *in*, the plate by the etcher's needle. So in the earliest stage of lithography, it was the acid that ate away the surrounding stone from the lines laid on with a mixture of wax and other

\* "The priority of the discovery of taking off impressions on paper from engraved plates is now conceded to the Italians. Zani and Ottley have fully established the claim of Maso Finiguerra, and Bartsch admits it. Zani . . . conjectures that he was born in 1418; Ottley supposes that he was born in 1410, and that a print in his possession was executed in 1445."—Editor's note to latest edition of Bryan's Dictionary of Painters and Engravers, under *Maso Finiguerra*.

† As the reader will see later on, the surroundings in lithographs are not actually removed, but rendered, by a chemical process, as good as absent.

materials, just as efficiently as in xylography this superfluous surface was removed by the engraver's hand.

While, however, those kinds of printing comprised under the wide terms of engraving, etching, and xylography, hardly fall within the scope of our subject in such a way as to demand a more detailed account of them, lithography has more pressing claims upon our attention. For the chromolithograph, even in its highest form of development, is, as its name implies, a lithograph of some sort. Hence we gladly avail ourselves of Mr. Audsley's permission to make free and unlimited use of an able lecture read by him, but not published, upon some of the more perfected kinds of "type," to which he introduces us by a brief but complete account of the origin of the lithographic art.

Alois Senefelder was a young German literary adventurer, who lived about the beginning of the present century. He was born in Prague, A.D. 1771, but early in life was removed to Munich, where his father was settled as an actor. His father, however, died while he was prosecuting his studies at the University of Ingoldstadt, and he was compelled to take to some means of earning his own living. He chose his father's profession, and for some years was on the stage. But tired at length of such a wandering life, he turned again to literature. His first effort was a dramatic work, which proved an utter failure. The expense of publishing it had completely exhausted his little means. It brought hardly any returns. And, what was worse, there appeared to be no prospect of any pecuniary advantage arising from the partial notoriety he had gained by it, in case he should proceed with a second attempt. He was conscious of being rich enough in talent to write a second play, but knew that he was too poor in point of material means to meet the necessary expense himself, and too unknown to fame, in spite of his first work, to be able to induce any publisher to risk money upon such a venture. So he set about devising some plan whereby he might become his own type-founder, printer, and publisher.

With this view he partially matured a contrivance for imitating type-printing; but that had to be abandoned, owing to the expense of the requisite materials. His next scheme was to etch imitations of printed characters and copper-plates. And in the prosecution of this, the necessity of a varnish for covering his slips and errors, and enabling him to etch again upon the same plate, soon presented itself. The "stopping-out" mixture used by engravers being unknown to him, he proceeded to make one for himself, and after many experiments he hit upon that peculiar compound of bees-wax, soap,

and lamp-black, by means of which he was subsequently to become the founder of an entirely new branch of art.

The trouble of having to remove the writing from his copper-plates before proceeding to any new page eventually disheartened him, and he was on the point of abandoning all further attempts, when his attention was drawn to a slab of Kelheim stone, upon which he had been in the habit of grinding his colours. It struck him that by polishing this stone and coating it over with a thin layer of his composition, he might continue his writing with greater facility than upon copper. He accordingly proceeded to work upon it, treating it and printing from it in the same manner as a copperplate; when a seemingly trifling circumstance gave a new direction to his experiments, and led to the important discovery of Lithography.

He had just finished a stone slab, when his mother entered and desired him to make out a list of clothes she was about to wash. Neither paper nor ink was at hand, but the newly-polished stone, and the composition he was wont to put upon it, presented themselves as convenient substitutes. So he jotted down the list upon the slab, with the intention of copying it upon paper at his leisure. But before doing so, it occurred to him to reverse his customary practice. Hitherto, he had scratched or corroded the writing *into* the stone through a thin layer of his varnish. Then he had removed the varnish, and daubed ink into the etched lines, wiped the stone, and printed off his copies as an etcher or engraver does from his copperplate. But he now left his writing in the greasy composition upon the stone, and endeavoured to depress by means of acids all portions of stone not covered by the writing, so that this would stand out in relief upon the stone. He thought that, slight as this relief might be, it would suffice to yield an impression when printers' ink had been rolled upon it. His first experiments were encouraging enough, and even with the rude and imperfect means at his disposal he was soon able to produce clean and firm impressions.

Although this was not the chemical lithography now practised, and of which he subsequently became the inventor, still, the comparatively perfect results of his new and facile mode of printing, as well as the inexpensive nature of the process, led Senefelder to conceive that he had already made an important discovery. The prospect of fame and wealth thus opened out diverted his ambition into a new channel; but poverty still stood in his way. He could not afford to provide the various ingredients, which he began to perceive were needed to perfect his invention, and he was fast be-

coming hopeless, when chance directed him to a musician named Gleissner, who was about to publish some compositions. Senefelder prevailed upon him to intrust the printing of them to him, and also to advance the needful funds. These pieces, the first fruits of stone-printing, were published with several others in 1796. For some years he worked away, making many improvements, but still impeded by the tedious nature of the process and its extremely limited powers. At length, however, he made two discoveries. The first was that calcareous stones, such as he had been using, absorb grease and imbibe watery solutions. The second that greasy substances have a disposition to adhere to each other. And he already was aware of the mutual antipathy between greasy and watery solutions. With the knowledge of these chemical facts, he made rapid progress. He discarded the tedious process of lowering the surface of the stone around his writing by means of strong acids, and wrote upon the stone with his greasy kind of ink. He found, then, that by merely damping the whole surface of his stone, the water penetrated everywhere except the lines of his greasy writing, which refused the water and continued dry. He then smeared the whole with his ink, which adhered to the inky writing already dried upon the stone, but was repelled by the water in every other part. Nothing then remained but to put his stone under the press, put in his pieces of paper, print, and draw them out. For this purpose he long retained the old copperplate printing-press, but subsequently improved it into what is now known as the lithographic press.

An attempt was made to introduce the art of lithography into England about 1802, but it was not until 1816 that it began to attract the attention of competent artists. And even then it made but slow progress. From about 1830, however, it has rapidly advanced both in the beauty of its artistic productions and in its extensive application to purposes of utility. And we have now not only ink-drawing upon stone, but chalk-drawing, etching, and engraving, as well as the beautiful and interesting process of chromolithography of which we shall have something to say later on. The process, therefore, of lithography essentially differs from that of copperplate, woodcut, or type-printing. In these operations the impressions are taken from incisions below the surface, or from projections above it; whereas in lithographic printing they are obtained from a uniformly level surface. It is based upon certain chemical laws of affinity and repulsion of the ingredients made use of.

But there are other and more elaborate and intricate kinds of *copying*, to which we must direct the reader's attention before inviting them to examine Messrs. Audsley and Bowes's magnificent plates, if they would wish the admiration they are sure to incite to develop into an intelligent appreciation of them as in themselves works of art.

In all the previously-mentioned processes, whether of lithography, xylography, engraving on copper or by means of wood, etching, &c., the labour of the human hand directed by artistic skill is necessary. This skill can be acquired only by the union of long education with native talent. Upon it depends all the merit, and hence the real value of the result. Hence such works belong to the domain of Art in its strictest sense; and, with the single exception of their absolute fidelity as copies, the processes we are now about to describe cannot compare with them. These processes are mainly three in number. They are Photolithography, Autotype, and Chromolithography. Two of these are the combination, in different ways, of Photography with the several kinds of printing that have preceded this wonderful modern invention, the distinctive agency of which consists in the chemical action of light. The specialty of the third kind consists in its power of imparting colour to the impressions produced by it.

As to Photolithography, it is the process by which drawings in line are reproduced by the aid of photography, and transferred to stone ready for the lithographic press. In other words, the chemical action of light is made to record the image of the picture to be photolithographed upon a sheet of prepared paper. This, in its turn, is made to impart that image to a lithographic stone in a condition ready for printing. The principal imperfection, however, incident to this process lies in its limited application. It can only be used for copying drawings which are produced by lines or dots. For these nothing could be better, as even an unpractised eye may determine by reference to Plates A and B of the large work under notice. Shadows, half-tints, and such-like delicate effects are quite beyond its powers. It must hence, as a means of producing exact and artistic copies of every description, yield to the more recently discovered process of Autotype.

Autotype acknowledges no limits or restrictions save those that are incident to photography itself. And as the complete process is of comparatively recent invention, it may not have reached the knowledge of many who would gladly become acquainted with it. We say the *complete* process advisedly; inasmuch as the rudimentary portion of it has long been



known. This, however, was almost useless for any practical purpose until the researches of eminent photographers discovered the appliances we will now describe. It had long been known that a solution of gelatine mixed with bichromate of potash and dried is so sensitive to the action of light, that if a negative\* be placed in juxtaposition to it and exposed to the sun, an image or pictorial effect will be the result. If the plate with this image upon it be then immersed in cold water, the gelatine will swell or expand itself where it is in an unaltered condition, that is, where the light has not acted upon it, and that it is impervious to the water and hence unaffected by it where the light *has* acted upon it. The plate is next dried, afterwards damped upon its surface, and finally covered with lithographic ink rolled into it by means of an ink-roller. Where the light has not acted the ink will not adhere; and where the action of the light has been most energetic, there will the ink adhere in the greatest quantity. In fact, it adheres in greater or less degree according to the greater or less intensity of the action of the light through the numberless shades of density in the negative. Thus a photographic image is formed in printer's ink. And this can be printed from. But the gelatine film is so soft, so adhesive to the applied paper, that it becomes a matter of much difficulty to get good impressions. The image, too, soon becomes blurred and the plate useless.

It was to remedy this serious flaw in the process that our leading photographers set themselves to discover some means of *fixing*, or hardening, this gelatinous coating or film. A patent was taken out in this country on behalf of Messrs. Tessié du Motay et Maréchal; another was taken out in 1867 by Ohm and Grossman in Berlin; and a third in October, 1869, which is now the property of Messrs. Spencer, Sawyer, Bird, & Co., and is worked by them with great success, as the plates in the work before us testify, at their interesting and extensive establishment at Ealing Dean.

This last patent contains most important novelties. One of these is the previous preparation of the plate by placing upon it a mixture of albumen, gelatine, and a bichromate, allowing it then to dry, and finally *hardening* it. This hardening is obtained by exposing it to the action of free light. Another is the process of placing upon this preliminary coating a film of sensitized gelatine hardened by the introduction of very finely divided particles of certain resinous gums. This film,

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\* A *negative* is the picture with the white portions turned into black and the black portions into white.

when allowed to dry, becomes completely insoluble in cold, or even hot water; and hence eminently adapted, by reason of its hardness, for producing prints with a texture so delicate as to require the aid of microscopic power to detect them. Moreover it is of so incredibly a strong and tenacious character as to bear without any risk of damage the tremendous pressure used in printing, and to yield hundreds of copies with little or no detriment to the most delicate lines. In Plates X., XXI., XXXIV., XLIII., and LI., we have, perhaps, as fine specimens of the Autotype process as it is possible to produce. Apart from their accurate fidelity as copies, they possess a rare beauty in themselves, by reason of the softness and delicacy combined with clearness and sharpness by which they rivet the eye and charm the mind.

We come now to Chromolithography; and this is the process to which we owe the exquisite coloured plates in Messrs. Audsley and Bowes's work. The vases, dishes, or other objects to be copied are first of all carefully photographed to the exact size of the intended plates. From this photograph an accurate tracing is made by hand, showing every line and detail of the object and its decoration. This is transferred to the surface of a prepared lithographic stone. The outline is then gone over in lithographic ink, and the stone inked up in the press. At this point the first important division of the process terminates; and the stone, with its inked drawing, is called the "key-stone," or "mother-stone." Now if it is found upon careful examination of the object to be copied that there are in it—say twelve different colours, the artist pulls twelve impressions from the "key-stone" upon sheets of paper pasted to sheets of zinc. They are attached to the zinc to prevent any expansion of the paper. These he immediately puts face downwards on twelve prepared lithographic stones and passes them through the press. The result is, of course, a faint outline upon the twelve stones. This concludes the second important division of the process. The twelve stones are now sent to the draughtsman or artist, who takes them one by one and carefully fills in such portions of the drawings as are to be painted in their respective colours, confining one colour to each stone. When this is completed to his satisfaction, the stones are returned to the printers to be "proved"; and thus ends the third part of the process. The printer inks up, cleans, and pulls impressions of all the stones in black, to see that all is perfect; and if it is, he goes on to "prove" the design. A stone is placed in the press and several impressions are taken in the exact colour intended—say red. Another is then placed in the press and printed

in *its* tint—say blue, upon these sheets previously pulled in red. This second stone has to be accurately adjusted in the press, so that, when the sheets are replaced upon what are called the register-points, the printed parts fall exactly in their proper relative positions to the red. Stone after stone is treated in precisely similar fashion, until the whole result is obtained for which the artist worked in preparing his colour-stones. After "proving," the stones are ready for the final printing, and are replaced in the press, one by one, and the full number of copies taken from each one in the order decided upon by the artist. It is needless to direct attention to the absolute necessity for any result approaching to perfection, of not only great delicacy of mechanical skill on his part, but an eye capable of discerning the slightest shade of difference in colours, and of copying each with unerring fidelity. In Plate XLV., for example, there are twelve different shades of blue, and consequently twelve stones and twelve printings had to be employed. We believe that no English firm could undertake the plates of this work, and hence the chromolithographic portions of it were intrusted to Messrs. Firmin-Didot, of Paris, the same, if we mistake not, to whom we are indebted for several of the splendid chromolithographs published by the Arundell Society.

"*Keramic Art of Japan*," then, furnishes us with a collection of specimens of the latest and most perfect as well as the most varied achievements in the art of printing. Apart, therefore, from its value in point of the literature of Art and the history of one nation's *Keramic art*, it is a work of art itself, and as such should speedily find its way into all the public libraries of Europe. Of course, it is something far more than this. It is a work which unfolds to us the riches that, until so late a date as 1867, had lain practically hidden from the art-loving world, and which from 1867 until the present time are known to few outside of it, and not to many within it. Even to the small number of individuals who, previous to the Paris Exhibition, had reason to believe in the wonderful artistic power of the potters of that mysterious nation, it was a surprise as great as it was agreeable to be able to feast their eyes on the rich and splendid assortment with which the daimiós and the Shôg'un,\* not the Mikado, as has often been thought, literally deluged the Japanese Annexe. By early and judicious purchases they at once secured for their private collections the choicest specimens at most reasonable prices. Fortunately, there were no government buyers from any country :

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\* See Mossman's "*New Japan*," p. 281.

our own was as usual behind in the matter and for once foreigners were likewise napping at the opportune moment. The shrewd and clever men, too, among the dealer class raised little opposition to the moderate prices that prevailed. More would speedily be forthcoming whence on one, and that the first invitation, so much had come. They little thought that the whole country had been well-nigh ransacked of its treasures, at least in the Ceramic line, and that so far from the supply proving abundant enough to enable them subsequently to laugh over the foolish eagerness of these prodigal purchasers, it had been almost exhausted, and these fond and unbusiness-like—though hailing chiefly from Liverpool—art-lovers would eventually have the laugh, and a hearty one too, against them. Hence, Professor T. C. Archer, F.R.S.E., was able to write in the "Art Journal," of January, 1874: "A common but very erroneous idea prevails, that such works are produced in great abundance in Japan, and will be brought over to meet the demand in vast quantities. There is no truth whatever in this idea; the tastes of the present generation in Japan, like those in this country a few years ago, are not only not equal to the production of the best class of works, but even an appreciation for the objects of the highest merit is not general; it is, in fact, confined to only a very limited number of the *cognoscenti* of their country. This the writer has learned from personal intercourse with the Japanese. One of their ambassadors who lately visited this country, assured him that he had, during his visit to England, seen more of the finest class of cloisonné enamels than he had ever seen in his own country." These cloisonné enamels, however, were the only element wanting in the Paris Exhibition, to render the department of Japanese Art complete. They, but they alone, have been brought to this country since the deposition of the Shōg'un.

It is, therefore, hardly to be wondered at that the work under notice can fairly lay claim, if we except Mr. Audsley's little brochures (Nos. 3, 4, and 10 at the head of this paper), to being the first attempt to unfold, and at the same time to systematize, the treasures that have so recently come to us from this interesting but distant people,—distant not only by geographical position, but by reason of severe laws affecting the admission of Europeans into the interior of their country. The circumstance that calls forth wonder and applause is that a first treatise should be *such* a treatise, at once so painstaking and so thoroughly exhaustive of its subject. Art treasures of other nations have accumulated here and there during the lapse of centuries, and a literature has grown up as slowly around them. But in one great branch of Japanese

Art we have an instance of a sudden revelation of the riches of a nation that has had great artists at least for centuries, and an almost simultaneous descriptive account of them (in part, at least, accomplished), which can be the outcome only of extended research aided by copious material means and a true insight into the principles that underlie all Art. The natural products of Japan have been treated of by several, notably Siebold, and its literature, its institutions, and its commerce by Mitford, Alcock, Mossman, and others. Messrs. Audsley and Bowes are the first to give an account of its Art. And they are doing their work so well that we can, and in probability shall, go on for many years quite content with the valuable and abundant information their volumes afford us.

As the title indicates, we must in "Keramic Art of Japan" expect to find in its fullest details an account of the potter's craft alone. Enamels, which in such exquisite perfection have lately come to Europe from Japan, and of which the "Times" has asserted that Mr. Bowes possesses the finest collection in the world, will doubtless occupy their attention so soon as the present work is fairly off their hands. What with the prospect of such an undertaking, added to their treatment of lacquer-work,—the specialty of Japan, of metal-work, textile fabrics, and carvings in ivory and in wood, we may fairly congratulate the gifted authors with having found and vigorously entered upon a life's work. The present treatise, however, will ever hold the first place in point of value as well as of time; for the erudite Introduction upon Japanese Art in general renders it an indispensable adjunct to any subsequent volumes upon special departments of their art. So replete in every detail of important information upon subjects hitherto completely beyond the means of European research is this preliminary and succinct account of the *elementary* requisites for the study of Japanese Art, that it is also in a certain sense the most valuable portion of "Keramic Art," as well as of the works that may follow it. Not only are there few, if any, art-students who have familiarity with such instruction as it is calculated to impart, but there is positively no other work in existence from which one tithe of it could be extracted.

Taking the three smaller treatises, together with the parts of the large work already published, as harbingers of what we may fairly anticipate, the reader will not fail to find throughout this splendid work true artistic appreciation of the broad outlines of Japanese Art, a comprehensive account of the various departments of their art-labours, and a minute description of the several ingredients, so to speak, which give a peculiar and national character to their artistic productions of

every class. Such are the features of the General Introduction : for anything approaching to an estimate of the splendid treatment of the art of pottery alone, the work itself must be resorted to. Of the importance of the great variety of facts enumerated in relation to Japanese Art in general, it is almost impossible to speak too earnestly. As well might one attempt to study European Art from A.D. 1000 to A.D. 1500 without a familiarity with the emblems that Christianity has symbolized and sanctified by constant and universal custom, as to unravel the delicate intricacies which underlie Japanese Art without a knowledge such as in this work, and, so far as we are aware, in no other, is presented to the reader. True, they seem to be ignorant of the Cross as an emblem, although many of their powderings and diaperings (see Plates A and B) are cruciform to a degree and in a variety strongly suggestive of Pugin's Glossary ; but, in point of number, the Japanese may safely compete with us as to symbolized natural objects. For our dove, our pelican, our fleur-de-lis, our vesica piscis, and the rest, they have their mythical lion, the ho-ho, the sacred peacock and "lordly" crane ; the ki-ku (chrysanthemum), and kiri ; the mooke or minogame (tortoise, emblem of longevity), and so on to an almost interminable length. Our churchyard yews, weeping willows, and commemorative oaks find more than a counterpart in their plum-trees (mume), firs, and bamboos, "under whose pleasant shades deified princes reposed, celebrated lawgivers revised their moral codes, and where priests and inspired poets composed their sublime psalms and poems" (p. xxii.). With us the dragon represents the evil one ; they too have the dragon, but rather as an object of idolatry than aversion. The fox (kitsuni), however, comes in for the larger share of the peculiar veneration in which they hold the spirit of evil, as the Japanese believe that his cunning fully establishes his claim to connection with the demon. For Zion in the old dispensation and Calvary in the new, they have their holy mountain (Fusiyama) ; their kirin unites in itself our four evangelistic symbols. Though composed mainly of geometrical figures, their heraldic emblazonments have great beauty and a variety far richer than our own. A striking, and perhaps to many European eyes at first sight an unpleasant, feature in Japanese Art is the prevalence of irregularity. This characteristic, in common with others less noticeable, meets with considerable notice at the hands of Messrs. Audsley and Bowes, as reference to pp. vi., vii., x., &c., and to Plates C and E will testify. So, too, the realistic use of natural objects of intricacy or beauty (p. xiii.), and the peculiar leaning to the grotesque which, even in some



of his highest achievements, mars their perfection, by dragging down the Japanese artist to what is unmistakably unbecoming and at times even indecent. We also meet with full information—so essential in introductory works upon a nation's art—of several of the practices prevalent in Japan which found expression in their works of art, and by being misunderstood brought blame upon the artist. For instance, their system of dwarfing fruit and other trees was so little known until recently in Europe, that the representations which found their way hither upon pottery, embroidery, and lacquer-work were regarded less as exact copies of things actually existing, as fantastic abortions, whose origin was mainly due to the artist's lack of skill in perspective. We need not, however, pursue this branch of the subject farther. Suffice it to repeat, that into all the elementary items of Japanese Art Messrs. Audsley and Bowes enter, and dwell upon them with a fertility of description one can hardly credit as attainable unless by long residence in Japan itself.

Great, however, as are the taste and skill of the specimens of Japanese Art as represented with such marvellous fidelity in this work, we cannot for our own parts help regarding them from a point of view which must seriously detract from the praise that has so lavishly of late been accorded to the art-education of this curious people. They are, it is true, examples but of one section of one great department of Art. But in Decorative Art undoubtedly lies their greatest amount of artistic power; and it is in their Ceramic Art that this power has most beautifully and extensively displayed itself. Indeed, of all arts it is the Ceramic which is usually most cultivated amongst uncivilized and semi-barbarian races. It may fairly be considered as the bridge between the uncouth and rude efforts of savage tribes to ornament their weapons and their utensils of ceremonious revellings, and the rudimentary presence of the germs of true Art in a young nation. And as it is the first to be cultivated, so it is commonly the one brought to earliest perfection. Moreover, from its connection with the household gods of the living and the rites paid to the ashes of the dead, specimens of its most antique styles and most elaborate workmanship oftentimes survive the more elegant productions of sister arts. Now we do not complain of the Japanese artists for not fashioning their vases in a manner that might compete with the beauty—if beauty of *shape* has yet existed in any vase—of the early Etruscan wares; the delicate, and at times gorgeous decoration they lavished upon them, shielded them no doubt from hostile

criticism, and from silent condemnation even of the ungainly mould in which they were cast. But as to high Art, we cannot forbear contrasting their standstill state since their Ceramic Art was in its glory, less with that of the Middle Ages than with that of other Pagan nations. Japan has been lost from time immemorial in the depths of a degrading idolatry. The Greeks and Romans\* were idolators too, but their idolatry was of a far less gross character than that of most Eastern nations, and it was partially foiled of its evil effects by sentiments tinctured even with the saving influence of revealed truth. Western pagans, too, had more vigour of mind and of body, more manliness of disposition, more nobility of soul, than the grovelling and enervated inhabitants especially of such countries as China and Japan. Moreover, their ideas of man and his destiny, of the soul and its something approaching to our idea of immortality, and above all of the Supreme Good, and True, and Beautiful, elevated them as a nation to a plane far higher than hardly an individual ever had contemplated among those less-favoured nations. And in Art they took the just view of man as their *beau idéal* of earthly beauty. Lavater says of Art, that it is "the highest sagacity and exertion of human nature"; and, had he added, "for expressing the Beautiful," we should consider his description of true Art a correct one. But if the Beautiful should be the artist's highest aim, what must be our estimate of a nation's Art, whose claims to excellence are limited to mere Decorative Art, and whose decorations are perpetually degraded by an appeal to the grotesque. And that appeal is commonly made when the noblest of creatures, whose ideal should be the artist's type of true beauty, is concerned—man. So far as we are aware, the Japanese have little or no poetry, and can hardly be said to possess a national poet. Perhaps they and the Chinese are about the only nations who thus lack one of the most powerful helps and incitements to improvement in high Art. Be this as it may, we can descry nothing either in their religion, their history, their personal character, the manners and customs of their country, that could have elevated their art tendencies. There are more hopeful signs as to the future; at least in so far as a nation's emerging from a state of centuries of political, religious, and moral degradation are grounds for hope, of more enlightened and elevating efforts

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\* In a certain sense the Romans do not deserve to be perpetually coupled with the Greeks as kindred nations in the cause of Art. They were, for the most part, merely artists by their power of appreciation of what the Greeks had bequeathed to them. Rome was the national Mæcenas of Greece.

towards true Art. Though foreigners are still nominally confined to the conceded districts, they frequently traverse large tracts of the interior, whence, at the worst, they are politely ejected if discovered—or rather, if there is some special reason for their being discovered—by the authorities. The disgusting Hara-kiri has died out. The upper classes have begun to see the folly of bowing down in worship before the rudest artistic efforts of a gross and rude age. And soon we may hope that all may be directed towards the Catholic Church, by the numbers of descendants of S. Francis Xavier's first converts, who, by a secret tradition, have kept alive the true faith and reverence for the See of Peter until the present day, though cut off in every way from all external communication with the rest of the Christian world. Moreover commerce, favoured notably by France, by Russia, by the United States, and by England, must continue to break down barriers to its own progress, and thus throw open the country eventually to the world. And unlike their Chinese neighbours, the Japanese are now sending many of their young men to Europe and to America. These cannot return with less of religion than they came, and may take back at least proper notions of religious toleration. This is all that Japan needs for a glorious religious future, notwithstanding the degradation in which it now lies.\* The blood of its early martyrs, which has now for nearly three centuries brought its blessing upon their native soil by the preservation in orthodox faith of multitudes of true believers throughout Japan, will prove its saving efficacy the moment the oppressor's hand is lightened, by restoring to the Church hundreds of her members hitherto unknown oftentimes even to each other, and certainly to their countrymen and to the inhabitants of the Western world. The numbers, we are told by the French priests of the Foreign Concession, who are thus secretly Christians, and merely awaiting some small degree at least of toleration, will astound the Christian world the moment the day of toleration comes. But we are trenching upon a subject of vast dimensions, and however interesting and important, only secondary in its relation to Art.

But low indeed as we candidly confess our opinion of Japanese Art to be, we nevertheless welcome the splendid and completely successful endeavour of Messrs. Audsley and Bowes

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\* The government, it is true, has removed the notorious proclamation-boards of torture and death to Christians, and seems wishful to accord to them a certain amount of toleration; but "it is evident that a lingering hatred to the Christian religion still (1873) exists throughout the country among the classes discontented with the new order of things."—Mossman's "*New Japan*," p. 469.

to let us know all that can be known upon the subject, and for bringing before our eyes many excellences and beauties that Art, even in a low stage, and merely imitative mood, is capable of producing. These are undoubtedly numerous and striking, and exhibit a power which needs but a higher range of ideas to elevate the Japanese artist to a level with our own.

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## ART. VII.—THE SCHOLASTICS ON INTELLECT AND ABSTRACTION.\*

*S. Thome Aq. Summa contra Gentes.* Nemausi. 1854.

LESSIUS. *De Divinis Perfectionibus.* Friburgi. 1861.

KLEUTGEN. *Filosofia Antica.* Roma. 1868.

GONZALEZ. *Philosophia Elementaria.* Matriti. 1868.

RITTER. *Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne.* Paris. 1861.

I. IN setting about the discovery of the doctrine of science, we conceive that the Scholastics made use of two methods, which for want of a better name may be called the method of exclusion and the method of assertion. The first is taken up with eliminating error, the second with establishing the form of truth. Both are extant in the Dialogues of Plato, and have given rise to that interesting discussion which has held the world at pause ever since, as to whether Socrates, the master-mind there depicted, was a sceptic, or, worse still in the eyes of moderns, an adept in mysticism. For, insomuch as by the play of dialectic he brought out the inherent defects of proposed systems, he acted the part of a dissolvent or separating force, and broke the whole belief which might have had practical influence over other minds. But this, which would have marked him out to all time as a sceptic, an ironical disbeliever of any and every creed, is found to be counterpoised by a doctrine, held fast and earnestly delivered, in which are the beginnings of Aristotelian science, and these, like most other beginnings in that far-away time, clothed upon with the beauty of mythic tradition. Nor did Socrates

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\* Vide the article in our last number on "The Scholastic Doctrine of Science."

mistake nature in acting so: he knew very well, though no Shakspeare had as yet pronounced it, that art is no more than nature refined and elevated, made better by itself. The implicit, spontaneous and unbought knowledge which had come to him as to all others, was a test of any new system that claimed his allegiance, and a starting-point for the prolonged reflection of genuine philosophy. No less natural was it, though certainly remarkable, that men so widely removed from him as S. Thomas and the mediæval Scholastics should have lighted upon the same methods when in search of the same object. Using their common sense, as it is the fashion to call it, they very soon perceived that an ambitious theory might be no better than "the fabric of a dream," and with quiet decision were of one mind in rejecting the vision of all things in God, the teaching of an Impersonal Intelligence, the promising but somewhat intangible doctrine of innate forms of thought. In all this they were polemical, dialectic, and, if you insist upon the word, sceptical. That they were so must be considered to show singular discernment when we take into account the excesses which have attended the spread of synthetic philosophies.

Comte de Maistre has remarked that negative results, in the problem of intelligence, are often the most valuable. This is evidently so in the case before us. We may of course be persuaded that no truth but scientific truth is worth having, as Protestants appear to think that, when you can get religion without seeking for it, it cannot be worth much. But supposing we are more rationally minded, it will relieve us from anxiety to know that science, like many other luxuries, admits of being dispensed with, and still does not make life a blank by its absence, whilst science falsely so called has an unequalled power of working mischief, and under the guise of truth may expel belief in the only realities which are worth caring for. Observe that we do not say the world can manage without truth: we only say it does not need science, not so imperatively as to crumble into dust for the want of it. To be wholly without truth is to be sceptical, irrational, and so much lower than the brutes as degradation is below imperfection. To be without scientific truth is to have not yet acquired the reward of intellectual toil, nor to have lifted (we do not say the heart or the soul, but) the mind to the contemplation for which it was made. If our examination of theories on the origin of ideas had ended in disappointment, it would have been a gain to be freed from delusion; we should not think of folding our hands in despair. And were we pressed for time, it would cost us little to forego the pleasure of any more

searching and seeking; since, however that might end, there would still be light enough to see by. Thus, then, if the Scholastics had only exposed the mistakes of others, they might be thought to have done good to mankind. For the bigotry of science is neither more attractive nor less in accordance with the nature of things than the bigotry of ignorance. Whether men are Gnostics or Philistines is all one. They have equally forgotten that it is the perfection of humanity to be human.

Well, we are not of opinion that the Scholastics followed only the method of exclusion. They adopted the other too. But it is easier to get people to say no, than to make many of them say yes, especially in matters of science. "I don't see that," is the expression most commonly heard among students. When any one cries out "I see," he had need to make sure that his eyes are in a sound state and himself well awake. So it has come to pass that the Schoolmen are seldom convicted of error, but it would be wonderful if they agreed everywhere upon the truths which go to make up an assertive philosophy. We shall have occasion to point out the extent to which they differed on some important heads, and have meant the preceding remarks to serve as a palliation of their differences. But it will be necessary also, and very pleasant, to dwell upon their substantial agreement not only in the negative but in the positive results which came out of their experiments in speculation.

It has been seen in our previous article, that neither S. Thomas nor any of his following, nor yet again Scotus or his following, admitted the synthetic origin of science. To them science was a combination of many, but kindred and connected universal views, having for their object the intellectual delineation of an essence. It was the unsettling and taking to pieces of those fixed realities which, seen like the stars in heaven eternal and immutable, were dimly but deeply reflected in the minds of the vulgar. And it began in analysis that it might more thoroughly in the end restore the essential unity, not now beheld confusedly, but clear, vivid, and penetrating. The objects of art, of religion, of poetry, the good and the beautiful and the true, were capable by their own nature of moving society and the individual to desire them. It was the purpose of science to deal with the same objects, to gaze upon them reverently, and by projecting their image upon the mind to intensify the lights by which action is ideally directed. In this way even the speculative sciences assumed the character of means to an end. They helped man forward on his journey from the "Here" to the "Hereafter." They were not barren



knowledge; their outcome, as it had been their aim, was wisdom.

The controversy about Universals, the objects at once of common knowledge and scientific inquiry, though it has taken many a varying tone from the events of history, has never ceased to be waged. It goes on as keenly at this moment as it did in the schools of Paris six hundred years ago, or in the market-place of Athens when philosophy was beginning to be a power in the world. It is the question of questions to a man who has felt his curiosity stirred and is desirous of using not faith or genius, but reflection and the instruments of logic in order to reach an answer. But it may be observed with profit that the progress of questioning in such a matter is the continual refining away of the grosser elements, till only that is left which cannot admit of alteration or denial. A long time ago the test of axiomatic truth was said to be its universality, and the contrast between the individual and the entire class was made the battle-ground of party. Leibnitz afterwards gave to posterity a definition of philosophical truth which has frequently come into use, being admitted on all hands as satisfactory. According to him, the marks of such truth are universality and necessity. The object of science is that which cannot but be true at all times and in all places when referred to a certain class of things, real or possible, as the case may be. But since the rise of the theory or hypothesis of association, the quarrel has turned, not on the note of universality, but on that of necessity. Leibnitz would have said, "All trilaterals are triangular," "all circles are conic sections": nowadays hardly any attention is paid to "all" and "none"; our propositions are put indefinitely, "a trilateral is triangular," "a circle is a conic section." This may seem the smallest possible matter, but it is not so. It denotes an advance in the whole discussion, and shows that both parties have recognized that universality is included in this kind of necessity and follows from it. Instead of being distracted by the contingent notions of time and space, the here and now, or there and then, we are enabled to contemplate at leisure a single truth, and to elicit the intrinsic relation of subject to predicate. And intuition, which was for a long time cast out as an absurdity, can now bear witness to itself, in the very act of recording its experience. As every one knows, the concession is fatal to the new philosophy. The relation between the terms of a necessary truth is undeniable, except at the cost of all the truth which is found in consciousness, that is, of every single statement we make. Hence the issue is as clear as it is decisive, and the sceptical basis of Phenomenism stands revealed.

This we have called a sign of progress; and it is such if our starting-point be not in S. Thomas. For the Scholastics had already passed by the universality, not counting it the primary character of anything, and were intent upon that which lies at the root of class-divisions, the bearing of one part upon another in an essence. If, then, it be more to the purpose to discuss necessity, the intrinsic nexus, than universality, the hypothetical realization in individuals, we may say that the last word of science will be uttered by the Scholastics. They have endeavoured to concentrate the light upon the source of necessity, and in so doing have made of their theory of knowledge and their theory of science one uniform piece. Science is of universals, but universals are founded upon essence; and the faculty which discerns the latter is already prepared to acquire the former; not fully prepared, we admit, but it has achieved a commencement. The inquiries, therefore, which we have hitherto pursued upon two different paths, are here reunited. We have examined the method of science as laid down in the schools, and it has resolved itself from synthesis into analysis. This last takes us back to certain necessary judgments, known by their own light and not the result of accident or chance. But judgments of metaphysical necessity are either definitions taken in a large scale or the result of definitions. And these, we have seen, are nothing but an account of the object from different points of view. The object, moreover, of which there is question, is not and cannot be, in the first instance, God or the purely super-sensible. It must be the sensible, though not as apprehended by the senses. The faculty which excels both imagination and sense is the intellect. Its function is of course to apprehend: but it cannot apprehend unless it has abstracted. Evidently, the main point, if we wish to understand the Scholastics, is to know what they meant by abstraction. Thus far we had come in our foregoing paper.

As we have said more than once, the School is unanimous upon the question of what abstraction is not, and this on both sides of the matter. It is not a sensible faculty in any degree, high or low: neither is it the faculty of contemplating God or the angels, or our own soul as apart from the body. But can we rest in a negation, unless there is nothing else possible? What must we hold about the intellect in itself? What is abstraction?

It would be rash to undertake the treatment of this question if there were no intelligible answer in prospect. At the same time, it would be going beyond our brief to say that we can answer as clearly as we should like. Up to a certain

point there is a consensus among the Schoolmen than which nothing can be a plainer testimony to facts: that point gained, we hear their words indeed, but perceive that they, as we, are standing in the presence of some pale luminosity, the traces of *nebulæ* still and for ever unresolved.

If, then, we would take the Scholastics for our guides, we must follow them patiently, step by step, setting out from the light of day as it spreads itself over the world, and using it diligently, as they did, till it fails us altogether. But though we arrive at some region "*dove il sol tace*"—to borrow Dante's line—it cannot be that we shall deny what we have seen and know. Once more, the obscurities of science are no kind of reason for turning round upon our convictions and rejecting them. On the contrary, whenever some apparent dictum of science breaks into our first knowledge, we shall unhesitatingly believe that it is science, not common sense, which is at fault. When we go down into the gloom, or peer into the distance, probably enough we shall fancy we see the form of some reality where there is only delusion. And wisdom, which does not belie nature, will tell us that we *are* deluded, that this was to be expected, and that we may set our minds at rest. Always, however, it will be allowable to make conjectures and to work onward from analogy, but with the increasing caution which the hazard of our position demands. How do we begin?

II. Our consciousness tells us that we exist, experience assures us that there is a world of reality with which we come in contact, the exercise of our understanding warrants us in believing that we can know the truth, and that the principle of contradiction is a negative test of every assertion. All this is made very clear as we reflect upon it, but, properly speaking, cannot be proved, for it furnishes the initial points of every proof. The principle of contradiction applied to experience teaches us that intellect is not sense, nor sense intellect; and these are, in a sort, ultimate facts, just as the distinction between colour and sound, which can never be resolved into each other. But there is a class which comprehends colour and sound, viz. the sensible, and this is rather narrow, whereas sense and intellect are only assimilated by metaphor and analogy. Nevertheless, it is a noticeable thing that our faculty of thought is concerned about sensible objects and the sensible universe, as those will be the first to admit who have such a high esteem for physical science. Moreover, if our intellect is not wholly independent, which it certainly is not, it can be proved to have been created. Therefore, we know that a First Intelligence exists, perfect in fulness, and the source of whatsoever intellect is or at any

time can be. In like manner, if the physical universe has upon it marks of design, (and this is self-evident), it too must depend on the First Intelligence, either because He made it, or because it came into being through the agency of an inferior intelligence. Now the problem of thought includes both subject and object, and unless these are submitted to inspection, we cannot establish any theory of the matter. But what we have said in this paragraph is sufficient for the construction of a pretty large theory.

One only observation need to be added. The clear intuition which reveals to me that I exist, when does it begin to dawn upon me? Not from the first moment of my existence. I go back in remembrance through the years, and I can make out of them an unbroken series, but at length my memory refuses to go further; the rest is a blank. Perhaps I only just remember the first day when I seemed to wake up and find myself distinct from the things around. But from that day to this I have had a mixed consciousness which I can no more doubt than I can doubt my own being. I have felt and I have thought, I and no other. My feelings of sensible pleasure and pain, in all their unceasing succession, have been only mine. I should know it to be absurd for any one else to claim them. But my thoughts also have been incommunicable. I have experienced, as present to me at any season, only one mind, and that the one which I cannot but identify with the innermost substance of myself. I can feel for others, but not in others; I can think for them, in a sense, but not pour my intelligence into theirs. I know it to be impossible to deny this twofold experience, or to attribute it to more than one person, to more than myself. If you ask me how this can be, how it is not a contradiction that one and the selfsame should be capable of eliciting thought, which has no parts, no extension, not even position, and also of grasping the sensible, which cannot be without parts, I hardly know what to answer. The broad fact is there, sunlit, undeniable: if you cannot accept it about me—you must about yourself—explain in turn why these phenomena should arise in me if they are nothing but deception and a dream. I do not prove my existence. I say with S. Augustine, S. Thomas, and Descartes, that I have simply to think in order to recognize that I exist. *Cogito, ergo sum*, though no syllogism, is not a bad statement of experience, and does more than satisfy my desire for truth. And by a like method I show to myself and declare to others that I have a composite being inclusive of faculties both sentient and intelligent, and therefore made up in the unity of a twofold substance. How it comes to pass that

matter and mind, the opposite poles of the universe, are able to interpenetrate each other is as mysterious as the coexistence of attraction and repulsion in the same crystal. Are these two phases of my experience identical? I must deny it. Am I, who have gone through them, identical, one and not several? This is beyond contradiction. But, further, knowing this, can I conceive sense apart from intellect? Assuredly; for, give the brute creation all the wealth of endowment that the testimony of science will permit, this does not include thought. So here is an actual separation of the two lives which I cognize in myself. But can there be a pure intelligence? True, I have no experience of such, but where is the contradiction in supposing an intellectual substance? If any contradiction exists, it must arise from this, that intellect negatives substance, or substance includes sense. But weigh the definitions together, for these are our tests of possibility—the comparison, which need not here be instituted, will show us that it is as easy to conceive, though not to imagine, an intellectual as a sensible substance. Now, then, we can mark out the lines of our hypothesis, and at the same time exhibit, perhaps to some advantage, the speculations of our grave and learned masters.

Intellectual knowledge, it should seem, is begun by experience or direct apprehension, increased by analogy, and wrought up into precision by careful distinction. Its factors are therefore affirmation simple and compound, and negation. For we affirm what we apprehend, and unless we deny this of that, there is no room for distinction. Let us apply this doctrine to the question, what is abstraction? Our preceding enumeration of the requisite outfit has not been scanty. It has furnished us with the means of affirming, comparing, and distinguishing. Thus: intellect is that faculty which gives us a certain kind of experience, it may be separated from sense, may exist in a perfect, independent substance, though in us it has a lifelong connection with the sensible and material. What is its proper act or operation when so connected?

III. The Scholastic procedure is a model of its kind in such voyages of discovery. Taking what is implied in the mere definition of intellect, viz., that it is that power which presents or represents the real ideally, they varied the term of investigation by considering three adjectives which may be joined to it. For intellect may be perfect, imperfect, or medium. Or, to use another nomenclature, it may be the uncreated, the created higher, or the created lower. This gave them the opening up of large vistas in philosophy, and allowed them to treat of the divine, the angelic, and the human intellect. Having planted their feet on the unyielding

ground of intuition, they envisaged the whole problem on its *a priori* side, and arrived at some very striking conclusions.

The divine intellect, they considered, is a perfect act, absolutely independent of creatures, and identified in the strictest sense with the divine Substance. God is His own Intelligence. He is pure Essence, and His knowledge is one with His essence. Since intellect is a pure perfection, nor includes any negation of perfection, God must be intellect. Since He is Himself the First Reality, infinite and immaterial, He must be the chief object of His own apprehension. If conscious Life is the highest good we can conceive, and it surely is, since it means the unity and indwelling in one substance of Truth and Love, and these rightly ordered are Sanctity, then we must hold that God is conscious of Himself, knows Himself, loves Himself, and is therefore the primal Holiness. And this cannot come to Him from without, else were He not the fulness of perfection, but dependent upon something which He had not made. But who will say that the absolutely first Intelligence, pure substantial Thought, is not its own sufficient reason? "God is Light and in Him is no darkness at all," "and of His fulness we have all received." Then He does not receive from anything. God is therefore the first truth, and truth to Himself, and the cause of all truth. The Scholastics proved all this, acting, we think with great prudence. The moderns who say that the Absolute is Thought seem to hold that it does not need proof. So much the better for our present purpose.

If God does not acquire His knowledge of essences, we mean, of real or possible objects, from the things themselves, does He possess any such knowledge at all? Aristotle believed that the First Cause of motion knew not that He moved all things, for how could He contemplate anything but Himself? Plato demanded an intelligible world, the realm of ideas, upon which the Good must for ever bend His gaze as He fashions matter into order and beauty. Whether this "university of ideas" was only the Good, as it were projected out of Himself, Plato has not told us, and the learned have not finished their quarrel over it yet. But we know that S. Augustine and S. Thomas accepted the doctrine of Plato on condition that its faults should be corrected by the light of Theology. Holding that the world had come to exist by a creative act, and that the Creator is intelligent in His working, and was free to choose any other world, or indeed not to create at all, they saw that within His infinite mind must be the patterns of all things. These are the Eternal Reasons, according to which the whole scheme of the universe has been



framed and compassed. These are part of that fairest prospect which stretches out before the vision of God and is the source of His unending complacency in Himself and His works. But how must we imagine that they arise? Since they are not derived from the realities which copy but do not exhaust them, can their origin be due to anything except the essence of God?

We are told much about these beautiful things in a book written by Leonardus Lessius, which contains a series of meditations such as the world cannot now rival. It is the fruit of times when Theology too was reckoned among the sciences, and even gifted men were not ashamed to ponder over the thought of God as we do now,—with what result let future ages judge,—over the concepts of matter and light. Lessius, whose mind was full of heavenly tranquillity, has gathered into one the doctrine of earlier saints and doctors. It dominates the Scholastic theory, and we need scarcely make an apology for quoting from the eloquent pages which suggest how science might be happily transfigured into art.

Lessius begins by reminding us of the mystical words of Dionysius: \* “not by learning things from them in themselves does the mind of God know them, but from itself and in itself, according as it contains and comprehends beforehand the knowledge, the notion, and the essence of all: not directing its glance towards each one in its kind, but knowing and holding them all in the unity of the cause, as light, according to the cause, which is in itself, anticipates the idea of darkness, not having learned darkness elsewhere, except from the light. Whence it follows that the Divine Wisdom, as it knows itself, will know all things, the material without matter, the divisible without division, the many after the likeness of one.” It is not till the reader has thought over these and similar passages many times that he will perceive how the fountains of philosophy are hidden in them. They are mysterious, perhaps, but only by the aid of such mysteries shall we ever learn the greatness and the littleness of our own minds.

The Greek conception of God as the first Artist, and the spring of intellectual beauty to the material world, has fixed itself deeply in the Scholastic and Patristic philosophy. But it was reserved to the comparatively late age of S. Thomas to connect and arrange what these older writers, such as Dionysius, had expressed. In the Angelic, many explanations occur of the imitability of the Divine Essence, and these were evidently guiding the pen of Lessius as he wrote. For

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\* “De Divinis Nominibus,” c. 7.

he goes on to say that the wisdom of God is filled with the notions and concepts of possible realities, and these are like so many seals,\* from which in the creation impressions and adumbrations are taken off. Neither does the creature seal its own idea upon the mind of God: but, contrariwise, it is the sealing of God upon created things which first brought them into being, and from within is constantly signed upon them, and so they are preserved from returning to their original nothing. But this sounds like poetry, which by many is regarded with suspicion, as being the product of a heated imagination, a mere fiction, like the myths in which Plato took delight, and therefore beneath the consideration of science. Let us endeavour, by way of amends, to quote some of the metaphysics of Lessius, which, however, are near akin to the thoughts he has uttered in the above.

Truth may be taken as an equality between a thing and its idea, or the conformity of reality to its rule and measure. To put it in another way, the real is only the actuation of the ideal, and is false so far as it falls short of the ideal to which it should correspond. This is how ordinary language speaks on the subject, and with exquisite propriety. But we do not say that the uncreated reality has any ideal, except itself. If it had, we should be moving along the path of an endless series, and multiplying terms which, for want of a first, must be unintelligible. The first reality is therefore a rule and measure to itself and the perfect fulfilment of its own pattern. This kind of truth is called ontological, material, and objective. To it the word idea belongs in a peculiar manner, for the signification of idea, in Plato and Aristotle, is that of type or original. But there is another kind of truth, the converse of that we have just named. It is an equality between the conception and the thing, and is styled, in opposition to the former, subjective, logical, and formal. Ontological truth, having reference to the mould in which anything has been fashioned, can be only one, since nothing is created more than once, or has many authors. Logical truth, on the other hand, may, without ceasing to be truth, vary in quality and perfection, according to the mind to which it belongs. Thus there is one truth for each thing, but there are many truths about it. All finally depend on the ontological truth, and must correspond to it in some degree, else they cease to be truth, and become falsehood. The truth of things must therefore be distinguished from the truth of knowledge concerning them. We may add that in the created mind, so long as it

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\* ἀποσφραγίσματα.

has only natural light, there can never be an adequate correspondence between the formal truth and the ontological. No creature, we imagine, can exhaust the intelligibility of an object, because it cannot learn right out the possibilities of an order of being. But, omitting this, let us consider how the ontological truth of things has immediate relation to the first truth, the Truth in itself. We have all along taken for granted that we may call the first Truth God.

Those who allow that there is any reality at all, must confess also that there is an independent reality, upon which all others depend. This is the Divine Essence. How do other essences stand related towards it? Clearly, it is their efficient and final cause. But we may also hold, without the slightest contradiction, that this First Cause possesses Intelligence. An intelligent efficient cause is a thing of which there are abundant examples round about us. Now since such a cause does not act blindly, nor produce all that in every conceivable hypothesis it can bring about, we argue with Lessius that the First Cause must act according to a plan or design, must be, so to put it, an artist or a poet. As Plato said, He is ever intent upon the forms of things possible, and out of these He chooses such as it pleases Him to call into existence. The realities that are now have not always been, but they were always present to the mind of God.

For He, who knew His own essence perfectly from all eternity, perceived that He could not produce another essence equal to it in perfection or glory. Since, had that come to pass, there would now be not one Infinite, but several. And this cannot be, from the nature of the Infinite. Nor does the Catholic dogma of the most Holy Trinity require that we should think it. We do not say there are three Infinite essences, but three persons, each of them infinite in the perfection of one and the same nature. God, then, perceiving that no infinite could be outside of Himself, saw that His power and majesty required that He should be able to share His perfection, in a finite degree, with creatures less than Himself, but resembling Him in something, and speaking to all and each of the glory from which they came. This is that participation\* of God's essence *ad extra* which all the theologians have insisted upon, not as though God could be divided or distributed, but because there is a close union of His creatures with Him, and they are entirely dependent upon Him. In a word, they imitate, in multitudinous perfections, and innumerable scattered lights, and shade after shade of height-

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\* The Platonic word *μέθεξις*, which has been so much abused.

ening or lessening beauty, the One Perfection, and the unchanging Light, and the consummate Beauty which they can never, in any sense, equal. And before they had been created, they shone in the orders of the varying essences upon the mind of God. For He beheld Himself and knew in what manner, and as many as they were, the things that could imitate Him. And He saw how there were perfections united in His infinite nature which could not be joined together so as to form one simple reality outside of Him: that whereas He possessed all the glory of every genus and species, and of every individual, yet in the world below the material and immaterial must be separated, so that neither should the higher be changeable into the lower, nor this be capable of elevation and transmutation into that. God, indeed, as we have heard from Dionysius, is wholly immaterial, and is neither light, nor sound, nor colour, nor sweetness, simply because He possesses in an eminent and altogether transcendent manner whatsoever good is in these. But that good must, as it were, it be dissolved into opposing categories, ranks, and orders, in so far as it is imitated abroad. The mystery of essential division appears in creation, for God alone is perfect unity. And the same law which requires that genera should be multiplied is no less stringent in the distribution of species into individuals. Only God possesses all the perfection which is indicated, for instance, in the type humanity. Nor can there ever be an individual who will seal up the sum, and in the breadth of his own life exhibit and recount every touch and addition that may diversify the same essence. The number of individuals can never be brought to an end: like the kings in that famous vision of Macbeth, they reflect others and yet others, and the line stretches out interminably. The perfections of the individual, however, are not communicable, and he too represents something in the divine nature, not simply as he is man, the fellow of us all, but as he is himself, enclosed in the sphere of his own totality.

Now what is it that His divine Majesty knows of each and all these things, and of the orders into which they combine? What He knows now, He has always known. The nature, properties, attributes, the capacities and ranges of perfectibility, the relations that are or can be at any given difference of time, the contingencies of free-will in any and every change of circumstances, the added glories of the supernatural order in every manner, degree, and result of which it is capable, all this and much more is known to God. Nor has it come to Him from without. Certainly, the terms of His knowledge, since they are created things,

or things at least possible, are other than Himself. God is not any real created being, nor any possible being, nor is the logical actuality of the merely possible anything in the real order; it presupposes a reality, but that is God Himself. And His wisdom reaches, to quote Dionysius once more, not only to the light, but to the darkness, not only to good but to evil. It includes the knowledge of all the negatives that can be formed, of every imperfection, deformity, ignorance, and sin. And yet it is in nothing stained, nor the beauty of its perfection dimmed by this awful spectacle. For God also knows why sin and evil can exist at all, and how this too means that He alone is the Infinite. And in all and through all He is the ever-blessed, ever-merciful, the only adorable Being, for Whose sake all things are, and to Whom all must give praise.

Hence is He the first Truth, fundamental and ontological, because He is that Essence which is the first and highest intelligible object amongst all intelligibles, because He is the first and supreme measure of all that can be measured, and in Him everything that is measurable or intelligible is contained, not formally but eminently, since He is the first determining and defining reason of all things.

But He is also the first Truth, formal and logical, because He is that Wisdom which infinitely excels all wisdom. In Him all wisdom and all conception of truth is contained. He it is who reaches to and penetrates, in the clearest manner, every objective truth. And as the objective truth of His own Essence is, in our way of looking at things, the measure of His wisdom, hence this is founded on that, and is the perfect adæquation of knowledge with essence, and the comprehension of Himself by Himself, and consequently of everything which is included, formally or otherwise, in His Being.\*

The whole of this marvellous teaching throws a light over the question of possibility, which, we need not say is intimately connected with the problem of intelligence. For possibility takes us back, on the one hand to the power, on the other, to the wisdom of God. The intelligibility of a thing determines its possibility. As we said above, the canon of contradiction is a negative test of existence. Now Lessius is the classic author on this subject. He divides possibility into internal and external. The former he defines to be the aptitude of a thing for existence. It arises, he says, not from any action of God, either necessary or free, for

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\* Lessius, "*De Divinis Perfectionibus*," bk. v. c. 2, sec. 10.

possible being, as such, cannot be the term of an efficient act; but simply from the property of the Divine Essence by which it is imitable and communicable *ad extra*. So that, of course, the possible is nothing in itself, for it is not God, and whilst it is only possible, it exists only as the term of some thought. As to external possibility, this means that the power of God is capable of producing the thing, and for it nothing is required except that it should be intrinsically possible. For God can do anything which does not imply a contradiction in Him.

Lessius concludes by saying that all the possibles are contained in the Divine Essence as in their original root, which may be called the virtual and radical exemplarity of God. Then they are contained in the divine wisdom as in the formal and proper exemplar, in which they exist as most perfect and glorious ideal objects, for they are resplendent there much more than in the created natures. Lastly, they are contained in the divine omnipotence as in their efficient cause. Perhaps, we may add that, in this way, the theory of possibility is capable of reference, by appropriation, to the three persons of the Blessed Trinity. For Essence, and Wisdom, and Power, already suggest to us the passages of Scripture in which a similar appropriation has been made.

It is pertinent to the matter in hand to consider whether God's knowledge of creatures is universal and abstract, or of a different sort. Of course, the very fact that He has not acquired it by receiving any influx from objects, not from any power they could exercise in order to produce a representation of themselves, is demonstration large enough that no abstraction, in that sense of the word, has taken place. And again, since the mere universal does not exhibit the whole order of reality, nor the individuals in whom that order exists, since the universal of which we are cognisant is but a form, it seems clear that God's own knowledge must be much more perfect. We are here obliged to distinguish, as we have done before, between the ontological and the logical, or between essence and wisdom. For it is right to call God the Ideal Cause of all things and to speak of His very essence as the Great Exemplar. Still, we do not mean that He is precisely an image or is in the determined shape of everything. This would be a grotesque heresy, and would level the infinite excellence of God to the range of the lowest creatures. What we say is that His Essence contains all these things eminently, in a supremely perfect way. They give as an illustration the relation of white light to the colours of the prism. For, says S. Augustine, the undivided light



may be thought of as the queen of all colours, but not because it is at once various and distinct hues. No, it is simple transparent crystal, which remaining pure is better than them all, till it comes to be refracted, and then in its shattering to pieces the lesser lights spring up. So God is only One, but in Him is all this Good not broken nor dissolved. And from this point of view, there is no universal in Him, for He is *Ens realissimum et singulare*.

But when we turn to His Wisdom, the answer is not so easy. If the universal implies indistinct or incomplete knowledge (it does so in us), if it imperils the unity of that act which is simply infinite, then we must conclude that there is in Wisdom no such universal. Were it not for some other lights which we have, the question would be ended here. Surely, God knows each thing properly, in itself, but then He also knows the resemblance of all the units of a kind to one another, and that they represent in their outward and inward progress some one aspect or view of His nature imitable by them and by no others in any other range. Therefore, His knowledge of this imitable archetype may be said to terminate in a universal. And according to this reasoning, S. Thomas asserts that there are many ideas in God.\* But the divine simplicity is not thereby annulled. For these are not forms which enable God to know, by informing, actuating, or enriching any faculty otherwise dormant: they are the terms of His knowledge, not principles. And it is not wrong to say that God knows many things. Hence, the idea of a singular as such, is, even in God, singular and individual, the idea of a genus or species may be called universal, because it is the idea of a type, but not gained from the objects which exhibit, show forth, manifest, or declare the type. And the generic idea is the clearest possible, not like our notions, very dim, and only just equal to their definition. But even we can advance, by experience and reflection, to the universal idea which rules a science, and is instinct with the life of all the particulars that, in any way, yielded it up as their product. And we may conceive that God has such specific ideas as those which rise to us in the order of reflection, but neither gained as we gain them, nor falling below the magnitude of the reality, as ours must do. Then it is to be inferred that we cannot say, in a breath, whether God's knowledge includes universals or does not include them. We have first to explain our meaning and to build up a scale of difference.

This rather curious observation is in place. The intelli-

\* "*Summa Th.*," p. i. q. xv. ar. 2.

gence of God, since it reaches to all things, must give Him a full insight into the minds of His creatures. Then He will be aware of the relative aspect which everything takes in the finite intellect. He will know the universals which we fabricate for ourselves, and the shadowy feeling of the world that instinct makes possible to the brutes. So that in this true sense, the mind of God stoops to every grade of knowledge, and the momentary span of an insect's apprehension and desire is no less measured by His gaze than the wide-reaching science of the angels, and of those likeliest among men, the souls into whom He has breathed the life of genius or prophecy. Any one who chose to pursue this thread of investigation might be rewarded with some very remarkable discoveries. Such an innermost penetration of the minds of others is almost as startling, from its strangeness, as the knowledge God has of Himself. For certainly, it is no less divine.

IV. That we see only through a glass, darkly, is a truth of philosophy no less than of revelation. And we must fain confess that our science of the knowledge of God is imperfect, ending, as it does, in the apparent contradiction of a transcendently simple essence, which, at the same time, is the original of all the wide diversities in this tangible universe. But how wisely does S. Thomas point out that a little knowledge of the highest good may enable us to illuminate with tenfold strength of beam the things within our nearer and surer grasp. This view, on every side so defective, of the First Intelligence, seems to direct and marshal all that can be put into words about the intelligibility of material and immaterial, and so to render the world endurable which, otherwise, must be as irritating as a blank surface or the sounds of an unknown language.

For the Scholastics, having established their doctrine of the Divine Science, go on to evoke the consentient voice of all mankind, asserting that from the First Cause issue forth two great and distinct orders, the unmistakable duality of the universe in matter and mind. No fine-spun reasoning can ever do away the conviction we have had ever since other light than that of the sun dawned upon us. Matter is around and beneath us, enters into and forms a part of us: when we lay it down, our office in the visible scheme of reality is gone, and we are lost to experience. But mind, or thought, or the intelligent—be it called what you will—is within us and known to us, and we live as men only when we are moving in its radiance. Other divisions except these we allow falteringly, and not till we have reflected on the less manifest differences in the things that move and live. Forces immaterial, but not

spiritual, baffle us somewhat to conceive, though we must needs locate them. But of mind and matter we are certain. Now, as we reasoned to a First Intelligence, the Infinite, we draw back little by little from the material, and we come to think that the height of all perfection must be wholly immaterial, a pure spirit. Moreover, trying to define any spiritual substance, we could only beat out for ourselves the thought of conscious life; and what can this be, if not intellect and the love which follows it? God is to us "*Actus purus intelligentiæ et amoris*," substantial Thought and Love, and these the one most real substance. He is then the supremely intelligent and intelligible.

But He is also the cause of matter, which never can be intelligent, for, though it be metamorphosed like Proteus, it does not rise out of itself and its own nature. We know, in some small measure, how God, the all-spiritual, should be the author of a line of intelligences; He is the Father of Spirits, and from Him is the perfect gift of Wisdom. But we do not seem to understand how He has created matter, placed as it is at the farthest remove from Him.

This great difficulty,—though to an ordinary thinker it may seem none—has always been felt by such as have given their time to intuition, and it has lain at the source of many a strange system, perplexing the world with assertions for which apparently there was no call. That matter is in itself dark and evil and unintelligible, was the unanimous teaching of the Greek schools best known among us. So thought the Manicheans, who attributed matter to the principle of evil; so before their day the Gnostics had thought. Religions were founded on this and the like beliefs: mortification and asceticism were pushed to unhallowed extremes, if so be they might free the better part of man, his intelligence, from bondage to the evil in which he had somehow got to be entangled. And much was written and preached almost the world through on the strength of this extraordinary doctrine, all which, however, we spare the reader who is familiar only with the prevailing and extensively countenanced glorification of matter. This we must observe in the interests of calm philosophy, that doctrines which have entered into the marrow of the human race do not bear to be neglected on the score of their uncountness. They may need to be corrected by the rules of, not the obvious sense of every day, but the larger sense of prudence, which should naturally follow the comparison of many systems. They cannot be simply absurd, else no man could have ever lived by them.

The Scholastics took up the belief which they found in

the authors most revered by them amongst philosophers, but there were certain doctrines to which that belief required to be subordinated. God is the creator of all things, and He knows them all, and no substance is evil. Then even matter is not wholly unintelligible. But since it partakes the least of all things of God's perfection, no wonder that it is not a light in itself. This is how they said it is not intelligible: it cannot, by any act or influence of its own, raise a reflection of itself in any mind. As the spiritual cannot cast a shadow, so the material cannot produce an idea. And how should it? The Schoolmen held, by some *à priori* argument, the doctrine to which an unexampled wealth of observation is bringing our contemporary men of science, that matter in itself cannot move itself, and cannot act at all unless it has received an impulse from something capable of immanent action or life. But if matter has no action except what is dependent upon mind, how can it exercise so perfect an action as is implied in the production of an idea? It cannot transmute another particle of matter before it has itself received an impulse to do so, and is ever an instrumental cause in the hands of some one higher. Then, even if, as in man, the making of this reflection is due to anything besides the essence of that intellect which holds the reflection, it will not be due simply to matter. This is still more evident upon considering that the action of matter on spirit—that is, on pure unembodied spirit—cannot be supposed to take place. For matter acts through motion, and even, it may be said, not without contact of active and passive. But how touch the intangible? or enter into contact with that which occupies no space, and being simply penetrable, stays no stroke that is aimed at it?

We do it wrong, being so majestic,  
To offer it the show of violence,  
For it is, as the air, invulnerable,  
And all our blows malicious mockery.

("Hamlet," act i. sc. 1.)

Indeed, who could be so whimsical as to persuade himself that any form of motion, however complicated, can bring forth a definition? And yet, to believe that the material by itself gives rise to an idea would imply almost the same strangeness of temperament. Then, we conclude, and would much desire it to be noticed attentively, that between the purely material and the purely intelligent there is a gulf which matter, at least, cannot cross over. If it be passable, that must be from the other side,

Leaving this for the moment, we will proceed with the Scholastic theory set up, under the tacit influence of these and suchlike considerations concerning the pure intelligences. The Scholastics would have said, we fancy, that the existence of angels, or separated substances, cannot be inculcated by force of argument, for S. Thomas only shows (in the *Summa contra Gentiles*) that the creation of the angels was fitting as designed to complete the gradations of being; not was necessary in the hypothesis of any creation. On other grounds of evidence they would have contended, as he also does, that angels really do exist. But their possibility, at any rate, is beyond the pale of discussion. This admitted, have we any means of conjecturing how they understand, or in what their intellect differs from ours? To be up to the level of scholastic dogmas on this point is to learn a very great deal about their view of intelligence. And it helps us also to feel how alien they were to the system of ontologism which has had such vogue in our century. They considered that no creature, not even the highest among cherubim or seraphim, was entitled to the vision of God's essence. This, if given to any, was from the goodwill and pleasure of the Great King, not required for a nature that it might operate according to its powers and destination. But as to see God in ever so slight a degree is to view His Essence, they argued that the angels knew Him not at all in this way. What then, was left? Did they know material things first, and from these spiritual? The question being raised by the pure reason, and experience on the subject being nil, it was necessary to construct some premises which would avail as an argument from the nature of the case. Suppose there were no material world, there might still exist whole hierarchies and worlds of angelic substances. This seemed to show that the necessary or proper object of their understanding is the supersensible. And this would follow too from the reasoning recorded above on the darkness of matter in itself. But the purely not-sensible is the spiritual. Then the formal and first object of angelic thought must be something spiritual. But this is not God. Therefore it is the angelic substance itself. Here is the whole theory. A pure intelligence has a perfect, proper, and adequate vision of itself, is its own ideal term, the light as it were reflected upon the light. It first knows itself, is always conscious of its own being and attributes, and makes this the form of all its science, arguing from its own limited nature and contingency to the existence of its infinite Creator and last end, and also to the possibility of other creatures like itself and less than itself. If we compare our human knowledge with that of the

angels, it is, says Lessius, like the comparison of a point in space to the circle of the heavens.

An occasion offers itself here to mention a fallacy, as we deem it, which has been the source of much confusion, to say nothing of polemical bitterness, in the recent philosophies. It has been often urged against Descartes that, beginning as he did from the sole knowledge of the subject, he must by logical necessity descend into the yawning depths of scepticism. We confess we do not see the necessity, and neither did the Scholastics. And surely, without either discussing the merits of Descartes, or the consequences in history which have been precipitated by the cooling of his intellectual mixtures, we may doubt that S. Thomas also would have fallen into such an error, had error been in question. The misapprehension seems to be this. Scepticism is the denial that we know anything as it is, or the universal doubt about our knowledge of objective reality. If we are only acquainted with phenomena, with what appears to us to be so and so, we cannot tell that there is anything outside of us. And our subjective belief may be no more than an "imbecility of thought," or travestying the sense of the words, "a last infirmity of noble minds." But there seems to be a confounding here of two meanings which lurk in the word subjective. For all knowledge that I have is mine, and therefore subjective; but if I have knowledge, it corresponds to some real term, or is founded upon it, and so is not subjective. If to be subjective is to deny the reality of that which is apprehended, we do not begin, and no sane philosophy *can* begin, from the subject. But what if I, who know myself, know that I am a reality, a substance, and cognize this truth with more and more assurance, as I continue to reflect upon myself? Is there not a most convincing argumentum ad hominem? For what philosopher—since he is, *par excellence*, the conscious thinker—has ever really doubted of his own existence? Though all else be phenomena, he is something more solid. They are all shadows projected from him; but is he not a substance?

To return. It deserves to be specially insisted upon, that the angelic intelligence, in S. Thomas's view, knows only itself immediately. Its measure of perfection in being determines the measure of its knowing, and this was said in that wisdom of the Scholastics which went down into the heart of things. For knowing is a kind of being, and in the creature is the means of attaining the perfect life, and contributes to that life when the term is reached and the labour of striving is over. To God the knowledge of all things comes from His essence: but the angel does not gather up into himself the perfections



of the world, nor is he their model. Though he stands highest, he is within the precincts of his own order; is neither eternal, nor immense, nor the first cause. His proper object is his own nature, as the proper object of the eye is colour, and that becomes to him the first premise of all science. For he can detect in himself the specific reason by which he is likened to others, and can argue, as we have said, to what is above him in the altitudes of heaven and to what may be beneath him if God so will. That God is, he knows by arguments *à posteriori*, as we do; what God is, he knows by way of affirmation, negation, and eminence, as theologians teach us about the human intellect, but the terms of his analogy are far more perfect than ours. Furthermore, as we reason to the existence of others from the signs of their presence, so does the angel learn that he is one of a spiritual universe; so, too, he can enter into relations of knowledge and love with the other high intelligences. Here his experience comes to an abrupt conclusion.

But what, it may be asked, does he know of the world of matter, supposing it to exist? Is it hidden from him? Might he perchance be moving through the spaces of our earth and the stars, yet find no reality in his path? The Scholastics seem to answer that this might be so, and no contradiction follow from it. But they add, most of them, that God has impressed upon the minds of the angels certain innate ideas by means of which they behold the essences even of material creation. How would this be? Imagine, then, for the sake of example, that you had never read the *Iliad*, nor heard of it, and that there were some magical operation, the influence of potent fumes upon the brain, which would dispose your already existing knowledge of the Greek alphabet into lines and cantos. Then you might wake up some morning and find that you knew the wrath of Achilles, and the prowess of Diomedes, and all the pathetic mourning of Priam over the dead body of Hector. So, through the moulding into certain shapes of elements known to them by intuition, the angels may have come to know the nature of the world. But mark, not as the senses describe these things. For no angel ever heard music, or looked at a sunset. In some mysterious way, unimaginable to us, the spiritual can truly represent the material. It is not even as the musician thinks his music, when, as S. Augustine beautifully says, there goes on within him a silent song, but after a fashion more perfect than this, though perhaps akin to it.

However, there are scholastic authors, some of them recent, who allow no innate ideas or natural impressions

sealed upon the mind, not even in the angels. For, they say, these would speak only of a possible world, and the object is to bring the existing world to the knowledge of the spiritual being. As, to return to our instance, though you should know all the *Iliad* by heart, still, if you had never heard it or seen it, how could you be sure there was such a book? It is not said that the innate ideas could not produce the knowledge of the possible, but that they have no aptitude for purposes of real knowledge. With this opinion we are prepared to coincide. And if it were the case of the human intellect, we should say at once that the argument is convincing.

But why, we say, may not the angels be able to affect corporal things, though these are unable to affect them? It seems reasonable enough, and even necessary, on the theory that bodies require to be moved by powers which excel them. Does not the revealed doctrine about angels and demons point to this conclusion? And if so, since action to be in the proper proportion to its cause must be intelligent in such beings, why may they not know by directly perceiving the sensible, in so far as it is intelligible or capable of definition and intellectual description? This problem deserves to be analyzed in more detail. It bears upon the purpose of our essay, inasmuch as there exists a close affinity between the angelic understanding of bodies and the human. Let us see how the analysis might be begun.

Take for granted, first of all, that bodies cannot exert a physical action on pure spirits. Still, is this action necessary? Is any physical action at all required? For we are talking about ideas, which are a real perfection, no doubt, in the mind, but are the product of the mind's own action within itself. The terms in which, as in some spiritual vehiculum, we involve the objects are words uttered by the living soul, and thus are living. Why may not the mere presence of an object suffice for this? The thing is before us, and we speak its nature to ourselves. That seems simple enough. And so it would be, were we not seeking the how and the why of this interior speaking. But, in truth, the presence of an object is not enough, whether it ought to be so, or no. God is present to the angels and to us. All the same, we do not see Him. Spiritual agencies encompass our path every hour: till they touch us we cannot apprehend them. And, moreover, what is meant by the presence of a thing? An immediate relation in space? Yet nothing is more immediate to us than the internal system of our own bodies, and nothing, for ages long, was less known to science. Again, what difference can it make

whether an object is near us or far off, unless that in the one case it can act upon us, in the other it cannot? As a matter of experience we know nothing of what is really distant from us; only by reasoning from what is near. Others may tell us, but then they have seen, they are travellers on their return. Grant that effectual presence is required, not the closeness only of juxtaposition, and you have granted this too, that physical action must precede the eliciting of an idea, if your purpose be to know the existing and not the possible. The action supposed need not be gross material. Spirit acts on spirit. But matter is not known to have any action unless through and in the material, accompanied by motion. Recollect now what we argued above as to the impotence of motion to affect a spirit and the impossibility of contact; how you may touch sphere to sphere in, at least, one point, whilst a spirit has properly neither parts nor position. And conclude that if the angels acquire an idea of the existing world, it must be by the expenditure of energy on their side, not on this.

They have such knowledge, for they move the heavens and earth, each in his place and degree. To catch the faintest gleam of how they come to know, we must again descend to the life of the spiritual in the material, manifest to us out of our own history. Here is the delicatest, most impalpable thing—nay, more—a spirit, so tangled and confined in mechanism that thought and extension must be said, without any mitigation, to be in the same substantial unity, and in one nature. And the life and growth of the body are strangely helpful to the education of the intelligence, whilst the movements of nerve and muscle are become the subject of moral obligations. To the timeless succession of thought cerebration corresponds: on the other hand, the physical actions which in the brute are blameless in us are amenable to law. These consequences recommend themselves when once we have allowed the mysterious union of two such differing factors, but they do not take away the mystery. It cannot be reasoned with, nor its elements dissolved, nor its reality denied. He is wise who reposes in the security of it, and learns to apply the lesson in other needs and occasions. Yet, if we do so here we ought to use caution, not as the ancients, who thought it a fine thing to make the stars animate, and to discourse about the “divine animals” in the pathway of the sun. There is need of more sobriety in an age when we can only just save the spiritual from being outvoted by acclamation.

What, therefore, if the angels have some relation to matter—not identical with ours, it would degrade them—but

analogous to it? Plato compared the human soul to an oarsman driving a boat. This is less than the truth, as we know. Suppose it to express the sway which finite but pure intelligences exert upon matter. It is only an illustration, however. Can we get nearer to the real truth? It might be thus. If God, who is the prime mover both of angels and men, were to give some spontaneous bias to the activity of the pure spirit, the supernal creature might take firmest hold by inherent power of this or that material substance, and under the influx of this action,—for it would recoil upon him, somewhat as the electric force returns into itself—he might elicit an act of knowledge and express the essence of his object. And this all the more perfectly because he had penetrated to its very centre. The embarrassment for us is to content ourselves with such a conception. It is so hard to get rid of the notion that we cannot understand unless we have seen with eyes of flesh and grasped with hands. But this is idle. Subtle observers of nature have detected a fineness in scents and odours capable of making them the media of very large knowledge. Then if we put away sense altogether, we only need suppose that the spiritual can act upon the material, and the rest follows.

We asked about the divine knowledge whether it can be called universal, or rather, whether it consists in any sort of universal ideas. The question must be reiterated concerning the angelic. However much the Scholastics had differed as to the absolute possibility of innate thought, here they came together again. Their view has been drawn out, at some length, by Kleutgen. It merits all the attention possible, and is admirable, considering the age it was formed in, for its acute and impartial consideration. It may be described shortly as the theory of genius. The angelic bears the same proportion to the human intellect that a genius, a prophet of reason, does to the multitudes of men. Again, man is called a reasoner, his peculiar gift is the discursive faculty. But the angel is an intelligence: he possesses pure spiritual intuitions. Thus he beholds his own essence, and he apprehends the material on the side which is hidden from us. In both cases his direct knowledge may be called universal, and his ideas universal. But they are very different from ours. Though falling infinitely short of God's perfection, they bear upon them a stamp which reminds us of Him. He is the Supreme Unity. And these ideas are unitive. The points to be observed, according to S. Thomas, are these:—God alone is the proper Original of species and individuals: all things are known to Him from His essence, but "singula

secundum proprias rationes." No other being has this relation to creatures; hence we have to distinguish the grades of knowledge according to the proper object of each. So far as this, the intuition which in the various cases is primary, may be conceived as measuring its own object. Beyond that is the sphere of secondary acquired ideas, and, where these fail, of reasoning from them to the unseen. But the perfection of acquired ideas depends, very much, on the mode of acquiring them. The angels have a power of penetrating to the inner recesses of matter without passing through the veil of sense; they see, as it were, into the very laboratory and secret workshop of nature. And they seize upon that in each thing which rests like a firm foundation for the play of many qualities and forces.

Look at the word intelligence. It means the apprehension of a truth in itself, not as concluded from something else. What intelligence knows, in us, are self-evident principles, the "*per se nota*" of the Schools. These are judgments, and as we reasoned in a previous article, they indicate division, the breaking of something into parts and sections. How much more perfect could they, still retaining the certitude and clearness of judgments, express one reality or essence by one idea—if, for instance, to have known a subject were to know all the propositions to be made upon it, and all the conclusions implicitly contained in it? There would be neither affirmation nor negation, any more than inferring or arguing, but something better than these, with all that they hold and the elements combined into unity.\* But it is unity which most denotes perfection. And the angelic nature is like an exceedingly clear glass not only used to gather the rays from the surface, but drawing them out from the substance.

Genius is another word, not unlike intelligence, though much more peculiar in meaning. No definition is quite satisfactory of those that have been given. Its characteristics, however, are marked enough to allow us, perhaps, the luxury of not attempting another failure in this department. And what are they? To speak superficially, they bear a likeness, so far as we can speak at all, to the notes of the divine intellect itself. So we are wont to call genius god-like, and with no less permissible hyperbole than we use of our nature when we say man is like God. Just as the simplicity of God contains the

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\* "*Si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti, haberet notitiam de omnibus, quæ possunt attribui subjecto, vel removeri ab eo, nunquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est.*" (*Sum. Th.*, p. i. q. 58, ar. 3.)

perfections of multiplicity and is not altered, so the mind of genius appears to illustrate this beautiful attribute of the Infinite Mind. Genius, by an easy unconscious movement, reaches swiftly to the height of science, disregarding the ascents climbed by so many feet. It holds a form of knowledge, not asking to be filled up, not hollow, but rich enough to give out light of itself and forestall the need of experience. Its most distinctive note is unity. Its ideas are very few, but inexhaustible. When they need to be put before others, the task seems endless. Enough is never said, and the conclusion is drawn only because fresh scenes keep coming into sight and threaten to overpower the brain. Let it be a musician or a poet. Do not consider what he writes merely. Try to understand in what mind and mood he finds himself when inspiration comes and he cannot shake it off. The theme unrolls itself in harmony, it is one, and he seizes it as one, the unity guides him, gives him the feeling of art. In another mind so many thoughts would breed confusion, or take away the mastery of reason. For it is said, "Great genius is to madness, sure, allied." But the difference is as clear as anything can be. Genius has the strength of unity and makes a living order, not a chaos of antagonistic ideas. It begins in unity and never loses sight of the law, never disturbs the symmetry of which that implicit unity is the groundwork. A study of man by Shakespere is worth whole volumes of philosophy,—if, we may surely say this in our own defence, a reader have the skill to understand his poetry. The scenes are many, characters speak at random, as nature, malice, or interest severally prompts their utterance. This is how it looks to one who turns over the leaves hastily. But underneath the chance-medley is one simple fruitful idea, it organizes the whole, takes off the reproach of license, pierces us with a conviction of reality, and allows no argument to gainsay it.

Strange it is that S. Thomas had never opened a Greek poet, nor can have known much of their feebler Latin plagiarists, and still, by native strength, or some better and holier gift, has traced out with delicacy the character of genius. Theology gave him a theory of art. It may be inferior to some finished efforts of our time, may need limitation, addition, polish—but it can scarcely be false. It enables us to see what we may be very glad to even slightly conceive, the nature of intelligences far removed from us. Genius is not, indeed, angelic intellect, it only resembles that in some essential features. The angels are free from matter, and their art is heavenly, not deflected from its primal rectitude by passing through an inefficient medium. They know the essence in



its entirety, and the individual whose own it is. To learn the existence of many individuals is not to them a superfluity, it offers them many sciences. They never indeed created anything, nor have essential representation of aught save themselves. It is theirs to discern and to move, not to be the efficient and exemplary cause of a whole order. Action and knowledge are dependent in them, yet of so vast a range that we, seeing them, should stand in bewilderment, and perhaps lose our reckoning of the distance between that which is and that other which is only participated. What must be the grace of the Beatific Vision, and of the divine order corresponding to it, if all we have hitherto recounted is merely natural!

The universal is defined to be "*unum quod est aptum inesse multis.*" The ideas of matter and the material world which angels possess have such an aptitude, but with a difference omitted in the definition. Universals there spoken of do not include a multitude of things, they prescind from them, leave them out of view. But this is a fault and a deficiency, and does not become the higher intelligences. Theirs must be universals in their oneness, but completely realized, as we said of the terms or ideal wholes of synthesis. So the answer to our question, "Does angelic knowledge consist of universal ideas?" must be affirmative, but, as Ophelia says, "with a difference." In a word, these are not abstract universals.

There appears no reason to doubt that the possible grades of being in the created order of intellect are innumerable. All of them agree in the possession of this inexplicable faculty of representation. They differ in the measure of their illumination. Arguments from analogy may teach us that the spiritual world is built up of thrones, dominations, principedoms and powers, ethereal virtues, as we mark rank after rank ascend in the lesser manifestations of God's majesty. It is with an abashed forehead that mortal man turns slowly from the contemplation of them to his own petty widths of knowledge, his acquisitions of days and nights spent in toiling amidst the darkness of sense and matter. His plea of justification whilst he knows only his own nature, is that God, Who wisely disposes all things, made him so, and order is beautiful for least as well as greatest, when each fulfils the divine purpose. Essence and nature are the rule of perfection, of morality, and therefore of true content.

V. The mistake in Plato's philosophy is that he misconstrued man's nature. S. Thomas reproaches him with it, and does not hesitate to say that it vitiates all his reasoning on the mode of our intelligence. Assign man to his rightful place in the universe, and then seek out what must be held,

for you have the clue to it. Otherwise, even if you escape from the labyrinth of confusion, you will not have learned the truth. Man is not of the brute creation, nor yet of the angelic. His soul was meant for his body, his body for his soul. Not by slow progression from the grossness of sense did he rise to be an understanding soul, he is that because no such progression is possible. Nor did he inhabit a better world once, and suffer the penalty of angelic pride by being thrust into the prison of his body. He was meant to be "an incorporated reason," and this belongs to the very substance of his intelligence. The soul is "*forma corporis*." This must be our main guide in all discussions about reason.

Man has been defined by the Scholastics as a rational animal; and in spite of all the definitions proposed by others, this will appear to such as care to investigate definitions as the clearest, most expressive, and most accurate. It gives the elements without which man could not be, and it denotes their combination into a real objective unity. Moreover, these are the predicates to which all those remaining must be traced: they contain in themselves the reason why any others should be possible, and they explain the history of man's course upon earth, whilst that course itself furnishes their unanswerable demonstration. But this will be shown more convincingly if we briefly lay down the Scholastic theory of man's composition. Then we shall have ascertained the grounds for distinction and assertion.

The two sets of phenomena which exist in us are due, as all allow, to the presence and union of two very different substances or substantial realities. What we call body and soul have been termed by the Scholastics matter and form: for one of these is moulded, governed, directed, and influenced, in every tissue and fibre, by the other, and this other is unmistakably of a higher condition than what it rules. But we must not conceive of matter and form, the determined and determining element in a composition, as two separate realities. The union between them is so close and immediate that they may be looked upon as coalescing into one substance, and exchanging, in a marvellous way, their properties and activities, so whilst they aid, limiting each other. Man is a complex being, intricately built up out of various realities, and bears upon him the stamp of multiplicity in whatever he does. As we remarked above, to be simple in nature and essence is the prerogative of Divinity: creatures need the resources of many limited perfections because they are not the limitless perfection itself. Man, taking from the right hand and the left, has brought into one the nature that is measured and felt and seen,

and the nature to which time and place are strange, though not absolutely incompatible with it.

But there is a broad distinction to be observed here between man and the brute creation. Every living thing, the Scholastics said, partakes of the immaterial, is compounded—if it be not pure spirit—of a living and life-giving form, and of matter by itself inert and dead. But all these forms are not alike in their nature nor in their destiny. The living force in plants is wholly taken up with making them what they are and enabling them to work through their present stage, which for them is the final one, of being. When they have attained the perfection which is the bloom of their life, they die, and the material elements pass into other unities, and there contribute to the carrying on of the world's course. The force, therefore, which bound the whole together and gave it a character was meant only to do this much, and had no intrinsic worth or proper operation of its own. In other words, the form was simply proportioned to the nature of which it was the chief constituent. But in man the form exceeds and excels: the living active force is not merely substantial; it is a substance, complete in itself so far that it is capable of enduring by itself, without the body which it once inhabited. Or, omitting the question of the soul's immortality, we are sure that it can do much more than give life to the body. A soul with only the operations of the sensitive and vegetative life would leave man among the flocks and herds, not lift him up to a work of his own, or give him a special title of distinction. But experience, we have said, tells us that we think and reason, that these are not actions of the sense, nor in any way to be confounded with movements of imagination and instinct. So that we have warrant for concluding to the life of growth, sense, and intelligence in man. Either he possesses them all in act, or some one of them, and has the capacity of unfolding the others to their perfection. Were he deprived of this capacity he would cease to be. Nevertheless, the body as such is outside the essential workings of the intellect. At most it is the instrumental cause of thought. And here is a justification of Leibnitz's splendid definition, that the soul, as intelligent, is "a spiritual automaton." Thus, too, may we gloss the saying, "*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*," by the addition "*nisi ipse intellectus*." That makes a great difference. It asserts that the intellect is the formative principle, and that man has a nearer relation to the angels than he has to the brutes. The distinction between matter and mind is incommensurable, that between various minds within the bounds of creation is only one of degree.

The Philosophy of the Ego, which has been professed in Europe since the rise of Kantism, has had the merit of calling attention to the certitude of consciousness, even when pretending to despise it. It has set the inner life in relief against the shifting and changing of the sensible world. But, as might have been expected, it has led to one most serious omission, and, in consequence, has gone far to ruin the proper notion of our personality. That the body is any portion of the Ego, the subject, seems to be generally denied. The utmost conceded is that it has a closer connection with the subject than any other sensible thing. Hence, there is a revival of the Platonic belief alluded to above, that the intelligence is confined in the body and directs it, but is quite independent of it. There are, people would say, two natures in juxtaposition, and this is a sufficient account of the matter. But the Scholastics thought very differently. They would have replied that the soul is in the body and the body in the soul, that not only does one contain the other, but they are mutually containing and contained, that there is something in the very essence of the soul—viz. of the intelligent principle in man—which makes it apt to inform a body, and that this distinguishes our souls from the pure spirits. An angel inhabiting a body would not be at all the same thing as our life of body and soul. We do not possess the body: in some sense we are the body. It is a part of our being, not an instrument that we lay hold of and appropriate. The faculty of consciousness takes in what we do, and includes amongst our own personal actions the movements of the body. Man is a spirit, but he is just as much flesh and blood. This is what many writers have enlarged upon when using such phrases as "*Sacramentum humanitatis*." For our twofold essence, consisting of visible and invisible, may be called a Sacrament, the manifestation of a mystery through the veil of the flesh. There is but one soul in man, the source of all the lives which he unites in his single person. The form, it is true, exceeds the matter, nor can be wholly immersed in it. But it is none the less a form, and the only form in man.\*

Many philosophers, in different ages of the world, have referred the phenomena to three distinct principles or souls, not believing it possible for one and the same substance to originate such opposed effects as growth, sense, and thought. Many others have reduced the lower lives to one principle, but

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\* The doctrine is not altered, whether we assign to "*forma corporis*" the full value demanded by the Thomists, or less than that, as is done by various late authors.

kept the rational soul apart, and a doctrine similar to this has come pretty recently under the judgment of the Church. Orthodox writers, on the other hand, have contended that the same force or energy, where involved in varying sets of circumstances, may show great diversity of operation. The immaterial principle may originate thought by itself, and also, when informing an organism adapted to it, may elicit the operations of sense. The clear conscience we have of our own identity is proof against all argument: the burden of showing that this is a contradiction rests upon those who say so. But at present we do not intend to demonstrate the point; we assume it in order to explain the nature of our intellect.

VI. It has been seen that the proper object of the Divine intellect is God's own essence. The infinite knows the infinite. And again, we have concluded that the proper object of the angelic intellect is the essence of the angel himself. The immaterial knows the immaterial. But in neither case did we say that the *only* object and the *proper* object are the same. God takes cognizance of all things by reason of His essence; this is the form by which He understands. The angel knows many things besides his own nature, but always by means of it. Whatever else is known besides the formal object stands in a relation to it, we have said, like that of a conclusion to the premises. But the conclusion is really known, though it needed ever so many principles to get at it. Thus, the proper object of an intellect does not limit its knowledge, but throws it into a form, imposes a method upon it, and denotes the starting-point or first thing to be known. This observation is of the gravest importance. Its neglect has led both to Scepticism and to Pantheism—a statement we might further elucidate if we had leisure for it.

Since there is always this kind of proportion between the subject and its formal object, our view about the nature of man has already determined what we shall think about the object of his intelligence. Man's operation as a rational being is not that of an angel. Then he is not conversant with his own soul as the first, proper, and formal term of intellect. This is the fault which vitiates the beautiful theory of Leibnitz; he separated the mind from the body when explaining the pre-established harmony, and so was obliged to make the soul reflect from the very first upon itself. But as S. Thomas notices, this is not true, reflection comes later. Man is a compound nature, at once material and immaterial. The first object of his intellect must be in a like order. This follows from the whole course of our argument.

It will help us, moreover, to consider man's relative position in the scale of mind. The Scholastics say that he is lowest of all. The proof they suggest is somewhat of this nature. All men are comprehended in the same definition, else we should have intelligent beings in the world, going by the name of men, but really of a different species. And this is contrary to experience. Now can we conceive any rational creatures, lower than our lowest savages in power of thought, differing from them, in fact, essentially, and filling up the chasm between man and brute? It does not appear that we can. Lessen the powers of reckoning by number, of reasoning confusedly, of perceiving the most obvious social relations, of getting some dim notions of right and wrong, and of providing for his wants by the use of fire and the invention of tools—the chief powers which exist in a savage—and there is nothing left to him of reason. There begins the region of mere sense and instinct. Then if we are all of the same species, we must take the lowest place, and consider that we have by nature only what is just necessary to constitute an intelligence. This used to be put into an axiom amongst the Schoolmen. Human reason they looked upon as "*pura potentia*." The reference is to the celebrated definition of *materia prima*, the prime stuff out of which bodies are made. It was said to be distinguishable, indeed, from mere nothing, but the most imperfect of all beings. Now the most perfect is God, whose description was "*Actus Purus*." And these two words "*actus*" and "*potentia*" are correlative but opposite. Hence as *materia*, though a reality, was said to be "*pura potentia*" in comparison with every other thing in the world, so the intellect of man is "*pura potentia*" in the order to which it belongs. To speak the language of the day, it is naturally a force with a special function, but quiescent and merely potential.

For clearness sake it must be noted that the Scholastics have hardly mentioned, if indeed they knew, the historical development of intellect which is an indubitable fact with regard to certain races. The subject is one of quite recent interest and investigation. We do not speak of the hereditary transmission of genius, which is a rare thing, and of no very great importance, but of that recurrence of intellectual characteristics and accumulation of inherited results which has such a large share in making up civilization. The fact is in no wise embarrassing to our theory, rather the contrary, but it cannot be passed over; for it will explain the appearance of what look like innate ideas, but are nothing of the sort. Innate ideas must be forms given us by nature, included, therefore, though implicitly, in the definition which is common to all



men. But these inherited ideas, so to call them, are peculiar to races, climates, and epochs of history; they are not the outfit with which we started, but have come to us through a succession of after-events. However, whether many or few, they are of the same form with the rest of our ideas, and are dependent on the proper object of the intellect as upon that which has made them possible.

Moreover, there cannot be a doubt that the law of gradual progress—the “*natura non facit saltum*”—is applicable to the growth of our intellect. Let us view it as touching the power of “reflection” so plainly characteristic of knowledge. Even sense has a kind of return upon itself; whence the sort of consciousness we observe in brutes. But, according to S. Thomas, it stops halfway. In the angelic mind reflection is almost as perfect as we can conceive, for the angel knows himself as his own first term. Then man will not be without the faculty of reflection, but will enjoy it in a less degree than the angel. From this we make out that the human mind is at first directed to something different from the subject. Man does not know himself before learning about other things. This is what experience has to say too; for the senses look out rather than upon the man who owns them, and children have long been engaged upon the world around before it strikes them to think, explicitly, about themselves. Here, then, we are brought to the proper object of the mind.

It must be the immaterial in the material, so to correspond to the perfection of the subject. And it is not, the subject himself. And it is known in the most imperfect way, but still known by a true intelligence, which, up to this, has been quiescent. Now the least that can be known about any object intelligibly is one or other of the widest universals. If a thing is not referred to some category, or recognizable class in Ontology, or, at any rate, to one of the transcendental types which precede the categories, then nothing is yet known of it ideally. Hence we derive the formula of the understanding. All objects are known to the human mind by some kind of reference to its first object. *The form of the object as intelligible and of the mind as intelligent is universality.* These expressions occur in the pages of Hegel no less than in those of S. Thomas. Rightly understood, they give us the Scholastic theory at a glance, and light us through the mazy labyrinths of its great modern opponent.

The problem of human intelligence is therefore resolved into these simple terms, “How does the mind acquire a form of universality?” and, “How does the object become uni-

versal?" The answer supplied by S. Thomas we have long since exhibited. The mind's form of universality is the Intellectus Agens, the process of universalizing the object is Abstraction. We will take the latter first.

The object—in our present case, a sensible and material thing—is described as ontologically true, and as universal in potentia. These phrases mutually aid each other. If a thing, a being, is true, this must be because of some conformity between that and a standard. It must realize, or, as we might say, crystallize some conception which looks for expression by means of it. The meaning of this is now clear to us. An object is ontologically true in so far as it answers to an imitable aspect of God, the first Ideal Cause. This granted, we perceive the origin of a creature's intelligibility. Now every existing thing, matter included, is some kind of likeness of the Divine Essence. Therefore, even matter is intelligible, and admits of being known as showing forth this aspect. We do not say that to understand anything we must recognize that it is an imitation of what is in God, but that we know it when we do actually see the aspect under which it is like God.\* "But," you may urge, "it is like God in every aspect which it has or can have, for whatever is real is a vestige of God's power, and carries His seal upon it." Precisely so, we do not dream of denying it; only now, permit us to recall the fact that there may be some intellect which does not immediately perceive the thing under every aspect. If any mind is obliged to make progress by degrees, it will only see thus or thus, not all in a moment. The whole of an object is intelligible, even if that object be matter. By all means: this is our assertion. But do not forget that the relative intelligibility is determined by the nature of the mind, not of the term in itself: "*Cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis.*" So much as regards ontological truth.

The other description was "universal in potentia." We are concerned with finite individuals, which are the only complete realities that exist or can exist outside of God. Observe, then, with Plato, Origen, S. Thomas, and the School generally, that no created thing is wisdom itself, nor goodness itself, nor yet again—what may seem more difficult—is any person himself the "auto-anthropos," nor any individual whatever the absolute summing up and exhausting of a species. This must signify that God cannot make any creature so perfect that the aspect of His essence thereby represented shall cease

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\* That is, we do not assert that, in order to have understanding, a thing must be known *reduplicative* as a likeness.

to be further imitable. No individual, no series of individuals, can render it impossible for God to add to their number in the same rank of being. There can be no "mundus optimus" in the sense of optimism. Here is one very profound and yet very plain meaning of "universal in potentia." An object represents some imitable perfection in God, it is a true copy taken from the type, having certain definite notes. There may be any number of similar copies, and we shall know about them beforehand if we have learned the notes in this particular sample. This very thing, numerically the same, cannot be produced as distinct from itself, but these notes can, for the original mould is not broken. And why? Because God has the perfection of the species, not formally, but in an infinite and supereminent manner. However, we have not yet finished our explanation of "universal in potentia."

We granted that the material object is, with reference to Almighty God, wholly and entirely intelligible, but not by any action which it can exert upon His being or intellect. And it is known to Him simply—that is, without any division. Turning now to creatures, we observe that this object *must* either act physically upon them or be acted upon by them, in order to be ideally represented. Further, it is at once imitable and not imitable, as having essential notes which may exist in others, and individual notes which exist only in itself. The angelic intelligence, we have said, sees all these notes together and "per modum unius," but not, of course, so perfectly as God sees them. But the human intelligence does not know the individual, as such, except by sensible and contingent marks; for example, those of place, time, parentage, outward figure and appearance, and the like. These we ascertain by experience: we cannot tell what an individual is in itself. As such it comes within the range of sense, not of intelligence. But we *do* know its imitable notes, or those which may be reproduced in others. But these are called essential, specific, and universal. Then we cognize the material and real ideally, but under the form of universality. This, then, is the first abstraction with reference to the intellect, the abstraction by which we divide a thing ideally into specific and individual. Not as though we cognized both these aspects (rationes) separately, but that we do not perceive the individual aspect at all. We are said to *prescind* from it.

This is the first abstraction, inasmuch as it covers and partly explains all the rest. But we should be very fortunate if this were the first in order of time, so that we could grasp all the essential notes at once, even though we overlooked the individual. We should have then a full notion of the object

learning all about a species from the instantaneous exhibition of any one of its members. In reality our knowledge brings us first the notes in which all things are alike, and we come to represent a species to ourselves only by the addition of notes in consequence of experience. Hence the first form of a thing's intelligibility is not, ex. gr. humanity, or any such deep disclosure of perfection, but the thinnest of all, the form of being. Here we have the commencement of a large number of abstractions, each of them tending more and more to express the complete notion. They do so, at last, when they tell us of the nearest genus and the specific differences. Further than this they cannot go.

Now suppose we construct a table of such abstractions: as they approximate to the complete essence, they also approach the individual, for could they exhaust their own notes, only the pure "ratio individui" would be left undiscovered. But the individual is called the concrete. Then, in a somewhat improper sense, the later and more intense or more descriptive abstractions might take the name "concrete" in comparison with their earlier predecessors. This is the Hegelian use of the term. We do not accept it at all, and only mention it here to warn readers off this perilous nomenclature. Confusion in such matters is the cause of endless arguing.

But there is a true sense in which these abstractions are concrete. They are, as we perceive, simply the various aspects of a really existing thing. Afterwards we may get something else out of them by means of reflection. But they are certainly objective forms under which a reality appears. As prescinding from other notes they indicate ideal division and therefore abstraction. As presenting to us something real they are real. I see so much of a landscape in this feeble light; increase the light and I shall see more and more distinctly; but am I not viewing a reality, and is not this a real presentation? Am I gazing at nothing? or at the image in my memory which I shall carry away as a record of the actual sight? If not, scepticism or idealism cannot enter by this door. For it is the real thing itself which is called the fundamental universal and the abstract in this part of our reasoning.

The question next proposed is a good deal more difficult. How does this form of universality, be it more or less perfect, proximately arise in the object? As it is relative to the mind, of course there is no possibility of its displaying itself before object and subject, intelligible and intelligent, are in contact. Indeed, since a physical action must precede, there is needed a physical contact. About this last we do not trouble, for the object is a sensible reality and the subject is not merely intel-

lect, but a spiritual substance informing a body. Physical contact is therefore abundantly possible. But in what manner, upon this contact, does the essential note get abstracted from the individual, which latter is, *to all intents and purposes*, material or sensible? What was intelligible in potentia becomes intelligible in actu, the latent is made apparent, and the supersensible is abstracted from the sensible. Yes, but how?

Reader, we would fain content you with one answer, plain and simple. But we cannot altogether content ourselves, and we must at least use openness. There is a formula in S. Thomas which seems answer enough, if we could only understand it. He says, "*Intellectus Agens facit phantasmata intelligibilia actu, abstrahendo ab eis intelligibiles species.*" On this many commentaries have been written, and the Scholastics themselves are not in agreement. By a process of reduction we may bring the various opinions into a sort of harmony, so that in the end there remain two explanations to be considered. One of these, so far as it affirms, is easy to follow, and does not seem likely to displease in any quarter. The other allows the first, but attempts to go deeper, and, in consequence, becomes obscure. Whether S. Thomas held decisively by the first or second is not, it appears, made out.

The first point is the extent to which these commentaries are at one. For we need not be astonished that even very eminent philosophers dissent from each other in the details of a theory which both would wish to defend. So much we must condone to human frailty and the ambiguity of words. But it is well to remember that these discrepancies do not and cannot affect the amount previously conceded. And, speaking of the matter in hand, we think the unanimity amongst Scholastic authors is greater than at first sight would seem. All allow, then, that the material derives its remote intelligibility from the Divine Essence, just as we have said, and that in itself it is not wholly intelligible to us; that it becomes so by an ideal separation of the objective notes; that the form of intelligibility for man is the universal; that there comes first a physical contact of object with subject; that this takes place through the senses and imagination; that, consequently, intellect is dependent on sense; that the reason of this is traceable to the natural conjunction of body and soul into one being; that the form produced in the intellect is, first of all, a direct universal; that its origin is due to the spontaneous energy of the mind; that by means of this form the act of understanding is elicited; that when the form ceases to be actually present, there still remains an habitual knowledge

which is like a permanent quality of the soul; that this accounts for the growth of intellect and gradually elevates knowledge into science; and that the instrument of science is reflection. Full concord exists as to the assertion that the soul, because it is in a certain grade of being, has a natural and innate capacity of forming universal concepts and necessary judgments of intuition upon the active presence of the object felt through the previous operations of sense. The same thing must be said about the perfection of knowledge hereby acquired. But we have no need to insist any longer on this last point after the copious explanations already given.

Thus far, all has been prosperous with us. Difficulties begin when we try to move in advance. The first theory, which is that of Suarez, insists upon all we have set down, but resolutely opposes any further efforts at analysis. The act of abstraction, says this great genius, is one and the same thing with the act of understanding: the only operation of the mind is that which elicits the immanent term, the word expressive of the object, and it is called abstractive, as it were negatively, not because it does something positive, but because it fails to do so. Given an impulse in the soul, all the faculties move to their operations, and amongst them the intellect—it at once fastens upon the object, sees something universal in it, and says so. But seeing and saying are here the same thing. True, the spirit perceives by its own light, and the intellect may be called a light, but this is no more than a metaphor. The whole action of the intellect is, therefore, completed within this faculty, and though it be representative, is not transitive. It does not work any change in the phantasmata, nor is it concerned with them except as a necessary condition in this life of its own operations. Hence the actions of sense and intellect are contemporaneous and parallel and in the same substance, but this is the utmost we can say. The intellect produces in itself an intelligible image of that object whose sensible image is already in the imagination. Suarez adds that this is the doctrine of S. Thomas.\* The substance of it has been taught by Liberatore, Palmieri, Balmez, and possibly by Leibnitz himself.

The second explanation is rendered intricate by its relations with the Thomistic theory of accidents. Yet, apart from this, it may be discussed, we imagine, with considerable profit to all sides. It supposes that the name of intellect may be given to two really distinct faculties—that of abstraction and that of understanding. The former has for its proper function

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\* Summa, p. I. q. 85, ar. 1.



simply to abstract and thereby to invest the sensible object with the form of universality; the latter, under the influence of this form, perceives the object (not the idea, which is only the "medium quo intelligitur") and so apprehends. And this is why the action of the Intellectus Agens is transitive, for it passes to a term outside of itself, and produces a term in another distinct faculty. The Intellectus Agens is the light of the soul; the Intellectus Possibilis may be compared to the eye, which can only see when there is an object illuminated for it to see. But, of course, neither the sensible object, nor its sensible representation is transferred bodily to the intellect. But the Intellectus Agens turns to that representation in the imaginative faculty, lights it up, and then produces the idea, or "species impressa," which is a spiritual entity formally representing the object, and informing as a principle of action the Intellectus Possibilis. As all these phrases, except perhaps "formal representation," are used by S. Thomas, and he probably held the common view of real accidents, it would be a miracle indeed if no one quoted him in favour of the Dominican Schools and against Suarez. Accordingly, there is a cloud of witnesses, far too many to enumerate, who have substituted this doctrine of two intellects for the one first mentioned by us.

The issue between them is clear enough. Both say that the intellect is a light which illuminates the sensible object, or the phantasmata, for this is the same thing. But the Thomists require a positive and definite action of intellect upon sense, and this they call abstraction. Non-Thomists cannot make any meaning out of this, and consider that with such a view, they must give up abstraction as a mystery. They add that, of course, there is a *kind of illumination and elevation* arising from the fact that these sensible objects produce their sensible representations in a soul which belongs to a higher grade of being, and is *both* sentient and intelligent. Certainly, too, the light of intellect is that which enables us to see things in their universal aspects, but this leaves matters where they were. Grant a modification or determination of the one subject, and let this subject be really capable of understanding, and you have all that can be asked. If you inquire the reason why of this intellectual power, some sort of answer may be given by referring to the purely immaterial nature of the faculty. But, to tell the truth, we do not thoroughly penetrate the essence of intellect, we can only generalize and argue from its known operations, and our explanation must halt somewhere before it has got to the ultimate reason.

This, it may be, will show us the lie of the ground and give us the means of arriving at a practical decision for ourselves, if not of passing a judgment on the intrinsic merits of the controversy. What ought we to think of a theory which professes to be ideally complete and eliminates all trace of mystery? which is clear from beginning to end, and denies that it has left anything unexplored? We do not see our way to holding any other opinion than this, that the theory must be either a delusion, or the fruit of infused and preternatural knowledge. Philosophers do not pretend to the latter; then it is probably a case of the former. The last word on abstraction ought, therefore, to involve a mystery. We conceive that it does so. A natural capacity of ideally illuminating sensible objects is inherent in us, but when shall we come to know how this can be? The obscurity seems impenetrable. Suarez and the Thomists illustrate both sides of the problem for us: he enlarges upon the part we can understand, they are constantly recurring to the part which is mysterious. We attach a plain, full sense to all that *he* has to lay before us; when we turn to *them*, it is like the sound of a voice through the storm, we distinguish nothing. Hence the Thomists will be always argued against, their definitive phrases shown almost to contain some contradiction, and all the same, they will never be discomfited for good. The theory of Suarez will draw to its side the men of clear understanding and logical ability, but it will never give complete satisfaction. It is a working and workable solution of the problem, like the sum of an infinite series, but is not the sum, merely a limit, and is there not beyond it a series of infinite approximations?

What if this be the account of S. Thomas's own apparent vacillation on the point at issue? He may perchance have given both solutions, and sometimes accentuated one, sometimes the other? It would, surely, not derogate from his unapproachable dignity to think so. For we do not say that these are contradictory, but that they represent a partially-illuminated disk, half in light, half in shadow. The nature and general function of the intellect are preserved in both, and their union would show, not that a thinker had forgotten his previous reasonings, but that he felt himself in the presence of a whole object too great and wide for him to comprehend. The duty of science is to ascertain all the phenomena and causes which can be ascertained: the duty of man as an intelligent being is to remember that heavenly and not earthly philosophy contains the solutions of all mysteries.

This is the state in which we leave the question. Abstraction considered in the object is due to its perfection of

virtual multiplicity by which the unity is equal to a series of partial representations. The aspects thus reproduced are all capable of existing, a *parte rei*, in other things besides this individual, nor does one of them necessarily postulate the other,\* unless we are speaking of the transcendentals.† Abstraction considered in the subject is due, in the first place, to its limitation, for it is said to abstract by neglecting to observe or overlooking a large number of intelligible characteristics. But this is not the whole. We are called upon to explain how the mind reaches that one note which it does perceive. The answer is, by forming within itself an immanent term or indwelling word representing the object and expressing this view of it. But how does it come to utter this word? Partly, we reply, by reason of a determination received through the senses, partly by its own native energy. Explain these. The determination appears to be sufficient, because what operates is not a separate faculty, but this intelligent and sentient being. The energy—we cannot explain that except by detailing its operations, and this we have just done. Its nature in itself and previous to action is not known to us: we can only say it must have been a force capable of this special function, but as yet quiescent. This is our way of speaking about all forces in such a state. What is the force of gravitation before it acts? or the faculty of sense? But may we not say that intellect is a force or faculty invested with the habitual and innate idea of Being? We answer, No, unless the after-operation cannot be explained without this. As a matter of fact such habitual ideas prior to all experience are neither necessary nor possible to man. "Well," say the Thomists, "we do not admit innate ideas any more than others who hold with S. Thomas, but is there not required some initial illumination of the object in order that the intellect may express it?" It may be so, nay, it seems as though it must be so, when we think that the object cannot touch the intellect as the intellect, but can only touch the man whose intellect it is. But in what this illumination may consist, over and above what Suarez has told us, we do not understand. We have arrived, it seems, at the confines of a great natural mystery. Others may be able to gaze into it, but not even they, not any man by his natural powers, will know how to pierce it through.

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\* *Distinctio cum præcisione objectiva.*

† *Distinctio cum præcisione formali.*

# ART. VIII.—SECULAR EDUCATION IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

*Public Education in the United States.* By HUGH SEYMOUR TREMENHEERE.  
*Thoughts selected from the Writings of Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts Education Board.*

*Reply to the Remarks of Thirty-one Boston Schoolmasters.* By HORACE MANN.

*Lecture on Education.* By HORACE MANN.

*De l'Education.* Par Mgr. DUPANLOUP, Evêque d'Orléans.

*La Liberté de l'Enseignement Supérieur.* Par Mgr. DUPANLOUP.

[We have had great pleasure in acceding to a suggestion made by the contributor of this article, that it should appear simultaneously in the new "Catholic American Quarterly." The article has more immediate reference to the United States than even to England; and we are only too glad to exhibit ourselves as thoroughly at one with our new and vigorous transatlantic contemporary, in that opposition to a predominantly secular education, which in these days may be accounted among the most characteristic notes of a true Catholic.]

NOBODY reproaches a tree because it sends its branches into the air and its roots into the ground. In doing so it only obeys a natural law. When the Church claims the right to teach her own children she does the same thing. She is a mother, and loves her own, as mothers are apt to do. They need her care, and would perish without it. For this end she was created, that she might secure victory to her children in their conflict with the world and the devil. That is the purpose for which she exists. And she fulfils it chiefly by *teaching* them. When the world says to her, as it begins to do in our day, "Give me your children to educate," it invites her to commit suicide. It might as well say to her, "Cease to exist." But that is a matter in which she has no liberty of choice. She *must* exist. She is not a fabric of human art, much less a product of spontaneous generation, but owes her being to the creative *fiat* of the Almighty. And as she is not the author of her own life, she has no power to lay it down, even if she had the wish. It is her destiny to endure "till the consummation of all things." God will have it so. Her children have never known, and never will know, any anxiety on that point; because her Divine Founder,

whose word is truth, has said, that no power of earth or hell, separately or in combination, "shall prevail against her." Both men and demons have done what they could, and have given her a troubled life; but even her impenitent adversaries understand, and confess with despair, that they are doomed to perpetual defeat, and she to eternal victory. "When we reflect on the tremendous assaults which she has survived," said Macaulay, "we find it difficult to conceive in what way she is to perish."

The special function of the Church is to teach: "Go, teach all nations." She has, indeed, other duties towards the children of men, being, as S. Paul says, "the pillar and ground of the truth," "the dispenser of the mysteries of God," and the sole channel through which the most precious gifts of the Creator are distributed to the creature. "They have not God for a father," was the language of the saints, "who have not the Church for a mother." But it is on the manner in which she discharges her *teaching office* that her life and theirs mainly depend. Vast as is the power delegated to her by her Founder, and the might which comes from her inseparable union with Him, it is with an infirm and unstable race that she has to deal, and she cannot change the conditions of her warfare. She has to protect the weak against the strong, human simplicity against diabolical craft. If her vigilance were not unsleeping, a combat so unequal could have only one result. Only supernatural armour can resist the deadly thrust which easily pierces through all human defences. The son of Jesse might refuse to wear a coat of mail, but it was because the sling and the stone with which he went to battle were weapons which God had lent him. If "the God of the armies of Israel" had so willed it, he could have strangled the Philistine with a silken thread. There is no might nor strength against God. But if we would be invulnerable, like David, we must be, as he was, in alliance with God. It is by union with His Church that we attain union with Him. She alone can equip us with that complete panoply which the shafts of the enemy cannot pierce. It is in her armoury that we shall find, and not elsewhere, the sword of the spirit and the helmet of salvation. Woe to us if we go forth to battle without her! It will not be long before the Philistine has his foot on our neck. There is no satanical artifice so transparent, and none so effective, as that which tempts human imbecility to mortal combat, without the only ally who can give it even a chance of victory! Yet in our own day the weakest member of the "diabolical trinity" has made an insane compact with the strongest, of which we begin, in more than one land, to see the fruits. "Your fundamental

mistake," says the Devil to the world, "is allowing the Church to educate your children." "Very true," replies the idiotic world, "but it is not too late to correct the mistake, especially with your valuable co-operation." The result of this conference between the two unequal but sympathetic potentates is a combined resolve to throttle the human race, or as much of it as they can contrive to grasp, with "secular education."

The project is not entirely new, for Julian tried it, not without a certain momentary appearance of success; but God took the apostate away, and the Church went on teaching. If the world could be induced to reason about such matters, we should ask it what it proposes to gain, even according to its own estimate of gain, by its latest bargain with Satan? But, as the gentle Fénelon said, "the world has still more need of reason than of faith." If it would reason first, it might end by believing. Let it consider, for example, if it desires to impart even a semblance of reason to its own proceedings, or to suggest a plausible justification of them, on what grounds it contests the right of the Church to educate her own children, and what are the ascertained results of attempting to supersede her in that function? The only reason which secularists have ever alleged is really, as far as the Church is concerned, no reason at all. People are so divided in their religious opinions, they say, and their differences so envenomed and irreconcilable, that our only chance of making education universal is by altogether excluding religion from our programme. This may be an impressive argument as respects those who do *not* belong to the Church, but how does it apply to those who do? Why should two-thirds of all the Christians in the world, who abide in unity and are subject to authority, be violently mulcted of their most sacred rights and reduced to spiritual famine, because the other third, who are outside the Church, find it easier to suppress religion altogether than to hold the same opinions about it? There is only one answer to this question. It is furnished by a candid American Protestant. "Secularism is not religious *neutrality*," he says, "but public atheism, the most intolerant and oppressive of all sectarianisms that have prevailed on earth."\* It is intolerable to the secularist that any one should believe more than he does; and as he finds, to his extreme mortification, that what *he* calls reason has no power to quench faith, and what he calls science quite as little, he goes to Parliament, or Congress, or Reichsrath, and says, with a forehead of brass and a face which knows not how to blush: "Oblige me by putting down

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\* "Things Sacred and Secular in American Life," p. 16.



Christian teachers by force, and count upon my vote and that of my friends to make it worth your while." As all the Governments of our day are officially atheistic,—except, perhaps, that of Ecuador,—and legislate as if there was no God, or none of whom they need take account, they reply: "Prove that your votes outnumber those of the Christians, and we are entirely at your service." The whole "science of government" as practised in the nineteenth century is epitomized in that response.

Is it unreasonable in Christians to desiderate, in a matter of such tremendous gravity,—affecting not only the future destiny but even the present fortunes of human society,—a little less of brute force and a little more of rational argument? We are open to conviction; and if the secularist can prove either that the Church has not the power, or has lost it, or has not the will, and is not likely to have it, to educate her own children, and make them good citizens as well as good Christians, we will endeavour to accept School Boards, if not with enthusiasm, at least with resignation. On that hypothesis, the final ruin of modern society may as well be accomplished by secular education as by anything else. If we must be buried, we are not particular about the depth of our grave, the shape of the coffin, or the colour of the pall. Let the worms who will feed on us dispute about that. But is it *true* that the Church has lost either the power or the will to do what God appointed her to do? That she had both once, and not so long ago, nobody disputes. As late as the seventeenth century, one of the giant intellects of that age confessed, her schools were the best ever seen on earth! Bacon, to whom men ascribe the glory of proposing the true method of cultivating science, ought to be an authority with all who quote him in that character. Aristotle was not more truly the father of inductive philosophy, according to contemporary critics, than Bacon of scientific investigation. We might, perhaps, dispute the statement, but have no present motive for doing so. We are content to invite materialists and secularists to listen to their own oracle. "As to the art of instructing youth," said Bacon, "the shortest method would be to say, *look at the schools of the Jesuits*, for among institutions of this kind there is nothing better."\* The immense and incontestable superiority of the Catholic schools, more than a century after the so-called Reformation, was so notorious, that Mr. Buckle finds in it the

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\* "Ad pedagogicam quod attinet, brevissimum foret dictu: *Consule scholas Jesuitarum*; nihil enim, quod in usum venit, his melius." (*De Augmentis Scientiarum*," lib. vi. cap. 4, p. 341. Argentorati, 1635.)

explanation of the famous antithesis of Macaulay: "Fifty years after the Lutheran separation, Catholicism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Mediterranean; a hundred years after the separation, Protestantism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Baltic." The Protestant clergy, says Mr. Buckle, "destroyed the possibility of free inquiry, and, so far as they were able, put a stop to the acquisition of all real knowledge." They ordered their Synods to "have a watchful eye over those ministers who study chemistry,"—what would they have said to the Jesuit missionaries who, as Humboldt remarked, recorded their observations on terrestrial magnetism?—"and grievously reprove and censure them." The result was that many Protestants, "seeing that under such a system it was impossible to educate their families with advantage, sent their children to some of those celebrated Catholic colleges, *where alone a sound education could then be obtained.*"\* The contrast was so fundamental, that a French writer says of one of the Protestant sects of his land, "*s'ils avaient vaincu, la France était perdue pour la vraie civilisation.*"†

But there was nothing new in this zeal of the Church to impart education. Long ages before Bacon attested her superiority as a teacher over all her rivals, she was founding in all Europe, and notably in our own land, those famous universities which the German Huber frankly styles "a bequest from Catholic to Protestant England." "As early as the end of the *ninth* century," he says, in the very darkest of the so-called dark ages, "Oxford was the seat of a school of the highest intellectual cultivation then existing." The Church did not wait for any impulse from "modern thought" or "modern civilization,"—cant words which feebly veil the penury of the one and the degradation of the other,—to enforce the principle upon which she has always acted, that the only limit of attainable knowledge is the limit of opportunity. "Most of the Continental universities," continues the Protestant Huber, "originated in entire dependence on the Church," and "her mode of exercising so important a trust is marked by an honourable activity." Nay more, "the new intellectual impulse sprang up, not only on the domain and under the guidance of the Church, *but out of ecclesiastical schools.*" And the great central authority, to which Christendom was then happily subject, lent all its energy and influence

\* Buckle's "History of Civilization in England," vol. i. ch. 9, p. 587. Third edition.

† "Services que le Catholicisme a rendus à la France," par M. le Vte. de Gazan, p. 43.

to this intellectual movement. "From the beginning of the eleventh century," we are still quoting Huber, "the Papal Bulls and Briefs took notes of the most minute details of management, even *superintending* the schools, as far as the age permitted." If the Church were really indifferent or hostile to cultivation of mind and the progress of knowledge, as her mendacious detractors affect to believe, her apathy had a curious resemblance to zeal, her repugnance to sympathy, and her hatred to friendship. She disguised her imaginary aversion to intellectual life with such complete success, that Huber sees only a notable *contrast* between the present and the earlier condition of our own universities. "There is no question," he says, "that during the Middle Age the English universities were distinguished *far more than ever afterwards* by energy and variety of intellect." Such a witness deserves to be heard to the end. He is speaking of a time when the Holy See was the supreme arbiter in all human affairs, and its authority an essential part of the public law of Europe. The Church was then free, as she had never been before, to mould human society according to her own maxims, and to take the initiative in all which related to its orderly progress. There were none to accuse and none to instruct her. Her action was spontaneous and unfettered, for she was truly Queen of the Nations. And how did she use the sovereignty which none disputed? "Later times," is the answer of Huber to this capital question, "cannot produce a concentration of men eminent in all the learning and science of the age, *such as Oxford and Cambridge then poured forth*, mightily influencing the intellectual development of all Western Christendom." And it was the very men who were most completely identified with the Church, who felt with her heart and thought with her mind, who were the most active and untiring agents both in stimulating the thirst for knowledge, and in satisfying the desire which their own contagious example had created. It was from the cloisters and monasteries of the Church that the hosts of students of that age, allured by no sordid motive, and attracted by no temporal advantage, received both the invitation to aspire to learning, and the direction, equally patient and acute, of the labours to which they were nobly encouraged. Among their teachers the immense majority were of the same class and profession; "most of these worthies," as Huber continues, "being monks of the Benedictine, Franciscan, Dominican, Carmelite, or reformed Augustinian order." It was no languid and intermittent effort which these laborious monks inspired, but a sustained and generous enthusiasm. "In consequence of this surpassing celebrity, Oxford became

the focus of a prodigious congregation of students," amounting in the thirteenth century to thirty thousand! And this vast concourse, which, as he observes, "eminently testifies intellectual activity in the nation and times," was the more significant of the real character of that triumphal age of the Church, "since the university was as yet very poor, and had no outward attractions to offer."\* And it was the same in Scotland as in England. "It ought not to be forgotten," said the late James Forbes, "that it is to the Mediæval Church that we are indebted for our universities. Three out of the four universities of Scotland had Catholic bishops for their founders."†

It would carry us too far if we were to attempt to illustrate in detail the character and temper of the old "monastic missionaries," who, as Montalembert says in his "Monks of the West,"‡ though they "were in reality the most direct agents, the most immediate envoys from the Holy See who had been yet seen in Christendom," not only exhorted our forefathers to liberal studies, and taught them "*self-government*, that is to say, the proud independence of the free man among his fellows in the general commonwealth," but made them at the same time "a nation of Christians more fervent, more liberal, more docile and attached to the Church, more fruitful in saintly men and women, than any other contemporary nation." But if we have no space for such details, we ask permission to give a single example, taken from a very early age, of the sagacity, prudence, and true enlightenment of the old English monks. S. Aldhelm, who in the *seventh* century was able to write both Latin and Greek, and who was buried with all honour and reverence by S. Dunstan, himself the noble successor of S. Odo, displays in the following remark the acuteness and supreme good sense of which, in every age, such men were always examples. Even the shallow and empirical critics of our day, whose "*superficial omniscience*" would have provoked a kind of jovial disgust in the philosophic saints whom they ignorantly despise, will perhaps consent to applaud it. "Apocryphorum enim nœnias," said this recluse of the seventh century, "et incertas frivolorum fabulas, nequaquam Catholica receptat Ecclesia."§ We should like to give other examples of monkish intelligence in these remote ages, but the seductive temptation must be resisted. "Modern thought" does not seem to us to have supplied their places.

\* Huber, "The English Universities," vol. i. pp. 13, 17, 43, 65, 66, ed. Francis Newman, 1843.

† "Life of James David Forbes, F.R.S.," p. 394.

‡ Vol. v. p. 184.

§ S. Aldhelm, "De Laudibus Virginitatis."

When faith disappears, everything else goes with it; for faith, as S. Augustine remarked, is a "condition of knowledge," as well as of all true nobility. The Church had enriched England with seminaries of learning, which were at the same time schools of piety; under the withering influence of the new national sect they quickly ceased to be either. In the time of Edward VI., to quote Huber once more, "the universities were made essentially Protestant, . . . and every academician whose conscience forbade him to renounce Catholicism was ejected. Anthony Wood relates that in Oxford fourteen heads of colleges and nearly ninety fellows were expelled, and among these were some of the most learned men." The decay was progressive, and in the reign of Elizabeth, "the most trustworthy evidence sets it beyond all doubt, that intellectual quite as much as moral and religious interests at the universities were at so low an ebb, as not to compare with far less favoured periods." As to the academical students, few in number compared with the host who flocked thither in the Middle Ages, "their morals and sentiments are described at the same time as having been in the highest degree wild, selfish, loose, devoid of all earnestness, honour, or piety." The "Catholic bequest to Protestant England" had been in a few years so effectually squandered, that, according to the decisive testimony of Anthony Wood, "in Oxford itself you have to search after the Oxford University, so greatly has everything changed for the worse."\*

It appears, then, by the unsuspecting evidence of Bacon and Huber, that from the seventh to the seventeenth century, the Church was both the most zealous and the most efficient teacher, not only of divine but of human learning. "A sure and unbroken progress of intellectual culture," says Von Ranke, "had been going on within its bosom for a series of ages; *all* the vital and productive elements of human culture were here united and mingled."† If the Church, as certain sociologists of our day assure us, has renounced her glorious past; abdicated, whether from weariness or a sense of incapacity, her teaching office, and resolved, for the first time in her long history, to oppose the progress of knowledge, and discountenance mental culture, we should like to ask, without expecting any reply, what intelligible token she has given of these new dispositions? Wherever she is least fettered in her action—as in England, France, Holland, Ireland, Canada, and the

\* Huber, pp. 307, 326.

† "History of the Reformation in Germany," by Leopold von Ranke, vol. i. book ii. chap. i. p. 251. Ed. Austin.

United States—she is actually founding new educational institutions. In the direction of these colleges and universities, for which she desires a constantly wider extension, her bishops everywhere invite the co-operation of the highest available talent. Not a question of science, philosophy, history, literature, or art, is proscribed. Every truth is welcome, because every truth is sacred. Without endowments, of which she has been despoiled, she combats enemies whose resources have been mainly derived from her own rifled treasury. In every arena of fair competition it is not her children who occupy the lowest place. A single supernatural virtue is indeed more precious in her judgment than a hundred triumphs of unconsecrated art, or a thousand efforts of unhallowed genius; but she is now, as ever, the home of the highest forms of the one, the source of the noblest products of the other. We see no change in her, either in her testimony to revealed truth, or her attitude towards the development of human knowledge. In both she remains unalterably the same. Why, then, should she cease to teach the world now, who for so many ages was its *only* teacher? Has she lost her gift? Has He who gave transferred it to other hands? Let those who claim to supersede her produce their diploma. If He who is "without variableness or shadow of change" has divorced His long cherished Spouse, and plucked from her brow the nuptial crown, by what apocryphal court was the decree pronounced, and in what fantastic register shall we find it recorded?

There is little wisdom in proposing bootless questions, to which no reply can be given. It is not the Church, we are told, who has changed, being constitutionally incapable of meriting that flattering reproach; but the progress of science has abolished the supernatural, refuted revelation, and reduced the Bible to the level of an oriental fable. There are people who profess to believe that! If we asked them *which* established truth of science is in formal contradiction with which truth of revelation, we doubt if they would tell us. It is less compromising to say, in vague and general terms, that faith and science are irreconcilable. This formula is at once more imposing and more elastic. It is also, which is perhaps an additional merit, totally untrue. The truths of science are one thing; its guesses, peradventures, and crude hypotheses are another. It is the latter only which ever did, or ever will, conflict with faith. One truth cannot contradict another, and it is notorious that, even in recent times, the great *discoverers* in the field of science, who have really added to the sum of human knowledge, have been earnest believers in revelation.



"Ask all the great men of the seventeenth century," says Mgr. Dupanloup, himself a man of vigorous and well-furnished mind, "who were the fathers of the modern sciences,—Leibnitz, Kepler, Newton, Bacon, Descartes, Pascal,—if faith repudiates science?"\* Ask in our own day, he adds, Ampère, Biot, Cauchy: with whom we may name Brewster, Forbes, Whewell, Faraday, and Owen. Of Forbes, his biographer says, "his scientific habits of thought never disturbed or cast the shadow of a doubt over his faith."† It is, in fact, only men of an inferior grade, both morally and intellectually, who would have been equally impious if they had been wholly ignorant of science, who pretend that there is any real conflict between truths of the natural and the supernatural order. "If you say that we are enemies of science," continues Mgr. Dupanloup, "give us back our professorial chairs, and we will show you that the genius of Christian *savants* is not an extinguished flame. But you insult us with impunity, while you refuse to untie our hands."

These noble words of the Bishop of Orleans, who has so little respect for ignorance that he has taught his own seminary to act the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, bring us to the grave topic to which what has been said thus far is only introductory, and reveal the true motive of those pretended votaries of science who wish to expel the Church from all share in the work of public education. They are really solicitous not, like Kepler and Leibnitz, about true science, but only about their own cynical theories and profane assumptions. This is what Professor Huxley has in view when he says, "the Roman Catholic Church is the one great spiritual organization which is able to resist, and must as a matter of life and death resist, the progress of science and modern civilization."‡ He wants that "nucleated mass of protoplasm" which is called man to be free to say whatever he pleases, without being subject to the vexatious admonitions of the Church. To be maintained always in the harmony of truth is an odious limitation of liberty. What is the use of being free if one is not free to err? But the Church is the witness and guardian of a certain deposit of revealed truth, and though she has no special lights about magnetism, chemistry, or biology, she has an infallible test by which she can try each of them, and every other human science. Starting from the principle that one truth cannot contradict another, and that the truths of faith are more certain than the truths of sense, because

\* "La Liberté de l'Enseignement supérieur," p. 23.

† "Life," p. 453.

‡ "Lay Sermons," iv. 61.

they rest on a more solid foundation, she arrives at the eminently rational conclusion, that when the doubtful and fluctuating presumes to dictate to the positive and permanent, when the human tries to soar with unsteady wing above the divine, when the nebulous dream of every pretentious pedant usurps the function and parodies the authority of all the Prophets and all the Apostles, there is no argument in all this against the salutary interposition of the Church, but rather against the inconceivable folly of those who resent its action and forfeit its help, only to commit that mental *ἑλαργυγῇ* which is the form of suicide most prevalent in our age.

Among the possible eccentricities of "modern thought" there is one which we have not yet encountered. We never met a man, even in the ranks of the most "advanced thinkers," who contended that in the acquisition of a foreign language the use of a grammar and dictionary is a fatal impediment. Yet this would be a rational proposition compared with the delirious popular notion that the authority which God has given to His Church is adverse to mental freedom. It is, in fact, its surest defence. If truths of every order were simply axiomatic, and if human reason were wholly exempt from error in its operations, we might evidently dispense with guides and teachers. But this absurdity finds so little acceptance even in our chaotic generation, that it is only in the sphere of spiritual truths that men claim to ignore authority. Writers like Professor Bain and Sir George Cornewall Lewis\* concur in the statement, that "between Authority and Reason there is no opposition"; and the pontiffs of materialism exact from their disciples a submission not less complete than the Church claims from hers. The main difference between them is, that the one maintains the rights of truth, the other the privileges of error. In the Church, now as in all former ages, every speculation is legitimate, in every sphere of thought, subject to this sole restriction, that no conclusion can be admitted which in itself or by legitimate consequence contradicts a revealed truth, previously established, and resting upon a fixed and immovable foundation. It is this fruitful and salutary postulate which encourages in Catholics the widest liberty of thought, because it supplies a certain guarantee against its errors and excesses. In the Middle Ages, when the authority of the Church was supreme in every conscience, and dominated every intellect, there was a riot of speculation, *de omni re scibili*. Huber thinks he perceives "an essential similarity between the general movement of mind in the present

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\* "Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion," ch. iii. p. 64.

nineteenth century and that in the *twelfth*"; and adds that "the Church met the new speculative tendency not altogether in hostility," but that "for whatever of the old studies survived, the merit is hers."\* When a man contends in our day, like Earl Russell and his echo Mr. Gladstone, that the Church stifles mental freedom, he only proves that he has lost his own, and contradicts the whole history of human thought. Her office is to secure it from senseless aberrations, which she alone has the power to do, because she possesses the eternal copyright of that grammar and dictionary which give the only clue to the divine language of revelation, and the rules by which it is to be interpreted.

And for this reason, as Von Ranke admits, the course of human thought was "a sure and unbroken progress for a series of ages," as long as the authority of the Church was respected. Since the great revolt of the sixteenth century, which gave to every man, as Goethe said, "the right to judge all things, without giving him the power," the ephemeral products of what is still called "thought" are chiefly remarkable for the voracity with which they devour one another. The truth of to-day is the fable of to-morrow, and our spurious philosophers, as a French ecclesiastical writer lately remarked, "after denying everything else, have ended by denying themselves." Like the old pagans, their sterile discussions end in a cry of despair, and the last word of their impotent philosophy is the ludicrous confession that all which is worth knowing is unknowable. Hence the grand discovery of our age, by which it hopes to regain all which it has lost, that religion must be divorced from education, and that the discrowned Teacher of the Nations must be content to veil her face before the rising sun of parochial magnates and district School Boards.

If it should turn out that a fundamental error, of enormous dimensions, lurks at the root of this new scheme by which the world proposes to try its hand in doing the work of the Church, it may chance that before long people will be saying of it, in the words of Lord Bacon, "the misery is, that the most effectual means are now applied *to the ends least to be desired*."† Evidence in support of that view of the subject accumulates with frightful rapidity. Witnesses of the most opposite character and principles, and of various nationalities, concur in the opinion that the secular education craze is either a delusion or a crime, or both at once. That it will be fruitless as a preventive against wickedness, and has not the remotest tendency to operate in that direction, even the prophets of the

\* Vol. i. pp. 5, 11.

† Bacon's "Essays, Civil and Moral."

unknowable emphatically assert. "The time will come," says Mr. Huxley, "when Englishmen will quote our educational maxims as the stock example of the stolid stupidity of their ancestors in the nineteenth century"; and he adds, "If I am a knave or a fool, teaching me to read and write won't make me less of either one or the other."\* "We have no evidence," observes Mr. Herbert Spencer, "that education, as commonly understood, is a preventive of crime." Facts look quite the other way; for, as he continues, "did much knowledge and piercing intelligence suffice to make men good, then Bacon should have been honest, and Napoleon should have been just."† In other words, though these gentlemen do not say it, secular education assumes as the only motive of human action one which is utterly powerless for good, and offers a remedy for human evils which can only augment them. Secular education no more tends to produce virtue in any man, either civic or religious, than teaching a dog to carry a parcel, or an ape to jump through a hoop. "L'éducation et l'instruction," says the Bishop of Orleans, "sont deux choses profondément distinctes."‡ But that is an elementary truth which has no place in the meagre philosophy of School Boards. Even Professor Max Müller would tell them that "truth is not found by addition and multiplication only";§ a fact which does not easily penetrate the parochial mind. Suggest to our educational satraps, who are the scourge of ratepayers and the Nemesis of washerwomen with large families, that something else is wanting,—though it were only the *θεῖόν τι* of Aristotle, or the "divine inspiration" of Plato,—and you will be like Ovid among the Thracians:—

Barbarus his ego sum, quia non intelligor illis.

Yet M. Thiers, whose free scope is not limited by any excessive respect for Christian maxims, once told the French Chamber, not simply that secular education is an unsubstantial bubble, but that no lay person can really *educate*,—he did not say *instruct*,—because "*il y faut du prêtre ou du religieux*." The most eminent of his countrymen, as Mgr. Dupanloup observes, have comprehended the absolute necessity of uniting religion with education. Guizot said that education without religion "*is a danger for society*"; and Cousin, who was careful to make his own peace with God and the Church before he died, did not fear to add, "It is the duty of families

\* "Lay Sermons," iii. 38, 41.

† "State Education Self-defeating," pp. 13, 15.

‡ "De l'Éducation," par Mgr. Dupanloup, tome i. ch. iv. p. 180.

§ "Lectures on the Science of Language," p. 35.

and of the clergy to combat any school where positive religious instruction is not given."\*

"All that may be very true," reply our impenitent secularists, "and if it is, we shall probably find it out sooner or later; but what in the world are we to do? If you will quarrel so fiercely about religion, which has become the most active disintegrating force of our time, we have no alternative but to banish that element of combustion from our schools." The difficulty may be a real one, though it is none of ours; but who does not see that it is revolt against the Church which has introduced this new curse into the world? No one pretends that it ever had any place among Catholics. "It is certain," said Lord Bacon, in whose writings we hardly expected to find such a sentiment, "that heresies and schisms are of all others the greatest scandals, yea, more than corruption of manners."† This great thinker, who was an ardent supporter of the Established Church because his royal mistress was its chief patron, did not consider that his reflection came a little too late. That Church was founded on *the right of revolt*, and could not long refuse to others the privilege which it had used so largely itself. The example was contagious. "It is true," said a famous Anglican at a later date, comparing his own raw sect with the Apostolic Church, "there were not so many schisms and divisions then as there are now; but the reason was," he plaintively adds, "*because the people did not make them*, as many do in our days, who, notwithstanding that they are admitted into our Church, are so far from continuing steadfast in communion with it, that they never think they can separate themselves far enough from it."‡ Vain lament! Nobody listens to the sot preaching temperance, nor to the sectary whining about schism. Example in both cases is more potent than precept. "Let Anglicans cease to maunder about schism," said the "Spectator" not long ago, "or cease to be Anglicans." Secular education, with its fatal cohort of attendant evils, is one of the inevitable results of the so-called Reformation, which has pretty nearly killed religion in every country which accepted it, and is now going to extinguish the little that remains by a process which, after being matured in other lands, is at length being adopted in our own.

Holy Scripture says, "Surely in vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird." Not quite in vain! Let the bird-catcher keep *himself* out of sight, which he is crafty enough

\* "La Liberté de l'Enseignement supérieur," p. 19.

† "Essays Civil and Moral."

‡ Beveridge, "Works," vol. ii. p. 437. 1843.

to do, and his net will soon be filled with birds of various plumage. We propose to illustrate this fact in the natural history of bird-catching mainly by the example of the United States. They are an acute people, at least in temporal matters, and see certain things very clearly, provided the range is not too great, and the objects looked at not too far from the ground. So many of them have been caught already in the net, where they lie fluttering in miserable captivity, that things in the air, and in the heavens above, have become quite invisible to them. But the same thing has happened in a good many other lands, the bird-catcher being everywhere diligent in his calling; and *State education* in Europe has banished all the songsters from the sky quite as effectually as *Common Schools* in America. It is fair to our Transatlantic kinsmen to recognize this fact, if they can derive any consolation from it. They may possibly be gratified to learn, though we wish them purer joys, that a so-called education in which the Church has had no share has produced exactly the same catastrophe in the older communities of France, Germany, and Russia as in the modern American Union.

The State in France has long had the monopoly of higher education, because every public career was closed to those who sought it from other hands; and Mgr. Dupanloup quotes the observation of M. Le Play, a former senator, who says of Paris, "There is no city in Europe in which corruption has attained the same intensity." Many years ago M. de Cormenin vainly warned his countrymen that the State colleges and lyceums had become "*les portes de l'enfer*." It is these fatal institutions, in which God was ignored and the Church insulted, which have brought France to her present condition, destroyed manliness and even patriotism, made revolution permanent, government impossible, and deluged the land with an obscene literature which scoffs at marriage, condones adultery, and has retained of Christian morality, as a living Frenchman bitterly observed, only this cynical reversal of two of its maxims: "Hate your neighbour, and love your neighbour's wife." "*Les lettres françaises*," says another writer, "*ont pris un caractère de légèreté à mesure que l'étude de la religion a perdu de son importance; et l'on pourrait suivre les degrés de leur décadence, en suivant les progrès de l'impiété.*"\* "*Notre littérature*," adds the Père Caussette, in accounting for the misfortunes of his country, "*est devenue la plus immorale de l'Europe actuelle.*"† It is to the pupils

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\* "De l'Etude des Lettres," ch. v. p. 128.

† "Dieu et les Malheurs de la France," p. 47. 1871.



of a system of public education divorced from religion that France owes the calamities which have overwhelmed her, and for which her material prosperity is the feeblest kind of compensation; but though a vigorous reaction has commenced, and the Legislature, taught by intolerable evils, has at length conceded to the Church the right of free instruction, in the hope that she may exorcise the unclean spirits who profited by her enforced silence to make France their prey, their incorrigible human confederates, gnashing their teeth at the approach of any deliverer *qui venit in nomine Domini*, still cry with one voice, "Leave us in the mire in which we love to wallow." The Bishop of Orleans quotes from the "*Revue de Philosophie Positive*" this characteristic argument:—"Observe what is taking place in Belgium. Education is there free, or nearly so; the result of which is that the Catholic and religious universities absorb the whole of the youth of that country." Was ever impiety more frank, or tyranny more candid? The moment we give you freedom, these secularists confess, you beat us out of the field. Therefore no freedom for you! You shall be impious like us, or you shall be nothing. We cannot compete with you in any condition of society in which liberty of the conscience and the intellect is respected, because in the heart of fathers and mothers your voice ever finds a responsive echo; and therefore we invoke the God State to suppress the instincts of human nature by force, to rebuke every aspiration of the soul which finds no place in ours, to build up an impassable wall between Christians and their God, and to tolerate no right but that which *we* claim, because it is the only one we value—the right to ruin ourselves and others.

In Germany, the secularists have got all they asked for, and perhaps a little more. The only unpardonable crime in that country is to be a Christian. The nearest to it in malignity, if we may judge by the Falk code, is to wish to be one. It is liberty enough for Germans, says that code, to believe as the State believes. Germans who prefer to believe *nothing* may do so, but the range of choice lies between those limits. For those who rashly stray into the forbidden domain beyond them there is prompt correction. To all who dare to serve God as their fathers did the judge has three replies: to-day he says, "fine him"; to-morrow, "incarcerate him"; and the next day, "exile him." If you are a priest, as S. Paul was, you shall starve; and, if you are a layman who presumes to feed the priest, you shall starve too. Holy and venerable Bishops, dear to God and man, shall languish in German dungeons, because they say to the German Cæsar, as S. Boniface and

S. Anselm did to the English one, "I will pay due obedience to my lord the Pope." To the furnace with these obstinate malefactors, who, when they "hear the sound of the sackbut, and psalter, and all kinds of music," are so ill-advised as not to "adore the golden statue which the king Nebuchadnezzar has set up." That is the way we arrange things in Prussia. How long it will last is quite another question. It is probable that before long these Prussian Babylonians will be "eating grass like an ox," that they may learn to "glorify the King of Heaven," and know that He "is able to abase them that walk in pride."\* Meanwhile, jubilant secularism, happily blended with discriminating culture-worship, is improving the work of the Church, which it has gagged and manacled after this triumphant fashion. A competent witness, Dr. Krummacher, court chaplain at Potsdam, thus describes the state of religion in Berlin, where he had charge of a large parish. "There was an almost total want of any interest in the Church, or connection with it, among the people, and of the population of *half a million* not more than thirty thousand attended public worship on Sunday, and those mostly women." In the work from which this is an extract, "the author speaks of the foundations of all morality being thoroughly corrupt and decayed, and faith, piety, respect for Divine and human authority, *at an end.*"† Quite recently, the Berlin correspondent of the "Times," though deeply enamoured of the very principles which have effected this ruin of society, gave an account of the same relapse into pagan barbarism which, as the "Spectator" observed the next day, is certainly one to excite very grave reflection, both religious and political. The writer tells us that in Prussia, one-sixth of the Protestant benefices, on becoming vacant, will have to remain vacant for want of candidates; that while the population has been increasing, the number of Protestant theological students in the universities of Prussia has been rapidly diminishing, so that there were only 740 in all the eight Prussian universities in 1873, against 2,203 in 1831. In other words, while the population has augmented by more than one-third, the candidates for the ministry have diminished by two-thirds. The same intelligent English journal continues: "If neither the cultivated class care to teach religion, nor the uncultivated to

\* Daniel iv. 34. "Dieu, comme l'homme, choisit ses verges parmi les éléments les plus bas de la création, parce qu'il est de la nature des verges d'être brisées quand elles ont servi. C'est ainsi que l'Allemagne, après avoir contribué à la moralisation des autres par les excès de son immoralité même, en recevra le châtimement trop mérité." (R. P. Caussette, *ubi supra*, p. 17.)

† "Saturday Review," Oct. 28, 1871.

learn it, the natural inference is that, for the time at least, there is likely to be a reign of the purest secularism among the Protestants of that part of Germany where such tendencies prevail." And this is not all. "As we have no belief at all," continues the "Spectator," with admirable good sense, "in the possibility that there can be any permanent vacuum of religious belief in the mind of a great Western people, we should say that the ground for anxiety which this prospect holds out is not so much fear for the growth of simple worldliness and disbelief in the supernatural, as fear that *some strange and dangerous form of fanaticism* may take its place." After observing that among the acute and educated unbelievers of America, Spiritualism, with its grotesque *diablerie*, "has run like a prairie-fire," the "Spectator" adds: "We should expect to see in Germany some very grim superstitions growing up so soon as the ground recently occupied by German Protestantism has been left fallow for a few years; and we should fear they would be superstitions of a kind likely to give great trouble, not only to the homes of the people, but to the government of the State." We shall see presently that this is exactly what is taking place in Russia, the recoil from State religions, and the contemptuous secularism which they engender, being attended everywhere by the same formidable results. When they come to a head in Germany, with communism and socialism in their train, the blinded statesmen of that land will have to go in sorrowful procession to unbar their prison doors, and entreat the captive bishops and priests to come forth, to stay the ruin which they alone could have averted, by the timely use of remedies which they alone can dispense.

But if liberty is dead and religion dying in Germany, a fate which Bossuet predicted for both in all non-Catholic lands, are not these trifling evils sufficiently compensated by the delightful evidences of increasing "culture" in its highly-educated population? What evidences? If there is a people in all Europe distinguished by a total absence of grace and refinement, and a coarseness and vulgarity of aspect and manners only matched by their impiety, it is the people of North Germany. Julius Froebel, though a German, comparing the uneducated Indian natives of Nicaragua, Chili, and Peru with the masses of his own countrymen, frankly confesses that, "in almost every respect," and especially in that dignity of carriage, which only religion gives, "they are *superior* to our German peasantry."\* No one who had an

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\* "Seven Years' Travel in Central America," ch. x. p. 585.

opportunity of comparing the German officers and soldiery with the French people during the recent occupation of France could fail to be struck with the immense social inferiority of the former. Comparing the "middle classes" of Saxony, the cradle of the Reformation and the nursery of scholars, with the inhabitants of the "darkest dens" of the most abject quarters of London, Mr. Henry Mayhew reports that, both morally and socially, the latter rank the highest! He adds, with a candour which we hardly expect in an English writer, —alluding to "the cant which is extremely consoling to the minds of English clergymen about the social benefits of the Reformation,"—"we can conscientiously aver that the Rhenish *Catholic population* is by many degrees less squalid and less beggarly in their appearance";\* while another impartial observer tells us, that "it is precisely in the tracts of country which are *Catholic to the core* that the peasants are most prosperous"; and again, that "in the Catholic half of Westphalia they are more like well-to-do farmers than like peasants, in the English sense of the word."† Such are the triumphs of secularism in a country which has ceased to be Protestant without becoming Christian.

The people of Russia, naturally inclined towards religion, and once conspicuous by an inherent docility of character, might have rivalled the Irish in purity, faith, and unity, if they had remained, like them, in communion with the Apostolic See. Under the influence of a purely national and political State-Church, wholly severed from Christendom, they are split into a hundred sects, and have substituted, as M. de Bonald observed, a formal or frantic superstition for the faith of S. Methodius and the practice of the ancient Oriental Church, as represented by S. Basil, S. Cyril, S. Chrysostom, and S. Athanasius. It was the constant belief of those great Doctors of the East, attested by the language of its Ecumenical Councils, that only the authority of the Holy See could keep a region so inclined to heresy in the faith. As soon as that authority was denied, the prediction was accomplished. The world has never seen such a monument of the withering effects of schism as exists at this day in Russia. A hundred contemporary writers, German, French, and English, have described the present religious aspect of that nation. Our space will only permit us to cite one, the latest in date, and a Protestant. His testimony will enable us to trace, once more, the effects of a so-called education not directed by the Church.

\* "German Life and Manners," vol. i. p. 384.

† See this REVIEW, October, 1872, p. 341.

"As education spreads," says our informant, "the sectaries multiply." He had good authority for the fact. "I have never known a peasant learn to read," said to me a parish priest, "and think for himself, who did not fall away into dissent."\*\* Yet it is certain that the ruling power in Russia, to which a fictitious religious is the instrument of an efficacious political unity, did not intend, in conceding to peasants the right of thinking, to promote this result. It is a delusion common to all non-catholic leaders of men, to imagine that they can loose the spirit of revolt in one direction and curb it in another. Vain dream! People who have been taught, as in England and Russia, that it is their highest duty to rebel against the Church, are sure to learn, sooner or later, that it is their highest privilege to rebel against everything else. They are learning it so fast in Russia, that the savage measures of repression adopted by the late Czar Nicholas, who predicted that "Russia will perish by her religious divisions," have only accelerated the catastrophe which they were designed to avert. "The result of thirty years of savage persecution is, that the nonconformists are to-day more numerous, wealthy, concentrated, than they were on the day when Nicholas began his reign." Their increase is so well understood, that "already it is felt in governing circles that nothing can be safely done in Russia unless these Old Believers like it. Every new suggestion laid before the Council of Ministers is met (I have been told) by the query—'What will the Old Believers say?'"† "Half the people, even now, are Old Believers, says a priest from Kem, *more than three-fourths will be the moment we are free*"; and Mr. Dixon adds in his own name, and is confirmed by "a German who has lived in Russia for thirty years," that "the Old Believers are the Russian people, while the Orthodox Believers are but a courtly, official, and monastic sect." And all the various sects, many of them holding opinions fatal to social order, who compose what is called "the Popular Church," "are as much the enemies of an official empire as they are of an official church. . . . They refuse to pray for Alexander as a true believer, and they fear he is dead to religion, and lost to God."‡ And while these sects maintain every odious doctrine which heresy can devise or fanaticism propagate, they all profess to derive their religion from the Bible! "Except in some New England homesteads, I have never heard such floods of reference and quotation in my life."§

\* "Free Russia," by William Hepworth Dixon, vol. i. ch. xxv. p. 267. 1870.

† Ch. xxvii. p. 285.    ‡ Ch. xxxiii. p. 348.    § Ch. xxviii. p. 313.

We have seen nothing thus far to shake our conviction that the Church of God was a more successful educator of the people, both in the interests of religion and of the State, than any of the human agencies, secularist or denominational, by which the world has attempted to supply her place. Her superiority is as visible now as it was in the Middle Ages, and will be to the end of time. She teaches *one* religion, not a hundred, and always teaches the same; and she makes loyalty to the civil power in its own sphere, whether monarchical or democratic, not a sentiment, a legend, or a caprice, but a sacred religious obligation. It is not her children who make revolutions. "When you pretend," says the eloquent Bishop of Orleans, "that the Church speaks only of herself,—which you all do, whoever you are, if you profess any doctrine at all,—you forget to add that for the last 1800 years the Church lives and adapts herself, over the whole surface of the globe, and at this hour in the United States as in France, to all political systems constructed by the hand of man. She discharges her mission, defends her just rights, accomplishes her duties, and leaves sovereigns and peoples to arrange as they please their ephemeral constitutions. She is the adversary of nothing but iniquity and oppression."\* And for this reason, while she makes the law of God her sole rule and guide, and aims at nothing but the temporal and eternal welfare of the human race, her instructions tend as directly to the preservation of social order, and the stability of States as to the increase of morality and the perpetuity of the faith. How is it with her human substitutes? In replying to this question our last example shall be taken from the American Union.

There is nothing in which the least reflecting portion of the American public fancy they see more reason for exuberant national self-complacency than in their system of Common Schools. The opinion is not shared by those, whether Americans or Europeans, who retain the admissible conviction, for which there is a good deal to be said, that man is not a machine, nor eternity a fable. Even they who deprecate any revision of the huge code of secularism which Americans have made a kind of national gospel, plead, with rare exceptions, that it is not *designed* to exclude religious instruction, which is properly a domestic affair, and is sufficiently provided for in Sunday schools. That is the sole argument by which the existing system is, or can be defended. But "this means," as one of the most intelligent organs of American opinion

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\* "La Liberté de l'Enseignement supérieur," p. 9.



observes,\* "that thirty hours a week ought to be given to the dictionary and the multiplication table, and one hour to the catechism and the ten commandments." It assumes, that is, as incontestable, that their relative importance is as thirty to one. "Send your children to schools all the week where they will hear nothing whatever of religion, where that most vital of all concerns will be a *forbidden subject*, where the idea will be practically, if not in so many words, impressed upon their tender minds that it is of no consequence whether they are Christians, or Jews, or infidels, so long as they master the various branches of worldly knowledge which promote success in the secular affairs of life; and then get them into the Sunday school, if you can, for a wild and ineffectual attempt to counteract the evil tendencies of the previous six days' teaching." No one, we think, will be surprised to hear that even the feeble remedy, which would be inadequate if it were applied over the whole surface of the country, is, in too many cases, not applied at all. "The theory," says Mr. Tremenhoe, "on which the whole public school system of the United States is based is, that the religious instruction which is not given in the day school is given in the Sunday school"; and he adds, from personal observation, and the testimony of capable witnesses, that this theory "is not carried out in practice."† The most ardent advocates of secularism admit that it *ought* to be, and that without this corrective agency the system would be self-condemned; and Mr. Tremenhoe assures us, that "the theory of a complete education, according to the view adopted in the United States, is *not fulfilled* in relation to a considerable proportion of the children at their schools."‡ Distinguished Americans, he adds, spoke to him in various parts of the country "in the most distinct and emphatic manner of the visible effect which, in their opinion, the small amount of instruction in the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and the lax mode of teaching them in the Sunday schools, were producing on the religious convictions and moral practice of the mass of the people."

The Rev. Dr. Edson, Rector of the Protestant Episcopal Church of St. Anne's, Lowell, in the State of Massachusetts, gave him this report. "My experience of now nearly thirty years as a pastor has, I am sorry to say, forced upon me the painful conviction that our public school system has undermined already among our population, to a great extent,

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\* New York "Catholic World," January, 1876, p. 477.

† "Public Education in the United States," by Hugh Seymour Tremenhoe, pp. 8, 26.

‡ P. 48.

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the doctrines and principles of Christianity." To which some will perhaps reply that it was not intended to do it, and others that they do not care if it does. "I find them generally well grounded in the ordinary elements of what is called common education, and clever and acute as to all worldly matters that concern them, but very lax in their notions of moral obligation and duty, and indisposed to submit to any authority or control whatever, even from a very early age." The Church, it will be admitted, used to form quite other dispositions, and apparently does so still; for whereas Dr. Edson goes on to say that the Protestant children will not come to the Sunday school, he admits, with honourable candour, of the Catholics, that "*they* are well looked after by their priests, and I have no doubt that nearly the whole of them attend some Sunday or other catechetical instruction." After describing the general decay of all fixed religious ideas, and the growing contempt for "parental authority"—why should they obey parents who are taught that they need not obey God and His Church?—he continues as follows: "I look upon this very prevalent condition of mind with very great apprehension, for all history shows that this is only the first downward step to complete irreligion and infidelity, and thence to a corruption of morals such as was exhibited in the heathen world. I much fear that we are making sure and not very slow strides in that direction; and while I deeply lament it, I am free to confess that I see *no present remedy for it in this country.*" \*

Yet he has himself noticed the contrast, in his own neighbourhood, between the influence of the Catholic Church and the destructive effects of that secularism which is only one of the poisoned fruits of schism. There is a remedy, then, if people would use it. We should like to know how this thoughtful and conscientious observer would have accounted for the fact, sufficiently notorious in the United States, that so large a proportion of the youth of both sexes, belonging to the more refined classes, are educated in Catholic schools? The present writer has visited many an American convent, in which one-third or even one-half of the pupils were Protestant young ladies. The explanation of this fact is furnished by a candid Protestant witness. Their parents, having some regard for the purity and dignity of their children, *dare not* send them elsewhere. "Many well-judging persons, of different religious persuasions, have assured me that the only really *useful and corrective* education is that of the Catholic schools and colleges. So far as I have known, these seminaries are

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\* Pp. 51-53.

crowded, not only with pupils of their own creed, but with those of other sects. And I have high *official* authority for saying that the ministers and missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church are at this moment doing more good for the cause of virtue and morality throughout the whole continent of America, than those of any other religious denomination whatever." \*

When Moses struck the rock in Horeb, the faint and thirsty wanderers in the desert were not so senseless as to refuse to drink, because the miraculous fount of water was a gift from God by His prophet; yet, there are millions in our day who die of thirst, or vainly seek to assuage it at every foul and noxious pool, rather than accept the water of salvation from His Church. Many of them, at least in America, seem to suspect that they have made an evil choice, and often put down the unfinished cup of death to whisper to one another that it tastes of poison. They shudder at the draught, but the next moment put their lips to it again. In clinging to the system of secular education, with a full apprehension of its deadly fruits, men seem to surpass the common measure of human infatuation. "In a considerable number of the many public schools I visited," says Mr. Tremenhoe, "in different parts of the United States, I had been struck with the entire absence of good manners on the part of the children. . . . There was a marked want of any outward demonstration of deference and respect, and, on the part of the teacher, what appeared to me a most singular submission of himself to the children. Nothing was put to them as from authority, but the most trifling command was conveyed in a tone and in language implying that it was for them to judge whether they would obey it or not." † How different is the character formed by the Catholic faith, and the teaching of the Church is evident from his own generous confession. "The civilization of the New World," he says, "owes something I think to the French Canadians, for keeping alive a reflection of the *best manners of the old*." He gives a lesson to Mr. Gladstone and other liberals of his class when he adds, that "warm feelings of loyalty to the British crown with *them* are a part of their religion." ‡

The language of American writers is even more emphatic. Mr. Horace Mann was for many years secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education. He tells us what they proposed to do, and what they have done. The poles may be said

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\* "The Statesmen of America in 1846," p. 491.

† P. 148.

‡ Pp. 303, 4.

to be in immediate contact compared with the huge interval between their ambitious design and its execution. "The object," he says, "of the Common School of Massachusetts was to give every child in the Commonwealth a free, straight, solid pathway by which he could walk directly up from the ignorance of an infant to a knowledge of the primary duties of man, and could acquire a power and an invincible will to discharge them."\* We should have thought Americans were more practical engineers than to propose to build a bridge, without any supports, and without any materials, of which the heart of an infant should be the buttress at one end, and an "invincible" phantom at the other. They would never span their own broad rivers with fairy structures of that kind. We are not surprised, therefore, to hear that the Massachusetts bridge over the infinite is still *à l'état de projet*. Owing to tumultuous dissensions among the engineers, destructive of unity of purpose, "good and pious men wait until delusions more insane than Millerism, and more fanatical and licentious than Mormonism, shall have overspread the land and generated their broods of scoffers and atheists,"—having an "invincible will" not to discharge their duties. "The influential, the wealthy, the learned, the pious are waiting until the combustible and explosive materials of prejudice and ignorance and sensuality shall have been scattered more profusely through our country, and heaped together in greater masses in our cities, to be kindled by the torch of some political or fanatical Catiline. God grant that when the leading men in our community awaken to a sense of their danger, it may not be too late to avert it."† The prospect is evidently not cheerful. "I do not hesitate to affirm," he says elsewhere, "that our republican edifice, at this time, in present fact and truth, is not sustained by those columns of solid and enduring adamant, Intelligence and Virtue"; and after describing "the rotten materials of the edifice," he adds, "unless, therefore, a new substructure can be placed beneath every buttress and angle of this boasted temple of liberty, it will soon totter and fall, and bury all in-dwellers in its ruins."‡

Perhaps any further evidence is superfluous; but as we are beginning to adopt in England, owing to inveterate religious conflicts, the secularism in education which has brought America to such a pass, we need not fear to err on the side

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\* "Reply to the Remarks of Thirty-one Boston Schoolmasters," p. 28.

† P. 173.

‡ "Thoughts selected from the writings of Horace Mann," p. 180.

of excess. On the 9th of last December, the New York "Journal of Commerce," referring to President Grant's too famous speech at Des Moines, the capital of Iowa, made this reflection: "So far from prohibiting the teaching of religious tenets in the popular education, we would encourage by every possible argument a more general attention to religious culture, wherever children can be brought under such wholesome influence. If we go much further in the direction whither the schools have been drifting, it will soon need something more than an article in the constitution to keep the whole nation from becoming atheistic or pagan." That this is the logical result of the public school system nobody seems to doubt. "We have been lately told by the public journals that the researches of Professor Agassiz into the growth of the 'social evil' have 'almost destroyed his faith in the boasted civilization of the nineteenth century,' and that 'a large number of the unfortunate women and girls traced their fall to influences which surrounded them in the public schools.'"\* And this authority adds, that in the State of Massachusetts, the paradise of public schools and nursery of public school teachers, "there is one divorce annually to every nine marriages." Nor have they even the poor consolation of attributing to the secularism which kills religion and virtue, superiority of learning and knowledge. "We are behind most nations," says Dr. Brownson, who knows his country so well, "in intellectual and moral culture."† It is not strangers, who might be suspected of imperfect sympathy with the country they describe, who say these things, but honourable Americans, who look each other in the face, without fearing to provoke resentment or contradiction. A New England physician, who shall be our last witness, and whose painful work, dedicated to the "Hon. William Sprague, ex-Governor of, and United States Senator from, Rhode Island," cannot be read without horror, thus describes, in 1871, the admitted results of the common school system:—"Irreligion and infidelity are progressing *pari passu* with the advanced guards of immorality and crime, and all are fostered, if not engendered, by the materialistic system of school instruction. The entire absence of all religious instruction from the schoolroom, which has resulted from the utter impossibility of harmonizing the multifarious creeds, and . . . are fast bearing fruit in a generation of infidels, and we are becoming worse even than the pagans of old, who had, at

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\* New York "Catholic World," January, 1872, p. 442.

† "Brownson's Quarterly Review," October, 1873, p. 509.

least, their positive sciences of philosophy, and their religion, such as it was, to oppose which was a criminal offence."\*

We have now a basis sufficiently solid to support certain practical conclusions which demand the instant attention of all thinking men on both sides of the Atlantic. That Secularism with its long train of attendant evils,—the destruction of reverence, obedience, parental authority, faith, and virtue,—of all, in a word, which constitutes the strength of nations,—derives its fatal power from "the utter impossibility of harmonizing" a hundred rival creeds, is admitted both by those who advocate, and by those who deplore the exclusion of religious instruction from common schools. The first contend that religious dissensions have made any other system "impossible"; the second, that, horrible as are its results, there "is no present remedy for it." On that point there is no difference of opinion. The evil is breaking up the foundations of society; but it must run its course. All who dread what is coming "are waiting," as Mr. Horace Mann says, till it comes! What is this unmanly despair, this prostrate and impotent acquiescence in intolerable evils, but the evidence of a terrible judgment on the one hand; and on the other, a confession that Protestantism, by its disintegration of faith and unity, destruction of authority, and ceaseless multiplication of lawless sects, is ruining the life of nations and preparing the way for Antichrist? What we see all around us is but the fulfilment of an Apostolic prediction. Both S. Peter and S. Paul speak of "sects," which they call "*works of the flesh*," and "self-willed teachers," as the special note of "the last times." They have come, as they foretold; and instead of inspiring disgust and condemnation, the very types in which their prophetic eye discerned the heralds and fore-runners of Antichrist,—the men who "despise government, audacious, self-willed," and, who "fear not to bring in sects,"†—are the popular dispensers of such shreds of religion as their contemporaries choose to accept, the echoes of all the antagonistic voices and rumours of this lower world, and the boast of "modern civilization"! The unpardonable crimes of the Apostolic age have become the characteristic virtues of ours! And the world smiles at its own improvement. As each prophetic "seal" is opened, it sees, not the evidences of impending ruin, but of salutary progress. Nobody doubts that, in the judgment of the Apostles, Secularism would have been regarded as a compact, conscious or otherwise, between Satan and the world, for the destruction of the

\* "Satan in Society," by a Physician, p. 51.

† 2 Pet. ii. 2—10.



Christian faith, and of human society. Nobody denies that, whether its designers intend it or not, that result is being everywhere attained "by sure, and not slow strides." We are entitled, therefore, to ask—at least of all who still admit that union with God is advantageous to man, and that the tried instrument which has proved its power in securing that union is simply of incalculable value,—what has the world gained, either intellectually or spiritually, either for time or eternity, by suppressing the Church, which during long ages was the faithful guardian both of religion and learning, in order to substitute a new agency which only destroys the one, without adding anything to the other?

For even the advocates of Secularism perceive, and often proclaim, that the Church is doing at this hour the same work, in the whole earth, forming the same characters, and developing the same supernatural virtues, as in all the ages of the past. In the New World as in the Old, she is training in the same hour dear children of God and loyal citizens of the State; and is the only efficient champion, as a Protestant writer has told us, of "the cause of virtue and morality throughout the whole continent of America." Is the world so obstinately bent on self-destruction as to refuse the benefits of which she is the sole and the inexhaustible source? If she gave it in the past, all the truth, liberty, civilization, and refinement it ever possessed, is there any sign that she has lost the power to confer the same gifts in the present? The mould is not broken in which the pure gold with which she works takes its form. Look, says the Bishop of Orleans, contrasting her daughters with the unsexed types around them, at that army of ministering angels who go forth in her name, and with her blessing, to the ends of the earth, in quest of every want which can be relieved, and every sorrow which can be consoled; and since you profess so much admiration for cultivation of mind, consider that "the three books which have perhaps been most widely read in our times, are the works of Catholic women—the *Récit d'une Sœur*," the *Mémoires d'Eugénie de Guérin*," and the *Lettres de Madame Swetchine*."\* But the same Church which, in every age, has offered to the love of God and the admiration of the world, women like S. Agnes and S. Teresa, has not lost the art of creating men like S. Benedict, S. Francis, and the Curé d'Ars. And even her sons who do not attain to *their* level,—the thousands who, in a lower spiritual sphere, live in her light and act by her maxims,—are in America as in Europe

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\* "*La Femme Studieuse*," par Mgr. l'Evêque d'Orléans, ch. x. p. 265.

models of civic as well as of religious fidelity, true patriots and loyal citizens, lovers of their country as well as of their God, submissive to human while subject to Divine law, and the very pith and marrow of earthly States, of which they never disturb the harmony by the selfishness of private aims, nor menace the existence by political sedition or the more fatal conspiracies of religious license. It is not they who disturb the repose of statesmen, or alarm the solicitude of magistrates; for their only weapon against the unjust is prayer, their only answer to the persecutor, resignation. And even when oppression becomes intolerable, when triumphant iniquity marks them as victims, and the blow of the secret assassin or the axe of the public executioner falls upon them, they utter no imprecation, wisely content to bless the hand which gives them an earlier deliverance from a world which is not worthy of them. How easy would it be to govern that foolish world, and how tranquil would be the life of kings and peoples, of cabinets and legislatures, if they had only to fear the rebellion of those who never revolt, and the machinations of those who never conspire! Yet the imprudent rulers of that delirious world not only refuse alliance with the only power which can give them assured peace, the only force from which they have nothing to fear, but affect to regard this friend and guide of every soul of man as the special enemy against whom they must keep vigilant watch, lest it should artfully undermine the authority of which God has made it the supreme expression and unfailing support, or compromise the liberty which it prizes more than any human good, because it is the fruit and evidence of that diviner gift of which God has said, "*the truth shall make you free.*"

It would seem that human folly could go no further. Yet it seeks still lower depths. There are even cases in which the perverse imbecility of human rulers, complicated by sordid political motives, seems to transcend the limits of the possible, and pass into the fantastic region of the formless and intangible. It is a bitter reflection that the Government of the great and generous people of the United States should furnish the most discreditable example. We need not fear to misinterpret the incendiary speech of President Grant at Des Moines, because all its critics, English and American, understand it in the same way. Mr. Carl Schurz, a distinguished member of the same political faction, appears to have said that its incitement to religious fanaticism "serves better as a cloak for public rogues than as an instrument for national purification."\* The Review from which we borrow this

\* Quoted in the "Catholic Review" (New York and Brooklyn), December 21, 1875.

observation considers the speech an indication that "an unscrupulous political organization will create a third factor in our national elections," and that this wanton crusade against "so conservative, so law-abiding, and so useful a body as the Catholics of the United States" is mainly an artifice to divert public attention from the ignoble frauds—such as the "whisky ring"—in which members of the Government or their relatives are said to have been involved. Our own journals, in spite of their devotion to Protestantism, are nearly unanimous in condemning it. The "Saturday Review" calls it "a bid for Protestant votes"; while even the "Pall Mall Gazette" sees in this reckless and criminal disturbance of public order a proof that "patriotism" is not General Grant's distinguishing virtue. The New York "Catholic World,"\* to which we turned with great interest for a reliable appreciation of the President's electioneering rhetoric, discusses his speech in an acute and ingenious article, which will probably afford no little amusement to our brethren in the United States. Affecting, with a *finesse* which will not deceive their penetration, but which was perfectly legitimate on such an occasion, to accept General Grant's words in their literal meaning, our excellent contemporary thanks him, with diverting gravity, for uttering sentiments which are so entirely its own. "For we find nothing in the oration with which we are in the least disposed to take issue."† "We also," it adds, referring to the President's injunction to *encourage free schools*, "have always contended for the same boon. Do we hear aright? Does the President of the United States maintain the proposition which has brought us so much contempt and derision? *What is a free school?* A free school is one in which every scholar can obtain an education without violating the honest convictions of conscience"; whereas the pretended free schools of America are conducted on principles which exclude large sections of the population from entering them. "To my certain knowledge," says a writer in the "Catholic Review,"‡ "there is in the whole United States not one single German Catholic congregation, having as many as seventy-five children, which is without a school of their own"; and the same thing is true, in various proportions, and according to the means at their disposal, of the Catholics of all other nationalities. On a much smaller scale, it is even true, we believe, of certain Protestant congregations. In all such cases, affecting, probably, at least one-fourth of the entire population, American citizens are compelled by a cruel and

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\* January, 1876.

† P. 435.

‡ January 8, 1876.

unjust law to support schools which, as Dr. Edson told Mr. Tremenheere, "have undermined already, to a great extent, the doctrines and principles of Christianity"; and at the same time to accept the heavy burden of building and maintaining other schools, in which no such fatal results are to be feared. By all means, then, says the "Catholic World," let us have the "free schools" which the President so earnestly recommends. We have not got them yet, and if he can help us to obtain what we have so long desired, why should we refuse to co-operate with so powerful an ally? As an argumentative retort nothing can be more effective, and the irony is maintained with equal power in relation to all the other clauses of President Grant's deplorable speech. But while we applaud the prudent artifice of our American contemporary, who has contrived to expose injustice and rebuke insincerity in terms so inoffensive, the fact remains in all its shameful enormity, that the chief magistrate of a great nation, which by its constitution is neither Catholic nor Protestant, has stooped to identify his private interests with a scheme of public education which is creating, in the words of Mr. Horace Mann, "a generation of infidels, worse even than the pagans of old"; and that he does this from no purer motive than the desire to vivify and reorganize his own political faction, utterly indifferent that its triumph should be purchased by the suppression of Christian liberty and the dissolution of public order, and by letting loose against the most religious and law-abiding section of the American community the worst passions of all for whom religion is only a name, and law only an instrument of oppression.

Only this incident was wanting to complete our estimate of Secularism, the agents by whom it is promoted, the motives on which they act, and the results to which their selfish and evil policy tends. Yet Secularism, as all authorities concur in stating, is nothing but a product of "the utter impossibility of harmonizing multiform creeds." In other words, it is a product of the so-called Reformation, and, we suppose, one of its peculiar titles to the admiration of the human race. Like many other results of that movement, of which we perceive more clearly every year the ruinous action upon modern society, it perplexes statesmen, puzzles preachers, and suggests to both that as religion is a factor of human life so unpliant and intractable, the only remedy is, to get rid of it altogether. And they get rid of it accordingly. If after being expelled from the school it can contrive to maintain a precarious existence in the family, there is at present no law, even in Prussia, prohibiting that expiring effort. Legislation is as yet content,

with benevolent forbearance, to refuse it all public recognition, and to sweep the children of God into the schools of Satan, with a coercive discipline of fines and imprisonment for all who refuse to come. The devout pupils of our Board Schools, or at least a good many of them, may be safely trusted to pursue the system to its logical term, when they assume, in their turn, the civic toga, and to hunt religion out of the family, as their teachers have hunted it out of the school. And then people will be able to say of our England, as Dr. Edson says of America, that secular education has proved to be "only the first downward step to complete irreligion and infidelity, and thence to a corruption of morals such as was exhibited in the heathen world." Perhaps when that auspicious era arrives, some Englishmen will still be found to say with Lord Bacon, only using the past instead of the future tense,—“the misery is that the most effectual means *have been* applied to the ends least to be desired.”

We may be permitted to ask in conclusion, without excessive and indiscreet curiosity, what the world imagines itself to have gained thus far, and what it hopes to gain in the future, by usurping the teaching office of the Church. We are quite willing to take its own account of the matter. If it can point to any definite and realized gains, moral, intellectual, or social, let it tell us what they are. It may choose any region of the earth where Secularism prevails for the field of comparison. Shall it be Germany, England, or the United States? There is a good deal of Secularism in China, India, and Central Africa, with the usual cheerful results; but perhaps the world would prefer to apply the test nearer home. If it will only apply it *somewhere*, we shall be quite content. But we venture to stipulate that it shall be applied fairly and honestly. Now all the possible advantages which can accrue to man may be classed under two heads: those which affect him in his relations to God, and those which improve his position in relation to society. We suppose that even the world will hardly contend that Secularism has done much for him as respects the first. It does not profess to have brought him into more intimate communion with God. To do that, even if it had the power, is no part of its programme. But perhaps if Secularism affords him no help as a Christian, it consoles and elevates him as a citizen? To this proposition we take a preliminary objection. There is no example in the history of our race, at any time or in any country, and least of all in the highly-cultivated societies of pagan antiquity, of either an individual or a community tending to higher social perfection, while constantly descending in the scale of moral

and religious worth. That is the candid testimony of all the sages of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The evils of life were so intolerable to *them*, under conditions which modern society is striving to reproduce, that while they vainly invoked a Deliverer, the sum of all their thoughts was expressed, in every dialect which they spoke, in the "wild word" *Despair*. They had matchless poets and artists, temples of surpassing beauty, public highways with which we have nothing to compare; yet morally they were dogs, and they knew it. The whole world of that epoch, it has been forcibly said, was divided into "beasts of burden and beasts of prey." The great law of nature was almost abolished, and instead of desiring to prolong life, the chief aspiration of many, including the most cultivated, was to have done with it. And then our compassionate God had pity on that perishing world, and there arose, in sight of heaven and earth, a Vision of unimagined beauty, in this crisis of its unutterable distress,—“coming forth as the morning rising, fair as the moon, bright as the sun, terrible as an army set in array,”\* to which He at whose word it sprang into life gave this triumphal name, “*the Church of the Living God.*” Men wanted a teacher, and at last they found one. The reign of darkness was over. From that hour no soul of man was doomed to perish for lack of a guide. All that omnipotent love can do for the children of men shall be done henceforth, and to the end of time, by and through this Holy Church. In unity and authority it shall be second only to God. “The glory of Libanus is given to it, the beauty of Carmel and Saron; they shall see the glory of the Lord, and the beauty of our God.”† We have seen it, and see it now, in the darkest night as in the brightest day, reflected in the burnished mirror of that unfailing Church. Like her Divine Founder she may say to the world, as she points to all the enduring monuments of her long and beneficent reign: “What more could I have done for thee, and have not done it?” Whatever there is on earth at this hour, of truth, peace, and hope; whatever it still retains of concord, civilization, and pure refinement, comes from her. If the wrath of the Avenger is turned aside, and the bolt which was about to fall arrested; if the loving patience of God still waits for the return of the penitent; if evil does not wholly triumph over good, nor the children of light lose heart in their combat with the Prince of this World; it is the Church, the *unchanged and unreformed* Church,—the Church, that is, *as God made her*, before impious imbecility pretended to improve His imperfect work,—which

\* Canticles vi. 9.

† Isaias xxxv. 2.



stays judgment, redresses wrong, makes justice triumph, and conquers the gates of hell. All the true joys we taste in this world, and all the rational hopes we form for the next; all the benedictions which God can give or man receive,—the light of faith, the fire of charity, the virtue of the Sacraments, and the strong protection of the Saints,—are ours only because we are hers. Even the senseless world enjoys a respite from its inevitable doom, and is less vile than it would be, because she offers every day on her thousand altars the sacrifice of Reparation. As He listens to her voice God forgets to punish, and the guilty escape, at least for a time, because the innocent hide them from the Judge.

Yet the thankless world, at the bidding of the cruel chief who rules not to save but to destroy it, greets her only with a frown of defiance, and finds nothing wiser to say to this messenger of God and teacher of the nations than such words as these,—“Depart from me, and leave me to myself. The benefits which you offer have no attractions for me. Your counsels weary and your reproofs affront me. I loathe the unity which has its source in authority, and the order which can only be maintained by submission. Chaos and anarchy have no terrors for me. They are the element in which I live. I have not, as you seem to imagine, any need of you. I can teach myself, or remain untaught. I am my own lawgiver, prophet, priest, and king. When I am tired of one code of laws, I make another. If you provoke me, I can make laws for you as well as for myself. I have done so before now. Your impotent sentence, by your own admission, only takes effect in the next world; mine enforces its penalties in this. You and yours have had some taste of them already. There is war between us, not peace, and we serve not the same master. If I cannot have order except in alliance with you, I dispense with it; and if I must perish, as you tell me, I would rather perish without your help than be saved by it.”

We seem to understand now why even He who came to seek that which was lost said: “*I pray not for the world.*” \* Must we, then, conclude that its case is hopeless? Not quite. The Church will plead for it to the last with her mighty intercession. She is able to save, not only her own, but many who as yet know her not. She will save by *teaching* them. The world may stop its ears, but the great Mother of all elect souls will not cease to speak. The Spirit of God is upon her, and speak she must. Even in this age of pagan Secularism she will continue to teach; and there is joy in the thought

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\* John xvii. 9.

that many a poor captive of the world and the sects will listen, in spite of himself, and, while she perseveres in teaching, will consent at last to be taught.

Since these pages were written, an American advocate of undiluted Secularism, Mr. Francis Abbott, has discussed the same subject from his own point of view in the "Fortnightly Review."\* The very title of his article, "The Catholic Peril in America," is an insidious *suggestio falsi*, and an unphilosophical begging of the whole question. He does not affect to appeal to reason, but only to ignorant and unteachable prejudice. His entire argument is based upon an *assumption*,—contradicted by all the facts of history, and even by the spontaneous testimony of the most acute and learned non-Catholics,—for which he does not attempt to offer a shred of proof. His assumption is, that the Catholic Church is hostile to human liberty. On this false and arbitrary premiss he builds his petulant conclusion, that its progress is a peril for every free State, and, therefore, for the American Republic.

An American and Protestant professor, Mr. Dawson, has observed of Mr. Herbert Spencer's writings: "Take away the assumptions, and nothing remains." The observation applies to every contemporary assailant of the Catholic Faith, and notably to the adventurous gentleman whom we are going to notice. We are only too familiar with his argumentative method. Having substituted crude and superficial guesses, not to say baseless and ungrateful calumnies, for the more irksome labour of a logical and deductive process, and paraded voluntary delusions as if they were self-evident geometrical axioms, our adversaries lie down to rest with the pleasant consciousness of a well-earned victory. They have assumed everything, and proved nothing, and then look round them with the serene complacency of triumphant intellectual gladiators, whose expiring antagonists lie bleeding at their feet. When the supposed dead rise unhurt, and without a scar, as they always do, the unconvinced victor sheaths his wooden sword, persuaded that they are only phantoms, and that if they are not dead they ought to be. Mr. Abbott kills us after this fashion, and would no doubt bury us too, if he had leisure to occupy himself with funeral rites, or the undertaker reported that we were in a condition to need them. But Mr. Abbott has not killed us yet, nor even given us the smallest reason to apprehend that fate, as we hope now to convince him.

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\* March 1st.

Secularism is the weapon with which Mr. Abbott proposes to give a mortal wound to the Church. He would not do her any harm, being a man of benevolent dispositions, if she were not such a dangerous enemy of human liberty. There is no curing her, he considers, of that fault. Is he quite sure of it? If we were to tell him that she is, in fact, the only source of true and enduring liberty both for nations and individuals, he would not believe us. The considerations upon which that conviction is founded belong to a sphere of thought from which he is self-excluded. But perhaps he will believe witnesses with whom he has more in common than he has with us, even though their unexpected testimony should fill him with surprise. There is a long array of them in an American book, with which he may easily make acquaintance, and which is perhaps the most important contribution to serious literature which we owe to his native land. We refer to the second volume of the translation of Alzog, which has just reached us, and which reflects the highest honour upon the learned and intelligent labour of Fathers Pabisch and Byrne, of the provincial seminary at Cincinnati. After quoting Wührer on "The Beneficent Influence of the Church during the Middle Ages for the decrease of Ignorance, Barbarity, and Lawlessness"; Kober on the "Influence of the Church and her Legislation on Morality, Humanity, and Civilization"; and the well-known confessions of Guizot on her priceless services to "Liberty and Learning"; Alzog gives useful instruction to such unreflecting assailants as Mr. Abbott, by citing other witnesses of great erudition, and notorious for a penetrating spirit of criticism. Jacob Grimm, to whom even our most jaunty Secularists will listen with deference, says, in his "Antiquities of German Law": "The wise men of our generation judge of the Middle Ages with about as much fairness as they do of our ancestors of ancient Germany." Then comparing "the whole-souled and gladsome life of bygone days," when the influence of the Church was paramount, with "the misery and wrong in these latter days," he adds, "from a legal point of view I will venture to assert that the bondage and servitude of past ages was less harsh and more tolerable than is the condition of our own oppressed peasants, and of the overtasked journeymen of our factories." Herder, from whom Alzog quotes the fine expression, that "the barque of the Church was freighted with the destiny of mankind,"—which reminds us of Guizot's confession, "the Christian Church saved Christianity,"—is still more emphatic in his great work, "Ideas on the History of Mankind." It is beyond dispute, he says, "that the *Roman hierarchy* was a necessary

power. Without it, Europe would have fallen under the power of a despot, would have become the theatre of interminable conflicts, and have been converted into a Mongolian desert." To have fought with despotism, and vanquished it so effectually that it never revived again till the fatal epoch of the so-called Reformation, when it assumed the form of absolute monarchy, is, according to Herder, one of the many services which an ungrateful world owes to the Church. Von Müller, the historian of Switzerland, proclaims that "all the enlightenment of the present day came originally *from that hierarchy* which, when the Roman empire fell to pieces, sustained and directed the human race. It imparted a stirring, an energizing, and a life-giving impulse, . . . till it finally achieved the triumphs that are now before the world." Von Ranke, in spite of his intense Protestantism, makes exactly the same admission, especially with regard to the conquests of the intellect. Even Huber is eloquent on the same subject. Daniel, like Huber, says that men talk "like a set of parrots," when they repeat one after another "that the Middle Ages were ages of ignorance and corruption." Gallé, rebuking the inveterate prejudice of "rigid orthodox Lutheranism," rejoices that by the aid of a deeper criticism "we are now far removed from those days when men professed to see in the Reformation the dawn of that glorious light which we now enjoy." Böhmer says that in the Middle Ages "the powers of the soul developed with wonderful wealth and beauty." Kraus contends that "they were distinguished by loftiness, originality, and strength of character, in a degree to which no succeeding age can furnish a parallel. . . . Taking all the institutions of that period, one with another, it cannot be denied that they were *more conducive to freedom and independence* than any which characterized Europe from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century." All these writers have formed their opinion, which Mr. Abbott has evidently not thought it necessary to do, upon an exact acquaintance with the period of which they treat, and all agree with Montalembert that it was "an epoch fertile in *men*," of which the most essential feature was that it was "*bristling with liberty*."

Of all the peevish and ignorant sophisms which disgrace our age, there is not one which is either more senseless or more profoundly immoral, chiefly because of its base ingratitude, than that which represents the Catholic Church as unfavourable to liberty. The *truth* is, that but for her sleepless vigilance, liberty would have died out of the world. No doubt there is a sense in which she limits our *false* liberty, as God does, by saying of certain thoughts and actions, *non licet*; but

it is by this very process that she secures our *true* liberty. Vice and error, against which she always contends, are not elements of liberty but of bondage. If God does not enslave us by His commandments, neither does the Church by her precepts. Her authority, like His, is only active against evil. The more it prevails, the more impossible it becomes to rob man of his liberty, either as a Christian or a citizen, either as a worker or a thinker. The only power under heaven which can keep his soul free from sin, and his intellect free from error, and thus secure to one who belongs to the lowest grade of intelligent being the privileges which belong to the highest, is a benefactor only second to God. And such a benefactor is the Catholic Church. She has no created auxiliary, and no human rival. All the paltry substitutes and delusive counterfeits by which men have endeavoured to supply her place, only serve to rivet their chains; and the newest of them, which they call Secularism, is simply, as an American writer has told us, "the most intolerant and oppressive of all sectarianisms that have prevailed on earth."

As the whole argument of Mr. Abbott, and of all his school, rests upon a baseless assumption, of which the untruth is contemptuously exposed even by a Guizot, a Ranke, a Huber, and a Grimm, his conclusion merits no attention. But it is worthy of observation that the *animus* of his rash and superficial talk is as evident to a writer in the "*Pall Mall Gazette*" as it is to ourselves. It is the *progress* of the Church in the United States, where all her strength is derived from her own internal life, which provokes his anger. In a notice of his article, the "*Pall Mall Gazette*"\* sums up his malicious objections with its usual keenness and discrimination. "The great first sin," it says, "of the Roman Catholic Church in America is its property." It appears from Mr. Abbott's figures, that while the aggregate wealth of the whole country increased 189 per cent. between 1860 and 1870, "the wealth of the Catholic Church increased 128 per cent." during the same decade; and that while "the Methodists, the most prosperous of all the Protestant sects, grew richer to the extent of 371 per cent." from 1850 to 1870, the Catholics, in the same period, "grew richer to the extent of 558 per cent." Although Mr. Abbott appears to know something of the great sums contributed to religious objects even by "servant girls and other poor Catholics" ("*Fortnightly Review*," p. 397), and does not attribute the growing wealth of the Methodists to any other source but their own zeal and liberality,—because

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\* March 14.

they would laugh in his face if he did,—in the case of the Catholics he finds the explanation in fraud and immorality! Because they accepted in New York, where they number one half of the whole population, municipal or state grants towards some of their institutions, as Jews and Protestants did likewise, they appropriated, says Mr. Abbott, “stolen property,” and contributed to “a general corruption of public morals.” He does not reflect that the institutions so aided were at least as advantageous to the general welfare as to that of the Catholics themselves, and quite loses sight of the fact, which would have inconveniently disarranged the symmetry of his argument, that their progress has been as conspicuous in every other part of the country, *without* state aid, as in New York. Anger and prejudice do not reason; they are content to declaim and revile.

“If we look to other evidences of growth,” continues the “Pall Mall Gazette,” “the result is the same”; and is recorded by Mr. Abbott, as this journal pleasantly remarks, “with a curious sense of injury.” Thus the increase of church accommodation among the Protestants of the United States was from 1850 to 1860 30 per cent., and from 1860 to 1870 only 11 per cent.; while among the Catholics it was 110 per cent. during the former, and 42 per cent. during the latter period. Nor does this express the whole difference, because each “sitting” is occupied in the Protestant churches by only one person, but in the Catholic, owing to the succession of services, by three or four. Thus it was discovered some years ago in Liverpool, by a careful census, that while the Protestant churches and chapels far exceeded in number the Catholic, the worshippers in the latter were far more numerous than in the former.

“The second great sin of the Catholics,” adds the “Pall Mall Gazette,” is their desire to bring up their children in their own religion.” As Mr. Abbott has no kind of sympathy with this fantastic desire, one religion being as good as another in his judgment, and pure Secularism better than any of them, he affects to regard Catholics as dangerous citizens, because of their avowed hostility to that ruinous public school system, which, as we have shown, religious Protestants condemn as earnestly as they do. “The Protestant Evangelical party,” he says (p. 401), “are doggedly resolved to keep the Bible in the schools.” Why not, since he and his intolerant sect are quite as doggedly resolved to keep it out of them? By what principle of natural law, or even of the American Constitution, are people who value religion to be bullied by



those who do not, and Christians to forfeit their liberty, because Secularists wish to play the tyrant?

The "Pall Mall Gazette" is not an advocate of any form of religion, and does not profess to be, but it is more observant, more acute, and a great deal more candid than Mr. Abbott. In an article on the educational projects of the new French government, which perhaps to-morrow will be already a thing of the past, and the foolish amendment proposed by M. Waddington, that journal observes: \* "If the amendment were levelled at the *clerical teachers* exclusively, it would almost certainly fail. The experience of such countries as Belgium is, we believe, that there are no better tutors for competitive examinations than the *Catholic teaching orders*." If Mr. Abbott will read the article by Bishop Becker in the new American Catholic Quarterly, he will find in it some reason for believing that the teachers in his own country are not quite so successful, and that their intellectual is on a par with their moral influence; but such men prefer to know only one side of a subject, and therefore know little even of that.

We have only space for a final reflection, and it is not without consolation. Mr. Abbott evidently suspects that his abuse of Catholics will awaken but a feeble echo in his own country. He deplors (p. 397) what he calls "the weakness of the public conscience, and the unsuspiciousness of the public intelligence." His only hope is that, by a combination of religious bigotry with political faction, the prevailing indifference to incendiary and unpatriotic appeals may be overcome. No honest American, we think, will share his hope, or wish well to the "great third party," as he styles it, which would rather that all religion were dead and buried than that the Catholic religion should do for the peace and liberties of the United States what it alone *can* do. That party does not disguise its aims. Among the "Demands of Liberalism," Mr. Abbott quotes (p. 404) these four: "that the employment of chaplains in Congress, in State Legislatures, in the navy and militia, and in prisons, asylums, and all other institutions supported by public money, shall be discontinued"; "that all religious services now sustained by the Government shall be abolished, and especially that the use of the Bible in the public schools shall be prohibited"; "that all laws directly or indirectly enforcing the observance of Sunday as the Sabbath shall be repealed"; and "that all laws looking to the enforcement of Christian morality shall be abrogated, and

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\* March 29.

shall be conformed to the requirements of *natural* morality, equal rights, and impartial liberty." A nation which should adopt this programme, in which Secularism announces its purpose without disguise, would soon be a community in which there would be no morality but that of the beasts, no rights but those of the impious, and no liberty but that of oppressing all who dare to demand it. The "*Pall Mall Gazette*" may well say, in terminating its remarks on the article of Mr. Abbott, "none of the suggested solutions seem at once sufficient in themselves, and likely to be accepted as sufficient by the majority of the American people." To which we have only to add our own thanks to Mr. Abbott for supplying us with a fresh proof that Secularism is the foul product of an alliance between contented ignorance and aggressive impiety, and is rightly considered an effective weapon against the Catholic Church, only because it is a prohibition of every form of truth, and every manifestation of liberty.

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## NOTE TO THE FOURTH ARTICLE IN THE JANUARY NUMBER.

IN our last number the following passage occurred :—

When F. Newman's letter first appeared (Jan. 1875, p. 214), we submitted to him our opinion that the "conscientia" of theologians is by no means precisely equivalent to his "conscience"; and in our following number (p. 485, note) we repeated our comment in stronger terms. We understood F. Newman to mean by the word "conscience"—what many modern writers indubitably mean by that word—the individual's private interpretation of the Natural Law, as distinct from the voice of Revelation. And we understood him to maintain—nay to maintain as the recognized and universal doctrine of theologians—that if the Pope imposes on me any precept, which cannot be obeyed without my transgressing my own private interpretation of the Natural Law, I cannot without sin obey such precept. I must of course—he would say—be very careful of my ground; and must admit at starting a great likelihood, that the Pope's interpretation of the Natural Law is more correct than my own. But (so we understood him to add) if after my best efforts I cannot see by my own moral reason the tenableness of the Pope's interpretation,—however numerous the theologians may be who *concur* in that interpretation,—I am bound under pain of sin to disobey and take the consequences. We have found however that some doubt exists among Catholics whose opinion justly carries with it much weight, whether F. Newman's meaning be really such as we have set forth; and we will therefore assume, for the purpose of our present argument, that we misconceived what F. Newman intended to maintain. We will here content ourselves then with submitting to him, that the passages which he has quoted from theologians concerning conscience (pp. 72-4 or 64-6) have really no relevance whatever to the purpose for which he has quoted them; that they do not throw any kind of light on the question, what are those cases which a Catholic may be permitted or even bound to disobey some Papal law or precept.

When theologians say that it is always a sin for me to act against my conscience, they do but mean (so we would submit) that it is always a sin for me to do that which at the moment of doing it I think sinful. But this indubitable truth surely gives no help whatever towards determining, what are those cases in which my conscience, if rightly informed, would *judge* obedience or disobedience to be sinful. The Pope commands me to do something, which my own private judgment would have accounted forbidden by the Natural Law, but which a large number of grave theologians regard as *not* so forbidden. Does my rightly informed conscience pronounce that I ought, or that I ought not, to obey this command? Evidently no answer whatever to this question is contained in the indubitable truth, that I ought

never to do what my conscience pronounces to be sinful. The whole question is, what is that course which my conscience *would* truly pronounce to be sinful. Now we are quite prepared to take one by one those passages concerning conscience which F. Newman has cited: we are prepared to maintain, that no one of them does more than state the indubitable truth we have just mentioned; and that no one of them therefore throws any light whatever on the problem, of which F. Newman thinks that they contain a solution (pp. 93, 4).

We may add a few further words, to elucidate what we here intended. The sense, we think, in which the word "conscience" is nowadays more commonly used, is to express "man's natural sense of right and wrong"; or (more accurately) to express "that innate power of human nature, whereby each man is enabled to apprehend certain portions of the Natural Law." We are not here inquiring, how far such apprehension extends, or how far it is trustworthy; because we are referring to a matter, not of doctrine, but of terminology. And plainly, when any one who uses the word in this sense refers to the dictate of his "conscience," he is referring to his personal apprehension (or, as we expressed it, his "private interpretation") of the Natural Law. But when Catholic theologians say that it is always a sin for me to act against my "conscience," they use the word in an entirely different sense. According to their use of the word,—so far from conscience being my primary informant on the Natural Law—it does not come into play *at all*, until I am *already* acquainted with certain general doctrines and principles of the Natural Law or of whatever other law may be in question.

And this statement leads to the explicit mention of a further particular. Acts of conscience (in the theological sense of that word) are not based on the Natural Law alone, but on the declarations of any law whatever by which I am bound. There are four great classes of such laws: (1) the Natural Law, whether as interpreted by the Church, or (where she may be silent) as cognized by my individual reason; (2) the Divine Positive Law as declared by Revelation; (3) the Church's Law; (4) Secular Law. In preparing to elicit my act of conscience, I contemplate these various laws, so far as I know them to bear on the circumstances of the moment; and then my act of conscience consists in my *inference*, as to what *hic et nunc* it is morally permissible to do.

Now we had understood F. Newman to use the word "conscience," not in this latter sense, but in the entirely different sense which we have mentioned as nowadays more prevalent. We added however, that "some doubt exists among Catholics whose opinion justly carries with it much weight, whether

F. Newman's meaning be really" what we had supposed. And this doubt is changed into certainty of the negative, by the express testimony borne in a letter which was addressed to the "Tablet" very soon after the publication of our last number. The letter is as follows:—

*To the Editor of the Tablet.*

Sir,—The Reviewer in the current number of the DUBLIN REVIEW pp. 93, 94, understands Dr. Newman to mean, by the word "conscience," "the individual's private interpretation of the Natural Law as distinct from the voice of Revelation"; and to maintain in consequence "that if the Pope imposes on me any precept, which cannot be obeyed without my transgressing my own private interpretation of the Natural Laws, I cannot without sin obey such precept." The Reviewer goes on to express his confidence, that F. Newman's quotations from theologians concerning conscience "have really no relevance whatever to the purpose for which he has quoted them": which purpose, he insists, cannot be the enforcement of the "indubitable truth," "that it is always a sin for me to do that which at the moment of doing it I think sinful," but must be to decide "what are those cases in which a Catholic may be permitted or even bound to disobey some Papal law or precept." I must ask leave to point out, that the reviewer misconstrues the writer whom he undertakes to criticise.

In his "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," 4th edit., p. 69, F. Newman says, "I am using the word 'conscience' not as a fancy or an opinion"; not, therefore, I may add, as 'a private interpretation,' "but as a dutiful obedience to what claims to be a Divine voice." . . . Nor as "a judgment upon any speculative truth, any abstract doctrine" . . . but as 'the practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what *hic et nunc* is to be done as being good, or to be avoided as evil.' From which account of conscience it indubitably does not follow, as the Reviewer thinks, that there are no interpretations of the Natural Law, which, although conscientiously ours, we may most conscientiously set aside in deference to an opinion which, on pure grounds of authority, we think the more probable.

F. Newman has nowhere implied that Revelation may not fall, as well as matters of the Natural Law, under the dictates of conscience. Conscience is contradistinguished from the *external* voice of Revelation, as a proximate from a remote *regula* of action: the external command binding the individual as regards each particular action, only so far as it is reiterated by the conscience. It is, of course, a dictate of conscience and a truth of the Natural Law, that we should obey the voice of God wherever it makes itself heard.

F. Newman has appealed to theologians precisely to enforce the truth "that it is always a sin for me to do that which at the moment of doing I think sinful," even although the Pope should prescribe it. An "indubitable truth," doubtless, but one frequently denied to be Catholic doctrine by Protestants none the less. It is quite true these quotations yield no answer to the question as to what commands my *rightly-informed* conscience pronounces that I ought or that I ought not to obey; but they were not meant to serve any such purpose.

In such precepts of the Pope as are not equivalent to definitions in faith and morals, he is not infallible ; therefore the gainsaying conscience—which even wrongly informed has an inalienable right to *hic et nunc* obedience unless the error be *hic et nunc* vincible—may sometimes be *rightly informed*.

F. Newman's object throughout has been to insist, that there is no legitimate absorption of the individual conscience in a general ecclesiastical conscience of which the Pope is the voice ; that conscience is in fact supreme. At the same time he has been most express in his acknowledgment of the necessity of the external voice of Revelation, for the right instruction of conscience. (See p. 67.)—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

H. I. D. R.

To this letter our contributor thus replied :—

*To the Editor of the Tablet.*

Sir,—I will take care that the important letter signed “H. I. D. R.” be inserted in our April number.

There is no need for me to quote the various expressions of F. Newman, which led me to interpret him as I did ; because I rejoice to infer from your correspondent's initials, that he is one whose explanation of F. Newman's meaning may be accepted as authentic. On the strength of his testimony, I am entirely convinced that I misunderstood what the illustrious writer intended to say ; and any one who reads my article will see how cordially I am at one with that doctrine on conscience, which your correspondent has expressed with such singular clearness and force. I thank him, therefore, heartily for his letter.

While I express sincere regret for any carelessness on my part which may have partly led to my mistake, I may add that your correspondent has not quite accurately caught the point of my remarks. I had on previous occasions expressed dissent from what I understood F. Newman to advocate concerning conscience. In the present article I expressed more definitely the doctrine which I had ascribed to him ; adding however, that I had found “some doubt to exist among Catholics whose opinion justly carries with it much weight, whether F. Newman's meaning were really such as I had set forth.”—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

THE DUBLIN REVIEWER.

We may mention incidentally our entire concurrence with “H. I. D. R.'s opinion, that when theologians speak of “vincible” ignorance, they invariably mean “vincible *hic et nunc*.” We also entirely agree with him, that F. Newman did very important service by protesting against the notion, that Catholics consider themselves bound by a kind of corporate conscience, and not each man by his own. And we assure F. Newman that there are very few occurrences which can give us so great pleasure, as the finding that we are able to follow him on an important matter, which we had feared was a point of divergence between his doctrine and our own.



## PIUS IX. ON LIBERAL CATHOLICISM.

[On former occasions, and again in our present number, we have drawn attention to Pius IX.'s repeated declarations, that certain Catholics—especially those calling themselves “Liberal Catholics”—are seriously deficient in yielding due intellectual submission to the infallible teaching of the Holy See. The following utterances of his are comprised within the space of hardly more than one year ; and we have thought that we should do good service by translating them. They are taken from F. At's admirable work on “authority and liberty” ; and are cited as genuine, on his authority. We have thought it more respectful not to italicise any particular passages ; but rather to exhibit the whole just as they stand, for the Catholic reader's devout study.]

### No. I.

*To Our dear Sons, the President and Associates of the Circle of S. Ambrose, Milan.*

### PIUS IX., POPE.

DEAR SONS, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDECTION.—At the present period, so sorrowful for the Church, assuredly a great alleviation of Our sufferings is supplied by the zeal of those Catholics, who, witnessing the persecutions which assail their religion, and the peril of their neighbour, are induced to make a more open profession of their faith, apply themselves with more ardour to rescue their brethren from danger, devote themselves with greater zeal to works of mercy, and place their principal glory in showing themselves more closely united to Us, and more humbly obedient to the teaching of this Chair of Truth and this Centre of Unity.

This attitude, indeed, is the sign by which We undoubtedly recognize the true children of the Church. This it is which constitutes that impregnable strength of unity, which alone can victoriously oppose the fury, the craft, and the audacity of her enemies. For to any one who considers the character of the war raised against the Church it will appear, that all the machinations of the enemy tend to destroy the Constitution of the Church, and to break the bands which unite the people to the Bishops, and the Bishops to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. As to the Pope they have despoiled him of his temporal domain ; in order that, being subject to a foreign power, he might be deprived of the liberty which is necessary to him for governing the Catholic family. And their attacks are especially directed against him, because, “when the Shepherd is smitten, the sheep are dispersed.”

Although the children of the world are wiser than the sons of light, their craft and their violence would nevertheless meet with less success if, among those who bear the name of Catholic, a great number did not extend to

them a friendly hand. Yes alas! there are those who, as if acting in concert with our enemies, are endeavouring to establish an alliance between light and darkness, between justice and iniquity, by means of those doctrines which they term *liberal Catholic*; doctrines which—based as they are on pernicious principles—approve the lay power when it invades spiritual things, and induce men to respect, or at least to tolerate, the most iniquitous laws, absolutely as if it had not been written “no man can serve two masters.”

Therefore these men are more dangerous and injurious than declared enemies: both because they second the efforts of the former without being noticed, even without expressing their judgment; and also because, holding themselves as it were on the limit of condemned opinions, they have an appearance of soundness and stainless doctrine, which allures the thoughtless lovers of conciliation, and deceives virtuous men, who would, were it not for them, firmly oppose manifest error. Thus they separate minds, disserve unity, and weaken the forces which should be united, and should act in concert against the enemy.

However, you may easily avoid their snares, if you keep before your eyes the Divine maxim, “By their fruits you shall know them”; if you observe that they display their animosity against everything which indicates prompt, entire, absolute obedience to the decrees and warnings of the Holy See; that they speak of that See with disdain, calling it the “Roman Curia”; that they accuse all its acts of being imprudent and inopportune; that they apply the names “Ultramontane” and “Jesuit” to the most zealous and obedient Sons of the Church; in fine, that, overflowing with pride, they esteem themselves wiser than the Church, to whom has been promised, specially and eternally, Divine assistance.

Do you, dear sons, remember that it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of God on earth, to decide all that regards faith, morals, and the government of the Church; according to what Jesus Christ Himself has said: “He scattereth, who gathereth not with Me.” Show, then, your wisdom by an absolute obedience, and a free and constant adherence to the Chair of Peter. For, thus animated by the same spirit, you will be perfect in the same judgments and in the same ideas, and you will strengthen that unity which must be opposed to the enemies of the Church. By this means, you will make the works of charity which you have undertaken, agreeable to God and useful to your neighbour; and you will give true consolation to Our soul, so much afflicted by the evils which overwhelm the Church. To this end, We wish you heavenly aid, and the gifts of Grace from on High. And as a presage of these graces, and a pledge of Our paternal solicitude, We grant you, dear sons, from the bottom of Our heart, the Apostolic blessing.

Given at Rome, near S. Peter's, 6th March, 1873, the 27th of Our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

No. II.

*To Our dear Sons, the Senator Connart d'Hamale, President, and the Members of the Federation of the Catholic Circles in Belgium.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

DEAR SONS, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BLESSING.—Whilst the situation of the Church becomes daily more painful, and whilst we see the audacity which tramples upon Her authority increase, as well as the obstinacy with which men are working for the dissolution of Catholic unity, and to tear from Us the children who belong to Us; We see at the same time, dear sons, your faith, your love of religion, and devotion to the Holy See, shine with an ever-increasing brilliance. With the object not only of frustrating these efforts of impiety, but also of attaching the faithful to Us by closer ties, you unite your talents, your strength, and your resources. What We praise most in this pious enterprise is, that you are full of aversion for the principles of *Liberal Catholicism*, which you are endeavouring to banish, as far as you can, from the minds of men.

It is true that those who are imbued with these principles make a profession of love and respect for the Church, and seem to consecrate to her defence their talents and their works; but they labour nevertheless to pervert her doctrine and her spirit and, each of them according to the diversity of his taste and temperament, is disposed to place himself at the service, either of Cæsar, or of those who claim rights in favour of a false liberty. They fancy that it is absolutely necessary to follow this course, in order to remove the cause of dissensions, to reconcile human progress with the Gospel, to re-establish order and tranquillity; as if light could co-exist with darkness, and as if truth did not cease to be truth when it is violently turned from its true signification, and when it is divested of the fixity inherent in its nature.

This insidious error is more dangerous than open enmity to the Church, because it is concealed by a specious veil of zeal and charity; and it is, assuredly, by persisting in your combat against it, and by carefully diverting simple minds from it, that you will extirpate the fatal root of discord, and that you will labour efficaciously in producing and in keeping up the close union of souls. Certainly, you do not require these warnings; you who adhere with such absolute devotion to all the instructions (documents) emanating from this Apostolic See, which you have seen condemn liberal principles on various occasions. But the desire to facilitate your labours and to render their fruit more abundant, induces Us to remind you of a point so important.

For the rest continue to fight the good fight which you have so generously begun; and strive each day to merit more and more from the Church of God, having in view the crown which will be your recompense. Meanwhile, We express our gratitude for your services, and We desire for your society ever new developments, with an abundance of Heavenly blessings. We desire that the presage of these favours may be the

Apostolic benediction, which We grant you, dear sons, as the pledge of our paternal solicitude.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 8th May, 1873, the 27th year of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

No. III.

*To Our Venerable Brother Anselm, Bishop of Quimper.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

VENERABLE BROTHER, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.—As, Venerable Brother, We rejoice to see that everywhere Catholic Associations are multiplying, which are indications of the vigour of the Faith, and the most proper means to enkindle and defend it,—so also it is with the greatest satisfaction that we have received the letter of the associates who, under your presidency, have held their first reunion in your episcopal city.

We have augured well from this opening, seeing that these Catholic reunions begin with a protestation of entire and absolute submission to the Holy See, and to its infallible magisterium. For, if their members do not really diverge in any way from its doctrine and its teaching, and if they, firmly guided and supported by its Divine strength, rest firmly on this sure foundation, they will certainly render a most efficacious and useful service to religion. Assuredly they will not be turned from this obedience by the writings and the efforts of the open enemies of the Church, and of Peter's See, against whom rather they will contend; but they might find an insidious road to error in the so-called liberal opinions which are embraced by many Catholics, otherwise upright and pious, whose very piety and influence might attract minds towards them, and incline them to very pernicious opinions. Warn, then, Venerable Brother, the members of the Catholic Association, that on the numerous occasions when We have censured the followers of liberal opinions, We have not had in view those who hate the Church, and whom it would have been useless to denounce; but, rather, those whom We have just named, who, preserving and keeping up the concealed virus of those liberal principles which they have unconsciously imbibed—under pretext that this virus is not manifestly fatal, and that it is not, according to them, noxious to religion—easily inoculate minds therewith, and thus propagate the seed of those perturbations which have so long agitated the world.

If the associates carefully avoid these snares, and direct their principal energy against this insidious enemy, they will certainly deserve very well of religion and the country. And they will assuredly attain this end if, as they have determined, they do not allow themselves to be carried away by any other breath of doctrine, than by that which emanates from this Chair of Truth. We predict a happy success for their undertaking; and, meanwhile, as a presage of Divine favour, and a pledge of our especial goodwill, We grant with all our heart the Apostolic benediction to you, Venerable Brother, to all the members of the Catholic Association, and to the whole of your diocese.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 28th July, 1873, the 28th of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

No. IV.

*To Our dear Sons, the noble Viscount de Morogues, President, and to all the Council of the Catholic Committee of Orleans, at Orleans.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

DEAR AND NOBLE SONS, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.—We rejoice, dear sons, that you also have formed a society to resist the impiety which labours to subvert all order; and We joyfully see that under the happy auspices with which you undertake the combat, you seek the aid and blessing of the Holy See, to which alone has been promised a constant victory over the powers of darkness.

But, although you are bound indeed to combat open impiety,—yet you have perhaps less to fear from it than from a party nearer home, composed of men imbued with that equivocal doctrine which, while rejecting the extreme consequences of error, obstinately retains and nourishes its first germ; and which—not choosing to embrace the whole truth, yet not daring to reject it altogether—endeavours to make the doctrines of the Church harmonize somewhat with its own notions.

For there are still men who adhere indeed by a pure effort of will to the truths recently defined—and this to avoid the manifest brand of schism, and to delude their own conscience—but who have by no means laid aside that pride which raises itself against the science of God; nor reduced their intelligence into captivity under obedience to Jesus Christ.

Should such opinions secretly insinuate themselves into and possess your mind, you could certainly not hope for that strength and firmness, which can proceed only from a perfect adhesion to the spirit and doctrines of this Chair of Peter; and for this reason, you would not only not be in a condition to sustain usefully the combat which you undertake, but you would perhaps cause the greatest damage to the cause you wish to defend.

Be then on your guard against this concealed enemy; repulse his dangerous suggestions; and, resting on the immovable rock established by Jesus Christ, and following the footsteps of your illustrious Bishop, march valiantly against the enemies of all authority, divine and human. God will give you strength and victory, and these We wish you with all our heart; while as a pledge of Heavenly favour, and the witness of our paternal solicitude, We lovingly grant you, dear sons, the Apostolic benediction.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 9th June, 1873, the 27th year of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

No. V.

*To Our dear Son Louis Veillot.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

DEAR SON, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.—We have received your letter of the 19th of this month, by which you announce to us the promulgation of the decree against your journal, of which We had been already informed by the public press. We fail not to reply to your

letter, dear son, in order to show our paternal affection for your deference towards us.

The present state of things, as you well know, is so miserable, that the enemies of God and of the Catholic Church, everywhere spread throughout the world and actuated by a violent fury, have employed all their power and all their strength to overturn the said Church; in which, however, they cannot succeed. To advance their designs, they shamefully avail themselves of the evils and difficulties which overwhelm Catholic nations, at the same time striving to keep up and foment the present divisions and dissensions of mind, so as to obtain greater power.

In this great confusion of civil society, since your strength and efforts, dear son, are faithfully applied to the propagation of good, you ought not to be astonished to find yourself in trouble. But whilst the most bitter enemies of the Church, believing themselves now able to advance securely, are proceeding with vast rapidity on the way of injustice and perdition—while those who seek to conciliate light and darkness are vainly and fallaciously flattering themselves that they have attained the object of their wishes—while others, from fear of a violent tempest, precipitately bow their head before the false wisdom of the age, wrongly believing that they will thus avoid being overwhelmed by the violence of the storm—you, dear son, with a heart firm, confident, and tranquil, await, with all good men, the time and the moment which the Heavenly Father has in His power appointed; and during this time your prayers ascend to the throne of Him to whom the words of the humble, and the sacrifices of those who are tried, surely arrive.

We hope that the Apostolic benediction which We lovingly impart to you in the Lord,—to you and your collaborators, according to your request,—will be to you a presage of Heavenly aid, and a pledge of our affection.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 31st January, 1874, the 28th of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

#### NO. VI.

*To Our dear Son Blanc de St. Bonnet.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

BELoved SON, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.—We have received from the hands of our beloved son, Cardinal J. B. Pitra, the work which you have composed under the title of "*La Légitimité*," and at the same time, the letter in which you offer us, with filial love, this pledge of your affection and devotion.

We are much gratified with the excellent sentiments expressed in this letter. They show that you reprove, with reason, the perverse doctrines of those men, who immolate the sacred rights of religion and truth to the false liberty of this age; doctrines condemned by Ourselves: and that you perfectly comprehend how great is the evil done to the Church and to civil society by the upholders of doctrines, which foster the pernicious germs of so many evils, and become a source of calamity to the faithful.



We are satisfied that your work corresponds to the zeal which animates you for the cause of the Church and social order, as well as to your devotion to the Apostolic See ; and We shall certainly find this to be the case, as soon as our occupations allow us to taste some portions thereof.

But now, as a presage of the salutary fruits which this work will bear for the good of religion and society, and as a witness of our satisfaction for the good offices you are endeavouring to render Us, We grant you, beloved son, and your family, according to your desire, the Apostolic benediction, the certain pledge of all the gifts of Heaven.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 11th October, 1873, the 28th of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

No. VII.

*To Our dear Sons, the Editors of the Journal La Croix, at Brussels.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

TO OUR DEAR SONS, HEALTH AND APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.—You have remarked with justice, dear sons, that the overthrow of religious and political order is introduced encouraged and propagated by the apostasy of many, by the compromises now so frequent between truth and error, and by the cowardice of the greater number. You show that there are no other means to employ to resist the invasion of disorder, except the force of truth, which it is absolutely necessary to seek where Christ has established the Chair of Truth.

Although We have not been able to read your journal, on account of the labours which overwhelm Us, it is nevertheless our duty to praise the object of which your letter has informed Us, and with which We have learnt that your journal fully corresponds ; namely, to exhibit, to spread abroad, to elucidate, and to penetrate minds with all that the Holy See has taught against certain culpable doctrines ; doctrines (to say the least) false, and received nevertheless in more places than one ; notably against Liberal Catholicism, which endeavours to conciliate light with darkness, truth with error. Doubtless, you have undertaken a hard and difficult combat : as these pernicious doctrines, which open the way to all impious enterprises, are at this moment supported with urgency by all who glory in favouring the pretended progress of civilization ; by all who, outwardly professing religion but not having its true spirit, everywhere talk loudly of peace, although they know not the way of peace ; drawing to themselves by these proceedings a considerable number of men, who are seduced by a selfish love of repose.

We wish you, then, in these serious conflicts, an aid specially efficacious ; so that, on the one hand, you may never pass the limits of truth and justice, and, on the other, that you may be able to dissipate the darkness with which minds are clouded.

Meanwhile, as a mark of the Divine favour, and the pledge of our paternal goodwill, We grant you the Apostolic benediction.

Given at Rome, near St. Peter's, 21st May, 1874, the 28th of our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

## THE CHURCH'S SOCIAL CONFLICT.

[Translated, with a few omissions, from an article of F. Ramière's, in the "Etudes" of February, 1876.]

"*Where are we? Whither are we tending?*" These are the two questions which many are now asking, without waiting for a reply. We now purpose casting a general glance over the position, measuring the road traversed by the Revolution, and lifting up, if we can, a corner of the veil which conceals from us the future.

I. The war waged against the Church is not exclusively confined to our period. But the struggle which has been long noiseless and disguised, partial, local, and limited in its pretensions, has, in our time, put on a bolder and fiercer character.

In the first place the struggle is formally a religious struggle. What is the cause of the dispute between the Church and her adversaries? Is Catholicity reproached, as was formerly the case, with her aversion to the liberty of the people, and her preference for absolute monarchy? Certainly not; we have heard M. de Bismarck allege the contrary.

The last State which has remained faithful to the Church is a republic of the New World; while in the hostile army we see the Swiss Confederacy and the Constitutional Monarchy of Italy holding out the right hand of fellowship to German Cesarism and Muscovite autocracy. We have no reason to say that now, as in the 16th century, the religious quarrel is envenomed by the rivalry of races and national interests. On the contrary, we see everywhere these interests sacrificed to hostility against the Church. While the founder of the German Empire compromises its solidity by the most inopportune excitement of religious hatred, the soi-disant liberals of Austria, Bavaria, and Belgium show themselves ready to purchase the slavery of the Church by the loss of the independence of their respective countries; and even as to the liberals of Italy and France, their fanaticism makes them forget their most bloody disasters and their hereditary hatreds.

The conflict is, then, exclusively religious; but even within the vast circle of religious interests, what is the especial object of the enemy's attack? It is not difficult to discover this: it is the authority of the Church or, let us rather say, of Jesus Christ Himself, Who lives and rules through the Church. This is not the only dogma attacked; for the anti-Christian army has in its ranks representatives of all the ancient heresies: but the link which unites all the various contradictory negations is the fundamental denial of the power which God has established here below to affirm the truth. Thus we have witnessed the intensity of the struggle increase, when the Church, to put her own defenders on their guard against the seduction of this dangerous heresy, has consolidated the basis of her authority, and particularized the conditions of its exercise

It is not that the infallibility of the Pope is more odious to our enemies than the infallibility of the Church. They well know, although they pretend not to know it, that the former, identical with the latter, has not a more extensive ground; and, consequently, does not conflict further with the domain of reason or with that of the civil power. But so long as the organ of the Church's authority was less clearly defined, they might hope to paralyze its action. The Vatican Council has dispelled all uncertainty; and by fixing the faith of Christians, it has dissipated the hopes of the enemy, and baffled their intrigues. The Divine authority is manifest to all eyes in its unity and universality; it is present throughout all Catholicity by the Episcopate, and personified at Rome in the Sovereign Pontiff. A complete affirmation has been opposed to the complete negation of contemporary rationalism, which denies all authority superior to man. We must not, then, be astonished at seeing this decisive point especially attacked.

The second character of the struggle which we are now witnessing is its unparalleled boldness. All false religions and all heresies have sprung from the desire inspired in man by the rebellious angel to make himself independent of the Divine authority; but, until now, man, in yielding to this desire, had not ventured to acknowledge to himself this fact; and only a few isolated members of the Satanic army had presumed to repeat the "non-serviam" with a full consciousness of their perversity. This cry has now become the watchword of the whole anti-Catholic army, and the resulting liberalism is only its faithful echo. For the first time the earth sees a numerous body in open revolt against Heaven, pretending to be self-sufficing, and refusing to acknowledge any superior power. This intoxication of pride explains the intensity of the hatred, with which the authority which represents God on earth is pursued. Seen at this point of view, the present struggle appears to us as the culminating point of the eternal war between truth and error.

However great may be the audacity of the Church's enemies, they do not forget that the favourite weapon of Satan is falsehood. So hypocrisy is the third mark of the war now waging against the Church. Without precluding themselves from open violence when they can exercise it with impunity, they for the most part make choice to restrain the Church by unjust and arbitrary laws; to shackle her liberty; to stifle her utterance; and paralyze her action. The means employed by the Revolution are seduction, falsehood, and deception. How could it succeed in obtaining so many victims, were it not for the fallacious promises which it makes so freely? Civil and political liberties, material and commercial prosperity, progress of science and art, equality of rank, fraternity of nations, cessation of war—what has it not promised to mankind? And are we then astonished that, bewitched by such brilliant promises, modern society should have reproduced on a grand scale the scene of the Terrestrial Paradise, and stretched its hand to pluck the forbidden fruit?

What renders this struggle yet more dangerous is that, on the one hand, rationalism proceeds with a kind of logic, rigorously deducing certain consequences from a principle laid down as an axiom; and that,

on the other hand, the children of the Church, by not boldly attacking this erroneous principle, unskillfully compromising with the error, deprive themselves of the strength always to be found in truth.

Rationalism thus reasons: seeing that every man is free to think what he pleases, there is not in the world an authority which can order or forbid his thinking in a certain manner. Every man and every society, which arrogates to itself such an authority, must be denounced as the enemy of human liberty, and consequently cannot claim any share in its benefits. And since the Incarnate Word and the Church founded by Him claim this authority, liberalism cannot do otherwise than persecute, and wage a bitter war against Jesus Christ and the Church. These few lines clearly express the last development of the liberal doctrine. They sum up the pleas by which the defenders of Prussian Cæsarism endeavour to justify its violence; and we must not conceal the fact that the favourable reception generally given by the liberal press to this theory, gives us room to fear that it will, sooner or later, conduct to a practice equally general.

In fact it is already practised in its most dangerous form in many a country, where public opinion is not yet prepared for violent persecution. By banishing religious teaching from schools, liberalism adopts the most effectual means to eradicate the faith completely; and by so doing, it only acts consistently with its principles. If the State be not obliged to recognize an authority divinely established to teach the truth, it is in its province to regulate all that appertains to education; and according to this rule, it should not restrict either the liberty of the teacher or of the children. The liberal State is despotic as regards education, and indifferent to every revealed doctrine. Its teaching then must, consistently, remain faithful to this indifference; and if it tend thus to destroy all positive faith, this result is simply attributable to the fact that the liberal principle is incompatible with Divine authority.

M. Minghetti, the head of the Italian ministry, has recently told his constituents that, following the example of Swiss liberalism, he is prepared to deduce from the same principles another consequence equally oppressive to the Church. The liberal State acknowledging no spiritual authority, and being, besides, sovereign judge in every dispute concerning property, is not obliged in its adjudication of ecclesiastical property to take into consideration the religious opinions of those who claim its revenues. A law, therefore, will be proposed, by which the churches and presbyteries (almost all that now belongs to the Catholic Church) will be at the disposal of a council elected by a majority of the parishioners. And, as true Catholics will not take any part in the election, the Catholic Church will be wholly robbed, without material violence, by virtue of the logical evolution of the revolutionary principle alone.

But that which constitutes the strength of our adversaries, is the weakness of the defenders of the truth. What can they oppose to this reasoning? Will they say that the rationalist conclusions tend to the negation of the rights of God, the annihilation of all truth, the destruction of all morality, an oppression of conscience unknown to former

persecutors? All this is true; but all this only proves that the liberal principle is incompatible with these sacred rights. Deny, then, this principle, unless you wish the results to be pressed against you. Unhappily, a large number of Catholics do not yet understand this necessity. They do not see,—what is, however, transparently evident,—that we cannot admit as a right the liberty of error, without thereby denying the sovereign right of truth; if they do not explicitly affirm the liberal principle, they do not care to deny it; still less do they dare to assert boldly the Christian principle, which is alone capable of saving society.

This weakness has rendered abortive the reaction repeatedly excited by the fatal results of the revolutionary spirit. In endeavouring to repel the consequences without daring to deny the principle, we bring against ourselves one of the two great rational weapons—Logic; and as to the other, which we reserve, namely Truth, we completely paralyze it by our reticences. Truth has no power as long as it is not affirmed; by dissembling it we give to our adversary a right to deny it.

II. We have been setting forth the progressive course of revolutionary error, whether it be called “liberalism” or “rationalism” matters little. The torrent increases in violence, and threatens soon to overwhelm us—to overwhelm even society itself. . . . Are we condemned without hope to be lost? As children of the Catholic Church we boldly reply, *No*; for we know the promises which have been made to her. Moreover, shall we not find, exterior even to the principles of faith, motives to reassure us? Let us not forget that error has within itself the principles of dissolution; while Truth on the contrary, because it is truth, will sooner or later triumph: “*Veritas Domini manet in æternum.*” The more violent and bitter the combat, the nearer must be the end. What will this end be? Could we not do something to render it successful?

Without being illuminated by prophetic light, we may, by analyzing facts and observing the ways of Providence in the past, form, as regards the future, some seriously probable conjecture. What says history? That all the errors which have successively assailed the Church have had two periods: one, of seduction and increase; the other, of disenchantment and decline. The eternal war between truth and error is divided into a series of partial struggles, in which truth is attacked by some especial error, dependent on illusion more or less specious. As long as these illusions last, weak minds are led captive by them, and error seems certain of victory; but, when the period of disenchantment succeeds this period of seduction, the souls who are not completely perverted yield to the influence of truth, which God then vouchsafes to display with a brilliancy proportioned to the violence of the attack. This theory, which it would be easy to prove by history, will permit us to show at what point the present struggle has now arrived, and determine its connection with those which have preceded it.

We have remarked that if error extends its tyrannical power, the reason is, that it appeals to the passions; that, to seduce and draw away people, the Revolution is careful to dazzle their eyes with the deceitful glare of false good which it so liberally promises. But now at the end of one period the

illusion is in course of being dispelled. Not one of the advantages promised to emancipated society, which has not been replaced by the very evil that it was to have cured. In the place of political liberty, we have had alternately the anarchical tyranny of the demagogy, and the despotic tyranny of Cæsarism. The civil liberties of the Christian ages, which had escaped the abusive centralization of the ancien régime, have been crushed out by the rod of iron wielded by the bureaucracy.

The working classes were promised that with the liberty of labour they should acquire happiness; and this deceptive liberty has resulted in making the workman a mere machine, subjecting him to the fluctuations of the labour-market, and placing his labour at the mercy of capital; so that the re-establishment of the ancient corporations was, at the last parliamentary inquiry, found to be an object of universal desire. The rights of the poor and the sick—yet more sacred—have been openly violated by the governments; which, on the pretext of managing charitable foundations, have diminished their revenues and compromised their capital. . . .

Much deeper and more irremediable is the disturbance of moral order, the first condition of social prosperity. Only to speak of Italy, transformed and regenerated by liberalism, she had already, in 1872, acquired the primacy of crime, as she had in her prisons 72,450 prisoners, a greater proportion than in all the other European states. In the budget of 1876 this number amounts to 85,000.

Has liberalism kept its promises relative to the progress of science and the diffusion of instruction? The Academies of France had already replied to this question by accusing the new regime of having killed science; the University of Turin has, through Professor Pacchiotti, re-echoed these complaints; and in Parliament it has been proposed to suppress several of the universities which the Church had founded in Italy, and which, once so flourishing, are now in want of students. Again, do we not see liberalism everywhere using its power to suppress religious schools, and condemning Catholic youth to ignorance, rather than furnish them with means to preserve their faith?

What has the new régime given us in place of that union, which previously existed between the different classes of society? Irreconcilable hatred, an ever-increasing hostility. All these monarchical or republican governments, which we see leagued together to destroy the Divine authority of the Church, are themselves menaced by the repugnance, more and more violent, which their subjects entertain against all authority. The religious question has as a necessary complement the social question. Governments must be under an extraordinary blindness, not to see the essential connection of these two questions; not to see the impossibility of their solving against the Church the religious question, without the social question being solved against *them*. But what they are so unwilling to see, cannot fail to be shown them by facts. The respect due to law and authority is the essential link of the social body; when this link is completely destroyed, the body will assuredly fall into dissolution.

It is then no longer possible to deny it: modern society has not derived



from its pretended emancipation any of the advantages it promised itself, and the expectation of which had seduced it. The invasion of liberalism has arrived at its second stage—that of disenchantment. A large number of minds already recognize their error ; and it is certain that this number will increase, as the results of the liberal heresy become more evident. Does this mean that society will of herself return to the truth ? No : a special aid of divine grace is indispensable, that she may re-ascend from the abyss into which she has so fatally fallen.

But what is our duty in order to insure success?—UNION. However small the number of devoted Catholics, how strong would they be if all—united in spirit and heart with the Pope—would oppose a compact phalanx and a perfectly concerted action against the enemy ! All noble causes are now identified with that of the Church. Human dignity, the prerogatives of reason, moral liberty, the legitimate autonomy of family and the community, the prosperity of the working classes, the alliance of capital and labour, authority and liberty, the union of class and the fraternity of the people, patriotism and the love of the human race, all these elements of individual and social happiness, which liberalism had perverted into irreconcilable contradictions and unrealizable Utopias, can only be reconciled and realized by the Catholic Faith. We must then rally round the centre of unity. Let us not forget that according to the Catholic doctrine, long since defined by the Council of Florence before it was defined by the Vatican, the Sovereign Pontiff was invested by Jesus Christ with full power, not only to teach, but also to direct the Church. Divine assistance then has been promised to him, and through him to all those who are united with him, not only on questions of faith, but also on questions of conduct. Another condition of our strength, another obligation imposed on us by the necessity and danger of the Church, is the duty of employing, for the triumph of a cause essentially supernatural, supernatural means. To speak and write is useful—indispensable ; but all this will be of no avail without the grace of God and PRAYER. It is not semi-Christians, men of a purely speculative belief, who are called to overcome the enemies of the Church, and to save society. This glorious mission has been reserved for the Maccabees : for the true soldiers of God, whose piety in the temple equals their valour in the combat ; for men of devotion and self-denial.

It is not only by prayer and speech that we must sustain the interests of God. Pius IX. has never ceased to repeat that above all—we must ACT : act for the Church to comfort her in her distress ; to compensate her for her losses, as far as we can ; to provide for her more urgent necessities ; to furnish the means of providing her children with the milk of heavenly doctrine, and to defend them from the venom of an impious education ; to contribute generously to the decoration of her temples, to the keeping up of those institutions with which her charity had covered the soil of Europe ; to act energetically with regard to her enemies, to defend her against their attacks, and to wrest from them at least that shred of justice, which they cannot refuse her without too flagrant self-contradiction. It is true that by carrying out their principles to their legitimate end, they succeed in ex-

cluding truth from the common rights secured to all errors; but this extreme logic is the last degree of absurdity, and it is by this means that liberalism is unmasked to the eyes of all men of good faith. The Falck laws in Prussia have done more injury to Protestantism than to Catholicity; and when M. de Bismarck recently desired to complete them by remodelling the Penal Code, the liberals perceived, a little too late, that they had given weapons to the State, from which they would in their turn suffer. We shall not then be alone in reclaiming the liberties of the Church. In proportion as the tyranny of liberalism is more completely unmasked, honest souls will come nearer to us; and, provided that our courage fail not in the struggle, we shall finally succeed, by attracting to ourselves that mass, more deceived than factious, which make up the bulk of the hostile army.

We have pointed out to Catholics the conditions of their future triumph, by reminding them of their duty, which the leader of the sacred army incessantly inculcates to his soldiers in his admirable speeches. Let us add a final recommendation of the august Pontiff. Addressing himself especially to the French Catholics represented by the pilgrims of Nantes, he said: "I conclude, dear children, by recommending you to PERSEVERE by the grace of God in the path which you have entered. Perseverance alone can assure you the crown of immortality. What then? Will it be possible,—when we see so many unfortunate souls obstinately persisting in evil, and vigorously employing, to oppress the Church, all the means suggested by hypocrisy and violence,—that Catholics shall not equally persevere and unite in defending the rights of God, Religion, and the Holy See, in claiming for the Church all the liberty due to her? Thank God! This duty you are now fulfilling; you will henceforth fulfil to the end; as you desire that your brow shall be adorned with the crown of Glory."

H. RAMIÈRE.

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## Notices of Books.

*Inaugural Address delivered at the Manchester Academia*, by H. E. Cardinal MANNING. Manchester: Roberts.

WE hope that this address will be carefully studied by all Catholics, whose acquirements and powers lead them to speculative study. Its main theme (p. 19) is "the sanctification of the intellect."

"Every century has had its special aberrations: but those of the early and of the mediæval ages were moral and spiritual errors in the form of heresy, invented by those who believed in the Christian revelation. But the aberration of the nineteenth century is the intellectual perversion of those, who have rejected all revelation, and all belief in a God, and all moral conception of the nature of man. It is to rectify and to restore the intellect of our day from this monstrous and perverse aberration, that we are called to labour."

We entirely concur with the Cardinal (p. 4) that of late years there has been a very perceptible growth of opinion among Catholics, as to the vital importance of studying science and literature with special reference throughout to dogma. And we also concur with him, that this most happy circumstance is in no small degree owing to the direct and indirect influence of the London Academia. May the new Manchester Academia have an equally auspicious career!

The following passage expresses, with such singular spirit and point, the indissoluble connection between theological and secular science, that we are sure our readers will excuse the length of our quotation:—

"It is not possible to send the Church to Coventry, because the commission of the Church pervades all the regions of science in some sort. As we say of sovereignty, its jurisdiction runs everywhere: so we say of revelation. For instance, what would seem further from revelation than the physical science of geology and the like? and yet the words, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' enter into physical science. The creation of the world is an axiom, I may say, even in the physical science of the world, and an axiom derived from revelation. It was precisely this axiom, which made the distinction between the heretics of old, who ascribed the existence of the world to the eternity of matter, or to the creative power of an inferior or evil being. The creation, then, is an axiom of science, which from revelation runs into geology. Again, the descent of man from a *superior* pair and the unity of mankind are also truths of revelation against which a multitude of scientific men, if I may

so call them, are at this moment trying, with every weapon and every instrument they can wield, to destroy their certainty. In this question revelation has its place, and no man who believes in the revelation of God can yield a hair's breadth. Metaphysics, pure mental philosophy, would seem to lie outside of revelation: but the question arises—Is there such a thing as a soul? or, does matter think? Here again revelation has something to say. Once more: is there such a thing as a moral sense, or are right and wrong mere conventional sensations arising out of the habit of attaching a sense of fear or shame to particular actions? or again, are moral habits learnt, as I once heard a very notable and ready speaker maintain, like the tumbling of pigeons; which is only a skilful evolution which the parent bird teaches its young to make: and the young ones learn to follow parental example, and under the training so acquired form the habit of tumbling and transmit it to posterity? So in like manner the notions of right and wrong are said to be acquired, and to have no foundation in the intrinsic distinction of things. Here again revelation has something to say. There is a soul, there is a conscience, there is a supreme lawgiver. Thus revelation runs with its jurisdiction into mental philosophy and into metaphysics (pp. 10, 11).

"And the Church, having a Divine liberty as the witness God has constituted in the world to deliver His revelation, and being the sole fountain of that knowledge, the Church has sovereignty, and that sovereignty is one which is exempt from all control of human authority. No authority on earth can intervene to dictate to the Church what it has to teach, or within what limits it shall teach. There is no authority to determine whether the Church shall teach or not this or that doctrine. It is therefore not only exempt, but supreme: and being supreme, there can be no appeal from it. It is the last final judge of what is the faith and what is the law of God: and when science and politics come into contact with that faith and that law, it admits of no appeal from its own decision, to any tribunal out of itself; to any tribunal of appeal in the past, or in the future (pp. 11, 12).

"When men talk of Galileo, I answer that Galileo did not demonstrate. He enunciated a hypothesis, and that hypothesis was not demonstrated for a century afterwards. Lord Bacon lived and died disbelieving the hypothesis. Sir Thomas Brown, one of the greatest literary men of the seventeenth century, also died disbelieving it. When Newton demonstrated the truth, he demonstrated nothing to touch the Faith: but as soon as he demonstrated it, the Church at once, which had carefully guarded the popular and visible interpretation of the historical words of Scripture—lest without cause the mind of man should be perturbed and doubts should be insinuated without necessity or power of solution—as soon as that demonstration was made, the Church gave full scope to science to use its own method, and its own principles within its own limits, as the Vatican Council has declared" (p. 12).

In fact it is continually forgotten, though the fact is indubitable, not only that Galileo "did not demonstrate" heliocentricism, but that in all probability he would not have even believed it except for his own gross scientific blunder. The one reason for his tenet, on which he laid incomparably the greatest stress, is now admitted by all scientific men to have been destitute of the very slightest relevancy. We refer to the argument which he based on the flux and reflux of the tides.

*The Relations of the Church to Society.* By F. O'REILLY, S.J. No. XIII. ("Irish Monthly Magazine," February, 1876.) Dublin: M'Glashan & Gill.

TWO more of F. O'Reilly's admirable papers have appeared, since we reviewed the series in our last number. The second of these commences a discussion, as yet not finished, on the Council of Constance; and we postpone, therefore, our notice of it till July. But the February Essay on "Liberty of Conscience" is full of interest. F. O'Reilly disputes (pp. 165-7) the propriety of this phrase, as it is used by Liberal Catholics and others. And, as regards the substance of the matter, he swells the chorus of orthodox theologians, who altogether deny that a Catholic is at liberty to hold the "Liberal Catholic" tenet on the subject.

"Let us hold to our Religion as it is, and not shirk difficulties. Well then, the Catholic Religion was revealed by God to be the Religion of all men, to be bound up with civil society, not to be subject to State authorities, but to be cherished and supported by them, and to cherish and support them in turn, to uphold their legitimate authority. . . Suppose the Catholic Religion to be the Religion of all men, as God wished it to be. Suppose the Catholic Religion to be recognized as Divinely true by all sovereigns, as God wished it to be. Suppose the Catholic Religion to be united with every State in friendly alliance, as God wished it to be. Suppose further, that in the midst of this condition of things a few men, or even not so very few, rose up in some country and sought to disturb this Divinely appointed system, would they, or ought they to have been left free to do so? Certainly not. God's plan would not have been reasonably or legitimately sacrificed to their fancies. That plan was not carried out to the full nor nearly to the full throughout the world, God Himself so permitting. It is not to be seen at present completely realized in any country. In ages gone by, and not so very long gone by, it was in operation in several countries—countries exclusively Catholic—and this state of things lasted we may say, though not in its fulness, down to our own times in Spain and Portugal and their dependencies and in Italy, Nor can it be considered as yet obsolete in those countries. It is the undoubted duty of Catholic governments to protect the Catholic Religion, to promote its interests, to guard their subjects against the encroachments of heresy, so far as circumstances permit" (pp. 167-8).

Doubtless the tenet of Liberal Catholicism is convenient to those Catholics who have to do with Protestant governments.

"Hence it is that Catholics have been led to proclaim it, emphasise it, and extol it in the most eloquent terms. I do not mean to imply that the Catholics I allude to consciously put forward a false theory for a purpose. They sincerely adopt it. Besides the plausible abstract reasonings whereby it is defended, men are easily led to generalize what fits their own circumstances. One who finds tropical heat serve his health, would be apt enough to set down a high temperature as the most wholesome generally. The convenience of the ultra-tolerant theory we have been considering commends it to those circumstanced as Catholics are in these countries, and helps to make many of them believe it; while on the other

hand they are disposed to look on an opposite view as not only incorrect, but dangerous. But, for all that, the principle is not true, and we must not sacrifice truth to convenience, not even to what may seem to be the public good. The principle is one which is not, and never has been, and never will be, approved by the Church of Christ." (p. 169).

"No convenience can warrant our departure *from the Church's doctrine*. This departure would not in the long run be even politic; because we should be constantly liable to the reproach of gainsaying the Church whose guidance we profess to accept. We should be driven to saying, either that we disagreed with the Church—which God forbid—or that the Church did not mean what she said and did" (p. 170).

At the same time,

"Circumstances vary very much the application of what I hold to be the undoubtedly true doctrine. Or, more correctly, the doctrine itself, fully developed, makes allowance for circumstances and embodies exceptions which do not appear on the face of a statement of it. As the Divine commandment—'Thou shalt not kill'—does not, when fully explained, convey an universal prohibition to kill men in all combinations of circumstances, though such may seem to be its meaning;—so *the equally Divine Law* which commands the exclusive maintenance of the Catholic Religion does not comprise all possible or actual cases" (p. 170).

In these two last quotations we have italicised a word or two, to show how distinctly F. O'Reilly lays down, that the Liberal Catholic tenet is inconsistent with the Church's teaching.

*The Voice of Creation.* By Very Rev. Canon OAKELEY.  
London: Burns & Oates.

**T**HIS is a truly charming work, and one which inspires its readers with a kind of personal affection for its author. We may add, that there is special interest in seeing Canon Oakeley embark on a line of thought, somewhat different in kind from those which he has more commonly pursued.

It is certain on S. Paul's testimony, that God's Existence is proved to a reasonable mind, by the contemplation of what is seen and experienced. On the other hand it is certain, that there is a method of studying the physical world, which rather indisposes the mind than otherwise to acceptance of religious truth. Canon Oakeley assumes the truth of Catholicity; and asks what is that view of nature, which on the one hand is reasonable, while on the other hand it is ministrative, and not antipathetic, to faith. This in brief is the theme of his little volume; and (as Cardinal Manning observes in his letter of approbation, p. vii.) it is especially appropriate to the present time, when "men of science seem to be going blind."

In his first lecture the writer maintains with great force, that "love—watchful generous unsparing abounding love—is the pervading unvarying characteristic" (p. 7), which will be discerned in creation by a well-disposed



mind. In his second he develops the same general subject into greater minuteness and detail. And he mentions (p. vi.) that he has verified and rectified his statements throughout, by "the maturer conclusions of more modern science."

But the third lecture is to our mind (as also to Cardinal Manning's) the most valuable of all. Canon Oakeley has argued in his first two lectures, that nature everywhere teems with marks of design, and that in every instance the design is a loving and merciful one. What then are we to say, as to the sin and suffering so widely prevalent here below?

Now in the first place we may ask, what is the *amount* of suffering on earth? There is hardly another fact so amazing, as the different answers given by different but equally candid thinkers to this question. We suppose that each man measures other men greatly by himself; and that the difference of temperament in different men is something prodigious. We know persons, who find life one round of enjoyment, hardly modified by any other thought except only the sense of its transitoriness. We know other men—not less favoured apparently than the former in external circumstances, often more so—who find life one almost unintermittent burden. While this difference of temperament remains, it is impossible (we suppose) to speak with confidence on our present matter of inquiry: but our own impression entirely coincides with Canon Oakeley's, that the griefs of life largely predominate over its joys. Even putting aside what is seen on the surface of society, there is "an incalculable amount of sorrow and distress which never meets the eye of the public: family ties suddenly snapped; widows and orphans reduced to penury; able-bodied men laid for months on a bed of sickness, and at length rising from it with enfeebled frames, impaired faculties, and shattered constitutions; . . . broken hearts; agonized consciences; racking anxieties; blasted hopes; false friendships; ruined fortunes" (p. 48). And all this, irrespectively of what is perhaps the still keener suffering, inflicted by the mind's action on itself, in the case of morbid, anxious, desponding or sceptical temperaments. We knew an excellent Catholic,—and one whom no one would have credited with specially intellectual trials—who had for many years never passed a day without suffering keen pain, from temptation against belief in God.

Canon Oakeley points out (p. 51), that *the Christian religion* at all events "boldly and uncompromisingly encounters the truth, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth under a superincumbent load of sin and misery." Indeed he implies, and we are disposed to concur, that the Christian religion may fairly be cited as corroborating his opinion, that the world is mainly and substantially a world of suffering. Revelation, he adds (p. 51), explains the existence of suffering, by the existence of sin; but "how *sin* originated," he adds, "is a mystery which Revelation itself does not solve, and which it will never be given us to understand so long as we see but through a glass darkly." In so speaking, he does not, of course, forget the freedom of the human will; but he means (we suppose) to say that, even granting that freedom, the circumstances of the moral world present an unfathomable mystery.

At all events however so much as this may be ventured. Even though Christianity do not solve the mystery to which Canon Oakeley refers, nevertheless (as he implies in p. 73) the doctrines of the Incarnation and Passion greatly soften its effect on the imagination. One can fancy Almighty God using such words as these, if it be not profane to permit the fancy. "Whether or no it be possible for the human faculties, in their present state, to understand the phenomena of the moral world,—so much as this is manifest, from the Revelation which I have given; viz., that there is no deficiency in Me of tenderest love to mankind. What can be so special an exhibition of love, as the suffering of one person in behalf of another? Yet, rather than forego that exhibition,—though the Divine Nature cannot suffer—a human nature has been created and personally united to God the Son, for the very end that God may suffer unspeakable anguish in behalf of mankind."

It is this third lecture, we confess, which has interested ourselves far more than the rest; but the devout reader will find every page of the volume replete with matter of interest and pious edification.

*On Eternal Punishment.* By H. L. OXENHAM. "Contemporary Review," for January, February, March, April, 1876.

WE have before now been obliged to make somewhat severe comments on Mr. Oxenham; but for that very reason it is the more incumbent on us to commemorate what seems to us a very important service conferred by him on the orthodox cause. We do not of course commit ourselves to all the statements contained in these four essays; but we feel that Mr. Oxenham has applied himself to a question, which urgently needed treatment from the orthodox side, and on which, as it happens, Catholics in England have not as yet presented themselves to the front. Those who, believing the Divine authority of Christianity, reject the dogma of Eternal Punishment, will find it no easy matter to look in the face Mr. Oxenham's arguments. We hope he will republish these articles in a separate volume.

*The Life of Pope Pius the Seventh.* By MARY H. ALLIES.  
Burns & Oates. 1875.

THIS welcome volume of the "Quarterly Series" under well-known editorship, may be summed up in a few words from its own preface. And this preface is from the pen of one whom we may almost say has earned his right to the noble title of Defender of S. Peter's Chair, the author of the "Formation of Christendom." It is peculiarly suitable that the first published work of Miss Allies should be, as it were, an offshoot of her father's mind; the outcome of studies which have been for years carefully guided and enriched by an accurate, well-stored, and practised master. At the same time, the "Life" before us is not only a

thoroughly independent and individual work, but it also bears distinct marks of intellectual individuality.

The words of the preface to which we allude are these :

"A simple Benedictine monk is placed by the Divine Providence on the Chair of Peter, when an universal deluge cast forth by the anti-Christian Revolution threatens to destroy the Church. At that moment rises a great warrior, a splendid genius, a remarkable legislator, who presumes that, by setting himself at the head of the Revolution, he can control and guide its forces. He seats himself on the throne of the eldest son of the Church, and forthwith seeks to raise again her altars. But soon appears in him the spirit not of a son. . . . He proceeds from victory to victory, and, in the height of his power, he lays his hands upon the Vicar of Christ, who had consecrated his throne, seizes him in his Apostolic palace . . . confines him in a small episcopal residence of a provincial town, and pronounces that the States of the Church form departments of his empire. The Vicar of Christ utters his protest in the name of Him Who, in his person, is insulted, imprisoned, and dethroned. . . . The crowned son of the Revolution. . . . exclaims. . . .

"What does Pius VII. mean? . . . Does he imagine that the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers?' In the meantime Europe crouches before him in silence. It seems not even to be indignant at the dethronement, the captivity of the Vicar of Christ. . . . Within three years from the date of the pseudo-marriage, the arms fall from the hands of hundreds of thousands of soldiers marshalled in vain against the snows of Russia. From his own palace of Fontainebleau, the Emperor sends back the Pope to his States, and Pius enters Rome in triumph, as Napoleon descends from his throne. . . . The period of Napoleon's captivity terminated by his death, a discrowned outcast, coincides with the period of the Pope's dethronement and captivity terminated by his triumphant restoration."

In March, 1800, the small conclave of thirty-five Cardinals, who were then about to meet in the Benedictine monastery in the Venetian island of St. George, elected Barnaba Chiaramonti, the Benedictine Cardinal-Bishop of Imola, who took the name of Pius, in grateful remembrance of his predecessor, Pius VI. It is recorded that, when quite a young monk, on the accession of Clement XIV., he leapt up behind an empty carriage to see the act of benediction from the *loggia*, and that the coachman then said to him—

"My dear little monk, why are you so anxious to see a function which will one day fall to your own lot?"

Pius VII. was crowned in the monastery, not in St. Mark's; as the Austrian Government, then under the strong bands of "Josephism," was selfishly anxious not to compromise itself with Bonaparte. The King of Naples therefore occupied Rome, "guarding it for its true sovereign," much as the wolf "guards" a sheepfold in the interest of the lambs. The new Pope was immediately pressed to go to Vienna, and to choose a Venetian Cardinal, an Austrian subject, as his Secretary of State. Pius VII. mildly refused, saying that his presence was urgently needed at Rome, declining any secretary but Consalvi, whose office he made purposely temporary. Bonaparte next tried his hand. He offered to make over to the Pope lands in Lombardy if he would consent to be

despoiled of the Romagna and his own Italian territory. After many letters and very disgraceful subterfuges, the Pope observed to the Marquis Ghislieri that "the Emperor of Austria had better not put the raiment of the Church into his wardrobe, for it would rust all his own clothes." Almost immediately afterwards, in fact, the battle of Marengo stripped him of Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy, with Italian territory as far as the Adige. Naples, then, alarmed for itself, preferred having the Pope as a neighbour to France, and Pius VII. was accordingly allowed to enter his own capital in July, 1800.

Nearly his first act was to appoint Consalvi Secretary of State, for which purpose he was raised to the Cardinalate and ordained deacon, for he had never received holy orders. The character of this remarkable man is well sketched by Miss Allies; his integrity and straightforward single mind, his devoted oneness with his master, and his extraordinary sweetness of disposition. He was called "the Roman Siren," and his influence with every sort and degree of people was likened to a perfume which penetrates whatever it is near. The French army crossed the Alps just as Pius VII. was announcing his accession to the Bishops, and Bonaparte ordered a *Te Deum* to be sung for the *deliverance* of Italy, while he made an allocution to the clergy of Milan, as a sketch of his future famous Concordat. In it he uses some remarkable words, which might stand as perpetually prophetic of the great country he governed.

"France, having acquired experience through its misfortunes, has awakened to a true knowledge of the state of the case, and now sees in the Catholic religion an unfailing support, which alone possesses power to quiet internal struggles, and to rescue it from the results of the storm."

It was altogether, indeed, a strange state of things. Religion, in France, was in a chaotic condition, and it was necessary to begin altogether afresh. Bonaparte imperiously demanded submission to his Concordat, which was contrary to Catholic principles, and it was at length obtained by the French envoy at Rome, that Cardinal Consalvi should go himself to Paris, and treat personally with Bonaparte. The idea was a master-stroke of wise largeness, and the negotiation shows that Consalvi had as singular an aptitude for diplomacy as he possessed courage and integrity. The Pope was induced to make great sacrifices to put an end to the constitutional schism, and it was, undoubtedly, wise to make them. But, to obtain the public recognition and public exercise of the Catholic faith in France, he was obliged to depose from eighty to a hundred Bishops, without cause or legal procedure; and they were the emigrant Bishops, who had given up all to show themselves faithful to the traditions of the Church. The nomination of Bishops, also, was to rest with Bonaparte, and they were to take an oath of submission to the Government, while the clergy in general were to be supported by the State. For these concessions it was asserted that an end would be put to schism, and the churches, which were now dedicated to liberty, equality, friendship, and the like, were to be restored to their lawful Catholic use.

After striving in vain by arrogant domineering, assumed violence and

rudeness, and most unworthy subterfuge on Bonaparte's side, to intimidate or overreach Consalvi, the Concordat was signed upon the two principles of the "liberty" and "publicity" of pure Catholic worship. But, after all the concessions made, Bonaparte drew back from his word, and nominated a large body of Constitutional Bishops, thus nullifying the concessions made by the Pope to extinguish schism. At the last moment, too, Bonaparte stopped Consalvi as he was getting into the carriage to leave Paris, and asked for the substance of the Bull which the Pope would send. Indefatigable as undaunted, Consalvi went back without the least irritation to his hotel, where he worked for eight consecutive hours to draw up the substance of the Bull. It need scarcely be said that on his return to Rome, Pius welcomed his faithful servant with the tenderest affection, and after calling a consistory, the Concordat was admitted as the best that could be obtained.

Bonaparte's promised word, however, was broken in more ways than one. Besides nominating ten Constitutional Bishops (two of them Archbishops), he ordered the attendance of the Constitutional clergy with the rest at the grand *Te Deum* after the Peace of Amiens in Notre Dame. What stories could not those two grand towers tell, looking down in majestic solemn repose upon that marvellous city of Paris, where good and evil both seem to have burst their ordinary bounds, and to have rioted in excess! They had last mourned with their speechless testimony over the ghastly festivals of reason, and now they were to behold at least the outward return of the French people to the faith. It must never be forgotten that this great step was entirely Bonaparte's doing. In the Concordat these words are to be read:—

"The Government of the Republic recognizes that the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion is the religion of the great majority of French citizens. . . . The Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion shall be fully exercised in France. Its worship shall be public. . . . Done at Paris . . . 15th July, 1801."

There was, of course, much accompanying objectionable matter restrictive of the liberties of the Church; but the ground, at least, was clear; the vital work of reconstruction could henceforth begin. It is very remarkable how, in more such junctures than one, the Bonaparte family have thus been used as instruments to open the door to the faith, while probably possessing little or none of it themselves; and in the case of the First Consul, he obviously intended to use the Pope merely for his own ambitious ends, and to cripple his supernatural office by falsehood or fraud. The gentle, tender-hearted Pius seemed almost from the beginning to discern both that painful concessions must be made for the good of the Church, and that they would be made in vain; and this double source of pain threw him into a state of profound depression and melancholy that alarmed Consalvi. The sorrowing Pope, at that time, made use of these remarkable, almost prophetic, words:—

"Alas! we find true peace and repose only in those Governments where Catholics are subject to infidels and heretics."

But Pius was, as yet, only at the beginning of sorrows. In 1804 he was summoned from Rome, without much reverence, to crown Bonaparte, then First Consul, as Emperor; and made the journey, with six Cardinals, on the express understanding that he should receive full satisfaction as to the Constitutional Bishops, and other vexatious points of the Concordat. Bonaparte met him, to avoid treating him properly, out in the country beyond Fontainebleau, and in hunting garb; and Pius was obliged to walk some way through the mud before Bonaparte would move a step to meet him. Then they embraced, and the Pope was driven first to lodge in the Palace at Fontainebleau, and afterwards in the Pavillon de Flore at the Tuileries, where the charm of his sweet, touching lowliness endeared him to all hearts. One signal act of justice was achieved by his going to Paris, although Bonaparte's ambition led him, later on, to break the tie. This was, that Pius firmly refused to crown Josephine with her husband unless the Church had previously sanctioned the marriage. Cardinal Fesch, therefore, married Bonaparte and Josephine, privately, in the Chapel of the Tuileries, the night before the First Consul was crowned Emperor of the French.

After the coronation, which was made the occasion of fresh slights to the Pope, he asked the new Emperor to give him back his own States, which Bonaparte still held. But he was answered only in words; and the sole consolation the Pope had from his condescension in going to Paris was, that the Constitutional Bishops, won by his affectionate humility, his undoubted learning and clear reasoning, and the manifest holiness of his life, renounced their errors, and put themselves entirely in his hands. The Emperor, with that mean jealousy which always stifled his splendid qualities, then became alarmed at the Pope's popularity, and forbade the Pontifical High Mass to be sung in Notre Dame at Christmas, and his remaining in Lyons for Easter Sunday. He proclaimed the new kingdom of Italy while Pope Pius was in Paris, and in his blind vanity, actually invited him to be present at his coronation in Milan as the Italian Sovereign.

But the first open rupture sprang, as so many others have done, from a question of marriage. The Emperor's youngest brother, Jerome Bonaparte, had married a Protestant—a Miss Patterson—in America, and the Emperor asked for a Bull to annul the marriage. But the Pope told the Emperor that even his power did not reach so far as to annul what God had knit together. The last shadow of courtesy then vanished from Bonaparte's letters and conduct. He occupied Ancona with French troops, and wrote most insultingly about the Pope to Cardinal Fesch. His letters to Pius himself carry the bombastic rhodomontade of self-exaltation to the most laughable extent, though he that "exalteth himself" against Christ's Vicar will never laugh to the end.

"Your Holiness is the Sovereign, but I am the Emperor of Rome. . . . As hitherto, I shall always manifest a filial respect for your Holiness. . . . but I am answerable before God for religion, which He has willed to restore through my means."

It is amazing—let us observe in passing—how widespread this kind of



filial piety and respect are among those who exalt themselves against the Holy See. From Napoleon to Victor Emmanuel, every oppressor of the Church is equally imbued with the virtue, and all insults and acts of spoliation on their part invariably spring from their regard to religion. We quite expect to find Prince Bismarck, in his turn, coming forward as an elder than the Eldest Son of the Church, and approaching another Pope Pius with professions of the deepest affection and respect.

"As to Italian affairs,"—goes on Bonaparte, in meek self-appreciation—"I have done everything for the Bishops. I have consolidated the interests of the Church. . . . since God has chosen me to watch over religion after such tremendous catastrophes, and if, at Rome, time is wasted in a guilty indifference, I can neither become nor remain heedless. . . . I know, most holy Father, that your Holiness wishes to do right, but you are surrounded by men who have no such wish."

Such are a few of the astounding sentences in which the Corsican certainly outcrowded the most Gallic of Gallic cocks in the year 1806. By degrees, when he wrote to order a *Te Deum* after a victory, he also supplied the substance of the pastoral to accompany it, and ended by supervising the Bishops' pastorals in general, and even the sermons of the Curés. Those who wrote "foolish sermons," i.e. which did not load him sufficiently with fulsome praise, were imprisoned or shut up in some monastery; and Vincennes, St. Marguérite at Cannes, and other State prisons, were soon crowded with good, innocent priests, whose only crime was their devoted affection to the Holy See.

Events hurried on towards their inevitable conclusion. Pius having refused to join what was indifferently called the French and Italian Confederation, the French troops, in 1808, occupied Rome, imprisoned the Pope in his own Quirinal Palace, and incorporated the Pontifical States with the French Empire. That same year Consalvi, having some time resigned, Cardinal Pacca became Secretary of State, and ably sustained and accompanied his venerable master in his surpassing trials. In 1809 the French broke open the Quirinal doors at half-past two in the morning, arrested Pius, who had been aroused, weak and suffering, from his rest; and refusing him even a couple of hours' preparation, hurried him away with Cardinal Pacca to Florence, on his way to Genoa and Savona. The Pope took up his breviary and crucifix, and, blessing Rome as he went, descended the stairs of the Quirinal, most truly like a sheep that is led to the slaughter, offering no word of reproach.

Pius remained at Savona, as every one knows, till 1812, when he was ordered to France with the same unseemly and inhuman haste as before he was hurried away; his white shoes smeared with ink to disguise him, his cross taken off, he was made to walk through Savona to the carriage in a common grey overcoat and ordinary priest's hat. At nearly the cost of his life he was carried through France, and at Fontainebleau occupied the same rooms in the palace as when he had gone for the Emperor's coronation. It was now Napoleon's plan to cause the Pope, by luxurious repose and the servile adulation of his servile clergy, to consent to leave Rome and live in Paris or Avignon with an annual allowance of two

millions, as the Head, under him, of a "Catholic Gallican" Church. In the last moments of extreme weakness from agonizing sickness, with all his faithful Cardinals in prison, and evil counsellors only at hand, Pius at last signed the "Concordat of Fontainebleau," and immediately afterwards fell into a state of melancholy which threatened the loss of his reason. It is impossible to dwell upon the incidents, full of the deepest interest, that rapidly followed. The Emperor, as his uncle Cardinal Fesch said, "had touched the Ark," and his downfall and punishment followed with startling quickness. The armies of the allied Sovereigns were pressing upon France, and Pius saw that the moment was come for returning to Rome. Accordingly, on the 14th of May, 1814, after receiving a blank Exchequer-bill from our Prince Regent, afterwards George IV., for his urgent expenses, Pius VII. re-entered Rome in triumph at the Porta del Popolo, met by bands of maidens in white and youths with palms in their hands, and greeted with the acclamations of the kneeling crowd who thronged the streets. About a fortnight before the Pope's return to Rome, Napoleon had signed his abdication of the French crown, and had been banished to the island of Elba. Thither, when smitten down by his anguish at the loss of power and blighted ambition, the heart of the loving Father whom he had outraged by such cruelty and insult, followed him with the tenderest sympathy; and he wrote to Consalvi, the "beloved Cardinal," to intercede with the Allies for "the poor exile." "We must both remember," he says, with touching forgiveness, "that, after God, the re-establishment of religion in the great kingdom of France is principally due to him."

These words, of that Divine humility which always stores up the recollections of good rather than those of evil, should also be bound up with our last impressions of the story of Napoleon I. His last exile at S. Helena lasted six years, the exact time that he had held the Pope captive. To use Miss Allies' own words:—

"Did not the lonely rock of St. Helena expiate with a terrible exactness a persecution as cruel as it was gratuitous? But did it not, likewise, as a most merciful punishment, open the gate of penitence and reconciliation?"

The narrative of this volume, with the single exception of the slight tendency to needless dissertation at the opening, to which we have alluded, is skilfully woven out of admirable materials, and is full of the deepest and most instructive interest, as we hope many readers will verify for themselves.

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*Das erste Pontificalschreiben des Apostelfürsten Petrus Wissenschaftliche und praktische Auslegung des ersten Briefes des H. Petrus, &c. &c.*  
Von Dr. L. J. HUNDHAUSEN, Professor der Theologie am bischöflichen Seminar Mainz. 1873.

*The First Pontifical Letter of Peter the Prince of the Apostles, being a Scientific and Practical Exposition of S. Peter's First Epistle, &c. &c.*  
By Dr. L. J. HUNDHAUSEN, Professor of Theology in the Episcopal Seminary, Mayence. 1873. F. Kirchheim.

WE believe that every Catholic who has given any attention to the critical study of the New Testament will acknowledge the great need of new commentaries on this part of the Scripture. We have abundance of excellent commentators who wrote in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They can never lose their value, and the time will never come when a student can afford to pass them by. But it is simply a matter of fact, that since the days of Maldonatus and Estius, enormous advances have been made in the knowledge of sacred geography, history, and above all, in the grammar and lexicography of the New Testament. These subjects have fallen in great measure into Protestant hands, and the consequence is, that the Catholic student is obliged to supplement Catholic by Protestant commentaries. Besides other disadvantages, this involves an amount of time which many are unable to give. Any commentator who unites a knowledge of the Catholic doctrine and the traditional line of interpretation to an acquaintance with the best results of later research, is sure to supply a great desideratum.

In England, so far as we know, no attempt has been made to do this most useful work as yet. Germany, on the other hand, has at least made a good beginning. We have the admirable commentary of Windischmann on the Galatians, those of Schegg on the Gospels, of Bisping on the Pauline Epistles. But even there much remains to be done, and Dr. Hundhausen's Commentary on the First Epistle of S. Peter is in every way most opportune.

Probably an account of Dr. Hundhausen's work will interest our readers more than any criticism of ours. He has written an octavo of some 500 pages, based upon the Greek text, and containing the text of the Epistle in a German translation made directly from it. In an introduction of 116 pages, the authenticity of the Epistle, the Churches to which it was addressed, the time and object of its composition, are discussed fully and clearly. In the Commentary itself, the opinions of the more celebrated commentators, ancient and modern, Catholic and Protestant, are given on the passages which present any difficulty. Very great attention is given to the connection of the argument, points of grammar, and to the exact meaning of Greek words, while the authority for the various readings is exhibited at least with tolerable fulness. Besides this the spiritual lessons of the Epistle are explained, and adapted to the present position of Christians in the world, and illustrated by very striking extracts from the Fathers and approved spiritual writers.

It is the exegetical part of the book which strikes us as particularly valuable. After reading the whole book through with very considerable care, we have found, with scarcely an exception, that in every text of any difficulty the reader is enabled to form a clear view, first, of the different interpretations given, and then of the particular view advocated by the writer of the Commentary. On special passages, such, for example, as the preaching to the "spirits in prison," the history of interpretation is so complete as to form a really important contribution to theology. It is evident, also, that great pains have been taken to verify the patristic citations, and also to illustrate S. Peter's use of the Old Testament. For our own part we are inclined to think the allusion to the present position of the Church too prominent in the title-page, and the amount of hortatory matter excessive. But this, of course, is a matter of taste. We can most heartily recommend the book to our Catholic readers, and cannot help concluding with the expression of an earnest wish that it may stimulate English Catholics to a wholesome rivalry.

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*Life of the Apostle St. John.* By M. L. BAUNARD. Translated from the first French edition. New York : The Catholic Publication Society. 1875.

WE trust that our notice may be the means of placing this "Life of the Apostle St. John" in the hands of some readers, who might not otherwise have thought of procuring it. The conception of the work is felicitous: the execution leaves very little to be desired. We are not without works dealing with the earliest and most interesting age in the annals of the Church; yet it remains, to many Catholics even, the "twilight of fable" preceding the time of veritable historic knowledge.

"There is no doubt regarding the frightful confusion reigning amongst even the most cultivated minds with respect to the holy beginnings of the mother country, of which they claim themselves sons. For them, for the greater part, St. Peter, St. Paul, and St. John, lost in a species of legendary aureola, appear like the heroes of a mythology which has preceded the era of positive history. John, more especially, has remained under the cloud. For some, John the Apostle is not the same personage as John the Evangelist. For others, the Evangelist is totally distinct from the prophet of the Apocalypse. Are there not even some who *identify the son of Zebedee with the son of Zacharias*? But how many who know him and who follow him in the Gospel, lose all trace of him while he is at Ephesus, and for whom a half-century of that divinely beautiful existence disappears under the mist of a vague tradition, wherein they can distinguish nothing!" (p. 13).

There is a little exaggeration in the lines that we have italicised. We have known an instance of such confusion, but not in a Catholic or cultivated mind. In substance the passage is true, and the reason is that histories of the first age either are too abstruse or are uninteresting from the want of personal life. The speciality of this work is, that it is

trustworthy history, combined with an interesting biography; Christian teaching, infused with the charm of Christian action; Christianity personified in the life of an Apostle, and traced from the little school of St. John the Baptist to the beginning of the Second Century. Taking the year 98 as a point of observation, we discern at a glance the value of a life which, impressed with the character of Apostolic authority, was the centre and source of all that is best known of the Church's work at a time so remote from its inception. The great dispersion from Jerusalem had taken place at least half a century before. The "*gloriosi principes*" had poured out on Rome "all their doctrine with their blood"; Linus and Cletus and Clement had followed; and yet the venerable Apostle remains, teaching with voice and pen, defending in all its purity and fulness the great Pentecostal revelation, and witnessing against the manifold assailants of faith, as one who had, from the beginning, heard and seen with his eyes and handled with his hands the Word of Life (1 John i. 1). What wonder was it that, as men remembered the Divine words, "So I will have him to remain till I come," and marked the undecaying vigour of the aged Apostle,—“this saying went abroad among the brethren that that disciple should not die.” No other Saint would suit so well as the central figure in the transitional time of the Church's life from the Apostolic to the Patristic age; for his life spans a century, and in its latter part is saved from obscurity by a school that inherited his spirit and witnessed to his work. We look in vain, even to Rome, for the same valuable evidences. Rome was the focus of heathen persecution. There was no opportunity for the manifestation of that inner life of Christianity which *polemics* more than *apologies* would develop. Christians could hardly breathe in Rome; in Asia Minor they found time and opportunity to indulge in speculation, and go astray.

What the author contemplates with respect to his subject is thus prefigured in a most valuable preface:—

“We should deceive ourselves, in fact, did we see in him but the type of inert and languid tenderness, as we might be led to believe from painting and legend. We remember that John styles himself the beloved disciple; we too readily forget that Jesus named him the ‘Son of Thunder.’ We willingly recognize in him the Evangelist of the Lamb; we forget that that Lamb was the heroic Victim, and that to love Him is to follow Him even to immolation. . . . We forget that he engaged to drink of His chalice of bitterness, and that he kept his word. . . . We do not sufficiently contemplate him standing upright on Calvary and at the foot of the Cross. . . . Perfection, for him, did not consist in contemplation, but in action and suffering. . . . He refuted Gnosticism, detested Nicolaism, anathematized Cerinthus and his errors; he suffered for justice, and hated iniquity; he cursed Rome, inebriated with voluptuousness and with blood; he suspended over the head of sacrilegious nations the stroke of Divine scourges; he roused from their torpidity the churches of Asia, and denounced stains even in their angels” (p. 13).

We hardly find, outside the preface, even the names of those who in modern times have perverted their talents to the propagation of rationalistic errors: but we easily see that the author has clearly before his mind, especially in the chapters headed *St. John and Gnosticism*, *The Gospel of*

*St. John, Doctrine of the Word made Flesh, &c.*, the bearing of his subject-matter on questions of the day. The *rationale* of St. John's Gospel gives it a special value at the present time. The last results of modern thought, much as they are famed, have only reached very old marks. Gnostic and Rationalist have a strange similarity in meaning; the *sequitur* of a modern "lay sermon" seems with unmistakable precision to be what Cerinthus dreamed the Godhead to be,—*depth* and *silence*; and surely as we read "that Simon admitted a hidden and invisible principle, whence emanated the world, and which, doubling itself in its manifestation, revealed itself as active principle in minds, as passive principle in matter" (p. 158), we can look a celebrated German in the face and say, *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*. Poetical allusions to the movement of history in cycles will not explain such striking facts; yet no doctrine of metempsychosis is needed. The principles of human knowledge are few and unchangeable; the power of the human mind does not seem to grow. In the past our reason reached certain points—in truth and in error, had some success and made some mistakes—it reaches the same now, and will reach the same in the future. Experimental science does not penetrate the veil; nor though it pushes its way farther and farther into the illimitable depths of space, and makes itself at home a million times beyond Sirius, will it learn more of the Invisible than it can at an arm's length. It was the same yearning that is now in human nature that made men of old look backward to solve the *in principio*, and find in innumerable Eons a theory which, if no less erroneous, was less ignoble than that which teaches an evolution from the sea-jelly, *bathybius*, into a cultured professor of modern science. It needed not an Aristotle peering into futurity—an Epicurus would have sufficed—to teach that human waifs "melt, like the streaks of a morning cloud, into the infinite azure of the past." Human nature stands upon no supernatural heights built up by science, nor sees in a wider sphere than when the psalmist declared, "The heavens show forth the glory of God." The same are the powers, the same are the limits, and the same the motives and prejudices, that still influence intellectual effort. Therefore it is that the same views come to the front again and again, for the human mind reaches the same points on the lines of truth if the true direction be followed, and the same soundings "in the depths of Satan," if the depths be sought.

The "eternal Gospel" (as Origen styles it) is above all the Sacred writings the basis of historical Christianity. Written in view of the Rationalism of the first century, its argument is as keen against the Rationalism of the nineteenth as if it were written to-day. The enemies of Christianity admit the fact: "One and indivisible, protected, so to say, by its originality as by an armour, the Gospel of St. John seemed to challenge criticism to a deadly duel. Either it must shatter its arms, and lay the remnants at the feet of the Gospel, or it must despoil it of all historical authority." (Strauss, "New Life of Jesus," vol. i. p. 137.) This was not the language spoken twenty years ago. In the "Life of Jesus" (the older work) Strauss endeavoured to veil the unchristian tendency, or rather term, of his speculations, by accepting the Gospel



*minus* the supernatural element that interpenetrates the narrative. The miraculous was a mythical halo, an aureola, with which credulous piety had decorated the simple truth. It was well that the Gnosticism of the nineteenth century did not choose the Pentateuch as the object of its critical exposition. In the dim distance time could have been assumed for the asserted brooding of pious imaginations over the original truths, time for the germs to develop and fructify into the luxuriant display of miracles and mysteries, which scientific criticism sought to prune away; but before the light of the Gospel narrative such speculations vanished. The Gospel of St. John especially was triumphantly forced upon the attention of Rationalism. The impress of a single mind is plain upon it from the beginning to the end; it could not have come from the pious thoughts of many magnifying natural truths through the haze of fancy, into fantastic myths. Modern Gnosticism, in the person of Strauss, abandoned its first position for the more congenial one of open hostility, as indicated above, and chose Goethe and music as the *omega* of human life. As we have said, hardly the name of a rationalist appears throughout the work; but the mind of exquisite beauty and unequalled sublimity that shines out so clearly from the pages of the fourth Gospel and is so special a proof of its authenticity, is pictured with loving care.

We do not expect to give our readers an adequate idea of the varied excellence of the book. It is brilliantly written, and has singularly a suggestive power of drawing the mind into all kinds of byways that temptingly wind away from the main path of the subject. As instances of valuable points incidentally brought forward, we notice the "Assumption of the Blessed Virgin" (p. 177), "The Condition of Ephesus," "The Christian Community of Ephesus," "The Churches of Asia" (p. 196), and the Word according to St. John compared with the Word of the Gnostics, of Plato, and of Philo (p. 296). The opinion that honours Ephesus as the place of the Blessed Virgin's death is somewhat peremptorily, though we believe rightly, rejected; and there seems some inconsistency in leaning to the view that assigns A.D. 48 as the date, with a wish not to part with the authority of Denis the Areopagite, who could not have been one of "the brethren" at so early a period (cf. Acts xvii.); yet the whole question is fully treated, and a most judicious and effective use made of Apocryphal works. From page to page the conviction will grow upon the reader's mind that the book is one of exceptional interest, but many will hardly discern the copious erudition that underlies it. It is like a well-finished work when the scaffolding is taken down, the workmen gone, the lumber carted away; and we must look long and oftentimes at the grace of the structure, the variety of its beauty, and the signs of patient loving care that have been lavished on every line, before we adequately estimate its worth. The author and the translator have done their work well, and in the least ostentatious manner. Of the former we have the name on the title-page—nothing more. Of the latter, not even the name, although his share in the work would reflect credit upon him. To the reader we can say, "*lege totum, si vis scire totum.*"

*The Chronicle of S. Antony of Padua, "the Eldest Son of S. Francis."*

Edited by HENRY JAMES COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus.  
Burns & Oates. 1875.

IT is remarkable, as F. Coleridge observes in his valuable preface to this volume, that whereas more than a hundred lives of S. Antony of Padua have been written, we have hitherto known so little of his contemporary teaching. We may say also that, although S. Antony the Franciscan's name repeatedly rises to our lips for certain matters, distinctively supposed to be under his special care, we yet have known very little of his life or general story. We have all invoked him, for instance, to help in finding lost things, or for safety against accidents by travelling, especially where animals are concerned; but we have known very little about S. Antony's great work as a preacher, or the ways in which he was prepared for it. It is curious to observe, again, what so frequently occurs in the Saints' lives, that S. Antony was in no way connected with the land and the city where devotion to him has sprung up and taken such firm root that his invocation is a daily household thing. Ferdinand Martin de Bulloens was, in truth, of that great mixed stock, Spanish and Flemish, which has produced many remarkable men; his father, Martin de Bulloens, being a Bouillon of the famous Godfrey's blood, and his mother of the old royal family of Asturias. Martin de Bulloens was one of the knights who, on their way to the Crusade under William Longsword, were besought by Alfonso I. of Portugal to stay and wage a crusade nearer home to deliver Lisbon from the Saracens. After a long siege this body of knights did rescue the Portuguese capital, and Martin de Bulloens was made governor of the city. His son, Ferdinand Martin, very early showed signs of grace, and at fifteen entered a House of Canons Regular of S. Augustine, near Lisbon, in which institute he remained eight years; but after his ordination as priest joined the order of Franciscan Friars, whose foundation was then not twenty years old. It was an extraordinary step for the rich, high-born priest to take, to seek admittance among the poor, begging friars of S. Francis; and his prior gave only a reluctant consent, bidding Ferdinand "go and be a saint." The ardent desire of the young monk Antony for martyrdom was gratified by his being sent for a short time to Africa; but he fell so ill, that he was recalled and went to Assisi, where S. Francis was still living. In 1222 Antony first began to preach at Forli, where the Superior ordered him to begin his sermon without an instant's preparation. Taking for his text, "*Christ became for us obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross,*" he preached a magnificent discourse, which took all his hearers by surprise, and it was then recognised with great joy that this was the man raised up by God to work at the conversion of Italy, then infested with heresy and full of the most scandalous evil living. Eight years of work in the Romagna, Southern France, Italy, and Sicily followed, and it was not till the year 1227, that S. Antony came to Padua, which, under his hands, became changed from

a sink of unspeakable vice into a holy city. Here a great many miracles were worked by him, and here the exquisite distinctive marvel of his life was vouchsafed, the visit of the Infant Jesus to his room. The whole account of this occurrence, as seen by Count Liso di Camposampiero, and of the other chief miracles of the life, are most beautifully told in this Chronicle. The chapter on S. Antony's sermons is conspicuously interesting and suggestive; and the familiar incident of the preaching to the fishes on the Adriatic (at the outfall of the Marecchia) is admirably narrated. In 1231 the short life, so rich in labour and fruit, was ended. From a hill on the way to Verona, S. Antony looked down upon the plain of Padua, where now his own seven-domed church is so plainly to be seen, and gave his beloved city his last blessing. He was so ill, that he was obliged to be carried in a cart to the little Franciscan monastery at Arcella, where he recited the penitential psalms, sang the whole of his favourite hymn, "O gloriosa Domina!" and calmly sank to his rest. This volume of the "Quarterly Series" is a great addition to our store of Lives of the Saints. The narrative is very skilfully interwoven, and unflagging in interest.

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*Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus.* Vol. III.  
Burns & Oates. 1875.

THE Fathers of the Society are doing a more than useful work in publishing the series of which this volume is the third. Whatever may be thought of the inheritance of religious works left us by the generation past, there cannot be a doubt that this special class is scanty in itself, and, judging from common consent, unsuitable to the wants or dispositions of the present time. We are slowly, very slowly, supplying this want. An occasional selection or collection of sermons comes to hand, but this series is the first sustained effort to meet a recognized want.

It is difficult in a short space to give a just measure of notice to the volume, for although there is a wonderful evenness throughout, and to a great extent a continuity, or at least a similarity, in the subjects, it is evident that many writers will present a variety of characteristics not easily embraced by general remarks.

There is a character about all the Sermons best described by saying, that it is expressive of the spirit of the Society. Calmness and thoughtfulness pervade them: in this is their strength. The application of Holy Scripture is frequently very striking and felicitous; and beautiful are many allusions made to something exceptional in the service of the day, and yet so simple, that we wonder that we have not thought of them before. For instance:—

"If then God visited in His own holy Son the mere shadow of our sin with such awful severity, what has the reality deserved in us? . . . 'For if they do these things in the green wood, what shall be done in the dry?' Christ Himself is the green wood, not fit for burning; it is we sinners who are the dry wood, which the fire will readily seize. 'If then,' says

our Lord, 'God's anger against sin is so keen and fierce a fire as to consume Me, this green and flourishing tree, because the shadow of sin has passed over Me, what will it do in the dry wood, which sin has withered?' (p. 7).

In the same Sermon we read :—

"I cannot refer you to-night, my brethren, to our Lord Jesus in the tabernacle, because for this one day (Good Friday) in the whole year the tabernacle is empty,—for this one day no Sacrifice is celebrated, no communion given. Imagine, then, that it is to-day that Jesus has died for your sins, and try to rouse yourselves to a more vivid contrition from this thought. But if He has died for our sins to-day, He will be back among us again to-morrow," &c. (p. 17).

There is hardly a tint of controversy to be seen in the volume, and even little of the vehement tone which the needs of an ordinary congregation sometimes exact from a preacher. The discourses on the Passion, at the beginning of the volume, are the best examples of preaching to a large and multiform congregation. The instructions on the "Fruits of Holy Communion" are thoughtful, unimpassioned lessons, that will amplify the circle of a Catholic's thoughts, and avail much to promote frequent and fervent communions. The last two Sermons are worthy of attention, as the reader will see, but we mark them especially for their singular exuberance of Scriptural language. All the discourses have a *feel* of piety and earnestness that cannot be missed by the careful reader. They are meditations that have found utterance,—*"ex abundantia cordis os loquitur"*; thoughts outflowing because of the fulness within; the speech of men who would agree with S. Augustine's advice to the Christian preacher: *"Sit orator antequam dictor . . . Priusquam exserat proferentem linguam, ad Deum levat animam sitientem, ut eructet quod biberit, vel quod impleverit fundat."*\*

Some of the Sermons have general titles, as "Easter Sunday," "The Feast of All Saints," "The Blessed Sacrament," and thereby suggest suspicions of vagueness in the subject-matter. Usually, a good sermon can be definitely epitomized in its heading, and a failure in this respect mostly implies want of method or view in the subject-matter—"aiming at nothing and hitting it." It is a blemish in this volume, yet only a blemish; for the Sermons named, and others, thus carelessly headed do not fail in this respect. The first (p. 53) to which we refer is evidently "The Risen Life of Christ the Type of a Christian's Life"; the second (p. 112) is an able exposition of a question that usually presents some difficulty even to theological students, viz., "The Idea of Sanctity as a Note of the Church." The reader will have no difficulty in apprehending the definite intention of all the Sermons, with one or two exceptions. We suppose the editor has had good reasons for not prefixing analyses as was admirably done in a previous volume. At the least, it implied careful supervision, and was useful to many readers.

In a few instances it has been forgotten that *frangere* is not *dividere*.

\* "De Doctrina Christiana," l. iv. c. 15.

Excellent though it be in its component parts, we can hardly approve of the plan of a discourse on the Blessed Eucharist, not that in which we find the words of S. Augustine, "omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas est," but the preceding (p. 76), which considers the Mystery, "first as a Sacrifice, secondly as a Sacrament, and thirdly as the abiding presence of Jesus Christ among His people." Surely, each of these points is suggestive of abundant subject-matter for at least one distinct discourse. As the Sermons are presented as a whole, we have some hesitation in making or suggesting comparisons, yet we venture to refer the reader to the instructions on the "Fruits of Holy Communion," which are excellent in point of structure. It is worthy of attention that they professedly follow a plan "taken from one of the *Opuscula* attributed to S. Thomas, entitled, 'De Venerabili Sacramento Altaris.'" We know that one of the most distinguished preachers of the day professes to do little more than adapt an article of the "Summa"; and these facts seem to point to the theological treatise as at once the most copious source of sound preaching and the guide in the delineation of the subject.

We close the volume well pleased with it, and can recommend it to our readers. It will be valuable to the clergy and laity, and will not be more carefully read than it deserves. There are some who will prefer the first volume of the series on account of its sweetness and its sympathetic intelligence with particular phases of spiritual life; and a limited class will have greater admiration for the second, inasmuch as it treats of subjects that few preachers dare aim at; but this present volume, more than the first, embraces questions of general importance, and is more valuable than the second to the wide range of Catholic readers.

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*The Sufferings of Our Lord Jesus Christ; Meditations for Lent.* By Father CLAUDE DE LA COLOMBIÈRE, S.J. London: R. Washbourne. 1876.

THIS is a very small book of very great worth. The name of the author is alone sufficient to invest it with a singular interest. F. de la Colombière, the confessor of Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque, and through her the chosen confidant of the secrets of the Sacred Heart. In the year 1677, two years after the first feast of the Sacred Heart, he preached Lenten discourses in the chapel of the Duchess of York, at St. James's. We have here six of the Meditations, the subjects being some of the virtues manifested by Jesus suffering. They are eminently practical; speaking of everyday things in a manner which touches at once the reason and the heart. While the clearness and simplicity of the style bring it within the understanding of all, it has a force and vigour that are at times almost startling, like a living voice speaking in words of fire, and this without a single attempt at studied rhetoric. It is unmistakably the eloquence of the heart taught by a Divine Heart. As an instance of the energy of his words, we may cite the passage where he appeals to the

"common sense" of his hearers, asking if they really believe what they profess, and if they believe and work carelessly for the salvation of their souls, how is it that they do not appear insane? "No," he answers, "you cannot pass for such, because on all other subjects you are rational; but that on this point you should be so careless would appear incredible if we did not see examples of it every day. I have not penetrated these truths so deeply as some have done, but, with the little knowledge I have of them, I confess that the conduct of the world in this respect is more incomprehensible to me than the doctrine of the Trinity and eternity."

Occasionally we are reminded of the place and period, though in a manner which affords an additional interest, enabling us to realize by passing glimpses the fact that, in the dull old Palace of St. James's, these burning thoughts once fell from the lips of the great-souled French priest. "Alas!" he exclaims, speaking to his wealthy audience, "whilst you are grieving over twenty or thirty crowns lost at cards, whilst you spend ten or twelve at the theatre, and fifty on a dress, there are a hundred families in want of bread." Then, after an allusion to the stable at Bethlehem he continues, pleading for the poor: "This same Jesus Christ suffers in places far worse than stables; your horses, if I may be allowed to say so, are incomparably better off than He."

Throughout these few pages, so brief, yet of such value, the translation is uniformly excellent, and it appears in a form well adapted for popular use. We trust that it will spread widely the words of F. de la Colombière, and that before long other works of his will be given to us by the same hand.

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*Franciscan Missions among the Colliers and Ironworkers of Monmouthshire.*  
London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

**T**HIS charming little book contains a record of the apostolic labours carried on since 1860 by a few Capuchins among the miners and iron workers of South Wales—labours happily crowned with a great measure of success, and resulting in a revival of the Faith in several centres of industry where it was well-nigh extinct. The people among whom those zealous sons of S. Francis have laboured so long are nearly all Irish, but before the missions began they had been for a considerable time without a priest, without the Sacraments, and without schools for their children. Surrounded as they were by a hundred temptations—especially in the form of drink—it is no wonder that for the most part they became utterly careless, and Catholics only in name. But the good seed was still there in their Irish hearts, and when F. Elzear and his companions brought them back the Sacraments and the Holy Sacrifice, it soon sprang up into a noble harvest of revived faith. "To the poor the Gospel is preached,"\* is the motto on the title-page of the little work before us, and it is an

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\* S. Luke vii. 22.



appropriate one, for these Irish labourers are among the poorest of the poor : yet for fifteen years they have spared from their poverty sufficient to support their Franciscan pastors, and not only this, but they have given their savings and their free labour to help in erecting churches and schools in the various mission centres of the district. Begun at Pontypool, the good work has been gradually extended until it embraced first Abersychan, then Cwmbran, then Blaenavon, Risca, Blackwood, and Abertillery. In all these places the Franciscans have gathered around them a congregation, now in a hired room, now in a school, now in a church built by themselves in places where at first sight it would seem hopeless to obtain one-tenth of the necessary funds. At Abertillery a church is now being built ; at Blackwood there is neither church nor school, and the fathers have received notice to give up the room hitherto used as a chapel ; so that unless some generous benefactor comes forward, the poor Irish Catholics of the district will be again deprived of Mass and the Sacraments.

We should have read with pleasure, even in the most unpolished language, a record of work such as these worthy sons of S. Francis have accomplished in Monmouthshire ; but the book is really very gracefully written. The anonymous author—evidently one of the Fathers—has a power of striking description and pleasant entertaining narration that made us read the ninety pages of his book at a single sitting. We wish that we could give some extracts. A few lines of description must suffice. Here is a pen-and-ink sketch of a town in Monmouthshire :

“About six miles from Pontypool stands, or rather straggles, the unfinished town of Blaenavon. The railroad from Pontypool thither runs through a narrow valley, deep down between steep wooded heights, and fertilized by the little river Avon Llwydd, which leaps and races along its rocky bed towards the works lower down, where it has to be so busy all day and night, among the vast machinery and the incessant whirr of the engines. The streets of the town are built for the most part on the slope of a steep hill, and generally end in unfinished houses, as if the effort to climb higher had proved too much for them.”

There are many touching episodes in the book. We would note especially the story of the lady—a tertiary of S. Francis—who devoted the last six years of her life to teaching the poor children at Pontypool, and this while she was suffering from a painful disease that was slowly sapping away her strength, until at length she had to relinquish her heroic labours, and return to London to die. We are glad that her hidden work among the Irish children in South Wales has not been left unrecorded. Of equal interest is the story of the Welsh convert, who was brought into the true fold by a vision of our Lord in the Blessed Sacrament ; a favour won for him by the prayers of his Irish wife ; and there is a beautiful anecdote on the last page, of a little Protestant girl, who had learned in the Catholic school one brief prayer to our Lady, and died with it upon her lips. The book is one which no one will read without being delighted with it. It is a glimpse as it were of what our Catholic missionaries are doing all around us—a fragment of the annals of the reconquest of our islands to the Faith.

*Reflections on the Stations of the Cross ; or, the Love of Jesus in His Passion, with the Devotions of the Via Crucis.* By the Very Rev. D. Canon GILBERT, D.D., V.G. 2nd edition. London : Burns & Oates.

THE very reverend author preludes this little work by stating that it has been published at the request of many who had heard its substance preached in the Church of St. Mary's, Moorfields. It contains exercises for the Way of the Cross. The special purpose with which he lays it before his readers is the enabling them to learn on the Way of Sorrows to bear the trials of life ; and doubtless there are many who, taking up the book with this intention, would derive appropriate fruit. The fact that the work has already reached a second edition speaks for itself.

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*An Essay on the Protagoras of Plato.* By the Rev. G. F. KINGDON, S. J. Cambridge and London. 1875.

THE purpose of this very full and suggestive dissertation is both critical and metaphysical. F. Kingdon does not write a commentary on the Protagoras, nor lay before his readers the theory of moral good, but whilst elucidating this one Platonic dialogue, he furnishes a key to the interpretation of Plato as a whole, and directs attention to the correct method of framing an ethical treatise. This brings him across the "modern critics," chiefly of the school or schools of Bentham, Mill, and George Grote. In point of knowledge, these forty pages are an evidence of large comparative studies in philosophy ; in point of clear exposition, they seem very highly commendable. Throughout there is a tone of urbanity, almost of deference, which should go far to recommend the essay in that University for the benefit of which it was written.

F. Kingdon's view is that Plato has suffered injustice from partial and fragmentary treatment, and that the dialogues ought to be studied in their mutual bearings, and in the light of that theory of induction which exhibits to us a science in the process of making. Thus we should look upon the various compositions of Plato as so many experimental efforts towards the acquisition of the science of good. A similar example in physical science would be, for instance, the hypothetical positions of Kepler, if we had a detailed account of them. They led up to the theory of gravitation. So did the Platonic inquiries lead up to Aristotle, and we think F. Kingdon would add, to the Scholastics. "The very existence of conscience, as an acknowledged and independent faculty of man's inner being, may be said to depend on that theory of man's nature which Plato sought to develop and establish." Plato is, therefore, an orthodox philosopher on this subject, and so, presumably, was his master Socrates. Then he could not have been a Utilitarian ; and since the Utilitarian

view of morality must be referred to the false metaphysics of Locke, neither was Plato of Locke's opinion about the human intellect.

But there is an objection to this favourable account of Plato as old as Aristotle, and concurred in by S. Thomas, with many other Scholastics. It is alleged that the Protagoras gives us genuine Platonic doctrines, not merely insinuated, but sketched at some length. Now the dialogue reiterates and insists upon the statement that moral virtue does not differ from knowledge. Sin is therefore only an error; the moral reason is an arithmetical computation of results; and so we let in the Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In answer, F. Kingdon seems inclined to distinguish between the historic and the Platonic Socrates. The former was, perhaps, not completely possessed of the truth that the *honestum* is one thing, and the *utile* quite another. But the latter does not appear only in Protagoras; he holds the famous discourse concerning the good in itself and the essence of human justice which is expanded through the books of the Republic. Hence, his last words in the Protagoras are a sign that he did not accept the arithmetical view of moral good. He had been simply compelling the Sophist to work out a theory, true or false, to its extreme logical consequences, and this was in accordance with the dialectic method of Plato, which made abundant use of hypotheses. "Not only the crowning success is fully described, but the struggle through which it had to pass, ere it eventually received its more complete and finished form." The final manner of proposing the question is that which Plato adopts in the Republic. This is by first answering the previous question, what is the right conception of man's nature, considered as a whole?

So far from admitting the utilitarian theory, Plato has given it a most complete exposure and refutation in the Protagoras, the Philebus, and certain books of the Republic, if all these be taken together. The relation of virtue to knowledge may have been rightly seized by Socrates, but was, beyond all doubt, known to Plato. S. Thomas, commenting on the Ethics of Aristotle, observes:—"Recta ratio ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae ejus, sed sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus." The same thought must have been in Plato's mind when he put into the mouth of Socrates the leading question, "What relation do the several parts of virtue bear to each other, and to virtue considered as a whole?" Follow this out, and you will perceive that human nature is composed of various faculties and passions in a relation of higher to lower, and that its perfection consists in the due preservation of that relation as well as in the possession of those capacities and emotions themselves. And thus the inductive process terminates in an ideal conception of man's moral nature and of the excellence belonging to it. F. Kingdon quotes Dr. Whewell in justification of the philosophy here employed. We need hardly say that it is also the doctrine of the Schools. Innate faculties governing and governed, culminating in the power of free-will to obey the declarations of conscience or to disobey them, are postulated in all the ethical teaching of Catholics.

The incidental remarks and criticisms, especially those on Mill, seem to us very valuable and well-founded. They reveal a curious state of things at Cambridge, if, as we gather, Locke is still an authority there. But Englishmen prefer their own writers, even when the world at large is somewhat ahead of them.

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*The Unseen Universe; or, Physical Speculations on a Future State.*  
London: Macmillan & Co. 1875.

ACCORDING to the bias of observers, the doctrine now so much in vogue, of the conservation of energy, will be looked upon as the final verdict of science upon religion, or a merely valuable hypothesis needing to be metaphysically verified. It may mean that all things are one; that force is only a relative function or determination of matter, and that beyond the universe of chemist and analyst there is naught conceivable. Or it may be simply a declaration of the scholastic axiom about forms in matter, "*corruptio unius est generatio alterius*," not helpful in any special way towards the solution of the higher problems. One thing is certain: the moment such words are uttered as conservation, transformation, energy, force, and influence, that moment we have passed into the region of primary notions, and the physical sciences have ceased to be the apex and culminating point of knowledge. The law of facts has at once to be tested by the laws of thought; and, by sheer force of consequence, the metaphysical is seen to be the architectonic science.

Those, however, who do not care for philosophy, will search about till they light upon some physical outlet from the chemist's world of matter. Perchance, the conservation of energy itself points to an escape into the unseen. For, does not all the sensible depend upon motion, and is there not a constant law by which the possibilities of motion are getting less and less? The kinetic energy which stirs and drives the pulsations of light, heat, electricity, and so forth, is changing into potential energy, stored up and arrested, capable of working if it be changed back again, but not till then. A time may come when all movement in the universe may have ceased, and all visible matter have been etherialized into energy. Then the worlds we know would have given place to the unseen; and the temporal, by traversing the regions of continuity, might arrive at an eternity in which no step would ever be taken backwards. Thus may we conceive some everlasting material medium for life to work in; a body of pure energy to be inhabited by an intelligent soul. And this would be the fulfilment of what is said in Scripture concerning the resurrection.

Our readers will wonder whether this is orthodox Christianity. They do not need to be reminded of S. Paul's doctrine that the resurrection of the just will include a glorification of the body which was sown in corruption and made subject to death. But they will, doubtless, be slow to recognize how a sphere of pure energy can be identical with the flesh in which the patriarch trusted to see God. And if our Lord is the first-

fruits of them that sleep, and His rising a pattern of ours, they will hardly grant that what S. Thomas felt and handled was immaterial force. This, however, is the doctrine, so far as we can make it out, of the anonymous book we are noticing.

The purpose of its authors—for there are several—is to reconcile the dogma of immortality with the results of science, and, generally, to put a favourable interpretation on the truths of the Christian religion. The attempt is praiseworthy in intention, no doubt. But we do not see that it has been very successful. Omitting minute criticism, for which there is no occasion, we should like to suggest that the requisites for such an apology are more numerous than the authors seem to have thought. Besides a knowledge of physical science as it is cultivated at the present time, there is need, surely, of some grasp of metaphysics, and a more than superficial acquaintance with the faith of Christians. But metaphysics are conspicuously absent from the book; Christianity, we grieve to say, is but mistily represented, and unless we mistake, the dogmas of the Blessed Trinity and our Lord's incarnation are very much more than distorted. It has already been seen how the resurrection of the body is likely to fare at the hands of these Protestant authors. On the surface, this is an endeavour to make peace between science and Christianity by giving up Christianity. And in fact, elementary misstatements in theology occur again and again.

It is curious that in a book of speculations on a future state, we can find no words to prove the immortality of the soul, nor any theory whatsoever on the nature of such a proof. One would suppose that the chief thing to know is not whether the body will rise again, but what is to become of the soul after death. The authors, who are not much given to making clear statements of their belief, do, indeed, separate life from energy; and, whilst admitting the law of continuity for the latter, seem to affirm the law of Biogenesis for the former. But they profess no metaphysics, and talk in a vague way of the development of life, without giving us here so much as a clue to follow. Their adaptation of the two great orders, energy and life, to certain articles of the Nicene Creed, is extremely peculiar.

The writing betrays no exceptional strength or felicity of diction, and may perhaps be characterized as amiably weak, with now and then a tendency to quote Scripture, and ramble off into preaching. This, with certain other indications, gives the book a savour of national peculiarities, existing for the most part north of the Tweed.

We would not be understood to say that there are no suggestive passages here and there to be met with. The scientific part has an interest of its own, and so has some of the history brought in; though, on the whole, this is inadequate and rather shallow.

Perhaps it will be well to enter a protest here against the very superfluous and inaccurate allusions to "medieval superstitions." When may we hope that non-Catholic writers will have penetrated the logical fallacy contained in remarks of this kind? It serves nobody's turn to miss the truth and quarrel with a shadow in its stead. Learn, first of all, what

Catholicity is, and then see how it can be argued against. There *are* difficulties, no question of that, but not quite on the score of "medieval superstitions." The real difficulties lead to investigations of considerable importance, but the vanishing Protestant tradition is little more than a cul-de-sac; its misrepresentations lead no whither.

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*Exposition of Catholic Doctrine.* By Rev. J. DI BRUNO, D.D. London : Burns & Oates.

IT is a very useful circumstance, that so many different expositions of Christian doctrine appear in England; because each priest has an opportunity of comparing one with another, and making use, on every different head, of that which he may find most serviceable.

We think that Dr. Di Bruno's volume will hold a good place of its own among these expositions. He has a great command of plain and intelligible language, and a quick perception of the points which ordinarily most need explanation. We may mention one or two particulars, on which we especially sympathize with what he says.

Here is an admirable description of *Tradition* in a very few words:—"As the Author of Nature engraved the Natural Law in the heart of man before engraving it on stone, so the Author of Redemption entrusted the whole of Revelation to the living heart of the Church long before it was committed to writing" (p. 18). Who could expressly formulate all that teaching of the Natural Law, which is engraven on the heart of man? So neither can any number of formularies exhaust what is contained in Apostolic Tradition.

Some Catholic controversialists, to our mind, a little exceed, when they represent the Church as urgently inculcating on her children a study of Scripture. But we think that Dr. Di Bruno's statement of the matter hits the exact mean. "The approved Catholic versions," he says (p. 26), accompanied "with notes . . . although they are not indiscriminately inculcated, are not withheld from the faithful; and the reverent reading of them is not discountenanced by the Church."

In some catechisms and expositions, the fundamental distinction between actual and habitual grace is by no means expressed with sufficient clearness; but our author (p. 33) leaves nothing to desire on this head.

In pp. 48-9 we think that a somewhat difficult point is handled with unusual felicity of illustration. We mean the explanation how it is, that to regard the Mass as a true sacrifice, is by no means inconsistent with confessing the absolute sufficiency of Christ's atoning Death.

We cannot help doubting, whether it be wise to introduce the question of *Predestination* into such a manual as this. But if it were to be done we still cannot accept the exposition given in pp. 55-7 as entirely satisfactory.



*The Elements of Gregorian or Plain Chant and Modern Music.* By the Professor of Music, and Organist All Hallow's College, Dublin.  
Dublin: McGlashan & Gill.

THIS will prove a useful little volume to amateurs in Church music, and especially so to students of the Gregorian Chant; as there is no English work, as far as we know, which gives as this does, in a short space and yet quite fully, the rules of Plain Chant. We may also recommend it as containing a really interesting account of the history of Church music in the introductory chapter. The Second Part, although equally well done, is of course less valuable, from the comparative abundance of books of instruction in the music of the present day. The writer is evidently a great admirer of Gregorian, and for this we are not disposed to quarrel with him; but when he says in his Preface that "the Church . . . has given her formal sanction to Plain Chant, and to it alone," we confess that we cannot understand what he means. Surely the fact that Palestrina's music is sung in the Pope's own church, by his own choir, contains in itself as distinct a sanction of that composer's most beautiful works, as any which Plain Chant has ever received? The writer also thinks (p. 11) that the Gregorian Chant is "the best exponent of the Church's spirit, and the most suited to sanctify and elevate the thoughts and affections of her children to the throne of God." This is of course a matter of taste.

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*Gertrude Mannering. A Tale of Sacrifice.* By FRANCES NOBLE.  
London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

THIS very pretty story is also, what many pretty stories are not, a very good story. Not "goody," but good. And it is also, with the exception of some easily cured defects of style, excellently told. The heroine of it, who is really a heroine—Gertrude Mannering—is the one daughter of an old Catholic house, who allows her affections to be engaged by a man, Stanley Graham, without religion, though otherwise attractive and formed in every way to win a woman's heart. She begins by hoping that he will allow her, after marriage, to practise her religion, though it is certainly difficult to conceive on what her hopes are grounded; but finds him more bitterly averse to all religious practice, especially that of the Catholic faith, than she could have thought possible. She therefore breaks off the engagement instantly, breaking her own heart the while; ends by offering her life for his conversion, and dies. Graham's conversion had preceded Gertrude's death, and she was allowed to know it, but not to see him, which carried out the sacrifice to its full completion. The perfect friendship and happiness of the father and daughter at their home, Whitewell Grange, is very prettily described, and the sweet, ingenuous girlish charac-

ter of Gertrude, whose girlishness covered so much strength, is admirably drawn. We hope such a race of English convent girls has not yet quite died out. The innocent convent pupil, however, was invited by a relation to stay with her in London during the season, was presented, and while passing through a course of amusements, at a ball at a ducal house first saw the cause of the ruin of her young life.

"Her eyes wandered over the dazzling scene for some minutes, until they were arrested suddenly, and lingered almost unconsciously, fascinated by a face which attracted them. It was that of a gentleman who was leaning against one of the pillars . . . a complete stranger to Gerty, for she knew at once that she had never seen that pale, proud face before, and she gazed at it as she might have done at a beautiful picture or statue.

"What a splendid face!" she thought; "I never saw one like it before! It would do for the picture of a Crusader, or some chivalrous knight in armour," &c. ; till she is covered with confusion at finding herself dreaming on and looking all the while at the face of a real person and not a picture. The "Crusader" is equally struck with the innocent, bright unworldliness of this novice in London society, and unbends so much under her influence that even his relations are taken by surprise.

Gertrude soon begins to feel troubled in mind about her hero, for she hears before long that he is a misbeliever, and she resolves, after a little almost unconscious shrinking, that he shall know she is a Catholic. The passage in which she first awakes to the knowledge of that shrinking is very pretty.

"Have I been at all afraid of the subject? Have I kept from letting him know my religion 'as long as possible, not directly perhaps, but indirectly? preferring to talk of other things, because I was so weak, because I was afraid he might not like to hear I was a Catholic, that it might make him not so kind. . . . Ah! I wish I knew if I *have* done, if I have been wrong like that?' . . . And she longed to be free of the presence of the maid who was dressing her, that she might kneel down and bury her face in her hands, while she asked God's pardon for the cowardice of which she fancied she had been guilty—she, the daughter of such an old Catholic house, which, in its time, had suffered so joyfully for the faith—descendant of glorious confessors who would have shamed (*sic*) to own one who was afraid of a little coldness, a little inward pain, endured for the cause for which they would freely have given their lives!" (p. 83).

It is perhaps a little unnatural that a girl so brought up should have yielded at once to an attachment that overpowered her reason, as well as that Graham should have spoken to her so trenchantly and fiercely in the very flush of his passion; but we need not quarrel with what serves so well for the working out of the story. There are, as we have said, minor faults of writing which should be corrected, especially as they are faults of pure carelessness and slovenliness of style, which are needless defects. We should certainly be surprised to hear any lady in good society, as Lady Hunter is represented to be, ask, "*Whatever* made you think of that, Gerty?" (p. 74). And not long before, Gertrude also, though in her character of a convent schoolgirl it might be condoned, says to herself as she is gazing on Stanley Graham's face, "O, *whatever* have I been doing?"

(p. 57). This singularly awkward trick of expression is again repeated by Lady Hunter to her husband and Gertrude on their coming in late from the Row: "*Whatever* have you been doing?" (p. 82). The same sort of slipslop English occurs when Mr. Mannering somewhere says, "Who talks of *you* dying, sunbeam?" And Gertrude exclaims to her father, "O, I don't like *you* leaving me, somehow." A very little care would have sufficed to prevent absolute faults in grammar, or expressions that are not common with well-bred people such as these. It is not usual, also, except as the provincialism of one or two northern counties, to say that we are frightened "of" a thing or person, but frightened "at." For we are by no means advocates of the common excuse, "No matter what the manner is, if the matter is good." On the contrary, where the matter is good, and especially where it is so exceptionally good as it is in Miss Noble's book, we should wish it to be set forth with the utmost grace and care of writing.

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*A Study of Hamlet.* By FRANK A. MARSHALL. Longmans. 1875.

"THIS book," Mr. Frank Marshall says in his preface, "had its origin in a lecture . . . before the Catholic Young Men's Association. . . . It was always my ambition to give a series of lectures on Shakespeare, accompanied with readings; but have learned to doubt my capacity for such a task. . . . One of my principal objects will have been gained, if I can induce any of my readers to study the text of Shakspeare's plays more carefully, and with a higher aim than mere verbal criticism; they will find that he is himself his best commentator, and that such study will open to them new fields of enjoyment."

We gladly welcome this very careful and intellectual "study," and heartily rejoice that any of our Catholic Young Men's Associations should have sought and appreciated the results of Mr. Marshall's refined and conscientious criticism, in which he seems to have united the results of study upon all the chief Shakspeare commentators. His remarks upon Steevens and Malone are excellent; and we hope that he will, notwithstanding his own diffidence, continue to give us and publish further lectures upon Shakspeare. For, first, there is the gain of the solid cultivation of the intellectual powers, in the interpretation of our great poet, and in bringing out the characters of his dramas into full relief to minds unaccustomed to weigh the conflicting evidence of criticism; and, next, the other gain of leaving on record a careful and minute analysis, the fruit of several years' reading, which will always be an enjoyable subject of literary study. The choice of "*Hamlet*" was judicious as what we hope will prove an introductory criticism, because this grand play is full of the soundest principles of Christian teaching, drawn, as Shakspeare's principles are, from the scarcely cast-off traditions of the Catholic faith. Mr. Marshall gives full prominence to this fact, while separating the more objectionab



And do not spread the compost on the weeds,  
To make them ranker.

*Queen.* O Hamlet, thou has cleft my heart in twain !

*Hamlet.* O throw away the worse part of it  
And live the purer with the other half ! ”

“ Never,” Mr. Marshall justly observes, “ was a nobler sermon preached than is embodied in these speeches ; they are instinct with the purest and truest morality, that knows of no compromise with evil ; the repentance to which Hamlet urges his mother is not that weak substitute for repentance which the frailty of our nature is too ready to adopt ; tears and sighs and groans, expressions of sorrow . . . are no atonement for sin ; the penitence which Hamlet preaches is that summed up in those sacred words “ Go, and sin no more.”

“ Once more, good night ;  
And, when you are desirous to be blest,  
I'll blessing beg of you.”

It is a great pleasure, we must again repeat, to see the results of very careful criticism brought to bear with such success upon the works of our greatest dramatist ; and if every one of Shakspeare's best plays could thus be presented, sifted of the injurious excrescences which take from the enjoyment as well as the benefit of their reading, it would be a valuable gain to literature.

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
*The Catholic Review.* New York and Brooklyn.

WE have received from an unknown hand a file of this Review ; in which we observe with pleasure the religious zeal, devotion to the interests of the Church, and disdain of all unworthy compromise, which are the honourable characteristics of our American Catholic brethren.

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WE much regret that we are accidentally obliged to defer until July our notice of a very interesting novel called “ The Wyndham Family.”

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